INTRO TO PHILOSOPHY
INTRO TO PHILOSOPHY PHIL 1000
Popular in Course
verified elite notetaker
Popular in PHIL-Philosophy
This 184 page Class Notes was uploaded by Deja Bosco on Tuesday October 13, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PHIL 1000 at Louisiana State University taught by F. Worrell in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 20 views. For similar materials see /class/223069/phil-1000-louisiana-state-university in PHIL-Philosophy at Louisiana State University.
Reviews for INTRO TO PHILOSOPHY
Report this Material
What is Karma?
Karma is the currency of StudySoup.
You can buy or earn more Karma at anytime and redeem it for class notes, study guides, flashcards, and more!
Date Created: 10/13/15
Haw Philampherg Dc It Philosophical Arguments argument consists of a series of statements called premises intended to provide support for another statement call the conclusion Philosophers give and evaluate arguments for philosophical conclusions gt1 Deductive Arguments Attempt to give strongest possible support for the conclusion ideally the premises logically guarantee it In a properly constructed deductive argument if the premises are true the conclusion must be true as well Most frequently used type of argument in philosophy Studied by formal logic Take PHIL 2010 for more Purports to offer reasons that establish its conclusion beyond doubt Syllogism A veiy common type of deductive argument Conclusion inferred from two premises SYLLOGISM 5cm walz us All human beings are mortal Socrates is a human being Thus Socrates is mortal Inductive Arguments Less ambitious than deductive arguments Premises are meant to provide strong support for the conclusion However the support they provide does NOT establish the conclusion beyond doubt Inductive Generalization An argument that moves 1 Swan 1 was white from a sample to a general conclusion about a 2 Swan 2 was white population 3 And so on for all ten Most scienti c arguments thousand swans I have are inductive seenl generalizations 4 Therefore probably all swans are white Argument by Analogy An analogy is a comparison between two or more things meant to be in some way illuminating An argument in which for example two or more things are compared in order to draw a conclusion about one of them Practical decisions are often made this way Comparison base and target item 1 The courses in Philosophy of Science Ethics an Philosophy of Religion are all philosophy courses that have been or will be taught by Professor Smit The courses in Philosophy of Science and E ics were entertaining Therefore probably the Philosophy of Religion course will also be entertaining Evaluating Arguments Let39s say that you39ve been presented with an argument and determined whether it is deductive or inductive What now N 0W you need to be able to evaluate it Deductive and inductive argunlents are judged by different standards Evaluating Deductive Arguments Three questions you should ask of any deductive argument ask them in the order given 1 Is the arganent valid ie do the premises logically guarantee the truth of the conclusion 2 Are the terms in the premises clear 3 Are the premises fairly obviously true Only move on to the next question when you39ve gotten a yes39 answer Validity In a valid argument if the premises are true then the conclusion must also be true The rules of logic are used correctly in a valid argument Notice that this is a conditional concept The conclusion ofu valid argument might befulse 1 All college students are 20 years old The president of the United States is a college student Thus the president of the United States is 20 years old Vahdlty Validity is a matter of logical form We39ve already seen two valid arguments with the form 1 All Xs are Ys Z is an X quot Therefore Z is a Y ANY argument with this form will be valid when the premises are true the conclusion will be true as well How can you tell when an argument ls valld Assume that the premises are ne can you imagine any scenarioino matter how crazyiin which the conclusion could be false If you can NOT then the argument is valid If you CAN then the argument is invalid If it s is valid you can move on to the second of our questions Clarity One term can have several djiferent meanings or senses The meaning can be unclear and if an argument contains a term with an unclear meaning we should withhold judgment until the term in question has been Clari ed Eg All persons have soulsquot What terms are unclear Iquot E Clarity Be especially wary of controversial terms It s wrong to kill a humanbeing A fetus is a human being Thus it s Wrong to kill a fetus Soundness A deductive arganent is sound when it is valid and has all true premises If a sound argument is valid and its premises are true then is its conclusion true 0139 false All of the casinos in Las Vegas Nevada have slot machines Caesar39s Palace is a casino in Las Vegas Nevada Thus Caesar39s Palace has slot machines Soundness A valid argument with Clear terms can still contain premises whose truth can be questioned It39s wrong to kill a hLunan being A fetus is a human being Thus it39s wrong to kill a fetus Evaluating Inductive Arguments When we evaluate inductive arguments we ask three questions sequentially as with deductive argimients 1 Is the arganent inductively strong ie do the premises provide strong support for the conclusion 2 Are the argunient s premises clear 3 Are the argument39s premises true Inductive Strength In an inductively strong argument if the premises are true then it is probable that the conclusion is also true Conversely if the premises doe not provide strong support for the conclusion the argument is inductively weak 1 There are 100 marbles in the jar 2 The rst marble to be inspected for color is red 3 Therefore all marbles in the jar are red Inductive strength or weakness is a matter of degree whereas validity is all or nothing Inductive Generalizations Two aspects of an inductive generalization are especially important when evaluating such an argument Size of the Sample The bigger your sample size the more plausible it will be to generalize from that sample Representativeness of the Sample The more representative the sample set the greater the inductive strength 4 Want a random population of samples that is not biased and contains an adequate variety of samples Inductive Generalizations The larger the sample the more likely it will be representative of the