10/6 and 10/8 Notes
10/6 and 10/8 Notes CPO 2002
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Date Created: 10/11/15
106 and 108 Notes Chapter 7 Cultural Determinants of Democracy 0 Intro 0 culture and democracy Does democracy require a democratic culture Are certain cultures incompatible with democracy 0 Cultural Arguments o primordialist s arguments treat culture as objectives and inherited imply that democracy is not for everyone 0 constructivist arguments treat culture constructed or invented cultures are malleable and not fixed cultures are socially constructed 0 Cultural Argument problems 0 problem 1 What is it about culture that matters The speci cs are Egg 0 Are particular morals incompatible o are certain customs problematic 0 Most theorists point to noncultural things that matter as well such as development If culturalist arguments are to have any explanatory power they must distinguish and specify what it is that matters 0 problem 2 What is the causal relationship between cultural economic and political factors does culture cause democracy Does it also cause economic development Or does democracy and development cause culture 0 A civic Culture 0 Culture how individuals think and feel about the political system 0 Three types Parochial suitable for traditional system Subject suitable for centralized authoritarian systems Participant suitable for democracy 0 A civic culture a high level of interpersonal trust a preference for gradual societal change a high level of support for the existing political system and high levels of satisfaction 0 Civic culture can be characterized by belief individuals can in uence political decisions positive feelings toward the political system belief other citizens are trustworthy preference for gradual societal change 0 Surveys and Democracy 0 citizens attitudes about democracy are now commonplace 0 We then use these surveys to make inferences about how democratic survival institutional legitimacy o M Values Survey has conducted interviews in eighty societies addresses issues of sociocultural and political change Main question Democracy may have problems but it s better than any form of government Could you please tell me if you strongly agree agree disagree or strongly disagree 0 To study the emergence of democracy surveys would need to be conducted in dictatorships even if surveys were allowed in dictatorships would the respondents reveal their true preferences A common problem with all surveys is that individuals often understand the same question in vastly different ways People in democracies are more willing to complain more than people in dictatorshipsstruggling democracies 0 Huntington claimed that certain cultures are incompatible with democracy Islamic and Confucianist countries cannot sustain democracy Catholic countries wind it hard to sustain democracy violent con ict will be particularly prevalent between Muslims and non Muslims 0 Growing evidence that cultures are invented constructed and malleable rather than primordial inherited and unchanging unlikely that particular religions or civilizations are permanently incompatible with democracy 0 Often depends less on the content of religious doctrine and more on the interests of religious leaders o All religions have historically been compatible with a broad range of political institutions 0 Most arguments that particular religions are incompatible with democracy are implicitly based on observations of the world at a particular point in time not a particularly good way of developing theories 0 Some Empirical Evidence 0 Emergence of Democracy Increased wealth makes transitions to democracy are more likely high economic growth makes transitions to democracy less likely countries that are predominantly catholic are more likely to become democracies Having a Protestant or Muslim majority has no effect on whether a country becomes democratic or not Ethnic religious and cultural diversity do not appear to impede or aid the emergence of democracy 0 Survival of democracy increased wealth increases democratic survival high economic growth increases democratic survival having a Muslim majority has no effect on democratic survival having a protestant majority increases democratic survival having a catholic majority decreases democratic survival ethnic and cultural but not religious diversity decreases for democratic survival 0 Experiments and Culture 0 We have examined how culture might affect democracy using survey evidence and statistical analyses we now look at some experimental results 0 ultimatum and dictator games o Ultimatum Game Players there is a proposer and a responder The proposer is given a divisible pie money Procedure 0 step 1 the proposer offers some of the pie to the responder 0 Step 2 the responder knowing the offer and size of the pie has to accept or reject the offer The outcome 0 if the responder accepts she gets to keep the offer and the proposer keeps the rest 0 if the responder rejects then neither player receives anything 0 Dictator Game the dictator game is exactly the same as the Ultimatum except that the responder is not given an opportunity to accept or reject the offer 0 the proposer dictator merely dictates the division 0 test of fairness as opposed to the ultimatum game o Ultimatum if the players are selfinterested we would expect the proposer to offer a where s is close to zero and keep the rest 18 for himself We would expect the responder to accept this offer because sgt0 o Dictator If the players are selfinterested we would expect the proposer to offer zero and keep everything for himself Chapter 8 Democratic Transitions 0 external impositions external forces impose