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Comparative Politics ADVANCE PRAISE FOR COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND CASE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS Comparative Politics and Case Studies in Comparative Politics are cut ting edge and high quality textbooks that many political scientists of my generation will consider using They address many of my concerns with existing texts by providing instructors with a great deal of leeway in de signing a syllabus Each case study is written by a prominent scholar or rising comparativist and is nicely linked to the thematic survey This would allow me the flexibility of using a different survey text or no survey text at all Ernrnanael Teitelbaarn George Washington University I have looked at many comparative politics textbooks and none of them have appealed to me the Way that this one did right away Some aim too high and ask far too much of students losing them in a sea of concepts with few tools to make sense of them Others aim too low and ask far too little of students failing to challenge them on the essential themes and concepts of comparative politics This one finds the middle ground by pre senting topics in an interesting and engaging manner and challenging stu dents to cultivate their analytical skills Katy CrossleyFrolicQ Denison University David Samuels helps students make sense of complex theoretical questions and approaches and he applies them very effectively to case examples This textbook beats all the alternatives it is very well thought out KennetlJ Roberts Cornell University Samuels engages professors as well as students by making our field acces sible without compromising the curiosities and complexities that make it so interesting The study of institutions interests and identities introduces undergraduates to the politics of countries in the world through a rigorous lens of comparative analysis Samuels raises the most interesting questions and puzzles within our field and guides the student through the methods of comparative politics science To have a textbook that moves beyond a list of concepts and an historical chronology of countries is immensely satisfy ing Laaretta Predereing University of Portland I am delighted that the author recognizes hovv graduate level comparative political scientists are trained and that he has brought this approach to the undergraduate level This is useful training not only for budding compara tive politics students but for those who seek to become informed world citizens ennifer White University of Georgia BRIEF CONTENTS Detailed Contents viii Preface xiii Maps xxi CHAPTER1 CHAPTER2 CHAPTER3 CHAPTER4 CHAPTER5 CHAPTER6 CHAPTER7 CHAPTER8 CHAPTER9 CHAPTER10 CHAPTER11 CHAPTER12 CHAPTER 13 Glossary 377 Credits 385 Index 387 Doing Comparative Politics 1 The State 28 Democratic Political Regimes 58 NonDemocratic Political Regimes 91 Regime Change 121 Political Identity 149 Religion and Politics 175 Gender and Politics 201 Collective Action 228 Political Violence 257 Political Economy of Development 285 The Political Economy of Redistribution 315 Globalization 345 vii x Detailed Contents Politicizing Identity Primordialism 153 Samuel Huntington and Global Conflict 154 Samuel Huntington s Critics 155 Evaluating Primordialism 155 Politicizing Identity Constructivism 157 Identity and I ndividual Choice 15 7 Identity and the Social Context 158 Constructivism and Racial and National Identity in Brazil 161 L Hypothesis Testing Collective Memory Influences the Construction of Political Identity Comparing the United States and Brazil 164 Constructivism and Nationalist Identity in Europe 166 Conclusion 169 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics 173 CHAPTER QUESTION What is the relationship between religious identity and democracy Religion and Democracy 175 Christianity and Democracy 176 Protestantism and Democracy 177 Catholicism and Democracy 179 Islam and Democracy 182 Separation of Religion and the State under Islam 182 The Status of Muslim Women 183 Islam and Politics in Arab Societies 184 L Hypothesis Testing In a Democracy Deeply Divided by Religious Disputes Treating Everyone Equally Is the Best Way to Promote Domestic Stability and Peace The Case of India 185 Modernization Secularization and Democracy 190 Evidence of Secularization 191 Connecting Modernization Secularization and Democratization 195 Conclusion 198 CHAPTER 8 Gender and Politics 201 CHAPTER QUESTION How do attitudes about gender influence politics Defining Gender 203 Gender as a Category 204 Gender as a Process 204 Attitudes about Gender around the World 206 Modernization and Attitudes about Gender 206 Attitudes about Gender Attitudes about Democracy 207 Gender Gaps in Established Democracies 209 The Traditional versus the Modern Gender Gap 209 Shaping the Modern Gender Gap 210 Women Shaping Gender Relations 211 L Hypothesis Testing Gender Quota Laws Are the Only Way to Dramatically Increase the Number of Female Legislators Comparing Costa Rica and South Africa 214 Politics Shapes Gender Roles 217 Similar Societies Different Outcomes Tunisia Morocco and Algeria 217 Similar Societies Different Outcomes Wealthy Democracies 219 Conclusion 224 CHAPTER9 Collective Action 228 CHAPTER QUESTION Why do people participate collectively in politics Resolving Collective Action Problems 230 Coercing 231 Appealing 231 Enticing 232 Political Leadership 233 Social Movements 235 Characteristics of Social Movements 235 How Social Movements Form 237 L Hypothesis Testing Political Context Shapes Social Movement Mobilization Comparing Indigenous Movements in Bolivia and Peru 238 The Dilemma of Formalization 240 Interest Groups 242 Characteristics of Interest Groups 242 How Interest Groups Form 243 Illustrating Corporatism The Case of Sweden 244 xii Detailed Contents PoiticaGobaization 349 Consequences for State Sovereignty 350 Consequences for Democracy 352 Economic Globalization 355 Explaining Economic Globalization 357 Globalization and Poverty 358 Globalization and Social Welfare 361 L Hypothesis Testing Poor People in Developing Countries Oppose Economic Globalization The Case of Bolivia 364 CuturaGobaization 366 Globalization Homogenizes World Culture 366 Globalization Allows Cultures to Flourish 370 Conclusion 371 Glossary 377 Credits 385 Index 387 xiv Preface FEATURES Approach To support the questiondriven approach described above each chapter of Com parative Politics begins with a question that focuses on a core aspect of what politics is all about around the world Framing the chapter s subject as a question provides a narrative thread for students to follow as they read the chapter it also fosters classroom discussion illustrates how scholars go about answering similar questions and provides a clear reference point for students to articulate answers on their own that they can use for assignments and exams To help students grasp the importance of the chapter opening question a real world example is provided For example in Chapter 6 the opening image shows a French Muslim woman in a red white and blue headscarf and the example explores the French separation of church and state both set up the question when does identity become politicized After the main question is introduced each chapter is organized around the ways scholars have attempted to answer it For example Chapter 10 asks what causes political violence It then guides students through the various facets of the topic and ways to critically assess and weigh sources of conflict Every chap ter in the book follows a similar approach posing a question that introduces a theme and then exploring different ways to answer that question Throughout every chapter more real world examples are employed to ground the question and clarify the discussion Although the chapter topics are sometimes complex they are all tightly organized and written in clear and accessible prose Furthermore as the chapter progresses each core chapter question is sup ported by subquestions that appear in the margins to encourage students to examine more than one facet of a political puzzle For example political econ omy can be an intimidating topic for many Chapter 11 s main question is how do states promote economic development To answer that question students must first understand how states and markets are intertwined Therefore the first section of the chapter asks and answers the question what is the relationship between states and markets Every subquestion relates back to the chapter s core question and builds towards the next subquestion and finally each chapter con cludes by returning the chapter question and summarizing what was learned In short each chapter shows students how political scientists engage a smaller piece of a larger puzzle and then explore debate and articulate plausible answers to key questions about politics in the world today Coverage Comparative Politics introduces students to the full breadth of our subfield by exploring common themes like institutions and interests as well as topics that are often downplayed particularly how political identities bridge institutions and inter ests An understanding of political identity is vital today because many of the most pressing and contentious political issues around the world issues that students find personally compelling touch on such questions as the tension between ethnicity and political instability gender and political change and religion and democracy xv i Preface I Every chapter includes a marginal glossary to support students understanding of new and important concepts at first encounter I For easy reference key terms from the marginal glossary are repeated at the end of each chapter along with review questions and an annotated list of sug gested readings I Numerous color photos and figures are integrated into the text to enliven the narrative CASE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS For instructors and students who want more specific country information to com plement the questions raised here an accompanying casebook is available that matches the pedagogical approach of this survey Each chapter is written by a different country expert and the collection includes cases on the United Kingdom Germany France Japan India Mexico Russia China Nigeria and Iran Just as each chapter in this book is organized around a core question so are the country chapters in the casebook Although every chapter takes on a different country and thus asks a different question they all follow the same basic frame work First an introductory section offers background information on the his torical development of each country The second section describes the country s political institutions and explains why each country has emerged as a democracy or remained a dictatorship Each chapter s third section focuses on the main forms of political identity in each country such as ethnicity nationalism economic class language religion or gender The fourth section focuses on the patterns of com petition over the distribution of political power and wealth between the differ ent organized interests and identities in each society parties interest groups and social movements Every chapter concludes by reviewing how the exploration of the country s institutions identities and interests has helped answer the question posed at the start El 5 En 39 E E I I7quot39l1 MYPOLISICLAB FOR COMPARATIVE POLITICS The moment you know T T39 Educators know it Students know it It s that inspired moment when something I that was difficult to understand suddenly makes perfect sense Our MyLab prod ucts have been designed and refined with a single purpose in mind to help educa tors create that moment of understanding with their students MyPoliSciLab delivers proven results in helping individual students succeed It provides engaging experiences that personalize stimulate and measure learning for each student And it comes from a trusted partner with educational expertise and a deep commitment to helping students instructors and departments achieve their goals MyPoliSciLab can be used by itself or linked to any learning management sys tem To learn more about how MyPoliSciLab combines proven learning applica tions with powerful assessment visit httpwwwmypoliscilabcom EIIHi1IIlIH39 IT xviii Preface SUPPLEMENTS Pearson is pleased to offer several resources to qualified adopters of Comparative Politics and their students that will make teaching and learning from this book even more effective and enjoyable Several of the supplements for this book are available at the Instructor Resource Center IRC an online hub that allows in structors to quickly download book specific supplements Please visit the IRC wel come page at httpwwwpea1 sonhigheredcomirc to register for access Instructor s ManualTest Bank This resource includes learning objectives lecture outlines multiplechoice ques tions truefalse questions and essay questions for each chapter Available exclu sively on the IRC Pearson MyTest This powerful assessment generation program includes all of the items in the in structor s manualtest bank Questions and tests can be easily created customized saved online and then printed allowing flexibility to manage assessments anytime and anywhere Available exclusively on the IRC PowerPoint Presentation Organized around a lecture outline these multimedia presentations also include photos figures and tables from each chapter Available exclusively on the IRC Sample Syllabus This resource provides suggestions for assigning content from this book and My PoliSciLab Available exclusively on the IRC Longman Atlas of World Issues 0205780202 From population and political systems to energy use and women s rights the Lorzgmarz Atlas of World Issues features fullcolor thematic maps that exam ine the forces shaping the world Featuring maps from the latest edition of The Penguin State of the World Atlas this excerpt includes criticalthinking exercises to promote a deeper understanding of how geography affects many global issues Goocle s World Atlas 0321652002 First published by Rand McNally in 1923 Goode s World Atlas has set the stan dard for college reference atlases It features hundreds of physical political and thematic maps as well as graphs tables and a pronouncing index XX Preface Farideh Farhi University of Hawaii at Manoa Mark Frazier University of Oklahoma Lauretta Frederking University of Portland Daniel Fuerstman State College of Florida Wynford Grant University of Warwick Kenneth S Hicks Rogers State University Jonathan Hollowell SUNY Brockport Debra Holzhauer Southeast Missouri State University Carrie Humphreys University of Utah Wade Jacoby Brigham Young University Ellis S Krauss University of California San Diego Eric Langenbacher Georgetown University F David Levenbach Arkansas State University Political Science Yitan Li Seattle University Staffan Lindberg University of Florida Daniel Lynch University of Southern California Shannan Mattiace Allegheny College Julie Mazzei Kent State University Anthony O Regan Los Angeles Valley College Angela Oberbauer San Diego Mesa College Rebecca K Root the State University of New York at Geneseo James C Ross University of Northern Colorado Amy Forster Rothbart University of Wisconsin at Madison John Scherpereel James Madison University Tracy H Slagter University of Wiscon sin Oshkosh Boyka Stefanova University of Texas San Antonio Tressa E Tabares American River College Gunes Tezcur Loyola University Chicago Erica TownsendBell University of Iowa Anca Turcu University of Central Florida Wendy N Whitman Santa Fe College Social and Behavioral Sciences Mark Wolfgram Oklahoma State University DAVID SAMUELS SOUTH AMERICA Sr 39 80 W 60 W 50 W 40 W 30 W Caribbean Sea 5 0 Barranquill 3 10 N GUYANA ATLANTIC quot SURINAME amaribo 0 C E A N L 7 Fx T Cayenne 2 FRENCH G U IA N A France 0 0 Vortaleza 10 S 10 S axlvador 20 S 20 S c H I L E j 235 S Tropic of W Tropic of 235 S Capricorn Cabo Ffio Capricorn P A C I F I C 3068 0 C E A N 3098 A C Santiago I 40 S 40 S A T L A N T I C Isla Grande SanMatim deChioe Pmn 39 Pmn Valdes Penninsula O C E A N Taitao Penninsula 50 S FALKLAND 50 S I S L A N D S S O U T H iiZ Z f Iey G E O R G 39 A Tierra Del Fuego I S L A N D O 500 miles 39 5 I4 O 500 km 7o w 60 W 5o w 4o w 3o w AFRICA Strait0fL Madeifa Gibraltar Casablanca Dakar Banjul 1 Bissau 10 N 10 N GUINEA Conakr BISSAU Freetown SIERRA y LEONE Monrovia LIBEIA Gumea quot A 39 39 EQUATORIAL Ba V Mogadishu 0 GUINEA lsibrevill 0 Sao Tome Qanzibar ares Salaam J 10 S 1o s llcomoros 5 W I UE 39 A T L A N T I C V Mozambique 0 C E A N 20 S 2o s T r o p i c o f 235 s C 3 I0 F i C 0 F n 5 j A 235 s 30 S 3o s CapeTown 1 O C E A N O 500 miles 0 500 km 0 0 0 0 0 0 10W 0 10E 20E 30E 40E 50E LE EAST 35 E THE MIDD 1 r Nicos r 35 N c Y P R u s u 0 Em Mediterranean LEBANON S e a ISRAEL Tel Aviv Jerusalem Alexandria Gulf of Oman Musca Tropic of 235 N Cancer 20 N abian Sea 15 N Socotra Gulfomen Yemen 0 500 miles 1 E T I I 14 Djibouti i y P u l O km 55 E 60 E AUSTRALI A AND OCEANIA 8 quot s o L o M o N 7 Britain S L A N D S P olomon Sea a Torretrj 3 Port Honiara l 0 quotquot Moresby 39 na 10S 10S 39 Timor i S 39 39 c G r e a I 6 New Hebrides I 9 C0ralSea ivANuATu 5m aG39 X llzevu A PX Er L4 vitf 39 A U ate Q39PortVila Lew Suva 20 s 2 Loyalty 20 S 39 N E w usnanus C A L E D O N I A France Nwm a T r 0 p i c 0 f Capricorn 235 3 P a c i f i c Norfolk Island Kingston 0 c e a n 30 S 30 S G r e Australia Sydney Kangaroo Mt Kosciuszko Ta S m a n S e a Island 1 9 40 S quot S 0 u t h e r V Tasmania 500 miles 500 km 120 E 130 E 140 E 150 E 160 E This page intentionally left blank 2 CHAPTER 1 Doing Comparative Politics Why study comparative politics uggead and Listen fter I graduated from college I wanted to travel In 1992 I ended up staying to Chapter 1 at mypoIisciIabcom so Study and Review the PreTest amp Flashcards at mypoisciabcom in Brazil for several months living as the guest of a politician serving in Brazil s Congress Brazil had recently emerged from a long military dicta torship and its politicians had written an entirely new constitution the country s seventh since independence in 1 822 My friend and his colleagues in Congress were engaged in a highstress and highstakes effort to impeach Brazil s president its first popularly elected leader since the military took power in 1964 Just a few years after the military had turned power over to civilians things were not working out as millions of Brazilians had hoped One day my friend turned to me in frustration and asked How did you grin gos manage to write a constitution that has survived for 200 years while we Latin Americans seem stuck with unstable governments and military takeovers Your Founding Fathers must ve been intellectual giants but the people who ve written our constitutions not so much Why We re no different from you really But why are our politics so different I had no answer and political scientists still debate whether Latin America has put instability and military influence behind it but my friend s query stuck with me He had asked this question because he knew that I take for granted rights for which he had fought for years such as freedom of speech With 2020 hindsight I now know that he exaggerated the political challenges Brazil faced despite suc cessfully impeaching that president it remains a democracy and strong economic growth has ensured political stability Moreover militaries around the region for the most part no longer meddle in politics as they used to Even so posing a contrast I d never thought about before why was political instability so pervasive in Latin America but not in the United States and my own frustrating inability to offer an answer at that time sparked a deeper interest not just in politics but in political science and over the years I have returned to my friend s question time and again in my teaching and research What I ve discovered is that the best way to think through any question about politics is by asking ques tions and posing comparisons Consider for a moment what s happened recently in the Middle East Almost uni formly dictators have long ruled the countries in the region Yet in late 2010 and early 2011 massive popular protests exploded in several Arab countries What made people so upset all of a sudden and why would they risk going to jail just to complain about the government Moreover why did these protests quickly lead to the ouster of the longterm rulers of Egypt and Tunisia but not rulers elsewhere in the region Now consider recent developments in China Perhaps you watched some of the 2008 Olympics on TV the games that were held in Beijing I watched some with 6 CHAPTER 1 Doing Comparative Politics that comparative politics research asks today are quite old while others have become relevant only recently Aristotle 384 322 BC may very well have been the first comparative political scientist when he asked What sort of constitution best combines political stability and good government Aristotle then challenged his students to compare and contrast the constitutions of every country in the known world at the time He was convinced that the only way to answer his question was to explore evidence from the real world the same approach scholars and students employ today when considering the question of how to combine limited and effec tive government to sustain democracy in the Middle East or elsewhere around the world Prior to the 1700s the study of politics was rooted in moral and religious principles All this began to change during Europe s so called age of Enlighten ment when new scientific discoveries justified a logical and empirical approach to studying the natural and social world and chipped away at the influence of re ligious dogma During the Enlightenment scholars increasingly considered ques tions about politics to be secular matters casting aside arguments based solely in religion For example the work of philosophers such as Montesquieu Hobbes John Locke and JeanJacques Rousseau asked whether a rational and secular basis for government existed independently of arguments for monarchy rooted Old neighborhoods being swallowed up by new construction in Shanghai China China39s government has carefully managed the country39s amazing economic growth a fact that raises the question about the proper level of government intervention in the market 8 CHAPTER 1 Doing Comparative Politics How do we build arguments in comparative politics ExpIore the Comparative Governments and Public Opinionquot at mypoliscilabcom question Why do some nondemocratic rulers relinquish their hold on power The Soviet Union collapsed ending the Cold War and generating optimism that for the first time the whole world might become democratic Indeed many won dered whether the world was witnessing the twilight of the idea of dictatorship and the end of non democratic ideologies once and for all Still given democracy s roots in Western Europe scholars also wondered Can democracy survive in so many different cultures Most recently political scientists have focused increased attention on ques tions related to the expanding role of women in politics the growing influence of religion and to the impact of globalization on domestic and international politics More and more women are winning elections around the world lead ing scholars to ask How do different attitudes about women s rights influence politics The impact of religion seems obvious but many assume that religious faith is a recipe for irreconcilable conflict between groups while others call that assumption into question And globalization brings us back to the sorts of questions Hobbes and Locke were asking hundreds of years ago with the rising importance of nontraditional actors in world politics such as terrorists and human rights activists will the sovereign state wither away This is where we find comparative politics today asking a series of important questions about how politics works and offering a method to help you make sense of the often confusing and rapid political change going on around the world At its essence comparative politics is an argument for the existence of patterns whether similarities or differences across countries and for undertaking a systematic effort to understand why different outcomes occur in similar places or similar out comes occur in different places These efforts help us make sense of and simplify these complex patterns offering simpler yet convincing answers to the questions that concern realworld political events THE COMPARATIVE METHOD The questions we ask in comparative politics are always inspired by realworld events there are no easy answers The worst sorts of arguments in comparative politics are based on opinions rooted in stereotypes in the belief that the past predicts the future or on generalizations drawn from specific facts For example someone might stereotypically claim that Democracy can never take root in Iraq because Iraqis are naturally antidemocratic or Iraq will never be a democracy simply because it has never been a democracy Such arguments are unconvincing because they fail to engage available evidence for example publicopinion polls consistently reveal that Iraqi citizens want a democracy and obviously every dem ocratic country today was not always so Someone might also offer the opinion Kuwait is next door to Iraq and it s not a democracy so obviously there s no way Iraq can become a democracy This approach seems logical on the surface but it too fails to consider the range of evidence One cannot assume that if something happens in one place it is bound to happen in other places 14 CHAPTER 1 Doing Comparative Politics Country 1 Country 2 Poor MiddleIncome Mountainous Flat Religiously Homegeneous Religiously Divided E thnically Divided E thnically Divided Country 4 Country 3 MiddleIncome Mountainous Religiously Divided Religiously Homogeneous Ethnically Divided E thnically Divided Country 5 Religiously Homogeneous E thnically Homogeneous FIGURE 11 Using the Method of Agreement Countries 1 through 4 all went to war and by comparing them against each other you will note that they agree on only one attribute ethnic diversity The country that did not agree on this characteristic also did not go to war The method of agreement finds the thing that all coun tries have in common and in this example leads to the conclusion that ethnic diversity is a cause of civil war After consulting the evidence from real world examples we find that certain country attributes always match to certain outcomes and that the method of agree ment helps us generate strong causal hypotheses However the method of agree ment is usually not the best way to build arguments First it is typically not the case that certain attributes always match up with certain outcomes More often than not countries agree on the key attribute but do not agree on the outcome For example although the example above implies that ethnic diversity is associated with civil conflict many ethnically diverse societies have never experienced civil war The more examples like this that we find the weaker our original hypothesis Second even though our original example points to the connection between ethnic diversity and civil war it cannot rule out the possibility that other things may cause civil war too Some countries experience civil war for reasons having The Comparative Method 15 nothing to do with ethnic tensions Although the method of agreement helps think through potential hypotheses and rule out some plausible explanations the method of difference offers a stronger guide to causal inference The Method of Difference The method of difference looks for some attribute method Of that is present when an outcome occurs but that is absent in otherwise similar d39ff quot quot I Com d t t cases when that outcome does not occur Suppose you were doing lab research on pares all Con rag 5 cases with the same plant growth and you added the same quantities of plant food water and sun attributes but dttte light to five genetically identical seedlings All five grow to exactly the same height ent outcomes and If ou then did a second ex eriment in which ou ave four seedlin s identical determines Causality Y P Y S S by finding an attribute that is present when an outcome occurs amounts of food water and light but gave the fifth seedling only water and light you d expect the fifth seedling to be scrawny If four seedlings got three inputs and grew and the fifth only got two inputs and did not grow you could be but that is absent in pretty certain that decreasing the amount of food causes stunted growth similar cases when the outcome does not OCCUI Country 1 Poor Flat Religiously Divided Ethnically Divided Country 2 Poor Flat Religiously Divided Ethnically Divided country 3 Country 4 Poor Poor Flat Flat Religiously Divided Ethnically Divided Religiously Divided Ethnically Divided Country 5 Poor Mountainous Religiously Divided Ethnically Divided FIGURE 12 Using the Method of Difference Countries 1 through 4 all remained at peace and all share several characteristics Country 5 went to war and the only way it differs from the other countries is in its terrain Using the method of difference in this example suggests a causal relationship between rough terrain and civil war Challenges of Comparative Research 17 research employs these two approaches in some way Unfortunately most of the time when we re trying to answer a real world question about politics it is not a simple matter to match attributes and outcomes comparative politics research involves several difficulties CHALLENGES OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH Why study comparative politics We study comparative politics because we want to develop convincing arguments explaining how and why politics works around the world Testing hypotheses confronts a series of challenges Doing comparative research is hard work because evidence from the world is often unclear or subject to multiple interpretations and because in contrast to studying microbiology physics or chemistry for example the objects of study in comparative politics change every day Peaceful countries erupt into civil war a dictatorship becomes a democracy poor countries grow rich within a generation or two All arguments in comparative politics are necessarily provisional because research confronts the challenges of separating causation from correlation identifying causation and assessing the reliability of data not obtained in a lab Separating Correlation from Causation Suppose that after systematically gathering information we discover that civil war is more likely in ethnically diverse societies What we ve uncovered is a correlation a measure of observed association between two variables How ever this is not a complete explanation that is a correlation between ethnic diversity and civil war does not allow us to say that the former causes the lat ter We say that two variables X and Y are correlated when change in the value of X is accompanied by change in the value of Y For example as ethnic diversity increases so does the likelihood of civil war Correlations can be positive when one variable increases so does the other or negative meaning that when one variable increases the other decreases The fact that attributes and outcomes appear to be associated with each other in a predictable way does not mean that one causes the other Causation is defined as a process or event that produces an observable effect Observing causation is often difficult For example the old riddle asks Why did the chicken cross the road The riddle s humor lies in its ludicrousness because we can t ask chickens about their intentions We don t know what caused the chicken to cross the road even though we certainly know how she did it by putting one foot in front of the other Without too much debate about poultry motivations we can say that walk ing the cause produced crossing the road the effect We can illustrate the difficulty of identifying causation with an example from comparative politics Even though we do observe a correlation between ethnic di versity and war the greater the diversity the higher the likelihood of war we cannot just conclude that ethnic diversity causes civil war Constructing a causal argument requires a systematic search for and comparison of relevant examples What chaHenges confront building arguments in comparative politics correlation I a measure of observed association between two variables causation I a process or event that produces an observ able effect Challenges of Comparative Research l 19 SUMMARY TABLE Challenges to Comparative Politics Research Separating The fact that attributes and outcomes are associated C0 eati0 from with each other does not mean that one causes the other Causation Identifying Social science evidence is not generated in a lab Causation IS Hard meaning scholars cannot fully isolate causal attributes Assessing Potentially Social scientists must rely on information provided by Unreliable Data the real world information that may be ambiguous or even unavailable not turn back time change some social or political attribute and rewind the world to see if the outcome would differ Sometimes the real world offers very few examples of either the attributes or the outcomes we re interested in exploring In addition information can frequently be ambiguous or even downright confusing For example if scholars want to test the relationship between ethnic diversity and civil war they have to agree on how to define ethnicity diver sity and civil war which is not easy Then they have to agree on how to measure those concepts which is even harder And even if they agree on all of the above they may find the historical