population Representativeness is the more inlportant of the two x Arguments by Analogy Are the things being compared actually similar enough to support the conclusion Are there any dissimilarities that would weaken the support between premises and conclusion Argu mm Wrang They Might Six bmmmimsmmmPh asopl mlRe mg Be Subject to Counterexamples A counterexalnple is an exception to a purportedly universal principle If someone says that 11All Xs are Ys and you point out an example of an X that is not a Y then you ve given a counterexample to All Xs are Ys If an argument contains a universal statement see if it is subject to counterexamples Generally check all your universal statements and de nitions for counterexamples Beg the Question An argument may beg the question in one of two ways 1 By assuming without argument the very thing one is trying to prove or By answering a question with a variation of the very question asked When one begs the uestion they have failed to given any reason for their View It is a so known as Circular reasoning 1 All of us cannot be famous because all us cannot be well known Jesse Iacks 11 Why is your client not guilty Because he is innocent An argument that begs the question is also known as a petitia principii Yield a Reductio Sometimes an argument leads to a contradiction or an absurdity if you follow its reasoning through Showing that an argument does so is called running a reductiu on it because it creates a reductiu ad uhsurdum Assume the controversial premise or conclusion to be true Then try to show either 1 a contradiction follows or 2 a patently absurd situation must follow If 1 then the statement in question is false if 2 then the statement is implausible Reductios can also be used to proof something is the case assume it is false and show how the falsity leads to contradiction or absurdity You can then conclude that the opposite ofwhat you assumed is true Equivocate An argument equivocates when a key word in the argument shifts its meanmg As we previously discussed many words have more than one meanin When an argument equivocates the conclusion is reached by trading on the ambiguity of a key word Two or more meanings of the same word have been confused One of your answers on the math exam was not right If something is not right then it s wrong If something is wrong then its immora Thus one of your answers on the math exam was immoral Generalize Too Hastin A hasty generalization is an inductive argument with either a severely small sample size a sample size far too small to warrant anything like the conclusion drawn or an Lmrepresentative sample Something true of a particular case is applied to the great run of cases without proper caution or care Again think of the College Republicans and my poll of the student body gt A Involve a False Analogy To commit the fallacy offalse analogy is to offer an argument based on an analogy Where there are important dissimilarities between the comparison base and the target item gt Think of the argument for the existence of God discussed earlier the universe is not very much like a watch Many other factors can affect the strength of an analogical argument These include The number of entities being compared 7 quot The number of similarities between the comparison base and the target item an x The relevance of those similarities for attributing the additional property to the target w The MindBody Problem The Philosophy of Mind The MindBody Problem Two Questions What is the nature of the mind How is the mind related to the physical body and its states and processes Four Problems Consciousness Intentionality Subjectivity Mental Causation Dualisn Humans are made of two very different sorts of things or states mental states and physical states Varieties of Dualism Substance dualism Property dualism Cartesian dualism Interactionistic property dualism Popular dualism Epiphenomenalism Materialism Human beings are thoroughly material or physical beings no mental stuff and no mental properties Types of Materialism Philosophical or logical Centralstate identity theory behaViOfiSHl Mental states and events are a Mental terms can be de ned numerically or quantitatively by terms that refer to identical to brain states and behavior and dispositions to events behaVC AKA reductive materialism Functionalism The nature or essence of a mental state is its causal role in relation to Environmental inputs to the body Other mental states and Behavioral outputs In Defense of Dualism Curt Ducasse Curt John Ducasse July 7 1881 September 3 1969 Philosophy of Mind and Aesthetics His ashes were buried in his backyard next to a particularly beloved Siamese cat The Strategy Ducasse is attempting to defend interactionistic property dualism by giving positive reasons to endorse the view and arguments against rival positions Remember interactionistic property dualism is the view that human beings are subject to both mental events and physical events and mental events can cause physical events and vice versa We are certain of the existence of two mutually exclusive categories of things Physical or Material Psychical 0r Mental Are or are capable of Inherently private in being perceptually public characten v h P quot When we focus on them 39 7 39 we introspect whereas with the physical we perceive Can be perceived by any human being with the right vantage point How are mental events private Inherently and ultimately private unlike events occurring inside the body Can be published but these publications are only signs of their existence 39 quot r v 1 If they re private Then how do have common names for these events The label is initially applied to our behavior and we learn the term in this way However when we use them ourselves it is to describe the event not the behavior Behaviorist semantics makes a claim that one Ducasse is denying Two Types of Behaviorism E quot 1 M h 1 1 Dogmatic Behav1orism mpmc g avigfis o Oglca Animal behavior is caused exclusively by physical causes A research program in which one seeks to explain all behavior in terms of physical causes Causation and the Two Types of Events That the mental can cause the physical and Vice versa is NOT paradoxical because leading theories of causation do NOT require the causeterm and the effectterm to belong to the same ontological category they merely require that both cause and effect he events The mysteriousness of this type of causation is only present if we