democracy 0 Bottomup transition citizens overthrow an authoritarian regime in a popular revolution 0 Topdown transition The dictatorial ruling elite introduce liberalizing reforms that ultimately lead to transition 0 External impositions 0 Findings intervention by the UN or dictatorial states leads to a reduction in democracy Intervention by democracies produces the trappings of democracy such as elections and legislatures but fails to meaningfully increase the level of democracy 0 Bottomup 0 East Germany 1989 o the collapse of communism is seen as inevitable But the collapse of communism came as a complete surprise to almost everyone 0 Because everyone thought Germany seemed stable they were not in a dire position in their economic citizen they were prosperous the government opened up the Berlin wall due to protesting 0 Why did the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe not occur earlier 0 Why are revolutions so rare Why are they hard to predict Collective action theory focuses on forms of mass action or collective action such as the protests in East Germany Strikes elections fraternities and sororities and so forth Typically collective action concerns the pursuit of public goods by groups of individuals A public good has two characteristics nonexcludable if the good is provided everyone gets to enjoy it Nobody can be excluded from it nonrivalrous if someone consumes the good there is still just as much for everyone else to consume EX Air national security lighthouse national park fire station fireworks and democracy public good are desirable things We are not interested in paying for these things it might be beneficial but everyone has individual incentives to hold back which can cause free rider problems Certain incentives discourage individuals from using collective action to achieve their common interests Known as the collective action problem or free rider problem individuals have little incentive to contribute to the provision of a public good that will bene t all members of a group There are many problems when it comes to joining or not joining a protest do you join a protest even if you might be faced with death or lose your job because your face was seen if you choose not to protest you could join the defensearmy if there39s one person then you won39t do it because you know nothing will come out of it and your face will be known if it39s a bigger group you will also not join because they39ll win with or without you so then you get a free ride o The decision to not participate is very appealing if the rally fails if the rally succeeds o This is the basic logic underlying the collective action problem 0 Two possible equilibria Equilibrium 1 No one participates o no one will want to participate because they will pay the cost of participating but the oneperson rally will be a failure Equilibrium 2 Exactly K people participate o If exactly K people participate all participants are critical to the rallies success while none of the nonparticipants will want to participate because the rally is successful without them 0 Difference between K and N o If KN then there is no incentive to free ride everyone must participate to obtain the public good and everyone knows this EX silence at library 0 forms of collective action such as protests strikes revolutions lobbying and so on are less likely to be successful when the number of group member requires for success K is significantly smaller than the number of people who would benefit from the success N 0 Size of N the size of the group N in uences the likelihood that you will think of yourself as critical to collective action Larger groups find it harder to overcome the collective action problem than small groups Counterintuitive implications 0 suggests that small groups may be more powerful than large groups 0 Important points 0 free riders are those who enjoy the benefit of a public good without paying the cost of providing it the presence of free riding can lead to the under provision of public goods the presence of free riding is often a justification for governmental intervention in private markets 0 Tipping models 0 O O preference falsification is reluctance to publicly reveal one s true preferences due to fear of public shaming of retaliation although many engage in preference falsification there is probably a protest size at which they would be willing to publicly reveal their true preferences if it39s a small group you wouldn39t join the protest but if there39s a huge group then i39ll reconsider on joining because now everyone is protesting and will most likely be successful As protests become larger it becomes harder for dictatorships to monitor and punish each individual We ll refer to the protest size at which an individual is willing to participate as his revolutionary threshold 0 An Example Society A O the distribution of revolutionary thresholds in society is crucial in determining whether a revolution occurs or not A 02234567810 most likely won t revolt But if it was A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 will most likely revolt so if it39s 12345 then it39s most likely a revolution because everyone is showing up but if it shows that 022 that means they39re waiting for someone to show up We should be able to expect the unpredictable predictability 0 Some implications 0 preference 0 a society 0 our inability o TopDown Transitions 0 Many democratic transitions are the result of a negotiates settlement that inadvertently leads to democratization o liberalizations is a controlled opening permission of political parties holding elections writing a constitution opening a legislature establishing a judiciary