record ambiguous in terms of membership in ethnic groups and the intensity of violence in particular countries Finally even if scholars agree on definitions and the historical record is clear the information needed to test a hypothesis might be difficult or even impossible to obtain Information on such subjects as corruption campaign finance and lob bying activities are often unavailable to researchers Interviewees are frequently unwilling to speak on sensitive issues such as religion ethnic prejudice or gender attitudes and useful information is sometimes locked away in government archives Some countries simply prohibit access to social scientists And even if information is readily available obtaining it may require months or years of work in the field and years of preparation to learn a new language 9 In comparative politics articulating convincing answers to questions is always difficult and often contentious The challenges noted in this section make comparing and contrasting across cases difficult meaning that arguments in comparative poli tics are never perfect and never final The world is a very complicated and rapidly changing place and sometimes our answers prove unsatisfying Yet this does not mean that we simply shrug our shoulders and give up An unsatisfying answer sparks additional questions giving scholars reason to go back to the drawing board and continue the search for a better answer And in any case as we will see in later chap ters in many cases the comparative method succeeds providing useful answers to questions about our complicated and messy world This chapter s feature box pushes you to think about how to formulate and subject a hypothesis to scrutiny Challenges of Comparative Research 21 Are Canadians particularly vigorous and bold and thus more capable of self government Are Saudis fearful and indecisive and consequently in need of the iron fist of a non democratic ruler Such stereotyping will not get us very far More over if we were to continue to gather information we39d quickly find countries that seem to confound Montesquieu s expectations For example consider Brazil and Russia Stereotypes of Brazilians and Russians fit Montesquieu s images Brazilians prefer spending the day at the beach rather than worlting while Russians are dour and tough The tropical sun in Brazil certainly enervates the body but Brazil is a democracy In contrast the Arctic cold in Russia would certainly constrict the body39s fibers but Russia is not a democracy ASSESS THE HYPOTHESIS These four cases do not confirm or disconfirm Montesquieu s hypothesis Using Table 12 can you brainstorm additional countries that fit in each box The more countries you find that fit in the Cold and Democratic and Hot and Non Democratic boxes the stronger the evidence in Montesquieu s favor Conversely the more countries that fit into the Cold and Non Democratic and Hot and Democratic boxes the wealter the evidence for this hypothesis On the one hand you might think Montesquieu s hypothesis is far fetched Even if you discovered that most countries are either Cold and Democratic or Hot and Non Democratic you might still wonder Why Many other things might explain why countries are democracies or not Perhaps Montesquieu s hypothesis is outdated a product of an era when stereotyping was accepted and unbiased information about the world scant Yet on the other hand scholars still talte Montesquieu s basic insight about the relationship TABLE 12 Exploring Montesquieu s Theory of Climate Hot Cold Democracy Brazil Canada Nondemocracy Saudi Arabia Russia between the environment and politics seriously The further one goes from the equator the less common are dangerous tropical diseases such as malaria and yellow fever Moreover one only finds large swaths of flat and fertile land in the temperate zones of both the northern and southern hemispheres Lands nearer to the equator are indeed too hot to support agriculture as they are typically covered with jungle or desert Some scholars have suggested that patterns of European settlement around the world in past centuries are related to the emergence of democracy and dictatorship today where settlers set up farms and strong property rights democracy later emerged Where settlers could not survive colonizers ruled via force and such patterns of rule continue long after the colonies gained independence3 We will revisit this question again in Chapter 11 Given this historical pattern 250 years after Montesquieu scholars who conduct research into questions such as why some countries are rich and others poor and why some countries are democracies while others remain non democratic test for a connection between climate and government form by including the latitude of a country s capital city in their analyses Latitude measures how far a country is from the equator and thus serves as a rough indicator of climate And although Montesquieu was basically stereotyping and guessing his intuition still finds support in technically sophisticated research since about 1800 the further a country is from the equator the more liltely is democracy to emerge x CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS 1 Do you think that Montesquieu might have confused correlation with causation in his original hypothesis 2 What else might cause the observed relationship between climate and form of government 3 Is it proper to generalize about a country39s climate Many larger countries encompass mountains deserts jungles and grasslands Most do not have a climate but rather several climates How might Montesquieu have responded to this 24 CHAPTER 1 Doing Comparative Politics CONCLUSION The world is a dangerous and fascinating place and only by learning about how politics works in other countries can we understand how best to engage those countries We need to understand how and why politics works elsewhere in or der to understand how their politics impacts us and how their politics impact other countries as well Comparative politics is about the systematic search for answers to questions about how people around the world make and contest au thoritative public choices To guide that effort we use the comparative method a way of thinking systematically about why the same outcome sometimes oc curs in cases that are very different and why different outcomes sometimes occur in cases that are very similar The comparative method highlights some of the many challenges to finding convincing answers to our questions about compara tive politics Comparative politics focuses on answering questions on explaining complex political phenomena The challenges it confronts means that explanations using the comparative method are always provisional a fact that may be somewhat disap pointing Yet the demand for answers is as pressing as ever given how complex the world has become and how fast the world is changing The world needs more and better comparative politics research and this book gives you the tools to make that happen by focusing your attention on useful ways of asking and answering these key questions Every chapter in Comparative Politics poses an important question about poli tics around the world and then explores the ways scholars have sought to answer that question using realworld examples to ground and clarify the discussion The book s approach differs from other texts by offering a set of key questions in lieu of a set of important countries This approach prioritizes the questions not the country cases because we want to develop convincing explanations and doing so requires gathering information from beyond the borders of a limited number of countries Because each chapter in this book begins with a question of broad interest you will gain experience learning how to develop arguments by comparing countries to each other The question that begins each chapter is posed within the context of an engag ing realworld example Consider Chapter 3 the question that chapter explores in depth is What is democracy The chapter starts off by drawing your attention to the Middle East a region with very few democratic governments but where protests ranging from mild to very violent have rocked autocratic governments since late 2010 No one knows whether democracy will flourish in the Middle East but the question of what sort of democracy might emerge in region is cer tainly among the most important for students of politics today After connecting a political science question to the real world of politics each chapter is organized around the key arguments that scholars of comparative poli tics offer in answer to that question This material is presented in a particular way each section of each chapter first poses a smaller question that ties back to the chapter s main question illustrating how each section contributes to answer ing the chapter s larger question This approach is designed to get you to see how political scientists do their own work often by engaging a smaller piece of a larger 26 CHAPTER 1 Doing Comparative Politics The next two chapters turn to the general question of how and why individuals political interests and identities are mobilized collectively Chapter 9 explores peaceful forms of collective action interest groups social movements and political parties while Chapter 10 asks why people sometimes take up arms against the established political order The last three chapters turn to pressing questions at the intersection of politics and economics Chapter 11 asks Why are some countries rich and others poor and Chapter 12 explores why some countries tax and spend more than others Finally Chapter 13 explores the question of globalization and its impact 5tudyandReiew In sum this book provides the tools for you to learn how comparativists t equot answer ressin uestions about olitics It oses uestions that will i ue our Chapter Exam O p g q O O p p q p q Y aimvP 39iSlti39abc m curiosity about how politics works around the world and leads you through the different ways that comparative political scientists have endeavored to answer those questions The book is organized around these questions but uses cases from the real world to demonstrate how to build arguments in political science A KEY TERMS politics 4 method of difference 15 comparative politics 5 correlation 17 hypothesis 10 causation 17 falsifiable 11 quantitative research 22 comparative method 13 qualitative research 23 method of agreement 13 mixed methods research 23 REVIEW GU ESTIO NS What is comparative politics What is the difference between a falsifiable and nonfalsifiable hypothesis What is the method of agreement What is the method of difference What is the difference between correlation and causation Why is it hard to identify the true cause of something Why are data in comparative politics research often unreliable What is quantitative research What is qualitative research KDOOlCTU1IgtUJJ SUGGESTED READINGS Fearon James Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science World Poli tics 43 1991 169196 Describes an important way to test arguments for which there is little or no direct empirical evidence counterfactuals or thought experiments Geddes Barbara How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get Selection Bias in Comparative Politics Political Analysis 2 1990 131150 Explains why the chal lenges of comparative research frequently impede the development of convincing expla nations for important events or processes Lijphart Arend Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method American Politi cal Science Review 65 3 1971 682693 A classic explanation of how to employ the comparative method The State Pirates have threatened commerce in every age Their numbers grow when they can find safe haven in ports that lack law and order 30 CHAPTER 2 The State What makes a state successful collective action problem I a situation wherein each individual has private incentives not to participate in an action that benefits all members of the group citizens willingly accept the state s sovereign authority to use power as well as the state s effectiveness how the institutions of the state shape citizens lives In this chapter we first explore the challenge of balancing individual and collective interests as a way to establish order in human societies We then differen tiate the state from other concepts such as nation government and society Third we compare the factors that explain state formation in early and later historical eras Finally we explore one way that political scientists measure states relative strength or weakness that is their ability to maintain effective order The point as you will see is that comparative politics provides insight into the question of where states come from Such insight then helps us understand why some succeed and others fail to exert authority over the territory within their borders BALANCING INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE INTERESTS A successful state must first solve the problem of establishing political order among its people Establishing political order is a collective action problem a clash between individual and collective interests When members of a group must choose whether to participate in a collective activity for example paying taxes to provide for education or participating in a protest movement against a dictatorship problematic issues often arise Leaders want everyone in the group to participate but each individual is torn between incentives not to participate and their interests in benefiting from the group s work From an individual s standpoint cooperating with others can be costly in terms of time money or forgoing other choices Individuals thus often have an incentive to let every one else do the hard work associated with public benefits Let s explore a classic example the Prisoner s Dilemma to illustrate how the tension between indi vidual and collective desires pervades politics The Prisoner s Dilemma The best known example of a collective action problem is the Prisoner s Dilemma which got its name from the following hypothetical situation two criminals are arrested under suspicion of having committed a bank robbery The police do not have enough evidence to convict either suspect so they tell each the same thing Here s the deal We admit that we don t have enough to convict you So if both of you hold out and don t confess to robbing that bank then we ll send you to prison for two years for violating your parole However if you confess to the robbery and your partner keeps his mouth shut then you ll go free while he will get ten years in the state penitentiary Of course if you don t confess and he does then we ll let him walk and you will do the ten years And if you both confess you ll both get five years The cops have the criminals in a bind because each will reason similarly If I keep quiet but my buddy rats me out then I m going up the river for ten years If I confess and he does too we both do five years And if we both keep quiet we both do two years The best for me would be if I confess and he keeps quiet because then I go free and he does the hard time But if he thinks just like me then he ll 32 CHAPTERZ Thestate T TH bELEs el 5 Ti 7 1 0Q K S h r1 Esav 1 In the Old Testament book of Job the leviathan was a croltodile lillte sea monster that only God could subdue This illustration shows a typical cover of Hobbes s book where the leviathan is imagined in human form as a giant who dominates the world and all the people in it 34 CHAPTER 2 The State What do states do Watch the Video quotArtificial Borders and Tribal Conflicts in Pakistanquot at mypoisciabcom Explore the Comparative quotPolitical Landscapesquot at mypoIisciIabcom the threat of punishment not moral qualms prevents most people from violating others rights For Hobbes the Leviathan should use force only to uphold citizens freedoms Hobbes believed that consenting to being coerced results in a stable and just social order Hobbes offered a philosophical answer to the question of where states come from He suggested that states help provide law and order and other useful services they help people avoid contemporary Somalia s situation of nearanarchy chaos and political violence In short states offer a response to individuals core interest in personal security they balance individual and collective interests Now let s look more closely at how the state maintains order by examining the state s attributes ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONS For Hobbes the creation of a strong central government could generate coopera tive behavior that would end the war of all against all and resolve the prisoner s dilemma inherent in the state of nature Ending such a war requires consenting to limitations on one s own freedoms thereby empowering a Leviathan Yet what are Leviathan s characteristics What exactly is the state We turn to these defin ing questions in order to explain what states do to distinguish the institutional notions of state and government from each other and to distinguish the state from ideas of nation and society which focus on political interests and identities rather than on political institutions Sovereignty As defined earlier a state is a political legal entity that has sovereignty Two characteristics of sovereignty are key to effective rule of the state The first is centralized decision making Ultimately one or some individuals control the state on behalf of everyone else Second centralization requires the possibility of coer cion given that centralized decisions for the entire community may or may not reflect everyone s individual interests States can force individuals to do what they do not want to do and can prevent them from doing what they want to do Many comparative politics questions focus on the ways states and their rulers regulate what people do with their time money property minds and bodies Let us focus for a moment on the part of the definition of the state involving a monopoly on the legitimate use of force All governments use force or the threat of force to maintain order Indeed the threat of violence is behind every authoritative political decision As Hobbes said Covenants without the sword are but words Similarly Columbia University political scientist Charles Tilly said Violence is writ ten in the DNA of the state Of course even the most dictatorial of states are never perfect monopolists of violence There will always be crime However states claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their territory authorization to use violence is ascribed to institutions or individuals only to the extent that the laws of the state permit it All other violence whether organized or random is illegitimate Establishing Institutions 37 A final important difference is that membership in a state is an objective legal fact you are either a citizen or not based on where you live or were born or what passport you carry In contrast nationalism the feeling of identification with a nation is a subjective sentiment It is a form of political identity a set of learned political beliefs that people can feel very deeply like religious faith People do not willingly lay their life on the line for their state although nationalistic patriotism often motivates people toward valor on the battlefield Let us now consider a final distinction between the state that holds legal sovereignty and the society that exists within that territory State versus Society Society sometimes called civil society is a term for the diverse forms of vol untary collective action that people engage in outside the realm of the state and its authoritative coerced public choices It consists of all formal and informal organizations social movements and interest groups that attempt to 1 remain autonomous from state control and 2 articulate their own economic cultural andor political identities and interests3 When we speak of society we mean the ways that people speak assemble associate and reason together on matters of public concern and act together to influence politics4 This idea invokes interests and identities rather than political institutions In the United States examples of such interest or identity based organizations include churches and other faith based organizations community groups ranging from the Boy Scouts to the Junior League to the Elks Club American Legion or Loyal Society of Moose professional associations such as the American Bar Association American Medical Association or even the American Political Science Association charities and other voluntary groups such as the United Way or the Red Cross nongovernmental advocacy organizations such as the National Rifle Association Planned Parenthood the American Civil Liberties Union the Federa tion for American Immigration Reform or Amnesty International labor unions such as the AFL CIO and business associations such as the National Association of Manufacturers or the Chamber of Commerce Organizations and groups such as these are clearly not part of the state Yet like state or nation the concept of society is an abstraction This makes it extremely difficult to locate the dividing line between state and society in the real world Nevertheless political scientists are interested in the former s capacity to use its coercive authority to influence the latter and in individuals and groups capacity to influence the state and the policies its government produces This sug gests that a potential tension always exists between state and society on the one hand the state can become too strong eliminating individual and group political economic and cultural freedoms On the other hand a strong society can serve as a monitor check and restraint on the use of coercive authority However if a state is too weak in the face of powerful societal interests it may be unable to control a part of the society For example in some countries rebel groups or criminal organizations are strong nationalism I a subjective feeling of membership in a nation society I a term for all organized groups social movements interest groups and individuals who attempt to remain autonomous from the influence and author ity of the state 39 Understanding Early State Formation SUMMARY TABLE Distinctions among State Government Nation and Society Concept Definition Example State A poitica legal unit with sovereignty over a particular territory and the population that resides in that territory Government The organization that has the authority to act on behalf of a state and the set of individuals who act within the state39s institutions Nation A cultural grouping of individuals who associate with each other based on collectively held political identity Society The formal and informal organizations social movements and interest groups that attempt to 1 remain autonomous from the state and 2 articulate their own identities and interests independently from the influence of the state and its authorities The U nited Kingdom British Prime Minister David Cameron his appointees and bureaucrats accountable to his leadership Scottish and Welsh groups that live in the U K but identify with a regional cultural identity including different accent or language dress food customs and perhaps religion British environmental feminist sports or religious organizations 2 An increase in the central government s sovereignty over carefully delin eated territory and a decline of decentralized and overlapping forms of sovereignty such as the traditional system of feudalism under which several local or regional landowning nobles claimed authority over a single piece of territory and only paid nominal allegiance to a central king or emperor 3 An increase in the organizational complexity of centralgovernment institutions feudalism I a form of political organization in which no single po litical entity or ruler held unambiguous territorial sovereignty and in which political rule involved multiple Many contemporary states do not perfectly conform to these criteria of deperson and Often Overlapping alized complex central government sovereignty In particular kinship remains lines of authority Understanding Early State Formation 41 FRENCH GALLEY VS BRITISH SHIP OF THE LINE A naval galley top contrasted against a ship of the line bottom Galleys were the dominant type of naval warship for almost 2500 years until the 16005 The largest weighed about 200 tons and typically carried one bronze smoothbore can non which was only useful at short range The larger and more powerful vessels emerged in the 16005 as a result of tech nological advances in ship design and construction A ship lilte this could weigh 2000 tons and carry more than 100 rifled iron cannon which were accurate at much longer ranges Building just one of these ships costs as much as an entire fleet of galleys but rulers who commanded fleets of advanced warships succeeded in consolidating state sovereignty Understanding Early State Formation 43 The Natural Environment and Early State Formation One way to explain early state formation focuses on how changes in the military economic and cultural identity contexts shaped rulers political interests which drove early state formation because of competition between leaders for territory and military power and because of tension between ruler and subject over the rights of taxation Let us now contrast this argument with one that deemphasizes politics and focuses instead on the impact of the natural environment Competition and warfare between rival leaders have occurred throughout human history This means that political competition by itself cannot explain the rise of the modern state in the 1600s An alternative explanation for the emer gence of the first modern states focuses on rising population density in Medieval Europe Historically whether in ancient or contemporary eras the size and den sity of the regional population is a strong predictor of political centralization and institutional complexity Populations increase when more babies survive into adulthood at which point they make more babies What causes declines in infant mortality rates The key factor lies with the natural environment an increase in food production Increases in food production allowed more babies to eat well survive into adulthood and make more babies An increase in food production in Medieval Europe thus may explain the increased population density that led to modern state formation If a rise in food production in Europe is allimportant for explaining early state formation a pertinent question is What explains the rise in food produc tion at this time The best answer to that question is that Europe had good luck rather than any particular advantage in brainpower or creativity implying there is nothing inherently superior about Western cultures Instead countries such as England France and Germany just had the good fortune to be located in a relatively flat temperate zone where heavy pack animals such as horses and cattle and food crops especially grains like wheat and oats and potatoes could thrive The idea that Western Europe s success at forming the first modern states was a determined by nature s roll of the dice has proven influential partly because it is politically correct The states that emerged and consolidated first had tremendous advantages over people in other regions These states had military economic and technological superiority which explains their eventual domination or colonization of most of the rest of the world from the 1500s to the mid twentieth century Yet this environmental argument suggests Western Europeans shouldn t be proud of this accomplishment because nothing they consciously did accounts for their superiority They just won the global environ mental lottery To explain early state formation both political competition and environmental factors are important the table on the following page summarizes the main points of this section Geography is not always destiny places with similar natural envi ronments do not always have similar political systems Because we cannot always map environmental conditions to political outcomes we know that political in terests also matter This combination of the political and environmental contexts Understanding Late State Formation 45 arguments regarding the military economic and cultural contexts as important influences in early state formation Let s see how these elements apply to cases of more recent state formation The Military Context Western European states formed during centuries of inter national conflict Indeed as discussed one of the most important factors driving state formation in early modern Europe was the international military context which reshaped the feudal order and forced European rulers to search for new ways to finance defense spending However the international military context of the Middle Ages differed dramatically from the post 1945 era The Cold War fol lowing World War II gained its name for a reason there were relatively few inter state hot wars after 1945 Even after the Cold War ended in 1990 the pattern continued the number of civil wars increased while the number of interstate wars remained fairly low As a result although rulers in both early and lateforming states shared an interest in maintaining the territorial integrity of their borders the international military context in recent decades did not contribute to state formation as it did in earlier eras8 The relative lack of military pressure from their neighbors meant that political leaders in recent decades faced weaker incentives to increase military spending weaker incentives to increase taxation and thus little reason to construct large complex bureaucracies that characterize stronger states To this military fac tor we must now add the way that a different economic context shaped state formation in the recent era The Economic Context A relative lack of military pressure is not sufficient to explain the relative weakness of many lateforming states States that consoli dated relatively early a few European states the United States and apan got the jump on the process of economic development By the late 1800s these were by far the world s wealthiest and most powerful states and during that period European states used their power to colonize most of Africa and much of Asia Japan colonized Korea Taiwan and large parts of mainland China in the early twentieth century Although the United States acquired few formal colonies it informally influenced many other states especially those in the Caribbean and Latin America Empires served the economic and political interests of the colonial power exploi tation of the labor and natural resources of the occupied territories Colonial pow ers were uninterested in developing legitimate institutions in their colonies instead they were only interested in maintaining order effectively enough to dominate the locals and to extract what resources they could As a result when colonized states gained independence in the twentieth century they did so almost overnight as the empires of foreign occupiers collapsed Political leaders in newly independent states had little time to engage in statebuilding practices such as societal mobilization for warfare or expanding administrative and tax extraction capacity Instead most new states tended to be relatively poor and their leaders were forced to work with the government institutions they had inherited from colonial authorities institutions that had never been designed to provide effective government services in the first Understanding Late State Formation 47 form of legitimate rule In contrast because the process of decolonization was so rapid for many lateforming states political leaders in many newly independent states lacked the time and resources to grind down locallevel political attachments in an effort to construct a coherent and legitimate national political identity9 For example in the Muslim world many people continue to believe that religious authorities should have political primacy not secular political leaders And across many parts of Asia Africa and the Middle East forms of political iden tity based on tribe clan or kinship group still predominate over any broader sense of national identity In short because of the persistent strength of non nationalistic forms of political identity many lateforming state institutions lack legitimacy A few states consolidated sovereignty by the 1 800s and these earlyforming states remain relatively strong In contrast states that formed in more recent decades such as Somalia tend to be relatively weaker in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness The explanation for such variation rests with differences in the way the military economic and cultural contexts shaped political interests in new states although military pressures from abroad were lower in recent decades many of these former colonies gained independence in a position of economic weakness Moreover in many cases rulers could not draw upon a cohesive sense of national identity to enhance state legitimacy The political con text in recent decades raised high hurdles for state consolidation In addition as in the earlier era in many cases the natural environment has also shaped trajec tories of state formation in recent decades The Natural Environment and Late State Formation Both political interests and the natural environment play a role in determining the relative strength of late forming states Many African states are precariously weak In some cases environmental factors do contribute to the relative weakness of late forming states because consolidating state authority and legitimacy is more dif ficult in states with mountainous or heavily forested areas or in junglecovered re gions that many rivers crisscross as in the