think of it as remote causation and not as what it really is proximate causation This diagram and its mates are from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fig I a n xowo39c k CHEER r NECK CORRILATI The Conservation of Energy Objection Encrgy smng 39 um n Encrgy 0 at H 394 units FIGURE 12 Conservation of energy principle fat the human bod The question at hand is whether or not the physical world is wholly closed can t just be answered by the bald assertion that it is Vanishing and emerging at other places It is not known if all causation involves transfer of energy Epiphenomenalism Fails because it is arbitrary d D39S l h CFWER i EERALCDRRELWI Psychophysical Parallelism There is no causal interaction between mental and physical events These events simply occur simultaneously 9 Mind and body are like 2 synchronized clocks Fails because it explains nothing it is a statement not an explanation Fig 2 d LNE DYASCE lv EITHER a N IFLll CORRELATE Conclusion Ducasse s View conceives of minds as being a series of causally related events This series of events constitutes the history and existence of the mind in question not merely a description of that mind Dualism For and Against Paul M Churchland Paul M Churchland Born October 21 1942 UC San Diego Wife is a philosopher both children are neuroscientists Neurophilosophy and philosophy of mind Substance Dualism l Cartesian Dualism 2 kinds of substance L Ordinary Matter extended in space 13 Mindstuff not extended in space essential feature is that it thinks 2 Main Supporting Reasons Direct introspection shows that I m a thinking thing recall the Cogz39z o How could a purely physical system engage in typically human activities 2 Big Worries U V How can the mind causally interact with the body Characterizing ordinary matter as thatwhichhas extensioninspace is no longer accurate Substance Dualisrn 2 Popular Dualisrn There is a spiritual substance with spatial properties Minds are inside the body they control in the head in intimate contact with the brain Interaction of the substances can be thought of as an exchange of energy not yet discovered by science can be consistent with the law of the conservation of energy Allows possibility of surviving death Reason for Wishing it true or believing it true 7 Property Dualism I Epiphenomenalism Strikes a bargain between respect for neuroscience and respect for introspection Irreducible emergent properties Demotion of mental properties seems counterintuitive Interactionistic Property Dualism Does not demote mental properties However emergence and irreducibility are unhappy partners Arguments For Dualism l Argument from Religion Response Deciding science with religion doesn t typically end well and social forces primarily determine religious belief 2 Argument from Introspection Response Why think that introspection shows things at there most basic Our senses don t Arguments For Dualism 3 Argument from Irreducibility Response Math and language can be used by purely physical computers Qualia are the only hangup But they are a problem for both the dualist and the materialist 4 Argument from Parapsychology Response As a version of the irreducibility argument it fails for similar reasons Also there s no good evidence for these phenomena anyway Arguments Against Dualism Materialism is the simpler of the two Views an appeal to Ockham s Razor Dualism is relatively explanatorin impotent as compared to materialism The Argument from the Neural Dependence of all known mental phenomena The Argument from Evolutionary History asi fi The MindBody Problem Jerry A Fodor Jerry A F0 dor State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers Born 1935 Cognitive Science Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Language Passionate opera follower Writes for LondonRevz39ew of Booes on opera and other topics Colin McGinn called him the greatest living philosopher of mind Olten criticized for polemical style The Problems With Dualism Mental causation We ll just keep beating this dead horse Psychologists use the scienti c experimental method but Why would these work if mental events are different types of things from physical events 7 Psychologists needed alternative to dualism to ground their scienti c methods quot3 Radical Behaviorism Behavior does not have mental causes All behavior is observable response to stimuli There is no mind body interaction Mental causation plays a large role in our language and our intuitive understanding of human behavior Mental processes seem to intervene in the causal chain even when behavior is clearly very closely related to environmental stimuli Psychology did not develop as a eld as the behaviorists predicted Logical Behaviorism Semantic theory in which mental ascriptions are equivalent to behavioral hypotheticals expressing behavioral dispositions Mental causation having a behavioral disposition and true antecedent of the correlative behavioral hypothetical Mental causation parallels nonbehavioral dispositions of physical science Problems for Behaviorism Psychology requires a less robust notion of causation than the physical sciences require Cannot provide an account of mental events causing other mental events Just radical behaviorism in a semantic form CentralState Identity Theory Mental events are identical with neurophysiological events Explains mental events causing mental events Explains mental causation and makes it just as rich as physical causation Can seriously entertain explaining human behavior in terms of mental causes Takes the explanatory constructs of psychology at face value CentralState Identity Theory Token Physicalism All mental particulars that happen to exist are neurophysiological Machines and ghost could still possibly have mental properties on this type of centralstate identity theory Type Physicalism All the mental particulars there could possibly be are neurophysiological Machines and ghosts could not have mental properties All kinds of physically different information processing systems could have the same psychological constitution as human beings It s software not hardware that matters What Now Need a relational account of mental properties that abstracts from the physical structure of their bearers Also need a theory that captures the causal interaction between mind and body Behaviorism got the rst one identity theory the second We re on a dilemma Can one theory do both Functionalism Saves the Day Stressing