Week 7 Notes PHI 2010
Week 7 Notes PHI 2010 PHI 2010
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This 4 page Class Notes was uploaded by Annette Marin on Sunday October 11, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PHI 2010 at Florida State University taught by Randolph Clarke in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 88 views. For similar materials see Intro to Philosophy in PHIL-Philosophy at Florida State University.
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Date Created: 10/11/15
The Disembodiment Argument 101215 118 AM Essential Properties roughly 0 Those features of a thing that it cannot possibly lack Necessarily anything lacking those features isn t that thing When something has an essence and its essence can t be known just by examining our concept of that thing then the thing has a hidden essence When our concept of a thing tells us that all the essential features of that thing can be seen just by examining that concept that is when the concept tells us that the thing has no hidden essence then we ll say that the concept is sufficiently comprehensive Revisions 2 If using concepts that are sufficiently comprehensive I can conceive of a particular scenario occurring then that scenario is possible 0 1 Using concepts that are sufficiently comprehensive I can conceive of experiencing this very pain while disembodied Epiphenomenalism Physical states cause mental states but mental states cause nothing The Causal Completeness of the Physical For every physical state at each time prior to when that state obtains there is a prior physical state that causes and is casually sufficient for that state The Identity Thesis 101215 118 AM MindBrain Identity 0 Is the mind identical to the brain Might seem obvious might seem not 0 A version of strong materialism maintains that all mental states and events are in fact physical states and eventsquot 0 But not a thesis about the meaning of linguistic expressions An Argument for the Identity Thesis 0 Why should we think that the mindbrain identity thesis is true 0 We think that some mental states and events are casually necessary for the occurrence of some physical onesquot 328 0 Why is this observation significant The Argument Formalized We can formalize the argument was follows 328 1 Some conscious states and events are casually necessary for the occurrence of some physical ones 2 In a completed neurophysiological science there will be no need to advert to anything other than physicalphysical casuality 3 TA went too fast Complete Knowledge Objection 0 One objection is that we could know all the physical facts about the brain without knowing what it is like to have experiences 3312 0 Complete knowledge of physical states would not imply knowledge of what experiences feel like 0 If experiences were physical states then complete knowledge of the physical would imply complete knowledge of experiences 0 So experiences are not physical states 0 For ex we could know all the facts about how the brain processes color without knowing what it is like to experience color 0 Knowing the physical state of the brain during a roller coaster ride isn t as much fun as actually riding one o Carruthers argues that while both premises are true the argument is invalid A valid argument is one that has proper form while a sound argument is one that has proper form and true premises such that the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion Valid but unsound o If Tallahassee is in Maryland then Miami is in Virginia 0 Tallahassee is in Maryland 0 Therefore Miami is in Virginia Example of invalid argument can t be sound 0 If Tallahassee is in Maryland then Miami is in Virginia 0 Miami is in Virginia 0 Therefore Tallahassee is in Maryland The basic idea is that there can be problems in the logical structure of thought independently of what the thought is about Carruthers grants that both premises of the complete knowledge objection are true but he claims that there is something wrong with the logical form of the argument So what is wrong with the form of the argument There is a shift in the meaning of the term knowledge Knowing what an experience feels like is not propositional factual knowledge but rather practical recognitional knowledge It is a matter of knowing how to do something rather than knowing that something is the casequot 332 I can know exactly how bikes work and how they are constructed without knowing how to ride one 101215 118 AM
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