Congo or Afghanistan for example Such difficult terrain weakens states capacity to control their own borders and police their own territory provide public services extract taxes and prevent smuggling Also when the terrain is difficult roads are more expensive to build and maintain This lack of access makes extending the reach of the state more expensive In contrast in countries without forests or jungles and with relatively flat terrain state building is relatively cheaper Yet even among African states with similar geographical andor environmental conditions some are stronger than others see the feature box on Botswana and Zimbabwe This suggests that as in earlyforming states the natural environ ment does not fully determine state strength in lateforming states For example state fragility in the Saharan region ranges from low to high Morocco s state is relatively strong while Mauritania and Niger are comparatively weak And in 50 CHAPTER2 Thestate independence and the country39s rulers deftly negotiated with huge and powerful multinational mining corporations to ensure sufficient government revenue Moreover unlike some other countries leaders they did not simply stash those profits in Swiss bank accounts but instead worlted to provide Botswana39s citizens with decent public services In addition politics taltes place in a fairly open and democratic system although one party has dominated elections since independence In Zimbabwe on the other hand one man has ruled since independence Robert Mugabe Mugabe was a hero of the blaclt independence movement yet his country has actually grown poorer since independence Mugabe liltes to blame foreign meddling for his country39s poverty but his unpredictable economic policies and dictatorial unwillingness to share or relinquish power helps explain his country39s dire social political and economic situation13 Botswana and Zimbabwe gained independence as extremely weak states but colonialism cannot explain why the former offers fairly effective and legitimate state governance while the latter represents a case of state failure Botswana39s diamonds give it a natural advantage but other countries have squandered such good fortune Civil war got Zimbabwe off on the wrong foot and differences in post independence political leadership also help explain why these two similar countries have talten such different paths in terms of state strength x CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS 1 What do you think is more important for explaining Botswana39s success the laclt of war diamonds or good leadership 2 Why do you think relatively few African countries have been able to follow Botswana39s example southern Africa Botswana exhibits low fragility while its neighbor Zimbabwe is among the most fragile states in the world This variation suggests that the natural environment can be important but does not fully determine the strength of late forming states The military economic and cultural context in recent decades has predisposed many lateforming states toward weakness ineffective and illegitimate gover nance And in some cases environmental conditions have made the consolidation of state authority in former colonies even harder Do these factors doom lateforming states to weakness At this point let us turn to the consequences of late state formation The Consequences of Late State Formation For many lateforming states such as Somalia the timing of independence has had fateful consequences for the state s strength Both the changed military and economic contexts as well as issues of political identity have weakened many lateforming states When they gained independence many inherited colonial institutions that were not originally designed to establish effective governance Moreover the population of these new states regarded the former colonial institutions as illegitimate meaning that the new state rulers were only seen as legitimate because they had led successful independence movements Such leadership is valuable but such legitimacy dissipates when citizens discover that rulers fail to provide effective governance Given the persistence of preexisting 52 CHAPTER 2 The State MEASURING STATE STRENGTH HOW can An important reason that states exist is because they can provide order and We measure foster the conditions for society to flourish Australia Japan Singapore Chile state strength Watch the Video quotSomaia39s Piratesquot at mypoisciabcom and Norway are states that tend to achieve these goals and they tend to perform well on measures of state strength Other states however fall into chaos and vio lence Examples at this end of the spectrum include Somalia Lebanon Iraq Af ghanistan Congo Pakistan and Haiti How can we identify the states most at risk of failure or collapse Several scholars and international nongovernmental orga nizations seek to answer these questions by assessing state strength and weakness To gain some insight into how they do this let s consider one such measure which suggests that strength is a function of a state s capacity to generate order and other collective benefits through 1 the use of power effectiveness and 2 voluntary compliance legitimacy This approach connects back to Hobbes s emphasis on combining coercion with consent as necessary elements for stable governance That is state strength is not simply an ability to carry out certain tasks it also involves a popular perception of the state as just and fair in the way it carries out those tasks Effectiveness and legitimacy are both necessary elements of state strength because a state may remain weak if it lacks effec tiveness or legitimacy but it is likely to completely fail only if it has lost both effectiveness and legitimacy The State Fragility Index Political scientists employ a useful tool called the State Fragility Index to measure state effectiveness and legitimacy on four dimensions security political economic and social The security dimension breaks down into two scores I Security Effectiveness Score assesses the danger of external armed conflict based on the intensity of international warfare in a state s recent past I Security Legitimacy Score measures state repression of its own citizens which ranges from none to systematic The political dimension also breaks down into two measures I Political Effectiveness Score a measure that combines considerations of 1 how long the political system has been in existence 2 how long the current leader has been in office and 3 the total number of recent attempts to overthrow the leader or the political system I Political Legitimacy Score a measure that assesses political factionalism ethnic group discrimination against more than 5 percent of the population the salience of ethnicity in politics the importance of an exclusionary ideology for those who control the government and the overall fragmentation of the political system The economic dimension is based on the following I Economic Effectiveness Score which combines 1 the most recent year s measure of the country s per capita income 2 the average growth rate of 54 CHAPTER 2 The State PACIFIC OCEAN IZI Low I Moderate High BOTSWANA State Fragility in 2009 Some states particuary those in Western Europe that formed in earlier historical eras tend to be relatively strong while others particuary those in Africa and parts of Asia and the Middle East tend to be wealter However even among former colonies in Africa for example some states are stronger than others How the Index Works Keep in mind the distinction between state and government the measure of state strength does not assess the stability or popularity of any particular gov ernment administration president or prime minister It measures the likelihood that the state itself is either coherent or vulnerable to collapse in a given year And although the rankings for any particular country could be debated the crosscountry pattern does reflect what we think is going on in the world as reflected in the map above The map s key describes which countries are most at risk of failure in the contemporary world Measuring state strength serves many purposes in comparative politics includ ing giving political scientists a way to make an abstract concept more concrete We will use the concept of state strength repeatedly throughout this teXt for example when discussing civil war and when considering why some states grow rich while others remain poor CONCLUSION States exert sovereignty supremacy of political authority and a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory They organize the institu tions interests and identities of governments nations and societies Where did all 56 CHAPTER 2 The State REVIEW GU ESTIO NS What is Hobbes s problem and why did he propose the state as the solution What are the differences between the state the government the nation and society How did political interests shape early state formation To what extent did the natural environment shape early state formation How did political interests shape late state formation To what extent did the natural environment shape late state formation Consider the elements of the State Fragility Index Which element do you think is most important to explain state strength andor fragility and why lCTU1IgtUJgt SUGGESTED READINGS Centeno Miguel A Blood and Deht War and the Nation State in Latin America University Park Pennsylvania State University Press 2002 A study of the implications of civil and international warfare in Latin America on state formation Fearon James and David Laitin Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States International Security 28 4 2004 543 Considers how the political vulnerability of newer states and the influence of stronger states perpetuate state weakness Hui Victoria War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe New York Cambridge University Press 2005 Explores the case of state formation in China in great depth Reno Will Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone New York Cambridge University Press 2008 Considers the relationship between the economic context and politicians incentives in a late forming state Spruyt Hendrik War Trade and State Formation In The Oxford Handhoole of Compara tive Politics edited by Carles Boix and Susan Stokes 211235 Oxford Oxford University Press 2007 Explains how the military and economic contexts shaped politicians interests in state building particularly in early forming states NOTES 1 Paul Salopek Off the Lawless Coast of Somalia Questions of Who Is Pirating Who Chicago Tribune October 10 2008 accessed April 15 2009 httpwww chicagotribunecon newschi somalia piratessalopek 1 oct1 006 1 550 1 6 story 2 See Max Weber Economy and Society vol 1 Berkeley University of California Press 1978 54 3 Larry Diamond Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press 1999 222 4 Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato Civil Society and Political Theory Cambridge MA MIT Press 1992 546 5 See Charles Tilly War Making and State Making as Organized Crime in Bringing the State Bacle In ed Evans et al New York Cambridge University Press 1985 169 6 Jared Diamond Guns Germs and Steel The Fate of Human Societies New York WW Norton 86 Co 1997 7 See Growth in United Nations Membership 1945 Present accessed December 20 2009 httpwwwunorgmembersgrowthshtml 8 See Jeffrey Herbst The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa International Organization 43 4 1989 673692 Democratic Political A protestor calling for democracy in early February 2011 encourages other Egyptians to mobilize against dictator Hosni Mubaralt by organizing and communicating though online social networks His sign opposes injustice and calls for an end to the time of fear 60 CHAPTER 3 Democratic Political Regimes DEFINING DEMOCRACY What One way to answer the question What is democracy is to return to its origin differentiates a The idea of rule by the people goes back thousands of years to ancient Greece democratic from a non democratic form of government Watch the Video quotParty Politics in Scotlandquot at mypoisciabcom accountability I a political mechanism that offers citizens regular and realistic opportunities to remove the rulers from office through peaceful and constitu tional means electorate I a group of citizens eligible to participate in the elec tion of government leaders universal suffrage I wherein all adult citizens have the right to participate in the electoral process that selects and removes government leaders but our contemporary definition of democracy is a fairly recent invention that has changed over time For example in 1832 only about 5 percent of the adult popu lation could vote in the United Kingdom Such a proportion sounds elitist yet today We venerate the UK as one of the World s oldest democracies The definition of democracy continues to evolve and no country perfectly fits the definition But if this is true Where s the dividing line How can we tell whether a country is a democracy or not A country is deemed a democracy if it enacts three principles accountability participation and contestation Let us consider these principles and their relationship to each other Accountability The first element of the definition is that democracy is a political system in which the rulers are accountable to the ruled In theory at least a democratic govern ment serves at the pleasure of the citizens and not vice versa Given this we define accountability as a political mechanism that offers citizens regular and realistic opportunities to remove the rulers from office through peaceful legal means Removing a leader via massive protest as occurred recently in Egypt is not a regular opportunity nor did the process follow constitutional guidelines In a democracy citizens can elect the government and then at the next election they can also remove it Accountability includes voting incumbent politicians out of office and it also can include impeaching elected officials or firing bureaucrats who violate the law or who do not perform their jobs Well Defining accountabil ity as the opportunity to remove rulers is fairly narrow the possibility of account ability in this sense does not guarantee it in a broader sense of good government or responsiveness to citizens demands Still it does offer the possibility of removing leaders peacefully while maintaining overall political stability To under stand how such outcomes are possible We need to understand how participation and contestation faciliate accountability Participation The first element in the definition of democracy is that the rulers are accountable to the ruled To this we must add two additional principles participation and contestation To guarantee accountability in a democracy political partici pation must be institutionalized suffrage must be universal and participation must be unforced By institutionalized we mean that clear and consistent rules define membership in the electorate the group of citizens eligible to partici pate in the election of government leaders and by universal suffrage we mean that everyone must have the right to participate in the process that selects and removes government leaders Acceptance of universal suffrage as a basic require ment for democracy has evolved only gradually For example the United States only granted Women the right to vote in 1920 Egypt granted women the vote in 1956 and Saudi Arabia did just in 20111 64 CHAPTER 3 Democratic Political Regimes they want regardless of the consequences These days one certainly cannot say I have a bomb while traveling on an airplane even in jest Democracies all over the world face similar quandaries about the limits of free speech For our pur poses freedom of expression means that the government cannot prohibit anyone from criticizing the government or impede anyone s attempt to influence others opinions about the government Democracies must also allow citizens freedom of assembly the right to join andor form organizations that are independent of state control Membership in organizations allows people to meet and talk with others who share their opin ions acquire new information encounter different viewpoints and also to publicly express their political preferences either in support of or opposition to the government Finally democracy requires freedom of the press the government cannot control the information conveyed to members of society To form their own political opinions citizens must be able to access competing viewpoints and different sources of information Freedom of the press thus requires that mass media TV newspapers radio the Internet etc be available in some form that is free from state control And such media must be able to present infor mation independently of what the government of the day might prefer When political rules of the game protect individual and group rights elections take on more meaning Fair and Frequent Elections To qualify as a democracy a country must combine the requirements of elected gov ernment and civil liberties to guarantee fair and frequent elections Fair elections mean that the government does not meddle in the election process to favor certain candidates and discriminate against others As for elections frequency a good ques tion is How frequent is frequent enough The length of a politician s term in office must strike a balance between limited and effective government On the one hand a lengthy term is an invitation for abuse of power and for a politician to ignore the public On the other hand we want politicians to have enough time to formulate and implement policies that are useful It is difficult to know where the sweet spot lies in terms of striking this balance common sense suggests that holding elections every few years qualifies a country as democratic In the real world the average term for directly elected executives and legislators is about four years The upper limit for presidents terms is six years Mexico for example and for legislators terms eight years Brazilian senators Anything longer than that suggests that the government is moving away from frequent elections Assessing the Quality of Democracy Democracy requires that citizens and politicians respect rules that guarantee elected government universal suffrage civil liberties and fair and frequent elections De Unitary versus Federal Constitutions 67 Four key constitutional rules work to concentrate or disperse political power 1 unitarism versus federalism 2 separation or fusion of powers 3 judicial review versus parliamentary supremacy and 4 a majoritarian or proportional electoral system These principles of constitutional design help us understand the different ways democracies address Madison s Dilemma UNITARY VERSUS FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS Democracy requires rules that support participation and contestation Yet it also demands that citizens and politicians make a decision about Madison s Dilemma what s the best way to balance limited and effective government by concentrating power or dispersing it The first key decision focuses on whether the constitution should be unitary or federal A unitary state is one in which the constitution grants the central government exclusive and final authority over policymaking across the entire national territory Unitary constitutions tightly circumscribe local state or regional governments responsibilities and authority by granting the central government veto power over subnational governments decisions Under unitary constitutions local governments have no autonomous authority to make policy Unitary constitutions thus clearly concentrate power at the national level meaning that they concentrate power in the hands of whatever politician or party controls the national government France Chile Japan Israel and the UK are examples of democracies with unitary constitutions In contrast in a federal state the constitution grants two or more governments overlapping political authority over the same group of people and same piece of territory for example a state or provincial government as well as the national government To qualify as a federal state the constitution must grant governments at the local state or provincial level exclusive control over at least one policy area This could include education or healthcare policy or the authority to impose certain forms of taxes for example In federal systems the central government can not veto policy decisions that fall under subnational governments control Given this federal constitutions tend to disperse and fragment political power relative to unitary constitutions The map below shows all 26 federal systems in the world as of 2010 Although most democracies are unitary many of the world s most populous democracies are federal including the United States India Brazil Mexico and Germany Thus al though only about 40 percent of the world lives in a federation more than half of all people in the world who live in a democracy live in a federation In both theory and practice unitary constitutions concentrate political power in the hands of politicians who control the central government However the degree to which federal countries grant autonomous powers to subnational governments varies considerably For example the United States is perhaps the most politically decentralized federation in the world State governments in the United States have considerable taxing and policymaking powers Moreover the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution says The powers not delegated to the national govern How do unitary and federal constitutions address adison s Dilemma unitarism I the constitution grants the central govern ment exclusive and final authority over policymalting across the entire national territory federalism I the con stitution grants two or more governments overlapping political authority over the same group of people and same piece of territory Explore the Comparative quotFederal and Unitary Systemsquot at mypoIisciIabcom 70 CHAPTER 3 Democratic Political Regimes separation of survival I members of both the executive and legisla tive branches serve for fixed terms of office parliamentary system I a constitu tional format in which the executive and leg islative branches have neither separation of origin nor separation of survival prime minister I the chief executive in a parliamentary system noconfidence vote I a parliamentary vote which if suc cessful terminates the prime minister39s appointment semipresidential hybrid I a consti tutional format in which the president and parliament enjoy separation of origin but only the president enjoys separation of survival happens when we take a different approach to separation of origin and survival and explore parliamentarism Parliamentarism In a parliamentary system such as that in the UK we see neither separation of origin nor separation of survival Voters directly elect members of the legislature called the parliament Those legislators then elect the chief executive known as a prime minister PM In turn the PM appoints a cabinet and together the PM and the cabinet run the executive branch departments sometimes called ministries There is no separation of origin because one branch of government the execu tive originates from within the other the legislature In contrast to presidential systems in parliamentary systems citizens have only an indirect voice in selecting the executive Parliamentarism also differs from presidentialism in that there is no separa tion of survival because neither the executive nor the legislative branches enjoy a fixed term Under certain conditions prime ministers can call early legislative elections thereby threatening the jobs of all members of parliament Yet the prime minister also serves at the pleasure of the parliamentary majority if he or she loses majority support a noconfidence vote can be called which if successful termi nates the prime minister s appointment In such cases parliament must choose a new PM and cabinet or call early elections to let the voters decide who should run the next government Thus in contrast to a presidential system under parliamen tarism the two branches of government the PM and the parliament depend on each other for survival in office until the next scheduled election Let s now turn to the third major way to structure the relationship between the executive and legisla tive branches of government the semipresidential hybrid format Hybrid Systems Presidentialism embodies separation of origin and survival while parliamentary systems have neither As the name implies the third constitutional format the semipresidential hybrid such as that found in France combines features of both presidentialism and parliamentarism First like presidentialism in hybrid systems the president and parliament enjoy separation of origin voters directly elect both the president and the members of the legislature Second unlike in presidential systems parliament in hybrid systems elects a prime minister whom the president typically must also approve The PM heads the cabinet which runs the executive branch ministries Thus in a hybrid system executive power is shared between the president and the prime minister7 Semipresidential hybrid constitutions often go into considerable detail about how authority and responsibilities will be divided In some countries presidents have very little authority beyond nominating the PM In other countries presidents control foreign affairs or can issue decrees with the force of law all of which has the effect of reducing the PM s influence 74 CHAPTER 3 Democratic Political Regimes divided government I occurs in presiden tial systems when the president comes from one party but a differ ent party controls the legislative branch Power under Presidentialism In a presidential system voters delegate control over government to two separate sets of politicians a president who controls the daytoday implementation of policy and a majority in the legislature which may or may not come from the president s party Thus on the one hand presi dential systems concentrate tremendous power in the hands of an autonomous president Most important because of the separation of survival a legislative ma jority cannot fire a president no matter how badly he or she performs In addi tion presidents control the cabinet and the executivebranch bureaucracy even if they don t control the legislature On the other hand presidential systems counterbalance the president s autono mous power by separating the executive and legislative branches All else being equal constitutions with separation of origin and survival disperse power compared to parliamentary systems Separation of origin means that presidents and legisla tive majorities possess independent bases of authority and legitimacy but this also means that they may not always see eye to eye And because of the separation of survival both the president and the legislature can survive in office without the assent of the other Given this institutional arrangement when the president and the legislative majority disagree about policy proposals the result might be government deadlock that is ineffective government To get anything done the president and the legislative majority must negotiate across constitutionally separate branches not merely within the legislature as in a parliamentary system Smooth negotiations and thus effective government across branches tend to follow when the president and his or her party not only control a legislative majority but when they agree on policy proposals Presidents have a legislative majority about 60 percent of the time under presidentialism The other 40 percent of the time the separation of executive and legislative branches under presiden tialism tends to disperse political power because the executive faces a legislature controlled by a party or coalition of parties other than his or her own a situation known as divided government8 Such a situation arose for example after the 2010 midterm elections in the United States when the Republicans took over control of the House of Representatives in the legislative branch while Democratic president Barack Obama remained in control of the executive branch Even though presidents concentrate considerable authority presidential consti tutions force the executive and legislature to negotiate across branches to accomplish anything thereby embodying the limitedgovernment principle of checks and balances The checks and balances created by the separation of survival often force presidents to negotiate with their own parties and make life even more difficult for presidents who do not control a legislative majority Power under Parliamentarism In contrast to presidentialism parliamentary systems have no checks and balances Instead they give members of parlia ment the authority to form the executive branch of government This means that the majority that controls parliament concentrates political power in its hands That majority both nominates and controls the fate of the prime minister and the cabinet PMs lack the separation of origin and survival that presidents enjoy 76 CHAPTER 3 Democratic Political Regimes lapse in which case a new government must be formed with different parties and often with a different prime minister Sometimes coalition collapse leads to new elections forcing politicians to face the voters In short as in presidential systems whether the chief executive s party controls a majority on its own or whether other parties are large enough to force the chief executive to negotiate can determine the real degree of concentration or dispersion of power in the political system indepen dently of the formal constitutional format Power under SemiPresidential Hybrids Parliamentary systems tend to con centrate power relatively more than do presidential systems though the structure of the political party system has the potential for dispersing authority In theory semipresidential hybrid constitutions occupy a middle ground As in parliamen tary systems in hybrid systems a parliamentary majority elects the prime minister and a parliamentary majority can remove the PM Yet as in presidential systems the directly elected president also plays a powerful role The dual executive works to disperse executive power because both the president and the PM must work together to implement policy In practice however two factors tend to concentrate power in most hybrid systems First many constitutions give presidents special unilateral powers In a few hybrid systems presidents are mere figureheads such as those in Austria and Ireland such countries function essentially as parliamentary systems Yet many other hybrid regimes give presidents substantially more power than the PM For example in Taiwan the president can name and dismiss the PM andor the cabinet enact certain laws without parliamentary assent and even dissolve parliament and call new elections When presidents possess this kind of authority political power is more concentrated than under a parliamentary constitution Second as in both presidential and parliamentary systems the relative con centration or dispersion of political power depends on the size of the president s party relative to other parties In hybrid systems presidents tend to dominate their own party informally independently of the formal authority they derive from the constitution Indeed if the president and PM come from the same party the PM is usually subordinate to the president For example in France the constitution specifically gives the president the power to nominate the prime minister However it is vague about whether the president can dismiss the PM In practice French presidents frequently dismiss PMs because the president is regarded as the party s leader and the PM is regarded as second in command When French president Nicholas Sarkozy won election in 2007 he immediately replaced Dominique de Villepin as PM even though Villepin and Sarkozy came from the same party Sarkozy then nominated another member of his party Fran cois Fillon to be his representative in parliament This pattern occurs in most hybrid systems The combination of formal and informal authority means that when the presi dent s party or coalition of parties forms a parliamentary majority the president rather than the PM becomes the linchpin of the entire political system In turn this 78 CHAPTER 3 Democratic Political Regimes How does judicial review versus parliamentary supremacy over the judiciary address adison s Dilemma judicial review I the ability of a country39s high court to invali date laws the legis lature has enacted by declaring them unconstitutional parliamentary supremacy I a principle accord ing to which judges decisions remain subordinate to deci sions of the legislative majority Explore the Comparative quotJudiciariesquot at mypoIisciIabcom Executive legislative relations are organized in three basic ways under democratic constitutions Yet there is one remaining branch of any government the judiciary that in uences the giveandtake between limited and effective government JUDICIAL REVIEW VERSUS PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY In addition to the question of federalism or unitarism and the issue of the way to organize relations between the executive and legislative branches of government democratic constitutions can concentrate or disperse power through decisions about how to the structure the legal system Judicial review is the ability of a coun try s high court to invalidate laws the legislature andor executive have enacted by declaring them unconstitutional This approach contrasts with the principle of parliamentary supremacy in which judges decisions remain subordinate to deci sions of the legislative majority Countries that enact