the distinction between hardware and software allows the functionalist to do both What determines the psychological type to Which a mental particular belongs is the causal role of the particular in the mental life of the organism A mental state can be de ned by causal relations to other mental states Not a reductionist thesis Fully compatible with token physicalism Functionalism Solves Dilemma The functionalist can assert both that mental properties are typically de ned in terms of their relations and that interactions of mind and body are typically causal in however robust a notion of causality is required by psychological explanations The Problem of Qualitative Content Functionalism de nes mental states in terms of their causes and effects but it looks as though two mental states could have the same causal relations but differ in their qualitative content 61 D I Iv The Problem of Intentional Content How could the functionalist conception of mental states capture the fact that mental states express propositions Symbols also have intentionality so mental states are NOT unique in this regard A computer is a mechanism that manipulates symbols Maybe our nervous system manipulates mental symbols Mental representation can be de ned in terms of a functional role Minds Brains Machines John Searle John Searle Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California Berkeley Philosophy of language philosophy of mind social philosophy The Searle Decision signi cantly increased rent levels in Berkeley Searle s View of Mind Mental phenomena are caused by processes going on in the brain Mental phenomena are just features of the brain and maybe the rest of the central nervous system Can Computers Think Part 2 Attacking the strong AI View of mind i What is this View Is it one we ve already discussed Any physical system Whatever that had the right program with the right inputs and outputs would have a mind in exactly the same sense that you and I have minds L v The Refutation of Strong AI Searle thinks that the de nition of a digital computer shows that the strong AI View is incorrect Computer programs have only syntactic processes NOT semantic content Syntax Semantics The Chinese Room There must be more to my thoughts than abstract strings of symbols because such strings on their own cannot have any meaning but the strings must have meaning if my thoughts are about anything The Chinese Room thoughtexperiment Do you understand Chinese gt You behave as though you do Possible Responses The Whole System Understands Chinese I am just the central processing unit of the computer in the example However there is still no way the system can get from syntax to semantics What If the Room was Programmed into a Robot The robot would be able to move around and causally interact with the world Still wouldn t bridge the gap from syntax to semantics Imagine that I am the computer in the robot The Right Question Target Can digital computers as de ned previously think Is instantiating the right computer program with the right inputs and outputs suf cient for or constitutive of thinking No it is not Without semantic contents there is no meaning Thinking involves meaningful contents Never a Possibility Regardless of advances in technology digital computers will not be able to think They can simulate but they can never duplicate mental phenomena Why do people think that a simulation of mental processes is a duplication of mental processes Temptation of behaviorism Dualism implicit in strong AI View The Master Argument Brains cause minds Syntax is not sufficient for semantics Computer programs are entirely de ned by their formal syntactical structure Minds have mental ie semantic contents Computer programs are not suf cient to give systems minds The way brains cause minds cannot be solely in Virtue of running a computer program To cause a mind a system must have causalpowers equal to those of a brain For any artifact to have a mind it must have causal powers at least equal to those of the human brain The Puzzle 0f Conscious Experience David J Chalmers David J Chalmers Born April 20 1966 Australia Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University and Visiting Professor of Philosophy at NYU Philosophy of mind and philosophy of language The Conscious Mud Zombie Blues The Problem of Consciousness Consciousness the subjective inner life of the mind Views range between two poles t Reductionism Mysterianism Wants to develop a position between the two Two Problems The problem of consciousness can be phrased in different ways First the easy problem of consciousness How does the brain do the things it does Can it be solved by neuroscience The Hard Problem 7 r The hard problem of consciousness how the brain gives rise to conscious subjective experience the explanatory gap The Mary Eg Why is there conscious experience at all Is Neuroscience Enough Not all scienti c entities are explained in terms of more basic entities Physics tries for a theory of everything but if consciousness cannot be derived from physical laws physics will fail in its goal Something else that is fundamental is required Conscious experience is a fundamental feature that cannot be reduced to anything more basic Need psychophysical laws to bridge the explanatory gap Psychophysical Laws Three possible highlevel bridging laws H Where there is awareness there is consciousness and vice versa The structure of conscious experience is mirrored by the structure of information in awareness and Vice versa Physical systems With the same abstract organization will give rise to the same kind of conscious experience no matter What they are made of Dancing Qualia An arti cial brain could have the same kind of conscious experiences as a human being Imagine a computer system that is organizationally and functionally the same as our brain neurons Will it be conscious is the same way we are Assume for reductz o see Chapter 1 it won t Qualia dance as we ip the switch Dancing Qualia ill be no behavioral change You will say nothing changes as the qualia dance But this is absurd Thus systems with the same organization have the same conscious experience The Fundamental Psychophysical Laws A speculative attempt to formulate a fundamental psychophysical law The abstract notion of information as a set of separate states with a basic structure of similarities and differences between them At least some information has two basic aspects