the principle of judicial review give courts power to invali date laws in one of two ways either through the country s regular court system as with the US Supreme Court for example or through a specially designated constitutional court This latter type of court is separate from the rest of the court system and only adjudicates the constitutionality of legislation the court has no jurisdiction over civil or criminal cases As of the mid2000s the constitutions of 71 percent of the world s democracies include provisions for judicial review of legislation13 Democracies that do not allow for judicial review include Denmark the Netherlands Switzerland and the UK Judicial review tends to disperse political power Recall that Madison feared majority tyranny that once elected a majority party might pass laws in its own interest endangering limited government Judicial review tempers the power of majorities protecting individuals minority groups and subnational governments in federal systems against laws that violate their constitutional rights Judicial review thus supports limited government because it creates an independent brake on majority control Many suggest that judicial review is key to the very definition of democracy without it so the argument goes elections provide insuf ficient insurance against the whims of a temporarily popular majority Arguments against judicial review exist For one giving judges indepen dent authority potentially sacrifices effective government on the altar of limited government During a serious national crisis for example perhaps an elected government should be allowed to try something cmything without worrying whether a Supreme Court will overturn its proposals Others object that giving unelected and unaccountable judges the power to invalidate legislation actually violates the definition of democracy as a political system in which the rulers are accountable to the ruled Opponents of judicial review argue that democracy requires that elected officials interpret the constitution not unelected judges They also suggest that it is naive to assume that unelected judges will be politically impartial After all elected politicians from one political party or another typically appoint those judges in the first place and politicians tend to nominate judges who share their political interests Because voters neither hire Majoritarian versus Proportional Electoral SYSTEMS 79 nor fire judges judicial review insulates a set of political actors from both voters and elected officials Judicial review in the United States goes back to 1803 in the case of Marbury 12 Madison yes that James Madison At that time the US Supreme Court established that the judicial branch had the authority to undertake judi cial review However until recent decades few other countries employed this constitutional principle In Europe most democracies emerged with the tradi tion of parliamentary supremacy which concentrates power in the hands of the parliamentary majority and gives elected politicians an advantage over unelected judges This may sound democratic but European countries began to embrace judicial review after the rise of fascist dictatorships in Nazi Germany Spain and Italy made it clear that parliamentary majorities could not be trusted to uphold limited government In fact under pressure from fascist movements like Hitler s Nazi party parliaments sometimes eagerly passed legislation that eliminated existing constitutional liberties The horrible consequences of fascism prompted politicians and activists in Europe and elsewhere to seek stronger safeguards against future collapses of democracy To escape the longstanding tradition of judicial subordination to parliament they institutionalized the principle of judicial review And as more and more countries adopted democracy in the last quarter of the twentieth cen tury many adopted judicial review for similar reasons to promote limited government and prevent the recurrence of dictatorship These countries new democratic leaders sought to enshrine checks and balances and ensure that courts could protect individual human rights Judicial review is now seen around the world as a key factor for defending the principles of individual and minority group rights because it tends to disperse political power In contrast the principle of parliamentary supremacy maintains judicial power relatively concentrated in the hands of the legislative majority Let s now consider the final important way that democratic constitutions can concen trate or disperse political power through the electoral process MAJORITARIAN VERSUS PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS The last important way democratic institutions address the tension between limited and effective government is through the electoral process The electoral system is the political rules that translate citizens votes into legislative seats and or control of a directly elected executive Let us focus on the way in which those rules tend to 1 manufacture majority control of the legislature giving one party control or 2 promote proportional representation in the legislature thereby giv ing ethnic religious or other political minorities some power Electoral systems that tend to give one party control over representative institutions concentrate power and emphasize the benefits of effective government In theory such institutions should not completely sacrifice limited government because voters can always hold that party accountable at the next election Still in contrast electoral systems that give minorities some representation address Madison s Marbury v Madison I A US Supreme Court case which established that the judicial branch had the authority to under take judicial review of laws passed by Con gress and signed by the president 37 How do different electoral systems address adison s Dilemma electoral system I the political rules that translate citizens votes into legislative seats andor control of a directly elected executive 82 CHAPTER 3 Democratic Political Regimes Supporters await the start of a political rally for the Bahujan Samaj Party in April 2009 The BSP is a regionally strong party gaining nearly all of its votes among poor people in India39s most populous state Uttar Pradesh the first eight parliamentary elections following its independence from the U K in 1947 a single party dominated the majority of seats However starting with the 1989 election no party has managed that feat again every government since that year has required a coalition between multiple parties Moreover India39s party system now exhibits far greater fragmentation than does the U K party system There are two relatively large parties which won almost 60 percent of the seats between them in 2009 However almost 40 other parties and numerous independent candidates not affiliated with any party at all split the remaining 40 percent of the seats with most winning just a few seats with a small fraction of the vote ASSESS THE HYPOTHESIS The resulting coalition government from the 2010 UK election might be an aberration but the consistent fragmentation of the Indian party system since the late 1980s undermines the hypothesis that plurality rule always tends to manufacture parliamentary majorities favoring effective government When will plurality rule not discriminate against smaller parties The 2010 results from the U K point toward an answer when parties can compete effectively in particular regions For example the Democratic Unionist party and Sinn F in compete only in Northern Ireland the Scottish Nationalist party competes only in Scotland and Plaid Cymru competes only in Wales Under the UK s plurality system these parties are viable on a small scale at least because they concentrate all their votes in particular geographic regions In contrast the Liberal Democrats spread their vote around the whole country doing well enough to win the plurality in only a few districts Plurality rule will not discriminate against smaller parties when those parties concentrate their votes in confined geographic regions Many small parties around the world target religious linguistic Continued 84 CHAPTER 3 Democratic Political Regimes majority rule I requires that candi dates obtain a major ity of 50 percent 1 of the votes in the district to win proportional representation I an electoral system that distributes seats pro portionally to the vote each party receives TABLE 35 France 2007 Parliamentary Election Results Percent of Votes Party First Round Percent of Seats Union for a Popular 456 598 Movement allies Socialist Party allies 356 393 Democratic Movement 76 05 Other Parties 112 04 Source Ministry of the Interior of France Legisatives 2007 Microsoft Excel file accessed July 7 2011 httpwwwinterieurgouvfrsectionsavotreserviceelectionsresultatsaccuei resultats downoadFieattachedFie2Leg07FEM ETROOMxs Majority Rule In contrast to plurality rule majority rule requires that candidates obtain an actual majority of 50 percent 1 of the votes in an electoral district to win Sometimes in a three way race for example no candidate obtains 50 percent 1 of the votes When this occurs countries that use majority rule then have a second round of elections that pit the top two vote getters from the first round against each other This necessarily results in a majority winner Majority rule and plurality rule do have something in common because only one seat is at stake in each electoral district majority rule electoral systems also tend to reward larger parties and penalize smaller parties Consider the results in Table 35 from the 2007 parliamentary elections in France which uses the tworound majorityrule system Because the Union for a Popular Movement UMP and the Socialists were by far the largest parties in their coalition we can consider them to be single parties At this election the smaller parties were heavily penalized the Democratic Move ment and smaller parties obtained almost 20 percent of the votes but less than 1 percent of the seats This result gave the two larger parties the Socialists and especially the UMP considerably more seats than their vote percentage might suggest As Table 36 illustrates like the plurality rule legislative elections using majority rule tend to concentrate control over representative institutions in the hands of one party Proportional Representation In countries that use plurality or majority electoral rules there is typically one seat at stake in every electoral constituency or district Just more than half of the world s democracies use some form of plurality or majority rule but about one in three use some form of proportional representation PR to translate votes into legislative seats In countries that use PR there must be more than one seat at stake in each Majoritarian versus Proportional Electoral SYSTEMS 87 As the name implies mixed electoral rules are designed to find a middle ground between the majorityenhancing effects of plurality or majority rule elec toral systems and the power dispersing effects of PR systems In practice the results of elections using mixed electoral rules often tend to resemble elections under PR Consider the results in Germany s 2009 parliamentary elections in Table 39 In contrast to the results for the UK even using plurality rule to elect half of the parliament only gives the largest party a small bonus Yet in contrast to the results for Israel the results do discriminate against the very smallest political parties Electoral rules address Madison s Dilemma in different ways Plurality and majority rule electoral systems focus on promoting effective government by tend ing to give one political party majority control over representative institutions In contrast PR and mixed electoral systems focus on limiting government power by giving smaller parties relatively greater ability to win some legislative seats Because passing a bill in a legislature always requires at least a majority of legislators votes PR and mixed systems tend to force larger parties to compromise with smaller par ties in order to get anything done As with the impact of federalism and the separation of powers the impact of electoral systems on the balance between effective and limited government de pends in part on the relative balance of political interests and identity groups in society and in particular on the question of what political interests and identities are mobilized into the party system In an ethnically linguistically or religiously homogenous country an electoral system that promotes majoritarian representa tional outcomes may work best because there is less worry that minority interests will be sacrificed in the name of effective government Yet in a more ethnically linguistically or religiously diverse society electoral systems that allow for PR may offer a better prescription for overall democratic performance because minorities may have more to fear from majority dominance TABLE 39 Election Results in Germany 2009 Party Percent of Party List Votes Percent of Total Seats Christian DemocratsChristian 338 384 Social Union Social Democrats 230 235 Free Democrats 146 150 The Left 119 122 Alliance 3990Greens 107 109 Others 60 00 Source Federal Returning Officer of Germany Final Result of the Election to the German Bundestag 2009 Accessed July 7 2011 httpwwwbundeswah eiterdeenbundestagswahlenBTWB U N D09ergebnissebundesergebnisseindexhtml Suggested Readings 89 of interest group representation and the number relative size and type of parties that can effectively compete for votes No one knows which mix of institutions offers the best balance between limited and effective democratic government In practice the question is resolved through trial and error political debate and through the electoral process That is supporters of each political viewpoint believe that their approach best promotes effective government while also preserving limited government Ultimately the question of what sorts of institutions promote both limited and effective govern ment is intimately related to the balance of a society s political social economic and cultural interests and identities K KEY TERMS democracy 59 accountability 60 electorate 60 universal suffrage 60 constitution 66 unitarism 67 federalism 68 presidential system 70 separation of origin 70 separation of survival 70 parliamentary system 70 prime minister 70 no confidence vote 70 semi presidential hybrid 71 dual executive 71 divided government 74 judicial review 78 parliamentary supremacy 78 Marbary 1 Madison 79 electoral process 79 plurality rule 80 majority rule 84 proportionalrepresentation 84 mixed electoral system 86 REVIEW GU ESTIO NS 1 Why does democracy require both participation and contestation 2 What institutional rules are necessary to guarantee participation and contestation and offer the possibility of accountability 3 What is Madison s Dilemma 4 What institutions of democracy tend to concentrate political power and why 5 What institutions of democracy tend to disperse political power and why SUGGESTED READINGS Dahl Robert Democracy and Its Critics New Haven CT Yale University Press 1989 A classic study of the evolving nature and definition of democracy Ginsburg Tom The Global Spread of Constitutional Review In The Oxford Handboole of Law and Politics edited by Keith Whittington and Daniel Keleman New York Oxford University Press 2008 Explores the evolution and impact of the spread of judicial review around the world Przeworski Adam et al Democracy and Development New York Cambridge University Press 2000 Chapter 1 Considers the best way to define and measure democracy Samuels David Executive Legislative Relations In The Oxford Handbook of Compara tive Politics edited by Carles Boix and Susan Stokes New York Oxford University Press 2006 Reviews many of the contemporary issues in the study of executive legislative relations so Study and Review the Post Test amp Chapter Exam at mypoisciabcom CHAPTER 4 Non Democratic Political Regimes gt J r quot39a39 V i t 2 39quotquot p 1 Kim Jong Il right who ruled North Korea from 1994 until his death in 2011 is shown here applauding a military parade His son and apparent successor Kim Jong Un stands in front of an array of high military authorities Leadership succession in North Korea is shrouded in mystery Understanding the Principles of NonDemocracy 93 ong Il calls attention to two key aspects of politics in non democratic regimes the relationship between state and society and the institutions of the regime itself The first focuses on the extent to which the government uses institutions of the state to shape citizens interests and identities while the second aspect considers how in the absence of truly competitive elections non democratic leaders are selected and removed from office These key principles which we shall describe in more detail in the next section define non democratic regimes With these two principles to guide this chapter s exploration we shall then differentiate between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and finally distinguish the ways non democratic regimes select and remove leaders UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPLES OF NONDEMOCRACY Democracy reigns in almost half the world s states as of 2011 And as you can see in Table 41 the number of Not Free countries has declined over the past few decades Still almost one in four states today still have a non democratic form of government and most are found in the Middle East Africa and Asia Until the 1990s Latin America and Eastern Europe also had many non democracies What defines non democratic regimes In a nondemocracy individuals and groups in society are subject to the hierarchical authority of the state Figure 41 points to the two key principles defining non democratic regimes Note that in opposition to the flow of power in a democracy the large arrow only flows from the state to society For this reason citizens are referred to as subjects to highlight the fact that in a non democratic regime individuals and groups lack the opportunity to hold rulers accountable as they can in a democratic regime they are subject to the regime s authority This first key facet of non democratic regimes focuses on the way in which the government attempts to use the institutions of the state to enforce hierarchical control over citizens in society TABLE 41 Types of Government Around the World Total Number Year Democracies SemiDemocracies NonDemocracies of Countries 1972 29 44 25 38 46 69 149 1986 34 o 57 34 o 57 32 o 53 167 1996 41 o 79 31 o 59 28 o 53 191 2011 45 87 31 60 24 47 194 Source Freedom House Freedom in the World Country Ratings httpwwwfreedomhouseorgimagesFiIefiwhistoricalCountrystatusRatingsOverview1973 2011pdf accessed July 9 2011 What defines non democratic regimes Explore the Comparative Chief Executivesquot at mypoliscilabcom Differentiating Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes 95 DIFFERENTIATING TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES In all non democratic regimes governments use the institutions of the state to con trol society Yet nondemocracies use this authority in very different ways and we can classify them as either totalitarian or authoritarian based on the way rulers establish hierarchical authority and relate to citizens and society Three character istics distinguish totalitarianism from authoritarianism 1 use of ideology 2 the extent of coercive mobilization and 3 the degree of social and political pluralism permitted4 Of the two types of nondemocracies totalitarian regimes tend to engage in more severe repression I A totalitarian regime is defined as one in which the government attempts to shape the interests and identities of its citizens by articulating a coherent ideology employing extensive efforts to coercively mobilize support for the regime and imposing tight restrictions on both social and political pluralism I An authoritarian regime concentrates on using coercion to limit political plu ralism in order to remain in power but relative to a totalitarian regime an authoritarian regime permits some social pluralism An authoritarian regime does not use ideology or coercive mobilization to shape citizens interests identities or support for the regime Today most non democratic regimes are authoritarian However totalitarian re gimes have played a critical role in shaping world politics since the 1930s Nazi Germany is perhaps the best known example totalitarian regimes also dominated Russian and Chinese politics for decades as we will discuss below The three key differences in the ways that nondemocratic regimes relate to society distinguish authoritarianism from totalitarianism Let s examine the use of ideology first Use of Ideology An ideology is a set of political beliefs or ideas that structures and gives meaning to our political interests and that motivates people to act politically in particular ways In a totalitarian regime leaders believe that their interests include implement ing their ideology s tenets and spreading and deepening its influence both at home and abroad In contrast authoritarian governments spend less time and government resources promulgating an official ideology This is not to say that authoritarian governments do not repress dissent but that they devote more resources to main taining order and less on drilling ideological purity into their subjects Totalitarian ideologies are distinct in five ways5 I Totalitarian ideologies are overt national leaders write them down and broadcast them publicly I Totalitarian ideologies are systematic governments discuss and update a highly detailed set of integrated ideological principles What is the distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism Explore the Comparative quotCivil Rightsquot at mypoIisciIabcom ideology I a set of political beliefs or ideas that structures and gives meaning to political interests and that motivates people to act politically in particular ways Differentiating Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes 97 regime its goals and its ideology To advance in any profession citizens living under totalitarian governments must become members of this government party and pledge complete obedience to the regime s ideology and party leaders To illustrate coercive mobilization further let s return to the example of the Soviet Union To supplement the ideological indoctrination students learned in school the government created and controlled special youth organizations called the Young Pioneers designed to enhance the socialization process and transform children into reliable regime supporters Unlike the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts or similar organizations in the United States and elsewhere kids in the Soviet Union were required to join the Pioneers at a young age and continue on through high school And also unlike the Scouts Soviet youth organizations were instruments of the government designed to reinforce ideological indoctrination mobilize peer pressure and manufacture absolute conformity with government dictates Once students entered university they faced pressure to join another government controlled organization called the Komsomol in Russian an abbreviation for Communist Youth Union which at one time had millions of members Job pros pects and career advancement especially in government jobs often depended on having demonstrated a commitment to the organization Komsomol leaders sup ported by the Communist Party acted like power mad dormitory resident assistants A painting of militarized Komsomol the communist youth organization under the USSR Powerful incentives drove millions of teenagers and young adults to join an example of a totalitarian government using institutions to coercively mobilize support Differentiating Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes 99 SUMMARY TABLE statesociety Relations in Different Political Regimes Democracy NonDemocracy Key Characteristic Authoritarianism Totalitarianism Use of ideological None Limited Extensive indoctrination Extent of coercive None Limited or minimal Extensive mobilization demobilization emphasized Degree of Social or Extensive Limited None political pluralism permitted Examples Canada Japan Israel Brazil 19641985 USSR 19171991 Nazi Mexico 19292000 Germany 19331945 Greece 19671974 Italy 19221943 North Egypt 19522011 Korea violence to control both political and social pluralism They typically create special police forces that have the authority to invade every aspect of individuals per sonal and social lives They also use informers encouraging citizens to report on each other s activities Fear of prison or personal harm divides individuals from each other and creates suspicion When distrust and fear prove insufficient to sup press pluralism the police jail or violently crush opponents The use of coercion deters political and social pluralism and keeps citizens in line George Orwell s famous notion from his book 1984 that Big Brother is watching you reflects the key idea behind totalitarianism the government toler ates absolutely no opposition has eyes and ears everywhere and is willing and able to whisk you away if you behave in a politically inappropriate manner In places like North Korea today or Hitler s Germany or the Soviet Union in the past totalitarian regimes have used the institutions of the state to indoctrinate individu als with an ideology in an effort to shape their interests and identities in support of the regime and they have followed through on their threat to use violence against those who resisted Totalitarian regimes emphasize ideological indoctrination and coercive mobilization and attempt to eliminate any and all social and political plu ralism By contrast authoritarian regimes can seem almost benign although their interest in demobilizing the population certainly opens the door for extensive use of repression and coercion The table above summarizes the distinctions between democratic authoritarian and totalitarian systems in terms of statesociety rela tions and provides examples of each type In the next section we explore the two most important ideologies totalitarian regimes employed to indoctrinate and mo bilize their populations fascism and communism Differentiating Communist and Fascist Ideologies 101 Marx never provided details as to how a communist political system would actually function in the real world It was left to Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin 18701924 to elaborate on Marxist ideology after he led the overthrow of Russia s monarchy in 1917 and established the Soviet Union Lenin consid ered average citizens incapable of constructive political engagement and argued that a communist revolution requires a select elite to lead a tightly controlled highly disciplined political party trained to combat entrenched political forces on behalf of the rest of society Lenin also asserted that after a successful communist revolution party lead ers would assume control of all state institutions and use coercion to completely transform society according to communist ideological principles For example he argued that the most effective way to promote a classless society of economic equals is to eliminate private property entirely and he also held that the most effective way to accomplish that goal is to give the central government complete control over all economic activity Under the communist regime he eventually set up in Russia pri vate citizens could not own property of any kind everything belonged to the state Lenin and his successor Josef Stalin 1878 195 3 were responsible for creat ing a fully totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union They elaborated communist ideology in great detail and used fearmongering and extensive coercion to enforce conformity with the regime s dogmatic ideological principles Thus although com munist ideology as Marx defined it advocated equality in practice members of the Communist Party became a privileged class enjoying perks that other citizens did not enjoy and enforcing totalitarian control over all aspects of society During the Cold War the clash between communist dictatorships and capitalist democracies drove the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust Today communist parties remain in power only in Cuba North Korea Laos Vietnam and China In all five of these countries a single party remains in power and tolerates no political opposition However Laos Vietnam and China abandoned communist economic principles after the collapse of the Soviet Union The Chinese Communist Party has gone so far as to wholeheartedly embrace capitalism even suggesting that getting rich is every Chinese citizen s patriotic duty Marx and Lenin are probably spinning in their graves These regimes have moved away from totalitarianism yet they all remain authori tarian because they continue to limit political pluralism and to punish political dissent North Korea has engaged in neither economic nor political reforms and remains the contemporary world s best example of a fully totalitarian regime Fascism Totalitarian communist regimes dominated governments from Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia for much of the twentieth century Fascism was a second important totalitarian ideology and fascist regimes emerged early in the twentieth century in Italy Germany and Spain Fascist movements also gained prominence in the UK France Brazil Japan and elsewhere Several principles unite fascist ideology First Fascism drew intellectual inspi ration from popular nineteenth century racist theories of Social Da1 winism the Watch the Video quotCastro39s Cubaquot at mypoisciabcom Social Darwinism I the idea that certain races are inherently superior to others and that the superior races would inevitably con quer the wealter ones Differentiating Communist and Fascist Ideologies 103 i SUMMARY TABLE Comparing Communism and Fascism Communism Fascism Core Economic capitalism exploits Racism and nationalism certain Elements of the poor communism justifies races are inherently superior to Ideology elimination of private property others and will naturally come to redistributes wealth to the poor dominate Extreme nationalism and advocates government control justifies the use of repression and of the economy violence Nature of Elite party leads the revolution Charismatic leader embodies the Leadership and then controls the state national will In turn fascism rejects communism s emphasis on economic class identity and class conflict and emphasizes nationalism as the most important form of political identity The summary table above highlights some of the key differences between fascism and communism Fascism arose in opposition to communism in early twentieth century Europe It was most popular with people who felt left behind by advances in modern technology and by the growth of large scale industrial capitalism This could include just about anybody small farmers craftsmen shopkeepers or even traditional landowning conservative elites who felt threatened by urban ization and the rising power of industrial workers In turn communism appealed to those industrial workers who sought political change to protect their rights as workers and to provide greater social welfare protections These political appeals help explain why fascism is associated with nostalgic backward looking extreme right wing conservative politics while communism is associated with utopian forwardlooking extreme leftwing radical politics even though both are totali tarian ideologies In sum totalitarian governments try to completely dominate individuals and society by developing an ideology and using the institutions of the state to shape or reshape individual and group interests and identities This effort at total domina tion differentiates totalitarian from authoritarian non democracies To be sure no matter how repressive no non democratic government has exactly corresponded to our definition of a totalitarian regime Even in Hitler s Germany or Stalin s Soviet Russia individuals still retained some private life Still like many political science concepts totalitarianism is useful because we can apply it to real world cases Although there is no clear way of measuring precisely how totalitarian any society is we can compare systems against each other or consider how regimes evolve over time and decide whether a non democratic system exhibits the main traits of a totalitarian regime Totalitarian regimes have become increasingly rare but some authoritarian regimes have attempted to employ totalitarian methods For example rulers in 106 CHAPTER 4 NonDemocratic Political Regimes military regime I a non democratic regime in which the selectorate is typically limited to the highest ranlts of the military officer corps junta I the group of leaders of a military regime group also vary across regimes and can include everything from charisma to per sonal connections to an ability to get things done in government In all single party regimes control over and transfer of political power takes place entirely within the top ranks of the ruling party The highestranking members of the party determine access to their little club and also determine who gets appointed as national leader from within their members This means that in singleparty regimes we see reciprocal accountability more clearly at work than in monarchy In single party regimes the leader owes his or her job to and is accountable to the selectorate but the selectorate is also accountable to the leader If those who choose the leader fail at their jobs the leader can demote them and take away their right to participate in choosing the next leader Singleparty regimes can be either totalitarian or authoritarian Examples of the former include Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union while examples of the latter include Mexico where a single party ruled from 1929 to 2000 and Taiwan where a single party ruled from 1950 to 2000 Sometimes as in the Soviet Union or Mexico singleparty regimes hold elections Often the ballots in such elections only allow citizens to vote for the party already in power but sometimes other parties are allowed to place candidates on the ballot Either way in singleparty regimes elections usually just rubber stamp the ruling par ty s choices for leadership with no real contestation for power Elections in the Soviet Union for example typically revealed 9999 percent support for the ruling Communist Party Several single party regimes exist today as in Cuba North Korea Laos and Vietnam but the most prominent singleparty regime in the contemporary world is the People s Republic of China In China a country with a population of 13 billion the top leadership of the Communist Party selects and can dismiss about 5000 top officials including all provincial governors heads of central government bureaucracies senior military officers and top members of the National People s Congress However this relationship is not purely hierarchical According to party rules the Communist Party s Central Committee which consists of about 300 of the highest ranllting party government and military officials has the power to choose the approximately two dozen members of the politburo an executive coun cil of the Central Committee Yet here is where we see the relationship of recip rocal accountability because the politburo members also choose the members of the Central Committee This means that politburo members owe their jobs to the Central Committee while Central Committee members also hold their positions at the pleasure of the politburo The lines of accountability run both ways within China s top leadership9 Military Regimes Military regimes are distinct from monarchies and singleparty regimes in that the selectorate is typically limited to the highest ranks of the military officer corps This group selects and removes the leader or junta meaning a group of leaders pronounced HUN ta Admission to the selectorate is restricted to those who rise through the military ranks and selection of the national leader is typically 108 CHAPTER 4 NonDemocratic Political Regimes oligarchy I a non democratic regime in which the selectorate consists of a small social economic or political elite which selects a leader to rep resent their interests The third factor that may give rise to military regimes has less to do with the interests of leaders of the armed forces and more to do with civilian institutions When both soldiers and average citizens perceive civilian political institutions as legitimate military leaders are less likely to overthrow the existing system Yet when officers and enlisted personnel begin to believe that civilian leaders and civilian institutions have forfeited their claim to legitimacy whether due to corruption generalized political disorder loss in war disastrous economic policies or an inability to end political deadlocllt their self perception as defenders of the homeland leads them to conclude that they must enter politics to fulfill their oath of office And in such situations the weakness and illegitimacy of civil ian political institutions means that the population may acquiesce or even support intervention by the armed forces In short military regimes are more common in weak states because the army may be the only strong institution remaining Military regimes have been quite common throughout history in almost every area of the world One recent example is Myanmar formerly known as Burma an extremely poor and isolated country in Southeast Asia where the armed forces controlled all institutions of government from 1962 to 2011 Twelve military com manders comprised the junta called the State Peace and Development Council10 The armed forces repressed opposition parties social movements and NGOs con trolled access to all forms of mass media including the Internet and engaged in widespread human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities and political opponents Elections were held in 2011 but pro democracy opposition parties refused to participate and alleged fraud Myanmar s current president and many of its top officials are former generals and the military retains tremendous influence in politics Oligarchies A fourth form of nondemocratic government is oligarchy which means Rule by the few In oligarchies the selectorate consists of a small social economic or po litical elite who select a leader to represent their interests Criteria for membership are often informal as are the group s rules for selecting the leader In contrast to a monarchy in an oligarchy family connections do not necessarily determine mem bership in the selectorate The ruling elite may be powerful economic actors such as landholders or financial or corporate elites who appoint a ruler who mainly serves their interests In contrast to a monarchy a singleparty regime or a military regime the relationship between the leader and the selectorate in an oligarchy is less insti tutionalized and more informal That is members of social economic or po litical elites may not have direct and formal control over selecting government leaders but they do exert disproportionate informal influence relative to the rest of the population Similarly the ruler may not formally determine who gets to be a member of the oligarchy Rather government leaders may use their con trol over the apparatus of government to play aspirants for wealth and power 110 CHAPTER 4 NonDemocratic Political Regimes personalistic regime I a system built around the glorification and empowerment of a single individual community is highly decentralized with no hierarchy of religious authorities In contrast Shiites have a more hierarchical clergy with grand ayatollahs at the top and ayatollahs outranking other clergy much like the pope outranks cardinals in the Catholic Church Because theocratic governance is guided by religious principles theocracy also embodies elements of totalitarianism First in a theocracy religion is analo gous to a totalitarian ideology After all religious authorities in a theocracy are concerned with using the institutions of the state to reshape society to remake individuals identities and interests according to their religion s dictates Second in principle religious authorities in a theocracy would not seek to demobilize citizens but would seek to encourage spread and deepen their faith That is a truly theocratic government would engage in some degree of coercive mobiliza tion forcing individuals to actively engage in and publicly proclaim their faith Finally a true theocracy in which religious authorities believe that nonbelievers are heretics would at a minimum have an uneasy relationship with religious and other political minorities This means that any theocracy tends toward the totalitarian end of the spectrum in terms of permitting social andor political pluralism In the contemporary world religious authorities have considerable power and comprise an important part of the selectorate in several Islamic states for example Saudi Arabia However religious authorities do not rule in those states Instead monarchs or other secular authorities do In today s world only the Vatican City where the pope rules is a true theocracy and Iran comes close However many question the degree to which Iran approximates this type of non democratic regime Personalistic Regimes The last form of nondemocratic regime is a personalistic regime a system built around the glorification and empowerment of a single individual This may sound familiar given the previous description of the personality cults that glorify the two Kims of North Korea The key characteristic of this kind of regime is a lack of institutionalization that is the absence of clear rules governing politics and in particular governing the transfer of political power In a personalistic regime rul ers arbitrarily intervene in individuals lives and their whims decide government policy Sometimes leaders are popular but more often they rule through cunning guile and a willingness to use violence All forms of nondemocracy including both totalitarian and authoritarian regimes can be personalistic to some degree if a charismatic leader is the ruler However the degree to which a non democratic regime corresponds to this type versus one of the others is a function of the degree to which leadership selection and succession is institutionalized or not In a purely personalistic regime leadership selection and succession is informal and based on personal connections or the lead ers whim In contrast monarchies military regimes and oneparty non democratic regimes can have highly institutionalized and relatively stable leadership succession This high degree of institutionalization helps explain why single parties managed to SUMMARY TABLE Characteristics of the Selectorate in NonDemocratic Regimes Type of Non Rules for Leadership Relationship between Examples as of Democracy Size Membership Criteria Selection Leader and Selectorate 2011 Monarchy Ruler s family Family relationship Family descent Institutionalized limited Saudi Arabia reciprocal accountability Brunei SingleParty Variable Party membership rise Determined by party Institutionalized reciprocal Cuba China Regime through ranlts rules accountability Vietnam Military Typically limited to Military member rise Determined by Institutionalized reciprocal Myanmar Fiji Regime high officer corps through ranlts military high accountability Mauritania command Oligarchy Small Informal Unclear and Informal reciprocal 19905 Russia informal accountability Theocracy Variable Member of a religious Variable Variable Vatican City Iran order rise through the ranks Personalistic Limited to ruler s Leader hand piclts Unclear and Reciprocal accountability Libya until Regime cronies Informal but unclear and unstable 2011 Burltina Faso Belarus sawg aa 0l1l2l1OLu9QU0 to suopn1g1su1 6uu12dLuo3 3939 114 CHAPTER 4 NonDemocratic Political Regimes so Study and Review the Post Test amp Chapter Exam at mypoisciabcom CONCLUSION What is nondemocracy The answer turns on two key distinctions First consider the way in which the nondemocratic state relates to society Although all non democratic forms of government lack accountability and involve a hierarchical relationship in which the state dominates society compared with authoritarian regimes totalitarian regimes go to extremes to shape the interests and identities of their subjects Totalitarian regimes dominate coerce mobilize and indoctri nate their citizens to accept the official state ideology In contrast authoritarian leaders are mainly preoccupied with demobilizing citizens to solidify their hold on power Communism and fascism were the dominant totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century Both are similar in that they devalue individual rights dismiss democracy and rationalize an all powerful state However important distinctions between these ideas place their proponents on opposite sides of the political spectrum Commu nism downplays nationalism and emphasizes the interests among workers across nations while fascism stresses the importance of national community militarism and a strong charismatic leader No truly fascist regimes have emerged since the end of World War II and most countries where communist parties remain in power have become authoritarian regimes Following state and society we considered the nature of the institutions of nondemocratic regimes A focus on the extent to which membership criteria in the selectorate and the relationship between the selectorate and the leader are institu tionalized helps distinguish several forms of nondemocratic government from each other monarchy oligarchy single party states theocracies military regimes and personalistic regimes Almost one in four states today have some type of nondemocratic regime In particular non democracies still rule over most states in the Middle East Africa and Asia Such governments consistently violate citizens economic and social rights as well as their individual liberties However as the information from Freedom House implies in recent decades many Not Free governments have shifted away from nondemocracy and into the Partly or fully Free categories In the next chapter we turn to the question of why governments sometimes transition between democratic and nondemocratic regimes K 116 CHAPTER 4 NonDemocratic Political Regimes Corruption is widespread in China but the Communist Party often makes a visible show of catching prosecuting and harshly punish ing perpetrators In this case the mayor of Chongqing a large city in central China led an anti corruption crusade that resulted in the arrest of more than 1500 suspects including police officers and government officials and improve government services such as education From time to time the government also makes a great show of publicly prosecuting and sometimes executing government officials convicted of corruption This means that compared to a place lilte the DRC in China relatively more government resources are devoted to the general public which means relatively fewer resources are available for corrupt officials to skim off the top as corruption In contrast dictators who have good reason to fear losing power in the short term have stronger incentives to extract wealth as fast as possible through corruption Faced with a liltely loss of power in the near term rulers and their entourages will grab what they can The DRC s president Joseph Kabila gained power in 2001 after his father was assassinated by his own bodyguards In fact his father had overthrown the DRC s previous president just four years earlier Since 2001 armed groups have attempted to assassinate Kabila at least five times most recently in February 201115 Widespread civil conflict continues in the country39s vast eastern region contributing to an overall context of political instability Since assuming office Kabila has claimed fighting corruption would be a government priority18 but efforts have not improved matters at all bribery and extortion remain rampant Meanwhile despite possessing vast stoclts of valuable natural resources the country39s economy remains stagnant and the government does little to improve the lives of average citizens Scholars have confirmed that the intuition from this comparison of the DRC against China holds up more generally corruption is worse in non democratic regimes where rulers have good reason to fear for their jobs in personalistic Continued 118 CHAPTER 4 NonDemocratic Political Regimes Levitsky Steven and Lucan Way eds Competitive Authoritarianism Hyhricl Regimes after the Cold War New York Cambridge University Press 2010 Brings in international fac tors to help explain how non democratic rulers manipulate elections to their advantage NOTES 1 2 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 See for example Choe Sang Hun North Korea Tries to Show Its Leader Is Healthy and in Control New Yorlc Times November 7 2008 A6 See David Hawk Thank You Father Kim Il Sung Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Vi olations of Freedom of Thought Conscience and Religion in North Korea United States Commission on Religious Freedom accessed February 10 2010 httphirc housegovarchives109NKwitnessespdf See Chol Hwan Kang and Pierre Rigoulot The Aquariums of Pyongyang Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag New York Basic Books 2005 See Juan Linz Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes with a Major New Introduc tion Boulder CO Lynne Rienner Publications 2000 Zbignew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington Political Power USAUSSR New York Viking Press 1964 See for example Reviving the Komsomol Time November 4 1968 httpwww timeconMtimemagazine article 09 1 71 90249 800html New Yorlc Times January 12 2005 httpquerynytimescorrMgstfullpagehtmlres9 AO0EED81638F931A25752COA9639C8B63 From The Doctrine of Fascism by Benito Mussolini and Giovanni Gentile 1935 The full text can be found at wwwhistoryguideorgeuropeducehtml This description comes from Susan Shirk The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China Berkeley University of California Press 1993 See httpwwwirrawaddyorgresearchshowphpartid454 accessed November 13 2008 Up to date information on Myanmar can be found at The Irawaclcly website httpwwwirrawaddyorg The Irawaclcly is a newsmagazine published by Burmese exiles living in Thailand See for example David Hoffman The Oligarchs Wealth and Power in the New Russia New York Public Affairs 2003 See Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates Jr eds Africana The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience New York Basic Books 1999 See State Failure Task Force Global Report accessed May 25 2011 httpwwwsys temicpeaceorgGlobal20Report202009pdf See World Bank Governance Indicators accessed May 24 2011 httpinfoworldbank orggovernancewgiindexasp See DR Congo Six killed in coup bid against Kabila accessed May 25 2011 http wwwbbccouknewsworld africa 12591259 See Q8cA DR Congo Conflict accessed May 25 2011 httpwwwbbccouldnews world africa 111085 89 accessed May 25 2011 See DR Congo Leader Kabila Sacks 3000 Civil Servants accessed May 25 2011 httpnewsbbccouk2hiafrica8442193stm See Eric Chang and Miriam Golden Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Re gimes Social Science Quarterly 91 1 2010 120 Historical Trends 121 such as providing health care education and other benefits that promote citizens general welfare2 There are no easy explanations for changes in political regimes because global developments such as the spread or decline of democracy often have multiple causes In addition the causes of regime change in one country at one particular moment in time may be relatively unimportant in another country 20 years later To get a handle on this chapter s question we first review the frequency of regime change between democracy and non democracy over time We then explore the domestic and international political factors that appear to be systematically associ ated with transitions between regime types and assess the likelihood that democ racy will continue to spread throughout the world or be undermined by emerging global political dynamics HISTORICAL TRENDS A first step toward understanding the causes of regime change comes from looking at historical trends both toward and away from democracy At a very broad level the world has experienced three waves of democratization two of which were followed by reverse waves of regime change in which many democracies col lapsed into dictatorship3 In each wave and reverse wave of regime change a num ber of countries make the same transition from one regime type to the other As Table 51 indicates the First Wave began in the early 1800s with the emergence of TABLE 51 Waves of Regime Change Democracies as Percent of Time Period Total Number Examples of Wave Approximate of Countries Regime Change First Wave of 18251925 2267 33 US UK France Democratization Germany First Reverse 19251945 1671 23 Germany 1933 Wave Second Wave of 19451960 34110 31 Germany Italy Democratization Japan 1945 Second Reverse 19601974 36140 26 Brazil 1964 Wave Chile 1973 Third Wave of 19741995 76160 48 Brazil 1985 Democratization Chile 1989 Source Center for Systemic Peace 2011 Polity IV Annual Time Series 18002010 Available at httpwwwsystemicpeaceorginscrinscrhtm July 10 2011 What proportion of the world39s states have been democracies historically Domestic Causes of Regime Change 123 DOMESTIC CAUSES OF REGIME CHANGE When we speak of domestic factors that drive regime change we refer to aspects of a country s history and culture the political interests in society and its institutions Our goal is to determine which of these factors are associated with regime change which seem to cause states to adopt democracy and which seem to perpetuate non democracy Domestic background conditions and historical trajectories make some political outcomes more likely and others improbable or even impossible The challenge is to identify those trajectories and then to explain how they lead to democracy or away from it Religious linguistic and economic conditions that exist in any particular country emerge out of long term historical processes Historical developments establish a set of conditions that can preclude or permit some sort of political change In this section we consider the impact of three pre existing domestic conditions as they pertain to regime change an element of political identity that we refer to as civic culture changes in political interests and culture that result from economic development and the armed forces attitude toward civilian po litical institutions The Civic Culture Does the nature of a country s culture make regime change more or less likely This idea seems plausible After all if a country s culture has historically sup ported the divine right of kings then democracy may not flourish5 The core claim of a cultural approach to regime change can be stated quite simply No demo crats Then no democracy The d in democrats is deliberately lowercase be cause the claim is not a partisan statement in favor of one American political party over the other It simply asserts that if a country s citizens value political equality and individual freedoms then a democratic regime is more likely to emerge than if they do not hold those values Many hold up the United States as a society with strong elements of what we call a civic culture which is defined by three specific elements high civic engagement political equality and solidarity Elements of Civic Culture Civic engagement refers to the degree of citizens active participation in public affairs such as by voting or participating in social movements interest groups or political parties In other words in cultures with high civic engagement citizens do more than pursue their own private business or family affairs In contrast citizens in cultures with low civic engagement are less likely to express their interests publicly in the political arena For example the United States has long been noted for having multiple organizations social move ments and interest groups In contrast an uncivic culture would have few such associations In a civic culture with political equality citizenship offers both equal rights and obligations Citizens in such communities believe that no one should be above the law They do not tolerate giving some people political rights while excluding others and they view non democratic regimes as illegitimate The more a political culture approximates this ideal of political equality the more predisposed it is to What are the domestic level political sources of regime change Watch the Video quotThe End of Apartheidquot at mypoisciabcom EExpIore the Comparative quotViolence and Civil Warsquot at mypoIisciIabcom civic culture I a key aspect of a county39s cultural identity defined by three char acteristics high civic engagement political equality and solidarity civic engagement I the degree of citizens active participation in public affairs such as by voting or partici pating in social move ments interest groups or political parties political equality I citizenship offers both equal rights and equal obligations Domestic Causes of Regime Change 125 The differences between good and bad social engagement suggests that the density of organizational membership does not accurately measure a society s degree of civic ness Instead the reasons why people mobilize are more important for the emergence of democracy than is the raw number of groups This problem is illustrated by the case of Germany Although a dense network of groups and as sociations emerged by the 19203 and 1930s this culture of civic engagement still enabled the rise of Hitler s Nazi Party6 A second issue is the chicken and egg problem Does a citizenry oozing with civicness cause democracy to emerge or does having a democracy cause citi zens to become more civic If the latter is true then the idea that a civic culture causes democracy to emerge may not be true This problem is illustrated by the case of the UK one of the world s oldest democracies but also a country of royalty and nobility a place of longstanding elite snobbery against those in the working and lower classes and a country that colonized much of the world How did democracy emerge from an aristocratic system in which political elites treated the masses both at home and abroad with such contempt If democracy can emerge in that cultural context then perhaps it can emerge in any cultural context The example of the UK suggests that a civic culture may reflect democracy but not cause it to come about Given these two problems an argument that empha sizes the causal importance of political culture is at best incomplete and we need to consider alternative explanations for regime change Instead of political culture let s consider the possibility that broad economic change such as that caused by widespread industrialization can bring about political change Economic Change A country s economic transformation from poor to rich may cause a political transformation from dictatorship to democracy Why would this be so To answer this question we can look to the political consequences of the Industrial Revolution which began around 1800 and the related process of economic modernization in Western Europe Those countries that industrialized changed rapidly from primarily rural to primarily urban and they experienced breathtaking technological changes and improvements in quality of life indicators such as education and infant mortality The processes driving economic modernization transformed or even destroyed preexisting social and economic structures across Western Europe Because such changes occurred in what were at that time all non democratic regimes scholars have long suspected that such socioeconomic changes might also transform politi cal structures and bring about regime change to democracy There are two ways economic change leads to political change The first approach focuses on interests specifically the way economic development can bring about the rise of new social classes who then have strong desire to fight for access to political power The second approach emphasizes identities specifically the way economic modernization changes people s values so that they grow more supportive of democracy 128 CHAPTER 5 Regime Change resource curse I hypothesizes that economic growth that relies on one valuable natural resource is unlikely to result in an equitable distribution of wealth which creates problematic political consequences dictatorships remain intact even after they have become quite wealthy In fact in the early twentieth century modernization in countries such as Germany and Japan generated support for nowdemocracy precisely the opposite of what moderniza tion theory predicts Stable democracies only emerged in those countries because the United States and its allies imposed it after World War II In the contemporary world too we find many exceptions For example Saudi Arabia retains a hierar chical political culture and appears in no danger of democratizing no matter how wealthy it grows At the same time democracy has emerged and survived in several impoverished countries India for example confounds modernization theory it adopted democracy upon independence in 1948 even though it was one of the poorest countries on earth If modernization theory were true India should not be a democracy The existence of wealthy non democracies and of poor democracies show that while economic modernization may explain some instances of regime change it can not provide a complete answer to this chapter s question about why some countries experience regime change Even though wealthy countries do tend to be democracies and poor countries tend not to be exceptions suggest that the relationship between economic development and regime change is not as straightforward as moderniza tion theory implies This in turn points us to other important factors of regime changes besides aggregate economic growth One twist on modernization theory focuses on the nature of a country s economy whether it is diverse or whether it depends on one single valuable commodity such as oil or diamonds Exceptions to modernization theory lead us to ask if there is a certain kind of economic growth that is a prerequisite for regime change in fact non democracies that develop diverse economies are more likely to see the emergence of a middle class that wants to participate in politics In contrast non democracies that rely on a single commodity for their wealth fall victim to what is called the resource curse which suggests that economic growth that relies on only one valuable resource may have problematic political consequences The logic of the resource curse is as follows governments in countries with one abundant natural resource have strong interests in retaining tight centralized control over the production sale and taxation of that commodity Governments sometimes become addicted to the revenue this valuable commodity generates and use that revenue to purchase political support Because control of the resource generates such easy money governments have few incentives to invest in other sectors of the economy In the end because economic development depends on government control of the main engine of the economy a diverse market does not fully develop This argument helps explain why economic modernization plays a smaller role in the democratization of many Third Wave cases 1970s 1990s During the Third Wave transitions to democracy were more likely in countries with diversified economies than in countries that produce oil or any other single valuable natural commodity With this hypothesis in mind the longterm prospects for democracy may be better in developing countries like Brazil or India which don t rely on one 130 CHAPTER 5 Regime Change Illustrating the military s sef perception as defender of Thai religious traditions an of ficer offers a traditional salute to a monk in front of a prominent Buddhist temple in the capital city Bangkok just days before the 2006 military coup corruption conflict of interest abuse of power nepotism misuse of government funds interfering with the system of checks and balances and mistakes in pursuing Islamic guerrillas in Thailand s southern provinces The Thai military set itself up as the defender of law and order and claimed that Shinawatra had violated Thai land s ethics and moral integrity and had destroyed the unity of the Thai nation8 The Thai military s rationale for taking power sounds self serving yet this example illustrates a key factor in explaining regime change whether a military traditionally perceives itself as subordinate to or independent of civilian author ity The question here for comparative analysis is What is the military s political identity Does that identity encourage the armed forces to intervene in civil ian politics or does it constrain the military to remain on the political sidelines Exploring the historical dynamic of civil military relations helps us understand why military coups sometimes cause regime change from democracy to non democracy and other times impede a regime change from non democracy to democracy 132 CHAPTER5 Regime Change Weak Landowning Elites and a Weak Military Can Sustain Democracy HYPOTHESIS TESTING I The Case of Costa Rica Several Latin American countries democratized during the second wave of regime change that followed in the walte of the Allied victory in World War II However during the Cold War many of these democracies collapsed into dictatorship during the second reverse wave Coups d tat destroyed democratic regimes in such countries as Brazil in 1964 Argentina in 1966 Uruguay in 1973 and as noted at the start of this chapter Chile in the same year In contrast Costa Rica democratized in 1948 and its democracy has survived to the present day Why did Costa Rica which was vulnerable to the same international influences as its regional neighbors during the Cold War not experience regime change to dictatorship when other similar countries did GATHER EVIDENCE Costa Rica presents us with a good political science puzzle precisely because its democracy survived even though it shares many attributes with other Latin American countries Consider for example the similarities between Costa Rica and its immediate neighbors in Central America El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Panama and Guatemala none of which experienced regime change to democracy until the 19905 All countries in Central America are relatively poor compared to developed democracies lilte the United States or the UK and all have economies that focused not on industry but on exporting agricultural products such as coffee and bananas None of these countries has a large middle class Instead a relatively small economic elite has dominated politics in each country since independence in the early 1800s Given these internal political and economic conditions we have little reason to expect democracy to emerge much less survive All of these small weak Central American countries were also all vulnerable to US influence during the Cold War During that period US foreign policy supported non democratic rulers in the region US meddling or outright intervention sometimes May 2010 its citizens elected the country39s first Democracy is so entrenched in Costa Rica that in female president Laura Chinchilla stymied