a physical one and an experiential one Ubiquity of Information Thermostats embody some information on this account Two possible responses Only some information has an experiential aspect depending on its physical processor or All information has an experiential aspect What Is It Like To Be 21 Eat Thomas Nagel Thomas Nagel Born July 4 1937 in Belgrade Yugoslavia now Serbia University Professor of Philosophy and Law at NYU Philosophy of mind political philosophy and ethics Supervised by John Rawls at Harvard The Possibility of Altruism The View om Nowhere Mortal Questions Consciousness The Hard Part Consciousness is the hard part of the mindbody problem and it is largely ignored Nagel s target is the reductionist What s reductionism again We have at present no conception of What an explanation of the physical nature of a mental phenomenon would be 436 No current reductionist framework can deal with consciousness Conscious Experience Lots of things have conscious experiences at least all mammals on Nagel s View An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism something it is like for the organism 436 The subjective character of experience Current reductionist schemes are compatible with it not existing Is this the same thing that Chalmers was talking about Why Reductionism Thus Far Fails Any reduction is based on an analysis All the reductionist analyses thus far leave out the subjective character of experience It is unlikely that a reduction that ignored it could be plausibly extended to accommodate it We have to understand this subjective character before we can know what a reductionist theory must do A physical account of the subjective character of phenomenological features must be given if reductionism is to succeed but this seems impossible Bats They have experiences Thus there is something that it is like to be a bat But the way a bat perceives the world is radically different from us can we even understand what it is like to be a bat What is the relevance here To Be a Bat Imagination won t help The bat s experiences have a a It would only tell me What it subjective character that we would be like for me to cannot conceive of behave as though I was a The worry is not limited to bats What other cases are relevant here We should NOT infer that the claim that bats have experiences as rich as our own is meaningless What It Is Like To Be Facts about what it is like to be a human are facts that embody a particular point of View In some sense they are objective we can say what the quality of another person s experience is like However this is possible only when are points of View are similar only when we can rst personally adopt their perspective The MindBody Problem If the facts of What it is like for the experiencing entity are only accessible from a single point of view then how could this subjective character of experience be revealed in the physical operation of that organism which can be objectively described Reductionism What would it mean to say that an experience has some objective aspect distinct from the point of View of the experiencing subject If we remove the subjective Viewpoint exactly what part of the experience remains Not attacking all types of reductionist theories Only psychophysical reductionism is the target In this case going from appearance to reality makes no sense Reductionism Moving closer to objectivity about experience gets us farther away from the true nature of conscious phenomena not closer to it as in most cases of reductionism Reduction can only succeed if the speciesspeci c Viewpoint is omitted from What is to be reduced Physicalism is a position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it might be true 446 A Very Brief ExcurSiOn The Start of the Second Wave First Wave The Suffragettes a concern with particular political rights Feminism Second Wave The Women s Liberation Movement a concern with legal and social equality It comes in three waves 39 Third Wave 77 areaction 39 7 to the second wave Introduction to T he Second Sex Simone de Beauvoir Simone de Beauvoir January 9 1908 April 14 1986 Longtime lover of Jean Paul Sartre French existentialist Novels essays biographies etc The Second Sex 1952 Woman Women are currently inferior look at their social legal and economic status But What is woman How did she become inferior Woman Woman is a becoming She is something that has become rather than something that is Biology does NOT dictate her status How did she become this Why has she accepted her inferior position r quotH mad 3 ham mc quot I39d SMASH Patriarchy lri I r V viii quot 1 39J Woman A Construction Woman is a construction Men have constructed her and become dominant over her through this construction Please note This construction and domination may not have been intentional Constructed through religion Eve Pandora Magdalene Constructed through philosophy Aristotle de nes woman as a de ciency Aquinas saw her as an imperfect man Constructed through science biology and psychology The Alterity of Woman subject Other distinction Man is subject woman is otherobject Man is positiveneutral woman is negative exception Androcentiism Why Do Women Accept Alterity Women are dispersed among men unlike other oppressed groups Women have strong economic and emotional ties to men Women lack a common culture or common history Will Men Change Things The lowest of men can always feel superior to a woman Men pro t in other ways from woman s alterity Even sympathetic men don t really understand women s situation 80 no Men will not change things Why would they What Now The lack of a history allows for the construction of a politically expedient history Female story has been constructed by men Women must write a new story What Did de Beauvoir Miss Gender is NOT the only axis of oppression g What others are there How much does de Beauvoir s experience generalize PHIL 1000 EXAM THREE STUDY GUIDE Exam Date Wednesday April 4 2012 in class Be prepared to answer questions requiring the information elicited by the following questions 1 State AnselIn s ontological argument carefully explaining each step as you go be sure to include and explain the de nition that Anselm makes use of What type of argument is it How does such an argument work State and fully explain one objection to it that we discussed in class Finally offer a response on the behalf of St Anselm to the objection that you ve discussed 2 Smte Aquinas co mnlnoical