countries efforts to chart an independent political path for example in Guatemala where the US government encouraged a military coup that overthrew a democratically elected president in 1954 We have noted that international influences were particularly important in the Cold War era as well as during the later Third Wave of transitions to democracy Yet Costa Rica resisted the global pressures during the Cold War which would have predicted a collapse of its democratic regime What explains democracy s resilience in Costa Rica ASSESS THE HYPOTHESIS Although Costa Rica shared many attributes with its neighbors it also differed in two key ways First although Costa Rica had never experienced significant industrialization and consequently did not witness the emergence of a large middle class its wealthy rural Continued 134 CHAPTER5 Regime Change SUMMARY TABLE Watch the Video quotToppIing Husseinquot at mypoisciabcom LongTerm Factors Promoting Regime Change Hypothesized Illustrative Factor Key Argument Status Impact Example Civic Culture Civic engagement H igh Democratization U SA 19th political equality century 5 nanny Low No democratization Saudi Arabia Economic Factors Class Conflict Strong middle class High Democratization U K Low No democratization North ltorea Modernization Economic development High Democratization Sweden Theory fosters Vene enenge Low No democratization Zimbabwe Military Identity Military perceives High Democratic collapse Chile 1973 nsenes lnnenennent of Low Stable democracy Costa Rica civilian authority 1949 present where democracy appeared threatened by communism and it oversaw regime change in the defeated Axis powers of Germany Italy and Japan The Allied forces defeat of fascism reverberated around the world as non democratic re gimes in other regions also collapsed and democracy emerged for example in Bra zil in 1945 and Argentina in 1946 However as the Cold War developed the United States frequently compromised its support for democracy in favor of military rulers and dictators who allied with the United States against the Soviet Union Given this inconsistent support for de mocracy anti democratic forces gained strength and legitimacy in many countries leading to the fall of democratic regimes in Brazil in 1964 Argentina in 1966 and Chile in 1973 to name a few In this way changes in US foreign policy contributed to both the Second Wave of democratization and the reverse wave that followed By the 1970s and especially the 1980s following the Vietnam War US foreign policy began to shift yet again as the US government began to redefine its national interest to support democracy and human rights For example in the 1970s and 1980s Congress began conditioning US foreign aid on recipient countries human rights standards These policies continued under Republican presidential admin istrations of Reagan and Bush 19811992 due to those presidents interest in contrasting the freedoms of US citizens against the absolute lack of freedoms offered by the totalitarian government that ruled the Soviet Union During the Third Wave American support for democracy meant that non democratic rulers lost an important external ally United States support for de 138 CHAPTER 5 Regime Change SUMMARY TABLE Global Causes of Regime Change Key Hypothesized Illustrative Factor Argument Status Impact Example Major Powers Major global Yes Transitions to Eastern Europe Foreign actors promote democracy 199O Policies USI oeroooreoy No Transitions to Latin America USSRI Catholic non democracy during the Number of High Transitions to Latin America democratic democracy during the Third regimes in the Wave er939r oorr ooo Low Transitions to Latin America Globalization non democracy during the Cold War Number of High Transitions to Third Wave of democratic democracy Democratization regimes r roe Low Transitions to Second Reverse world non democracy Wave during the Cold War Here s an analogy to illustrate the contrast between long and mediumterm factors versus those at work in the short term suppose you wanted to explain why the Titanic sank On the one hand you might suggest that the Titanic sank because it hit an iceberg On the other hand you might argue that the ship was doomed before it even left port because its design was vulnerable to flooding13 Which explanation is more satisfying The ship certainly would not have sunk without the iceberg but it also might not have sunk had its design been better even if it had hit the iceberg Both explanations the background conditions and the immediate cause are important Both explain the same outcome but empha size different factors In light of this analogy consider the transitions to democracy in Argentina Brazil Chile and Paraguay in the 1980s On the one hand all four of these regimes were under similar international pressures to democratize Yet on the other hand each regime collapsed because of a different short term factor Ar gentina s military was humiliated in a war with the UK over the Falkland Islands in 1983 Brazil s military regime grew divided over how to govern the country during an economic crisis and handed power back to civilians Paraguay s long term military ruler died without an obvious heir and as noted at the start of the chapter Chile s dictator decided to obey the results of a plebiscite that denied him another term in office The Future of Regime Change 139 In any case of regime change short term factors are the iceberg that sinks the ship Crises tend to expose a regime s flaws and delegitimize it in citizens eyes Because the regime has lost its leader its war or its way crises provide cata lysts that encourage fed up citizens to mobilize against the government In many countries such popular protests prove critical to the regime s downfall In par ticular because non democratic regimes do not have the safety valve of rotating leaders and regular elections non democratic regimes may be more brittle and susceptible to collapse in a crisis situation In these Latin American cases these short term catalysts were all different but led to the same outcome a transition to democracy Such short term events are always important but because they can be so dif ferent they are not subject to the more systematic comparative analysis we under took for the domestic and international factors Unlike domestic and international causes short term factors typically apply only to a particular case not a whole pattern of regime change Sometimes a dictator dies but another dictator assumes power leaving the non democratic regime in place Likewise an economic crisis may cause a fatal decline in regime legitimacy in one democracy but not in an other Because short term factors vary so much from country to country the key to answering this chapter s main question lies with the domestic and international background conditions And now that we have a handle on the sources of regime change in the next section consider what the future of regime change might look like THE FUTURE OF REGIME CHANGE Given what we ve discussed thus far what does the future hold in terms of regime change around the world Will the Third Wave of democratization continue and will more nondemocracies and partly free countries transition to democracy for example in countries like Egypt or Tunisia Or will we soon see a reverse Third Wave of regime change There are grounds for optimism as well as pessimism With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and China s abandonment of com munism as a totalitarian ideology some are optimistic that democracy is now the only form of government around the world with broad legitimacy Recent events in the Middle East where multitudes have demanded an end to non democratic rule have fueled this optimism And to the extent that this view is correct we have reason to expect more transitions to democracy in the future However we also have reason to be pessimistic In the late 2000s several coun tries that had at least partially democratized have sunk back into non democracy such as the case of Thailand mentioned earlier where the military overthrew a democratically elected prime minister In July 2011 elections were held and a civilian government returned to power but Thailand s future remains uncer tain Moreover despite widespread protests and great hopes for deep and lasting change in the region no Middle Eastern non democracy has yet to truly transition to democracy In general our crystal ball peering into the future remains cloudy Although the number of Free democratic countries increased and the number of What does the future hold in terms of regime change around the world Watch the Video quotVenezuea39s Constitutional Referendumquot at mypoisciabcom 142 CHAPTER 5 Regime Change However there are two reasons why the international climate today may pro vide only weak support for democracy encouraging backsliding into illiberal de mocracy or even into nondemocracy First although in principle both the United States and the EU support democracy both apply this principle inconsistently For example both Democratic and Republican US presidents have long supported a repressive monarchy in Saudi Arabia in order to protect US strategic interests in the Middle East European leaders are no less inconsistent for example they demand that EU member states adhere to strict democratic principles while they also coddle favor with dictators on other continents In many cases democratic global powers conclude that strategic interests in protecting a non democratic ruler outweigh promoting democracy Second the foreign policies of two other major global powers do not clearly support the spread of democracy even if they do not actively promote the spread of nondemocracy The first major power is Russia which has grown increasingly non democratic since 2000 and which has sought to influence the politics of coun tries on or near its borders Russia has little interest in promoting democracy it is only concerned with achieving its foreignpolicy interests The second major global power that does not necessarily support the spread of democracy is China China s rapid economic growth has extended the country s economic influence to every corner of the planet Because its economy depends on exports and the imports of food and raw materials China has strong interests in maintaining ties to friendly governments Thus far China has not sought to explicitly support non democracy but it has also used its economic influence to sustain dictators in Africa and Asia for example21 Overall as the summary table below suggests today s global political environment contains both pro and anti democratic elements and as we have seen these elements go a long way toward helping us answer this chapter s main question about why some countries experience regime change and others do not The United States and the EU both support democracy but both also apply this principle inconsistently supporting democracy in some regions or countries while propping up dictators elsewhere Moreover Russia and China are at best indifferent to democracy favor ing cmy government that supports their interests SUMMARY TABLE The Future of Regime Change Effect Tends to support democracy Element at Work in Global Politics No major global actor actively spreads nondemocracy US and EU foreign policy is inconsistent sometimes May undermine democracy support dictators Russian and Chinese foreign policy do not actively May undermine democracy support democracy sometimes support dictators Conclusion 145 NOTES 1 2 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Shirley Christian Foes of Pinochet Win Referendum Regime Concedes New Yorlc Times October 6 1988 A1 See for example Adam Przeworski et al Democracy and Development New York Cambridge University Press 2000 Samuel Huntington The Third Wave Democratization in the Late 20th Century Nor man University of Oklahoma Press 1991 I base the periodization on Huntington To calculate the number of democracies and number of countries I used the cutoff of 6 on the POLITY IV scale which ranges from 10 least democratic to 10 most democratic You can find these data at http wwwsystemicpeaceorgpolitypolity4htm See Robert Putnam Maleing Democracy Worle Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1991 See Sheri Berman Civic Culture and the Collapse of Weimar Germany World Poli tics 1997 vol 49 3 401429 See for example Josef Joffe Why Tunisia Isn t a Tipping Point for the Arab World The New Republic Online January 18 2011 accessed April 27 2011 httpwwwtnr corrdarticlepolitics81658tunisia revolution riot economy democracy or Francis Fu kuyama Political Order in Egypt The American Interest Online MayJune 2011 accessed April 27 2011 httpwwwthe american interestcon articlecfmpiece95 3 See the list ofreasons in WhatThaksin Had Done Wrong in The Nation a Bangkok news paper accessed December 1 2008 httpnationmultimediacorrU20061122headlines headlines30019578php The Nation has been accused of anti Thaksin bias Jeffrey M Paige Coffee and Power Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1997 87 See Daniel Ziblatt Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization A Test of the Bread and Democracy Thesis and the Case of Prussia World Politics 60 4 2008 610641 John Peeler Elite Settlements and Democratic Consolidation Colombia Costa Rica and Venezuela in Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and South ern Europe edited by John Higley and Richard Gunther Cambridge Cambridge Uni versity Press 1992 81112 See Kathryn Sikkink Mixed Signals US Foreign Policy in Latin America New York Cornell University Press Century Foundation 2004 There are countless theories about the Titanic s sinking A recent book that advances this argument is Jennifer Hooper McCarty and Tim Foecke What Really Sanlc the Ti tanic Lebanon IN Citadel Press 2008 See Samuel Huntington The Third Wave Larry Diamond Thinking about Hybrid Regimes Journal of Democracy 13 2002 521 See for example Joshua Kurlantzick The Great Democracy Meltdown The New Republic May 19 2011 httpwwwtnrcomprintarticleworldmagazine88632 failing democracy venezuela arab spring Fareed Zakaria The Rise of Illiberal Democracy Foreign Affairs NovemberDecem ber 1997 httpwwwforeignaffairsorg19971101faessay3809fareed zakariathe rise of illiberal democracyhtml See for example Peter Smith and Melissa Ziegler Liberal and Illiberal Democracy in Latin America Latin American Politics and Society 50 1 2008 3157 148 CHAPTER 6 Political Identity When does identity become politicized ERead and Listen n 2004 France s government passed a law banning the wearing of conspicuous to Chapter 6 at mypoIisciIabcom O lStudy and Review the PreTest amp Flashcards at mypoisciabcom religious garments in public primary and high schools1 Although the law applies to any religious garment and includes skullcaps that Orthodox Jewish boys wear turbans that observant Sikh boys wear and even large Christian cruci fixes the main target of the law was the headscarf of Muslim women French laws and legal institutions dictate a greater degree of separation of church and state than the US Constitution In France a majority of citizens support laws that require French public schools to be religion free zones Before the 1960s French secularity laws attracted little attention However around that time many Muslims began immigrating into France Their interests at the time were largely economic they were looking for work Most came from Algeria and Morocco former French colonies in North Africa Today estimates put the number of Muslims in France at about 47 million out of a total population of about 65 million2 The religious identity of many of these immigrants clashes with the principles of French secularity Our politicized identities are a function of individual choices and our surround ing social contexts Politicization depends on how strongly people feel about aspects of their identity but our choices are also shaped by what s going on around us When other peoples actions restrict our personal choices corresponding aspects of our identity are thrust into the political spotlight Consider the young Frenchwoman pictured at the beginning of the chapter Why is she participating in a protest march She seems of college age so she might be active in a campus women s group or she might be marching with others for minority rights Or perhaps she s a strong French nationalist as the colors of her headscarf imply and she s celebrating France s 1998 World Cup victory Any of these identities as a woman struggling student ethnic minority or French nationalist might shape how she thinks feels and acts politically The fact is this young woman is taking political action on the basis of her religious identity Her picture was taken at a march to support the wearing of headscarves which many Muslim women regard as part of Jijab a religious requirement for modesty in dress Perhaps this Frenchwoman had always thought of Islam as a private and personal choice However when the French government forced the issue barring her from wearing the headscarf she was mobilized to action In short her indi vidual choice to wear the headscarf a part of her identity became political The explanation for much political competition and conflict around the world lies with questions of political identity perceptions of membership in different social groups Yet when does identity become politicized To understand the interplay of individual choice and social context in the politicization of identity this chapter first explores the forms political identity can take economic and noneconomic and then critically assesses two approaches to explaining the politicization of identity primordialism and constructivism 150 CHAPTER 6 Political Identity bourgeoisie I an eco nomic class of wealthy capitalists that emerged during the Industrial Revolution proletariat I an eco nomic class of wage laborers who worlt in factories that emerged during the Industrial Revolution classconsciousness I individuals self awareness of the political implications of being a member of a particular economic class Karl Marx and Economic Identity Karl Marx 18181883 was a scholar journalist and activist Inspired by what he believed to be the start of a workers revolution across Western Europe to gether with Friedrich Engels he wrote the Communist Manifesto in 1848 By 1849 those revolutions had fizzled out but one could argue that the Manifesto s twenty odd pages have had more impact on the intellectual and political history of the world than any other single work in the past 15 0 years helping to inspire later revolutions in Russia Cuba and China Marx had such a powerful impact because he was one of the first to emphasize the way economic interests can shape political identity He argued that an indi vidual s political identity is rooted in his or her economic position in society at the top in the middle or at the bottom So if asked why the woman in our opening example was protesting Marx might explain that the real reason is because she is economically exploited In the Communist Manifesto Marx explored the consequences of the Indus trial Revolution of the early 1800s which radically transformed the economies of Western Europe Before that time agriculture dominated economic production and there were two main economic groups a small number of elite landowners and a huge number of landless peasants As industrialization advanced two new economic groups emerged the bourgeoisie and the proletariat Members of the bourgeoisie are wealthy capitalists who invest in factories and the like Members of the proletariat are the wage laborers who work in those factories Marx understood that industrialization meant that landowners would grow relatively weaker while both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat would grow stron ger As both these new economic groups grew politics would increasingly turn into conflicts between the haves and the havenots the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat What is critical for Marx is that industrialization not only increased the number of people in the proletariat it also created a new form of political identity among that group classconsciousness Classconsciousness has two elements for workers 1 Self awareness that they are members of an economic group that the bour geoisie exploits and 2 Self awareness that their class has particular economic interests Marx argued that workers collective identity as an economic class would facilitate their ability to form trade unions and advance their interests for better wages and working conditions for example against the bourgeoisie s political influence which derived from their wealth Marx s notion of classconsciousness implies that economic status is the source of political identity Marx was so sure of this connection that he believed indus trialization would wipe out other forms of political identity such as nationalism religion and ethnicity because he supposed that a factory worker in one country would have the same classconsciousness as a factory worker in another coun try Indeed Marx believed that nationalism and other forms of cultural identity were merely smokescreens that obscured powerful economic interests and that only served to impede workers unifying their mobilization efforts 152 CHAPTER 6 Political Identity political cleavage I a deep and lasting salient dimension of political conflict and competition within a given society such as religion ethnicity ide ology or other forms of identity Interests and Identity for Marx and Weber Given their differing views Marx and Weber conceived of the relationship between interests and identity differently The table below summarizes these dis tinctions Marx s argument is simple political identity and underlying political interests are a function of economic status He believed that the proletariat would organize and mobilize on its own behalf almost naturally because class conflict was an inevitable product of the process of industrialization Weber dismissed this notion noting that economic classes are not communities in the usual sense of the word Instead noneconomic forms of identity ethnicity tribe or religion for example more naturally provide the basis of the communities in which people live their day to day lives This view implies that mobilization along noneconomic lines would be easier than mobilization of economic classes because noneconomic groups share both cultural orientations and lived experiences such as religious ob servance or family and community history practices and traditions Weber s insight explains why a view of identity that relies on economics only weakly predicts the nature of political conflict in most societies A central con cept here is the political cleavage a deep and lasting salient source of political conflict based on identity that pits one group against another or several others In some societies an economic class cleavage emerges pitting the relatively poor against the relatively well off The UK has a distinct class cleavage for example the Labour Party tends to obtain support from worllting class voters while the Conservative Party tends to obtain support from wealthier voters However other societies see the emergence of political cleavages based on noneconomic forms of identity for example pitting ethnic groups against one another or adherents of one religion against adherents of another Thus in India most political competition results not from economic class differences but from a religious cleavage between Hindus and Muslims and from various ethnic cleavages that divide Hindus from each other Most countries are divided by several political cleavages which helps us under stand why political identity based on economic interests only weakly explains the SUMMARY TABLE Political Interests and Identity Marx vs Weber What Defines Interests and Identity What Drives Mobilization Marx Political identity and Mobilization will occur interests are a function of along economic class lines for economic status example bourgeoisie versus proletariat Weber Political identity and Mobilization will occur along interests are a function of noneconomic group differences noneconomic status group lines for example one ethnic group versus another 154 CHAPTER 6 Political Identity Primordialism suggests that collective mobilization occurs when groups per ceive a threat to the continued practice of their collective identity They react just as they would if their family were threatened Collective identities can also mobilize even when survival is not directly at stake because individuals feel affection for and loyalty toward those who share common physical characteristics language religion customs or culture while naturally feeling a sense of alienation mistrust and antagonism toward outsiders strangers and those who do not share their community s characteristics Primordial attachments that can motivate political action can thus extend far beyond one s immediate relatives into an imaginary extended family to one s clan tribe ethnic group or nation Samuel Huntington and Global Conflict In his 1993 article The Clash of Civilizations Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington explored the political implications of the end of the Cold War5 He concluded that the collapse of the Soviet Union effectively ended ideological con flict between capitalist democracies and communist dictatorships Many hoped that this development would herald the dawn of a peaceful era in global affairs but Huntington poured cold water on that idea and suggested that conflict in the post Cold War era would continue only that it would be cultural and based on forms of political identity besides ideology Huntington argued that civilizations are the broadest cultural identities that exist and that they are defined by language history religion customs and by individuals subjective self identification as members of one civilization and not another These primordial differences are deeply held less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than are ideological differences rooted in economic class Huntington viewed religion as a particularly problematic source of civilizational conflict because issues of faith are not subject to negotiation The explanation for politicization of these identities is straightforward com munities act in defense of their collective identity because doing so is in their very nature People want to protect their community just like they want to protect their family For example as in the case of French Muslims if the government passes a law that prohibits the wearing of certain clothes primordialism predicts that members of the oppressed identity group would naturally rise in protest This approach seems to explain why such passionate emotions erupt in cultural conflicts Such clashes pivot on deeprooted communal insecurities anxieties and fears An outsider may not comprehend such powerful emotions but such sentiments remain very real to those involved Huntington s argument is primordialist not simply because he insists that cul tural characteristics will drive future conflicts but because he assumes that indi viduals are born with one set of characteristics or another that such characteristics are immutable and that groups with different cultural characteristics will inevi tably clash He believed that the Cold War s ideological battles had temporarily suppressed but never destroyed primordial cultural attachments When the Cold War ended these longstanding ethnic and religious animosities reemerged and Huntington predicted that conflict would emerge between nations and different civilizations Politicizing Identity Constructivism 157 i SUMMARY TABLE Primordialism and Political Identity Why It S Useful Offers an intuitive explanation for the sources of political identity you39re born with it Offers a simple explanation for the politicization of identity group membership instinctively arouses group loyalties Why It s Problematic Cannot explain variation in the emergence or change in the politicization of identity Cannot explain how or why individuals and groups change identities over time the approach leaves many key questions unanswered and for this reason few scholars take it up Identities are not always so easily politicized and the political salience of a form of identity often changes over time We thus require additional information to explain variation in when where and why identity becomes politicized and why groups only sometimes enter into conflict An alternative approach to understanding the politicization of identity constructivism may offer a more satisfying explanation POLITICIZING IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIVISM Unlike primordialism constructivism assumes that the forms meaning and po litical salience of different forms of identity can change Constructivism forces us to delve more deeply into the question of how identity becomes politicized at both the individual and societal levels In this section we first consider the ways individuals actively choose and consciously attach political significance to particular forms of identity We then consider how the social and political con text shapes constrains and thus constructs those individual choices Finally we illustrate the logic of the constructivist approach to identity by exploring the evolution of the racial divide in Brazil and the politicization of nationalist iden tity in Europe Identity and Individual Choice The first way of thinking about how identity is constructed starts with individual choices for example the young woman in our opening example who has chosen to protest the French ban on wearing headscarves Constructivism does not sug gest that individuals are completely free to choose their identity Obviously biol ogy constrains racial or ethnic identity choice for example Facial features or skin hair or even eye color tend to designate us as members of one group or another whether we want to identify as a member of a particular group or not Many indi viduals do not obviously fall into a clear racial or ethnic category but depending What is the I constructivist approach to understanding the politicization of identity Watch the Video quotYouth in Iranquot at mypoisciabcom 162 CHAPTER 6 Political Identity not white while identifying 4 5 front row center 9 and 1 as white However what about 3 2 or 10 When presented with pictures of men with similar fa cial features and skin tones most Americans would tend to classify these men as not white However most Brazilians respond differently and include peo ple with those kinds of features as white In general Americans have a nar rower definition of who is white and tend to apply a hard color line that divides people between races In contrast Brazilians accept a broader spectrum of whiteness they are less willing to divide people into just two groups black and white10 Partly because Americans see a hard color line while Brazilians do not race has been politically salient in the United States but not historically in Brazil The civil rights movement in the 1960s is the most prominent example of how race has served as a source of political mobilization in the United States Blacks felt politi cally excluded and organized to obtain equal rights In Brazil blacks comprise a much larger proportion of the population but no large scale political mobilization built along racial lines has ever emerged A primordialist argument cannot explain why people in Brazil and the United States think so differently about race or why race has historically been hotly politicized in the United States but much less so in Brazil If racial divisions were primordial white people would know that they were white and black people would know that they were black end of story In the United States although some people identify as biracial or multiracial racial identi fication between blacks and whites has historically been largely an eitheror question This view aligns more closely to a primordialist view races exist natu rally people are either one race or another and people understand the political significance of racial differences Yet Brazilians do not recognize this same rigid color line Why not Both Brazil and the United States share a historical experience of slavery As in the United States millions of black Africans were brought to Brazil to work on sugar and coffee plantations This experience left black Brazilians in conditions of social economic and political exclusion Yet American blacks share this history meaning that slavery cannot explain the different way that race is politicized in the two countries The key to explaining why racial identities were constructed differently in Brazil and the United States lies with a different aspect of the social context the political interests of late nineteenthcentury and early twentiethcentury Brazilian leaders who wanted to consolidate political control over the country When Brazil gained independence in 1822 part of Portugal s royal family established itself as Brazil s rulers Brazil s emperors Pedro I and his son Pedro II enjoyed widespread legitimacy and played key roles as symbols of Brazilian national unity In 1888 Pedro II s daughter Princess Isabel decreed the abolition of slavery This Brazilian Emancipation Proclamation angered the country s politically conserva tive wealthy white landowning and slave owning elites A year later Brazil s military overthrew the monarchy and handed the reins of power to members of this powerful group 164 CHAPTER6 Political Identity Social scientists often use the term collective memory to refer to the idea that successive generations in a society tend to attach the same meaning and significance to particular historical events Collective memory can be reinforced by the kinds of memorials and public art that are erected in public spaces For example the National Mall in Washington DC memorializes the role of ltey US presidents in founding or guiding the country reinforcing those presidents heroic image in the mind of the millions who visit each year Paintings photos movies and TV also continually produce a flow of images that reinforce and sometimes challenge established visions of a society39s collective memory For example Americans today tend to remember events such as Kennedy39s assassination the moon landing or 911 in particular ways because of the impact of shared TV newspaper and Internet images even if they did not actually witness those events personally Such visions cement bonds between members of a community about common experiences values and ideals HOW a society remembers key people and events can shape the collective memory If certain people or groups are portrayed negatively that image may stick in the collective memory as a stereotype What a society chooses not to memorialize can also be important If certain people or events are never memorialized at all they may be effectively erased from the collective memory How did Brazil and the United States end up with such different conceptions of racial identity Exploring how Brazil and the United States tend to see founding events in their respective collective John Trumbull Signing ofthe Declaration oflndependence 1819 The images in this famous painting convey important signals about race class and gender about what kinds of people were important in the formation of the American national community Continued 166 CHAPTER 6 Political Identity the left we see a slave mother and her child both of whom hold farm implements and the mother even holds a rifle Behind her a blaclt soldier presents his baby for the emperor to see and an indigenous woman ltneels with her three children On the right of the painting we see several white Brazilians including an oldster and a member of the armed forces but all of them appear to be average people note that of all the people whose feet are visible only one wears shoes Overall the painting portrays the idea that Brazilians of all races and economic classes are included in the new nation ASSESS THE HYPOTHESIS generations tend to perceive who qualifies as a full member of the national community Trumbull s image has entered Americans collective memory his painting projects the notion that a very narrow social group was responsible for forming the American polity In contrast the Brazilian image includes women and people of different races and economic classes implying that Brazil39s initial conception of its national community was more inclusive even though quite paradoxically both countries relied on slavery This sort of image residing in Brazilians collective memory lies at the root of notion that Brazil embodies a racial democracy A These two paintings cannot encompass the full range of sentiments artists have portrayed about the nature of the national community in the United States or Brazil Nevertheless they echo common think about American nationalism and what images in the collective memory of the founding political significance to those images carry events in each country39s history that are taught in 2 What purpose do public monuments and schools in both countries to this day These images memorials play in constructing national carry significance for how individuals in successive memory CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS 1 What other images come to mind when you Constructivism and Nationalist Identity in Europe In Brazil national leaders made strenuous efforts to de empJasize racial differences between whites and blacks in an effort to promote political stability and social peace Let s now consider an example of how political elites attempt to emphasize a particular form of identity Nationalism can generate a sense of belonging to a large community in which everyone shares a cultural framework One key way that politi cal elites construct nationalist identity is by making education compulsory Sup pose that a new country has just declared independence but its citizens are mostly illiterate peasants who live in rural villages These villagers may be isolated on cul tural islands that speak different languages or dialects wear different clothes lis ten to different music tell different tales and worship God differently Given this cultural fragmentation a strong nationalist identity an emotional identification with the newly independent country that unites all the villagers together is unlikely to exist To make nationalism a meaningful form of political identity people must be encouraged to think they have much in common with those outside their immediate community One way to construct such an identity is by promoting mass literacy Literacy in a single national language which governments of states only began to encourage in the early 1800s permits communication among a multitude of strangers and means that many more citizens can understand and pass on a single unified version of a society s history15 168 CHAPTER 6 Political Identity primordial After all nationalist political identities in Eastern Europe did not even exist before the twentieth century In contrast to primordialism constructivism does not assume that forms of political identity are timeless or natural and does not assume that individuals and communities more or less naturally respond to perceived communal threats In stead as our examples of racial and nationalist identity demonstrate constructivism starts by assessing a country s social context in order to explain the extent to which different forms of identity have become politicized or not In particular it looks to the impact of interests on the formation of identity Such an approach offers better explanations than primordialism for why forms of identity such as race or nation alism become politicized in some places but not others Students and scholars can be forgiven for wanting to unpack the historical sources of political identity as they work with the constructivist framework However constructivism s clearest shortcoming is its inability to make sense of the way most people perceive their own identities The fact is that most people think of their ethnic racial religious national or other identity as primordial and they are uninterested in hearing that historical context shaped the identity choices available to them In short constructivism is better at explaining where different forms of identity around the world come from but primordialism offers a more intuitive explanation of identity s capacity to move people to action Few people critically assess their identity in order to know when and how to act in its defense they accept that their identity constitutes an essential part of their being and must be defended with blood if necessary One might reasonably wonder if identity is so malleable why do people fight and die to protect their group Constructivism does offer an answer to this ques tion As the examples of race in Brazil and nationalism in Europe illustrate behav ior that appears rooted in one s identity such as religiously inspired violence is often linked to tangible interests such as political competition for land resources or power The politicization of identity is not always a product of interests but the latter are often critical Constructivism recognizes that individuals can and do choose their identi ties This means that the politicization of identity is not natural However it also acknowledges that for most people identities feel natural stable and permanent that is primordial Given this just like primordialism constructivism leaves key ques tions unanswered The table on the following page highlights the key advantages and shortcomings of the constructivist approach to understanding political iden tity In the end it is extremely difficult to identify the precise processes by which identities are politicized across millions or even billions of people and how such politicization is maintained from one generation to the next Still constructivism pushes us to think critically and ask how the social context shapes individuals choices and to explore why some forms of identity not only become politicized but remain so for long periods while others remain politically irrelevant Primordial ism takes forms of identity and their political salience as given but constructivism seeks to explain why forms of identity emerge and acquire political relevance This focus on the origins and variation in the salience of different forms of identity is constructivism s main strength Conclusion 171 SUGGESTED READINGS Anderson Benedict Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism Rev ed London and New York Verso 1991 A classic constructivist ac count of the emergence of nationalist identity Brass Paul Elite Groups Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia Primordialist and Instrumentalist Interpretations of Ethnic Identity In Brass Ethnicity and Nationalism Theory and Comparison 1991 6989 Thousand Oaks CA SAGE A critique of primordialism and defense of a constructivist approach for understanding ethnic conflict in India Cohen Robin The Making of Ethnicity A Modest Defense of Primordialism In People Nation and State The Origins of Ethnicity and Nationalism edited by Edward Mortimer and Robert Fine 311 London IB Tauris 1999 Argues in favor of primordialism Griffin John Howard New York Houghton Mif in 1961 Blaclc Lilee Me A true story of a white American who takes medicine that turns his skin black in the late 1950s south Illus trates the tension between individual choice and social context in the formation of identity Huntington Samuel The Clash of Civilizations and the Remalcing of World Order New York Simon and Schuster 1998 A prominent thought provoking and controversial application of a primordialist approach to understanding the politicization of identity in the contemporary world NOTES 1 For news coverage of the law s passage see for example French Scarf Ban Comes into Force accessed January 6 2010 httpnewsbbccouk2hi3619988stm A brief but useful study of the headscarf ban is Veiled Meaning The French Law Ban ning Religious Symbols in Public Schools Brookings Institution US France Analysis March 2004 accessed January 6 2010 httpwwwbrookingsedufpcusfanalysis vaisse20040229pdf 2 Few Forum on Religion and Public Life 2011 The Future of the Global Muslim Population January 2011 accessed April 29 2011 httpfeaturespewforumorg muslim population graphicFrance 3 See for example Russell Dalton The Quantity and Quality of Party Systems Party System Polarization Its Measurement and Its Consequences Comparative Political Studies 4172008 899920 4 The classic primordialist statement comes from Clifford Geertz The Interpretation of Cultures New York Basic Books 1973 See especially 259 See Foreign Affairs 72 3 1993 2250 6 For example see Edward Said The Clash of Ignorance The Nation October 4 2001 httpwwwthenationconddoc2001 1022said 7 See Congo War Driven Crisis Kills 45000 a Month Study accessed January 16 2010 httpwwwreuterscon articleidUSL2280201220080122 8 See James D Fearon and David D Laitin Explaining Interethnic Cooperation American Political Science Review 9041996 715735 9 Brazil Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica 2006 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilio accessed February 16 2009 httpwwwibgegovbrhome estatisticapopulacaotrabalhoerendimentopnad2006brasilpnad2006pdf United States Census Bureau accessed April 30 2011 httpquickfactscensusgovqfd states00000html U1 174 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics What is the relationship between religious identity and democracy gneadand Listen ince the 911 terrorist attacks the US government has engaged in warfare to Chapter7 at mypoIisciIabcom 4O IStudy and Review the PreTest amp Flashcards at mypoisciabcom in Iraq and Afghanistan based in part on an assumption that if their non democratic rulers could be forcibly removed those countries could become democracies That is official US government policy assumes Islam and democracy are compatible On July 26 2006 Iraq s first democratically elected prime minis ter Nouri alMaliki spoke to a packed joint session of the US Congress In his speech Maliki directly addressed the tension between religion and democracy in Iraq saying Our people aspire to liberty democracy human rights and the rule of law Those are not Western values they are universal values for humanity They are as much for me the pinnacle embodiment of my faith and religion as they are for all free spirits I know that some of you here question whether Iraq is part of the war on terror Let me be very clear this is a battle between true Islam for which a person s liberty and rights constitute essential cornerstones and terrorism which wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak waging a war on Muslims and Islamic values Human rights are not an artificial construct reserved for the few They are the divine entitlement for all It is on this unwavering belief that we are determined to build our nation a land whose people are free whose air is liberty and where the rule of law is supreme1 Iraq s future and the path of US policy in the Middle East and elsewhere depends considerably on the extent to which Maliki and his successors put these words into practice This chapter continues our investigation of the sources and consequences of collective political identity by exploring the relationship between religious identity and politics We focus specifically on one of the toughest ques tions confronting comparative politics today what is the relationship between religious identity and democracy Given its salience for global politics this question is far from academic Recall Samuel Huntington s argument that the most important civilizational fault line is not ethnic linguistic or national but religious the potential clash between Is lamic civilization and the largely Christian Western civilization Around the world politicians have long mixed politics and religion using religion as a mobilizational tool sometimes to promote peaceful change sometimes to promote violence against others who believe differently Certain religious identities may be more or less compatible with certain insti tutions of government Religion ethnicity and nationalism are often linked and religious beliefs also shape how individuals view gender relations Religious identity powerfully shapes what many people think they want from participating in poli tics In this way religion also impacts the forms of collective political mobilization we observe in different countries both peaceful and violent For example religion often motivates social movements or political parties and religious disputes also frequently motivate civil wars 176 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics Does having a predominantly Christian religious tradition necessarily mean democracy will emerge 72 How compatible are different religions with democracy in the real world Is there a clear relationship between a country s predominant religion and democ racy Consider the democracies first Most democracies are in areas where Christi anity dominates Yet several nonChristian democracies exist such as Japan Israel and India Moreover several predominantly Christian countries remain non or only partially democratic such as Russia and Belarus which are predominantly Eastern Orthodox Christian Venezuela and Colombia in Latin America and most countries in subSaharan Africa In contrast nearly all predominantly Muslim countries are nondemocracies Fortysix countries in the world have Muslim majority populations and on average those countries rank worse than countries without a Muslim majority on Freedom House s democracy rankings In fact in 2011 Freedom House classified only two of the 46 majorityMuslim countries as Free Seventeen were classified as Partly Free and 27 were classified as Not Free Included in the list of Free and Partly Free majorityMuslim countries are Turkey Senegal Indonesia Bangladesh Mali Sierra Leone and Albania2 The fact that not every predominantly Christian country is Free casts doubt on the idea of a necessary connection between Christianity and democracy Like wise the fact that some majorityMuslim states are Partly Free or Free re futes the idea that Islam and democracy are necessarily incompatible Still a clear picture does emerge currently countries where Christianity dominates tend to be democratic while nondemocracy dominates in Muslim majority countries What explains this pattern CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY Is there something primordial about Christianity that explains its connection with democracy Or is there something in historical experience that points toward a constructivist interpretation of this pattern Jesus never sought to set up a political or legal system but he did provide some clues regarding his views about earthly political matters by saying My kingdom is not of this world and by urging his followers to Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar s and render unto God that which is God s Matthew 2221 These biblical statements affirm the sepa ration of church and state As a matter of historical fact democracy did originate in Western Europe a region powerfully shaped by Christianity Many argue that this connection be tween Christianity and democracy in Europe is not coincidental However mod ern democracy took root under the Protestant version of Christianity as opposed to the Catholic or Orthodox versions which are prevalent in southern and east ern Europe This fact leads us to a different question is there something perhaps primordially prodemocratic about Protestantism In this next section we con centrate on the historical connection between Protestantism and democracy and then consider why a connection between Catholicism and democracy only emerged later 178 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics only to Anglicans but also to Methodists Baptists Quakers and Congregational ists However the Act continued to discriminate against Catholics and Unitarians who were regarded as heretics When the Puritans and representatives of other dissenting religious sects emi grated from Britain to the American colonies many became vocal advocates for religious freedom Their political activism helped establish the principle that vol untary associations could exist in civil society outside of state control Today we call these forms of collective action nongovernmental organizations NGOs social movements or interest groups Although this considerably simplifies cen turies of history we can characterize the emergence and spread of Protestantism as one of voluntary religious organizations formed outside of centralized state control These key elements of Protestant faith along with Protestant efforts to prevent government meddling in religious affairs opened the door for the spread of the con cept of separation of Church and State This supports the notion that something in the historical experience of Protestantism is associated with the rise of democracy Yet despite the historical connection between Protestantism and democracy being a Protestant does not automatically make one a friend of liberty For example many Protestant leaders in the early decades of the United States sought biblical justifications for slavery numerous German Protestant leaders supported Hitler s Nazi regime and leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa preached a religious justification for apartheid the political and legal system by which the white minority oppressed the black majority until the early 1990s These examples suggest that there is no necessary primordial connection between Protestantism and democracy although a general affinity between Protestantism and key demo cratic principles does exist If Protestantism were automatically associated with democracy the dramatic growth of Protestant churches in Latin America Asia and Africa would be good news for the future of democracy in those regions Yet there is an important contrast between the early and more recent spread of Protestantism Lutherans Methodists Congregationalists and Presbyterians led Protestantism s early spread while Evangelical and Pentecostal congregations are leading Protestantism s more recent growth spurt What implications might this difference have for any future connection between Protestantism and democracy On the one hand both newer and older Protestants hold to the conviction that salvation must come from within and cannot be com pelled by the state Yet on the other hand considerable differences exist between older Protestant denominations which emphasize education and learning and some newer congregations which bestow authority and leadership based on revealed spiritual gifts rather than through study and knowledge In earlier eras the older Protestant denominations dominated in what were then and are now the world s wealthiest countries More recently Protestantism has spread more rapidly in poorer countries Democratization tends to follow modernization in particular when the expan sion of educational opportunities and the breakdown of traditional social hierarchies 180 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics Second Vatican Council I 1965 meeting of Catholic authorities from around the world that reformulated longstanding Church doctrines Pope John Paul II addressing a multitude in communist controled that is officially atheist Poland 1979 The pope was instrumental in encouraging Poles to demand freedom of worship freedom the separation of Church and State and progress liberalism and recent civilization in its entirety Despite sounding outlandish today the Church held tightly to these views Change in the Catholic Church s attitude toward democracy only emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century following the 1965 Second Vatican Council a meeting at which Church authorities from around the world sought to grapple with the political social and religious challenges of modernity Church leaders reformulated many longstanding doctrines and after the meeting Pope Paul VI declared that religious liberty was a fundamental God given human right and that states should not interfere with an individual s search for religious truth The Catholic Church s approval of freedom of conscience and religious tol eration was part of a broader modernization of Catholic religious doctrine and practice Once the Church undertook these changes many of its leaders around the world the cardinals bishops and priests who lead the Church in each country began agitating for political reforms in nondemocratic states often to promote freedom of worship for Catholics For example Pope John Paul II elected in 1978 was a native of Poland which was ruled by a communist dictatorship at that time He strongly advocated dem0cracy not just in Eastern Europe but also around the entire world John Paul II led the Catholic Church s important role in promoting the third wave of democratization5 182 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics often found in predominantly Christian countries With this conclusion in mind let s turn to the alleged incompatibility of Islam and democracy ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 73 Does a Islam is the world s second largest religion with approximately 13 billion Musnm adherents compared to Christianity s 21 billion and Hinduism s 900 million religious culture necessarily offer little support for democracy Arab I an ethnic group defined by lan guage and geographic location in countries in North Africa and the Middle East Watch the Video quotlraq39s Oil Cursequot at mypoisciabcom Maj orityMuslim states cover a wide swath of the world s territory from Morocco in Northwest Africa to Indonesia in Southeast Asia Although Islam originated in what is now Saudi Arabia about 75 percent of the world s Muslims are not Arabs an ethnic group defined by language and who predominate in countries in North Africa and the Middle East In fact the countries with the largest Mus lim populations are all outside the Arab world Indonesia 200 million Pakistan 160 million India 150 million and Bangladesh 130 million Separation of Religion and the State under Islam Democracy only emerged in predominantly Christian Europe after considerable political social economic and especially religious change This undermines the idea of a primordial connection between Christianity and democracy Still some suggest a primordial link exists between Islam and nondemocracy6 If this is true then perhaps Samuel Huntington s argument has some merit the world is fated to witness an ongoing clash between the Islamic and Christian civiliza tions Yet as with Christianity historical and political factors have shaped the Country Populations with Large Percentages of Muslims The darker the shading the higher the proportion of Muslims in the population Orange shading represents a Sunni majority while green represents a Shiite majority 184 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics civil law code I a set of laws that cov ers issues pertaining to private property rights and family law partition I the creation of two separate sovereign states out of a ter ritory that initially comprised only one state in order to separate antagonis tic groups argument connects the relative weakness of democracy to the subordina tion of women in some Islamic countries8 Such discrimination can start early in life For example many Islamic societies have a higher proportion of men than women Such sexratio imbalances which occur in many nonMuslim countries as well can have many causes including selective abortion in ferior nutrition in infancy poor healthcare for infant girls or even female infanticide In some Islamic societies women are also more likely to be illit erate than men reflecting the lower social value placed on girls education Naturally illiteracy greatly diminishes a woman s chances of having a suc cessful professional life outside the home Perhaps because of their treatment as girls and young women compared with other similar but nonMuslim countries women in Muslim societies are also less likely to hold government positions9 This lifelong economic andor cultural discrimination against girls and women can have profound political consequences When men are entrenched in dominant positions in society they tend to be more comfortable with social inequalities and political hierarchies than are women Male social dominance can reflect deep seated cultural values of respect for hierarchical authority values that may sup port nondemocratic rule In this way it is possible that longstanding practices of gender discrimination may account for the predominance of nondemocracy in the Islamic world However evidence suggests that female subordination is not driven directly by religious identity because the treatment of women varies widely across Islamic societies just as it does across predominantly Christian societies In some Muslim countries gender discrimination is far worse than anything Islamic law might mandate and those countries tend to be nondemocracies Yet in other Muslim majority countries women enjoy good educational social and economic oppor tunities as they do for example in Turkey Indonesia and Malaysia countries that Freedom House ranks either as Free Indonesia or Partly Free Turkey and Malaysia It is also useful to remember that both the Hebrew and Chris tian Bibles suggest far greater female subordination than is practiced anywhere today Given such variation one cannot attribute the mistreatment of women to Islam itself since women s rights and opportunities vary considerably across Muslim societies Gender relations may be a function of political factors only indirectly related to religious doctrine as considered in this chapter s feature box on India And just as they have in JudeoChristian culture gender relations in Islamic cultures could change over time which in turn implies that political change might follow Islam and Politics in Arab Societies Neither religious doctrine nor the treatment of women fully explains the connec tion between Islam and nondemocracy in the contemporary world Political sci entists have offered a third potential explanation Arab Islamic countries are far less likely to be democratic than non AmI9 Islamic countries in subSaharan Africa Islam and Democracy 187 leaders with promises to continue to ignore the Indian constitution s call for a unified civil code along with other sorts of political payoffs something the BJ P would never do The electoral system and political self interest pushes the INC and several other parties to trade Muslim electoral support for Muslim self governance in legal affairs possibly preventing a massive civil war from erupting across India In the end having separate civil codes appear to reduce but not eliminate the incidence of violence across India and preserve its fragile democracy K why not southeastern Europe or Asia10 Table 71 lists Muslimmajority countries divided by whether the population is Arab or not In 2011 according to Freedom House 86 percent of all Arabs live in a Not Free society but only 21 percent of nonArab Muslims do In fact nonArab Muslim societies are about 20 times more likely to have held competitive elections than Arab countries This implies that the observed connection between Islam and non democracy worldwide is largely shaped by the resilience of non democracy in Arab cultures What aspects of Arab culture or politics could account for this connection Since both Arab and non Arab Muslim societies share religious iden tity something besides religion must account for the variation in the quality of democracy between Arab and non Arab Islamic societies Let us consider two explanations oil and geopolitics Oil The Resource Curse Some observers suggest that an abundance of oil ex plains the persistence of non democracy in the Arab world Political scien tists have labeled this argument the resource curse which hypothesizes that any country possessing sizeable deposits of petroleum or other exportable natural re sources is unlikely to distribute the resulting wealth to the majority of people to develop a diversified modern economy or to become a democracy13 In oil rich non democracies rulers have strong interests in keeping a lid on political partici pation and contestation in order to maintain control over the vast wealth that oil production generates This argument suggests that political interests spe cifically dictators interests in staying in power rather than religious identity explain the persistence of non democracy in Arab societies This argument has great appeal but unfortunately it does not hold up to scru tiny First although many Arab states have lots of oil including Saudi Arabia Libya Algeria Iraq and Kuwait others have none or very little including Syria Jordan Morocco and Egypt Since none of these latter countries are yet democ racies we cannot say that oil directly causes the persistence of non democracy across the entire Arab world And in any case four of the top ten oil producers in the world the United States Canada Mexico and Norway are democracies CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS 1 How does having a separate civil code for Muslims in India promote civil peace 2 Would letting different religious communities establish their own civil codes strengthen or weaken democracy in the United States Why or I ES0lI CE ClI SE I hypothesizes that any country whose economic growth relies on one valu able natural resource is unlikely to result in an equitable dis tribution of wealth which in turn creates problematic political consequences Islam and Democracy 189 suggesting that great resource wealth does not automatically curse a country to a perpetual status as a nondemocracy Oil and Geopolitics A more promising explanation connects international fac tors to the persistence of non democracy in the Arab world In particular Western democracies need for stable access to oil and a desire to prevent another Arab Israeli war may help explain the persistence of non democracy in both oilrich and oilpoor countries in the region This view suggests that the United States and other wealthy democracies prefer the stability of nondemocratic rule in the Arab world to the unpredictability of democracy in order to ensure continued access to petroleum and to maintain peace between Israel Egypt Syria and Jordan To promote regional stability the United States and its allies provide non democratic rulers billions of dollars in economic and military aid every year How ever the Arab Israeli conflict and the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have generated strong antiWestern sentiment around the region To deflect criticism about their relationship with the United States and other Western countries Arab rulers attempt to generate nationalist support by stirring up animosity against the United States and Israel and also argue that allowing democracy would only bring chaos and violence to the region According to this argument it is not religious identity but rather interna tional geopolitical dynamics that has sustained non democracy in some Islamic countries This argument has the advantage of explaining both the prevalence of nondemocracy in the Arab world as well as the political liberalization of some nonArab Muslim countries where oil and the Israeli conflict are not at issue However the protests that rocked the Arab Middle East in 20102011 may un dermine the logic of this