argument carefully e Plainin each step as you go Be sure to defend any premises that are not obviously true namely 2 and 4 State and fully explain one objection to it that we discussed in class Finally offer a response on the behalf oquuinas to the objection that you ve discussed 3 State Palefs teleological argument as we understood it carefully explaining each step as you go Be sure explain any definitions the argument makes use of that might be unclear namely Property D and defend any premises that might seem controversial namely 2 State and fully explain one objection to it that we discussed in class Finally offer a response on the behalf of Paley to the objection that you ve discussed 4 State William Lane Craig s argument from miracles carefully explaining each step as you go State and fully both objections to it that SinnottrArmstrong discusses Finally offer a response on the behalf of Craig to one of the objections that you ve discussed 5 Smte Pascal s Wager argument carefully explaining each step as you go Is it an argument for the existence of God A background argument sets the stage for the Wager what are the conclusions of that argument and how are they relevant for the Wager State and fully explain one objection to it that we discussed in class Finally offer a response on the behalf of Pascal to the objection that you ve discussed 6 Of the arguments discussed in questions 175 above which do you think best accomplishes the goal ofproving the existence or utility ofbeliefin God Why do you think it is the best Why do you think it is superior to the others be specific 7 Smte Hume s problem of evil carefully explaining each step as you go ls each premise justi ed Offer a justification for any controversial premises What cheap solution does Cleanthes offer to the argument What are Philo s responses to this argument Explain both 8 What are theodicies How are they supposed to work Carefully explain three of the theodicies we discussed in class Explain why each of the three you discussed might fail to accomplish their goal Knowledge Skepticism and Belief WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE IS KNOWLEDGE POSSIBLE WHAT OUGI IT WE TO BELIEVE Epistemology ii 0 Epistemology or the theory of knowledge inquires into the nature possibility and scope of knowledge 0 What is knowledge 0 Can I have knowledge 0 Of what subject matters can I have knowledge 0 Also considers issues of justification having evidence and reasons for belief and the ethics of belief Three Kinds of Knowledge Q Knowledge by acquaintance Skill knowledge Propositional knowledge We re concerned with propositional knowledge and from this point forward when we say knowledge we mean propositional knowledge I m walking outside in the sun A Brain in a Vat John L Pollock Th6 Problem of a 4 If is 5533 0 A nonskeptic or dogmatist claims that knowledge about a certain subject matter or domain is not only possible but is in fact something individuals typically possess Skepticism about knowledge involves at a minimum the refusal to grant that there is knowledge 0 Don t confuse skepticism with a claim of ignorance a current lack of knowledge they are different Two Types of Skepticism Theoretical Skepticism Practical Skepticism Denies that there is Withholds belief about knowledge Whether or not there is 0 Also called Cartesian knOWIEdge skepticism Also called Pyrrhonian skepticism Two More Types of Skepticism Local Skepticism Global Skepticism Skepticism about Skepticism about all all knowledge of some subject matters domains but not others including or course philosophy 0 How is this consistent What is Knowledge 0 0 Attempting to define propositional knowledge 0 We need necessary conditions conditions that must be met for knowing some proposition 0 We need a list of necessary conditions that jointly constitute a sufficient condition a condition that is enough for knowledge 0 The traditional conception of knowledge has three parts S knows that p def 1 S believes p the belief condition 2 p is true the truth condition 3 S is justified in believing p the justification condition RENE DESCARTES l l leditation ll M l gm 9 0 Motivation We have lots of false beliefs and we ve built other beliefs on these false foundations If we want our sciences and philosophy to have a firm and permanent structure we need true foundations Goal Knowledge in the Cartesian sense of justi ed guaranteed true belief J GTB 0 Certain and indubitable o Cartesian conception of knowledge S knows that p def S believes p p is true and one s justifying evidence for p guarantees the truth of p 0 He s a foundationalist about knowledge all knowledge should rest on a firm indubitable foundation of a I The method comes out of the exclusion principle that is implied by the J GTB conception of knowledge In order to know some proposition p one must be able on the basis of one s evidence to rule out or exclude and thus know to be false any proposition that one knows to be incompatible with p Descartes method is to reject any belief as false if he can find any reason to doubt it 0 Since going through each belief would take forever literally he ll call into question the principles upon which they are founded Descartes Method Q o with of a of belief be doubted o If yes throw out all beliefs of that kind 0 If no keep it as the foundation The Stages of Cartesian Doubt Stage 1 Q o The process of doubting proceeds in stages and begins with a general worry about the reliability of the senses o The far away and the very small 0 We can compound Descartes worries about the senses General Sensory Doubt Stage 1 Supplemented Checkershadow 11540quot The Squares Irarkec J x ant E in me same Shade 01 gvav Enwac kl Meleequot What s ruled out What remains The information our senses give us in potentially borderline That my body and immediate surroundings are accurately represented to me Stage 2 Further Sensory Worries The Dream Argument 1 Dream experiences are almost always deceptwe 2 Sleep and wakin cannot be d1st1ngu1shed y any certaln s1gns 3 Thus for all I know any part1cu1ar experIence couldbe a dream eXper1ence 4 Thus for all I know any part1cularoex er1ence could be 1s deceptwe Stage a Q What s ruled out What remains The veracity of what 0 General my senses report as my things properties like current experience It having eyes a head might not really be hands and a body happenmg to me 0 Our dream images are composed of things we ve seen in reality But painters are capable of making things up that are not based on these general parts that we find in experience 0 Thus hands eyes bodies etc may be the work of my imagination An extension of the Dream Argument What s ruled out What remains The existence of the general characteristics of my body and my body itself are subject to doubt They could be the work of my imagination Only the most general things color shape extension number or quantity time location etc mail a lter 3 Will kmquot 0 At the end of stage 3 the sciences which study composite things are called into question Physics Astronomy Medicine etc 0 However the sciences which only treat of things that are very simple and very general are still beyond doubt Arithmetic Geometry Logic etc Stage 4 The Evil Genius Q The only person who could deceive me about things like arithmetic is God but God is not a deceiver Thus Descartes imagines an all powerful evil genius who can deceive him about things like 224 An external source of deception at lm W H 1quotle H J 1 LMi39ij in J iquottfLi39Jv Lt jilii Even the most basic Presumably nothing sciences like Arithmetic Nothing seems immune from this doubt m u quotl quot3quot witquot f Hf n quot 4 i x a J r a a W tuvanmlwih iz liitalim lH ll tilt Ml lainlulbl N37 It seems that the evil genius prohibits my having any certain and indubitable knowledge BUT ALL IS NOT LOST Even if the evil genius is deceiving me about everything considered thus far there is still one thing about which he cannot deceive me The Cogito Q o The one indubitable true that Descartes discovers is called the Cogito I am I exist is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it or that I mentally conceive it 289 Is it an argument 0 It was previously formulated as I think therefore I am in the Discourse 1637 Why the change lal gar 3 g 0 What s so special about thinking 0 Eg I am spitting therefore I exist 0 You could have made the same inference from any one of your other actions since it is known by the natural light that Whatever acts exists 0 Descartes responds exception of thought It is my awareness that proves my existence because I have called my body into doubt Has Descartes simply missed the point here G E Moore 1873 1958 3v Q A 0 Moore s target is Cartesian Dream Skepticism about the external world 1 HI don t know that I m not dreaming then I don t know that I m standing up 2 I don t know that I m not dreaming 3 Therefore I don t know that I m standing up Moore is right to note that while your not knowing that you re standing up certainly follows from not knowing that you re not dreaming it certainly does not follow that you re not standing up IfI don t know that I m not dreaming then I don t know that I am standing up I know that I am standing up Therefore I know that I m not dreaming The issue now turns on the second premises of the arguments For which is there more support 3m I 0 Moore cannot appeal to the evidence of his senses this would beg the question His redefinition of sensory experience helps him avoid this pitfall 0 One claim that gives credence to the second premise of the skeptic s argument is the assertion that many of our current sensory experiences are very similar to images we ve had in dreams 0 Moore thinks this claim begs the question 0 Does Moore s criticism work 0 Wouldn t dreaming of dreams count as dreams occurring 7quot Ifquot Fm rm Gm IF 5quot 5 V1912 up nz NAM 7 to C H lili l Let s give the skeptic this claim and concede that it is true most of us including Moore would grant this claim Will it follow that I don t know that I m not now dreaming The skeptic will make the leap from this statement to the claim that it is logically possible that there should be dreamimages exactly like all the sensory experiences I am now having 0 From there it is a small jump to infer that it is logically possible that all the sensory experiences that I am now haVing are mere dreamimages Moore puts his bets on the conjunction of his memories of the immediate past and his current sensory experiences Together they are sufficient to show that he knows he isn t dreaming 0 But the skeptic can rebut It is logically possible both that you should remember what you remember and have the sensory experiences you re having but be dreaming Given this logical possibility you can t say for certain that you know you re not dreaming atquot it39ll Mull 4 53gt Cit tr was 0 Moore however asks if this really is logically possible 0 He claims that no argument has been offered for this contention In the absence of an establishing argument Moore thinks his second premise that he is standing up is just as likely to be true as the skeptic s Moore thinks that his memories and his sensory experience together make the claim that he might be dreaming a likely selfcontradiction Wobteme with Moote e Atgtn nent x my 0 Is it really just an argument from ignorance How good are his objections to the Skeptic s argument Wittgenstein s Defense The Traditional interpretation ll 323 0 Typically commentators have interpreted Moore s proof of an external world as 1 Here is one hand 2 If this hand exists there is an external world 3 Thus there is an external world The Traditional Interpretation 0 There are clearly problems with this reading of the proof 0 First and most importantly it begs the question 0 Why would seeing the hand fulfill the if clause of the condition 0 We still need to establish the existence of the hand beyond our sensory perception of it o The only reason we have to believe that the hand we perceive exists is our assumption that the external world exists 0 Thus on this understanding the proof seems doomed to failure Technically it is a failure of warrant transmission Fortunately for Moore there is another way to read this proof 0 Specifically the traditional interpretation completely ignores that over half of this lengthy paper is consumed with clarifying two definitions objects presented in space and objects to be met with in space 0 Moore clearly thinks they re crucial to the proof otherwise why would he spend so much time on them so let s be charitable and see if these help him out of the traditional reading bjeetsm Presented in Space To Be Met with in Space 0 Appear as though they 0 Their existence is are in space but need independent of their not be met with in being perceived Space 0 Can be perceived by 0 Examples after more than one images double images observer ie are not and bodily pains logically private and the as 53 iv if s 0 These two categories are NOT mutually exclusive 0 All objects to be met within space are objects to be presented 11 space 0 Moore has defined objects to be met within space in such a way that any such object must be external 0 Thus proving the existence of any such object or objects will prove the existence of the external world I can now give a lar e number of different proofs eac of which is a perfectly rigorous proof and that at many other times I have been in a position to give many others I can rove now for instance that two human ands exist How By holding up my two hands and sayin as I make a certain gesture with t e ri ht hand Here is one hand and a ding as I make a certain gesture with the left and here is another And if by doing this I have roved ipsofacto the existence ofpexternal things you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways there is no need to multiply examples 1456 The Preei Reeehsidered Q Remember Importance This paper was originally 0 The audience confirms a lecture presented in the existence of his front of other people hands He presents hands to 0 He showing that the his audience set of things to be met a 39 39 with in space is not empty 0 Why is the audience significant W 39A quotA 14 f1 quotquotu39v mr 1 r 39 quot T o How would I go about proving to you that unicorns existed Moore is doing something similar He is literally showing you the thing who s existence you ve called into question Perceptions of hands are not private thus hands are not merely objects presented in space 0 Has Moore avoided the alleged circularity 0 Has the circularity just been pushed back a level PETER UNGER Peter Unger Born 1942 g f vquot 1 quot g ew xf x y gt V quot10quot 337 quotu r 7 i wu rww 4 Ar 4 xy Jb llr Ml m or urinal Milieu l a g c7 3 r quotQa w 7 2 J 33 0 Exotic contrast cases skeptical scenarios 1 If you know that there are rocks then you can know that there is no scientist deceiving you by means of electrodes in your brain No one can ever know that there is no evil scientist deceiving you by means of electrodes in your brain Thus you never know that there are rocks Thus nobody ever knows anything about the external world a 3quot 3 51 If 13 mi 0 Any argument with the form of the previous argument can be called a classical argument for skepticism 0 These arguments are credible and convincing and Unger hopes to build off of them Unger s Reading of Moore Moore s rigidity about the external world seems foolhardy and dogmatic If the electrodes were removed and your real surroundings revealed you d feel quite foolhardy and dogmatic You d have been irrational in your commitment to the outside world Your commitment would still be irrational and dogmatic even if there is no deceiving scientist Ordinary Cases and Skepticism The exotic cases show that certain ordinary cases should lead us to the same conclusion 0 Any claim to knowledge manifests a dogmatic attitude WILLIAM K CLIFFORD William Kingdon Clifford May 4 1845 March 3 1879 The Ship vvner Q o Belief acquired by sti ing doubts Would have been wrong even if the ship has not sank Why The rightnesswrongness hinges on how he acquired his belief not whether it turned out to be true or false Did he have a right to believe on the evidence available to him The Agitators Case Again the truth or the falsity of the belief is not the issue 0 We are concerned in Whether they had suf cient evidence for their Views 0 Even if they were correct they would not be honorable imatle lemont Couldn t the ship owner have said I m firm in my conviction but I ll have the vessel inspected just to be on the safe side 0 Yes and irrespective of conviction we may choose how we act There s still a duty to investigate 0 However the investigation that follows would never be unbiased Certainty will color the inquiry Belief and Action Q 0 All true beliefs will in uence action 0 A new belief becomes part of a web that determines our actions characters and other beliefs Furthermore belief is a social affair Social Station and Beliel Also the issue at hand is not important merely for those in places of social importance it is the duty of all people to seek adequate evidence for their Views Why Do We Believe without Sufficient Evidence Q 0 Doubt is less than fun We get a feeling of power from knowledge so we desire to believe and fear to doubt 0 We have a fully justified belief the pleasure we feel is of the highest kind 0 It is good for others and ourselves iiiWhat it the Uninstiiiied Causes Ne WW 0 Even if an unjustified belief causes no harm we have weakened our capacities by adopting it o The true danger is in the adoption of an credulous character If society loses its habit of testing t descend into savagery lll lljull lfi Eg is Illi39ss The Harm 0f Credulity The less I care about having suf cient evidence for my own beliefs the less I care about others having suf cient justi cation It is wrong always everywhere and for anyone to believe anything upon insuf cient evidence Why isn39t Jersey Sfll j 013jg MEMEBASE on I Implications of Cli 39ord s View quot 7 1 A A L N 2 V up u 73 5x Ax v T I yd a 1 I I w 1 rmLI L gg h L i V39YIHI I VE I 14 aquot PETER VAN INWAGEN Peter van Inwagen Born September 21 1942 f f rdi grumapm 0 Van Inwagen wants to examine the consequences that consistently applying this principle would have upon our lives 0 Specifically he thinks about this problem in terms of justification of philosophical views 0 Philosophers agree about very little 0 How is a philosopher justified in believing his views 0 Wants to avoid philosophical skepticism the inability to pick a winner in a debate of which your are aware xxxxx Perhaps nothing really hangs on philosophical questions Perhaps philosophy is not about matters of empirical fact How do we reject philosophical skepticism in the light of Clifford s maxim Incommunicable insight It certainly isn t a necessary truth that we aren t justified in holding a controversial political belief Implications of van Inwagen s View For Religious Convictions For Moral Convictions Is it different than 0 Is it different than Clifford s VieW V 394 l l Wrong 39 l l
Are you sure you want to buy this material for
You're already Subscribed!
Looks like you've already subscribed to StudySoup, you won't need to purchase another subscription to get this material. To access this material simply click 'View Full Document'