hypothesis The multitudes of ordinary Arabs who took to the streets did not shout antiAmerican or antiIsrael slogans they blamed their own rulers for their countries problems with corruption and weak eco nomic growth And the United States and other powerful oildependent countries did not as one would expect if this argument were true automatically sup port Arab rulers who sought to crack down on dissent Because the situation in the region is rapidly changing scholars and students will continue to debate the sources of resistance to democracy in the Arab world but geopolitics has and will likely continue to play an important role Religious identity cannot explain the connection between Islam and non democracy in the world today Provisional alternative explanations for the preva lence of nondemocracy in Muslim societies include cultural practices that enforce female subordination the preponderance of non democracy in the Arab world compared to nonArab Muslim societies and oil wealth Geopolitics also offers a promising explanation for the prevalence of non democracy across the Middle East but recent events may have undermined this connection In any case the summary table on the following page highlights the implication that as with Christianity several historical and political factors have shaped or constructed the relationship between Islam and democracy in different ways 192 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics value emphasis on personal survival I people who value per sonal survival empha size the importance of nuclear family childrearing and hard worlt worry a great deal about having enough money and wish for greater gov ernment involvement in the economy value emphasis on personal wellbeing I people who focus on personal wellbeing place higher value on individual freedom leisure time and be ing happy worlt as a source of personal satisfaction and value freedom of expression and the ability to par ticipate in politics traditional values I people who value tra ditional forms of political authority such as ltings tribal chiefs and religious leaders tend to be more religious and nationalistic express respect for hierarchi cal authority relations and express a belief in a clear difference between good and evil secular rational Values I people who hold secular rational values tend to not be religious are sltepti cal of authority figures in general and are reluctant to affirm a simple difference between good and evil Yet as Figure 71 shows even Americans have become somewhat more sec ular over time Participation in organized religious activities more than once a week declined from about 35 percent of the population in 1970 to about 24 percent in 2006 in that same time period the proportion of people who say they never participate in organized religious activities increased from 10 percent to about 20 percent of the population In general evidence points toward a decline in religiosity in wealthy democracies no matter how religiosity is measured15 How does the evidence of secularization in the world s wealthy democracies stack up against the rest of the world To answer this question we can explore the World Values Surveys WVS a set of public opinion surveys taken in many countries around the world every few years since the 1970s As befits the name the WVS explores the evolution of citizens political values which reflect their political interests and identities To describe cross national variation in political values the WVS takes peoples re sponses to its surveys tens of thousands from around the world and boils them down to just two dimensions 1 whether people s values tend to focus on personal surviva or personal wellbeing and 2 whether people value traditional or secular rational forms of political authority Statistical analysis can then place a person on a world val ues map along these two dimensions16 Similar statistical procedures can also be used to place the average person from a given country on the same map and then to compare the average individual response in one country against average responses in other countries To understand these two dimensions consider Figure 72 People who indicate a concern for survival tend to respond to certain survey questions in a way that 40 35 o 25 39F 20 15 A Weelty or More Never 10 5 0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Q Q V Q Q V Q Q V We do e e e e e e e e eqbeq 0 re e as FIG U R E 71 Religious Participation in the United States Percent 19722006 Americans have grown somewhat more secular and less religious over time Source General Social Survey Data obtained from httpWWWtheardacomquicIltStatsqs105tasp May 1 2009 Question HoW often do you attend religious services 194 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics forms of political authority Religiosity nationalism respect for hierarchical author ity relations and a belief in a clear difference between good and evil are all associ ated with respect for traditional forms of authority such as kings tribal chiefs and religious leaders In contrast people who are not religious tend to be more skeptical of authority figures Also those who support secular rational forms of authority are reluctant to affirm a simple difference between good and evil and are more likely to accept independent judges nonpartisan bureaucracies or elected officials forms of authority present in democracies How do citizens values around the world compare against each other Figure 74 lays several key countries on the dimensions of Figures 72 and 73 In general average responses to questions on the World Values Survey in the world s wealthier countries tend to fall to the upper right quadrant while people in poorer countries tend to fall in the lower left quadrant This lends some support to modernization theory seculariza tion tends to be associated with country wealth but not with a country s predominant religious identity For example although almost all predominantly Muslim countries fall in the lowerleft quadrant many non Muslim societies can also be found there 5 3 Japan it Sweden T5 8 3 Germany f E 3 8 lt0 China France Russia U K India E E USA 3 Iran To C 3 Nigeria quotC5 9 39 Mexico Surivival We Being FIG U R E 74 World Values Surveys Approximate Country Locations Given Average Survey Responses as of 2008 Approximate location of most citizens of several countries on the WVS two dimensions given their responses to the survey questions Source The WVS Cultural Map of the World httpWWW WordvauessurveyorgWvsarticesfoderpubishedarticebase54 Accessed December 8 2011 196 CHAPTER 7 Religion and Politics concerned about survival they grow more concerned about individual wellbeing in a broader sense and thus many come to hold political values that motivate participation in emancipative social movements that seek to attain sustain or ex tend democratic freedoms17 In contrast people in countries in the lower left quadrant of Figure 74 remain worried about putting food on the table To them democratic freedoms may be a luxury Moreover they tend to place relatively less value on concepts associated with democracy such as political liberty and individual equality while remaining attached to hierarchical forms of political authority The WVS suggests that over time poor countries will move up and to the right on Figure 74 as their economies develop Yet since the WVS started in the 1970s few countries have moved solidly into the upperright quadrant This is because historically very few countries have been able to combine growth with equity with out massive government intervention in the economy The challenge facing the world s poor countries whether predominantly Islamic Christian or something else is not just figuring out how to grow but figuring out how to spread the wealth around as widely as possible without leaving masses of people in misery To the extent that most poor countries today have experienced economic devel opment at all it has been relatively unequal Even countries with oil or other natural resources do not seem able to escape this pattern in many cases economic inequal ity is worse in countries that have abundant natural wealth Regardless the fact that tremendous inequality accompanies economic development in the contempo rary world suggests that secularization is unlikely to occur in most countries today whether the predominant religious identity in those countries is Muslim Christian or other In fact scholars point to increasing religiosity in the contemporary devel oping world not secularization18 Only time will tell what these trends in religion hold for the future of democracy As discussed elsewhere and as Figure 75 suggests a direct route from eco nomic modernization to democratization may exist certain kinds of economic growth can expand educational opportunities generate urbanization and break down traditional social hierarchies transforming individuals values and increas ing their support for democratic principles However Figure 75 illustrates another possible causal pathway which we ve discussed here economic modernization could lead to secularization which in turn could promote democratization These two arguments are similar and debate continues over the precise way in which modernization may or may not generate support for democracy Evidence from the World Values Surveys does support the argument that modernization is associated with secularization religiosity and support for traditional values remain strong in the world s poorer countries while secular rational values have gained ground in the world s wealthier societies However recent research has suggested that secularization only follows from a particular kind of modernization growth with equity which in turn means that only this kind of economic modernization will be associated with the value change that aids democratization The twist on modernization theory presented in this chapter helps explain why Freedom House scores connect Christian religious identity with democracy and Islamic religious identity with nondemocracy most wealthy countries in the Suggested Readings 199 also economic between haves and have nots Given the argument in this chapter these global divisions might be avoided if poor countries can achieve growth with equity Issues of faith are by definition not resolved by recourse to logical reasoning and the role of religion in politics around the world has obvious relevance in the post 911 world American leaders have expressed their belief that democracy can take root in the Middle East Suppose that the Arab Israeli conflict were resolved and that scientists discovered a miraculously cheap replacement for oil Such develop ments are obviously unlikely but the thought experiment is useful nonetheless The arguments in this chapter suggest that if Arab Middle Eastern countries could de velop relatively equitable societies they could emulate other Islamic states such as Turkey Indonesia or Mali and begin the process of democratization Is such a large scale political transformation outside the realm of plausibility And what would the world be like if it were These questions demand further exploration K KEY TERMS Protestant Reformation 177 resource curse 187 religious pluralism 177 secularization 191 Second Vatican Council 180 value emphasis on personal survival 192 Arab 182 value emphasis on personal Sharia 183 well being 192 civil law code 184 traditional values 192 partition 184 secular rational values 192 REVIEW GU ESTIO NS 1 Under what conditions can a strong religious identity promote democracy 2 What arguments tend to support the association between Christianity and democracy and what arguments tend to refute that association 3 What arguments tend to support the association between Islam and democracy and what arguments tend to refute that association 4 On Figure 74 Americans values on the vertical seculartraditional axis are closer to citizens of India or Iran than to citizens of Japan or other Western European countries Why does the United States appear to confound the predictions of secularization theory 5 What is the connection between economic modernization secularization and democratization SUGGESTED READINGS Ghalioun Burhan The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism journal of Democracy 15 4 2004 126132 Also focuses on explaining non democracy s prevalence in Arab coun tries focusing on the geopolitical context and the consequences of economic modernization Jamal Amaney and Mark Tessler Attitudes in the Arab World journal of Democracy 19 1 2008 97110 Provides information about what citizens of Arab countries think about democracy and non democracy Keddie Nikki A Woman s Place Democratization in the Middle East Current History 103 669 2004 2530 Explores the ways in which women are pushing for democratic reforms in Islamic countries so Study and Review the Post Test amp Chapter Exam at mypoisciabcom Gender and Politics With a mosque in the background a few hundred Afghan women protest against a law legalizing rape in marriage About three times as many men organized a vocal ltounter protest nearby threatening the women with violence 202 CHAPTER8 Gender and Politics How do attitudes about gender influence politics ggli etadind Listen n 2009 the parliament of Afghanistan made it legal for a husband to 0 ap er at mypoIisciIabcom so S39tlIdy and Review the PreTest amp Flashcards at mypoisciabcom withhold food from his wife if she refused his sexual demands1 The law also required a wife to get her husband s permission to work outside the home and granted guardianship of children in cases of divorce exclusively to fathers or grandfathers Political leaders in the United States and other countries that had sent troops to fight the Taliban which had enacted similar laws before being overthrown in 2001 objected strenuously to this effort to legally subjugate women Yet despite international condemnation and even though it contra dicted Afghanistan s own constitution parliament approved the new law This fact speaks volumes about both the way many Afghan men think about women and family relations and about the inability of Afghan women to determine their own fates Indeed when several hundred women tried to protest the new law as the chapter opening photo illustrates a much larger crowd of angry stone throwing men confronted them and called them whores Until recent decades political scientists paid little attention to the political implications of episodes like the one above dismissing issues of family law and re lationships between men and women as purely private matters bound by centuries old traditions When political science emerged as an academic discipline in the late 1800s relatively few women participated in politics and fewer still conducted political research When men proclaimed new discoveries about human political behavior they were really only writing about male political behavior and not just because most government officials were male but also because they considered women and women s interests and opinions irrelevant or inconsequential Yet just as more women have entered politics around the world more women have also become political scientists earning about 40 percent of all doctorates awarded each year by the 2000s New generations of scholars male and female have demonstrated the myriad ways public policy shapes what many consider to be private practices and in doing so they have raised a host of important ques tions about gender and politics For example many have sought to explain the extensive cross national variation in women s legal rights in cases of divorce job discrimination property inheritance or rape Others scholars examine why some governments pass reform laws in support of maternity leave child care availabil ity of birth control or abortion while others do not Still other scholars explore the persistence and change in informal cultural practices such as honor killings of women suspected of adultery selective abortion favoring male babies and female genital cutting2 These issues may affect more women personally and directly than men but research on gender is not the same as research on women s issues Contemporary research has incorporated issues of gender into key questions of comparative politics such as the likelihood of war and peace the emergence and survival of democracy and the prospect of social protest or civil conflict Issues of gender also impact us all at a personal level because each of us has an interest in laws that govern what we can or cannot do with our own bodies Because most policymakers around the Defining Gender 205 This way of thinking about gender as a process focuses on the ways people engage in politics to shape and reshape gender relations3 Thinking about gender as a process also requires that we consider how entrenched interests and existing public policies shape different degrees of male domination and female subordination Legal systems often keep women in subordinate positions political institutions sometimes exclude women s issues from the agenda and powerful interest groups especially those organized around religious principles may seek to shape what people think are legitimate relations between genders For example marriage and divorce laws around the world have historically entrenched men s political domination This is not merely the case in Afghanistan For example Chile only legalized divorce in 2004 and still requires a threeyear waiting period if one party objects In many countries until recently marriage laws explic itly named the man as the head of the household and often prohibited women from working outside the home testifying in court or enrolling children in school without the husband s permission Laws regarding adultery divorce and child custody have traditionally reinforced men s freedom and women s submission4 Without a separate income or the means for selfsufficiency women s ability to mobilize on their own behalf is severely curtailed Political institutions and social practices can directly shape men s and women s relative political social and economic rights and opportunities Thinking about gender pushes us to separate socially acceptable meanings of masculinity and femininity from men s and women s biological features The table below summarizes these two ways political scientists explore the concept of gender Some scholars draw attention to the political implications of the ways people think about femininity and masculinity around the world Others seek to illuminate how people mobilize to change those understandings and how state institutions and political actors shape and constrain the possibilities for change In the next two SUMMARY TABLE Understanding Gender Gender The images people in different Example in contrast to 50 years as a societies have of what is ago in wealthy democracies most Category considered to be socially people now accept that women Gender as a Process acceptable versus transgressive male and female behavior How people engage in politics to challenge existing conceptions of gender roles and how political institutions and public policies shape different degrees of male domination and female subordination will gain as much education as men worlt outside the home and become engaged in politics Examples 1 more women run for office challenging the notion that only men are fit to govern 2 around the world marriage and divorce laws have historically advantaged men over women Attitudes about Gender around the World 207 SECU LAR RATIONAL AUTHORITY 100 080 060 040 020 0 020 040 060 080 100 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 39 Abortion 39 080 0llt 080 39 Divorce 39 060 0 060 040 040 Homosexual OK 020 Hard 020 G woman worlt E E needs Ch39d Friends IaS 0 39 0 Money important 0 5 children nbeetlulqs W0n 1enS 339 3 ot parents movement LE4 020 020 040 040 Want many 39 children 39 060 060 Family important 080 080 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I p 100 080 060 040 020 0 020 040 060 080 100 TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY FIGURE 81 Genderrelated World Values Surveys Questions Responses to World Values Surveys questions on gender related issues Note the relative placement of the answers given the survival vs well being and traditional vs secular rational authority axes of the figure Source Ronald Inglehart Modernization and Postmodernization Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1997 Attitudes about Gender Attitudes about Democracy Differences in attitudes about gender equality may impact whether citizens tend to support democracy or not Let us focus for a moment on a subset of countries that fall in the lowerleft quadrant of Figure 81 Where the social context has traditionally kept Women subordinate the majority Muslim countries Although Freedom House classified about 45 percent of the world s countries as Free in 2011 only about 5 percent of majorty Muslim countries were similarly rated Given this you might be surprised to learn that citizens of Western democracies and non democratic Islamic societies actually agree on many of the key principles Gender Gaps in Established Democracies 209 SUMMARY TABLE The Impact of Modernization on Attitudes about Gender and Democracy Expected Ghange Resulting Support Socioeconomic in Attitudes about for Principle of Modernization Gender Equality for All Limited Limited Limited Extensive Extensive Widespread in majorityMuslim societies overwhelmingly express support for democracy but just as in other countries that fall in the lowerleft quadrant of Figure 82 it remains an open question as to whether their more traditional attitudes about gender sup port democracy or not In the next section we turn our attention to the impact of socioeconomic change on attitudes in the wealthy democracies GENDER GAPS IN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES In the previous section we related patterns of socioeconomic development to vari ation in attitudes around the world about gender equality Men and women in relatively wealthier societies tend to be more liberal on such questions suggesting that when combined with direct mobilization by activists modernization tends to reconstruct gender relations In this section we explore a related phenomenon the fact that although both men and women become more liberal on matters related to gender as a function of socioeconomic change women grow even more liberal than men Specifically the World Values Surveys reveal a rising gap between men and women s political preferences in many of the world s wealthiest democracies This implies that the process of modernization has a stronger impact on women s percep tions of their political interests The Traditional versus the Modern Gender Gap Fifty years ago a traditional gender gap in political attitudes existed in which women were more likely to vote for conservative political parties than were men Table 82 illustrates the strength of this difference as of the early 1970s Even after the social transformations and political turmoil of the 1960s women remained more likely to vote for conservative parties in most wealthy established democra cies The United States is an exception but only because the traditional gender gap had vanished by that time If liberal attitudes spread with socioeconomic change why did women in wealthy democracies remain more conservative than men up through the 1970s Explana tions for women s traditional conservatism emphasize their religiosity and different labor force participation Up through the 1970s women were more likely to be reli giously observant and to stay home and raise children rather than to work outside the home Women s political attitudes tended to follow their social roles which focused 33 Why do women39s attitudes change more than men39s as a result of socioeconomic change traditional gender gap I a situation in a country in which women are more liltely to be conservative and vote for conservative political parties than are men Women Shaping Gender Relations 211 SUMMARY TABLE The Traditional versus the Modern Gender Gap Reason women are more liltely to have less education to worlt at home and to be more religious Traditional Gender Gap women are more politically conservative than men Modern Gender Gap women are more politically liberal than men Reason economic change opens job and educational opportunities for women which changes their attitudes more than men s toward an array of public policies workforce altered many women s perspectives about an array of public policies relative to what their mothers or grandmothers may have thought As a result in recent decades many women have organized and engaged in lobbying efforts to change public policies about job and pay discrimination parental leave health care childcare and primary education An increase in women s education and work opportunities has changed men s and women s perspectives on proper gender roles What most people in wealthy democracies consider acceptable gender roles today differs dramatically from what they accepted as normal 50 years ago In contrast as in Afghanistan where eco nomic change has advanced relatively little what counts as a socially acceptable role for a woman has changed much less Even though many women lobby for political change in places like Afghanistan their efforts encounter resistance not only among men but also among women who retain more traditional conceptions of gender roles The argument builds on what we ve learned in previous chapters economic change can generate social and political change Modernization has transformed men s and women s actual gender roles and it has reshaped their attitudes about gender and gender related policies yet it has changed women s attitudes more than men s Over just two generations women in wealthy democracies have gone from being more conservative to being more liberal than men especially on issues related to gender and the family Changes in the socioeconomic context can powerfully reshape people s attitudes but as we will see in the next two sections women s engagement in politics as well as political institutions also shape and con strain the possibilities for change in gender relations WOMEN SHAPING GENDER RELATIONS In the previous two sections we explored gender as a category focusing on how variation in socioeconomic context constructs gender as a salient form of political identity in different ways around the world Yet gender may be thought of not just as a category but also as process In this section we focus on the impact of women s increasing presence in legislatures around the world The previous section suggested that the cultural and socioeconomic context shapes men and women s attitudes about gender related practices and policies How has women39s growing participation in politics changed gender related policies 214 CHAPTER 3 Gender and Politics Gender Quota Laws are the Only Way to Dramatically Increase the Number of Female Legislators Comparing Costa HYPOTHESIS TESTING Rica and South Africa South Africa and Costa Rica have distinct cultural histories Costa Rica gained independence from Spain in the early 1800s while South Africa gained independence from the UK in 1948 Costa Rica has been a democracy since that year while in South Africa the African National Congress ANC movement engaged in violent struggle to end a white supremacist non democratic regime that ruled from 1948 to 1994 Neither South Africa nor Costa Rica is among the most developed countries in the world per capita income in both countries is about 10000 per year Yet despite their status as middle income countries with traditionally conservative cultures in which one would not expect the most progressive gender relations the proportion of women in the parliaments of Costa Rica and South Africa are among the highest in the world39s democracies 39 percent and 45 percent respectively Do gender quotas explain these comparatively high figures GATHER EVIDENCE The Inter Parliamentary Union a Swiss organization founded in 1889 to foster understanding of how legislatures around the world operate has counted the proportion of women in every legislature in the world every year since 1945 That year only about 3 percent of all legislators worldwide were women This figure reached 11 percent by 1975 but did not increase again through 199512 Given the slow increase in the number of women in politics many scholars and policymakers called for a more effective method to reach gender balance in political institutions As noted the solution many countries have adopted is a gender quota national legislation requiring that a certain proportion of legislators be women Today about 19 percent of all legislators worldwide are women an increase of about 50 percent in fewer than 20 years13 Gender quota laws were uncommon prior to 1980 but by 2010 about 50 countries adopted some sort of gender quota Can countries substantially and rapidly increase the number of women in politics without a gender quota law ASSESS THE HYPOTHESIS To explore this question let39s consider two countries with similar proportions of female legislators Costa Rica and South Africa In the former women mobilized to enact a quota law starting in the late 1980s as part of a broader effort to pass equal rights legislation The legislature adopted a gender quota law in 19 which required that women comprise 40 percent of all candidates for office The law originally did not require parties to ensure that women would win 40 percent of the seats however only that they filled 40 percent of the slots on the ballots This meant that parties often put women in races they could not win Women activists argued that this result violated the spirit of the law and eventually Costa Rica39s Supreme Court agreed requiring that women be placed in 40 percent of the electable positions based on the number of seats the party had won at the last election As of 2011 women must comprise 50 percent of all electable positions As a consequence of these reforms the proportion of women in Costa Rica39s parliament increased from 14 percent in 1994 to 39 percent in 2006 The efforts of women activists clearly paid off in Costa Rica as the quota law now mandates full gender equality Costa Rica39s current president is also a woman The story in South Africa is different Before democratization in 1994 just 3 percent of South Africa39s legislators were women yet just 15 years later almost half were However South Africa reveals that quota laws are not the only way to increase the number of women in politics as it has no such legal requirement on the books Instead the dominant political party the ANC has adopted a voluntary and internal quota as if the Democratic Continued 216 CHAPTER 8 Gender and Politics Then Speallter of the House Nancy Pelosi D CA discusses the healthcare reform bill in March 2010 Pelosi was the first woman to lead a major US political party and the first woman to hold the office of Speaker women s interests As a result as more and more women win elective office policies begin to change Of course legislative activism is not the only way that women can mobilize to change gender relations or reshape established cultural understandings of gender However it is an important and obvious manifestation of this first way of thinking about gender as a process Let us now explore the limits of explanations based on political attitudes and consider how entrenched male political interests can shape and constrain gender relations regardless of attitudes SUMMARY TABLE How Having More Women in Office Shapes GenderRelated Policies 1 Female legislators tend to be more liberal than are men 2 Women have different policy priorities than do men 3 Having women in office changes stereotypical perceptions of women and the way men tallt about women 4 Democracies with more female legislators pass more laws benefiting women children and families 218 CHAPTER 8 Gender and Politics family law code I a set of laws gov erning marriage divorce inheritance of family property responsibility for children and other related matters and Algeria17 The differences in family laws in these three countries highlight the importance particularly in non democratic societies of paying attention to the interests of those who hold power and their political allies Tunisia Morocco and Algeria share many characteristics they are geographic neighbors on the Mediterranean coast in an area of North Africa known as Maghreb they are all former French colonies and they gained independence around the same time Moreover they share a religious and cultural history in which Islamic law has traditionally afforded greater legal rights to men than to women Finally none has any experience with democracy However the situation may soon change in Tuni sia and Morocco Despite these similarities in recent decades each country took a different path in terms of enacting a family law code a set of laws governing mar riage divorce inheritance of property responsibility for children and other related legal matters Almost immediately after winning independence from France in 1956 Tunisia s new government sharply broke with existing traditional Islamic law A new family law code prohibited polygamy abolished a husband s unilateral right to divorce his wife at will without a court proceeding permitted women as well as men to file for divorce increased mothers child custody rights in cases of divorce and expanded women s inheritance rights In short Tunisia rapidly and radically liberalized wom en s formal legal rights simultaneously weakening husbands and male tribal leaders longstanding informal cultural authority Morocco passed a family law code that same year Yet in contrast to Tunisia Morocco s system reinforced conservative Islamic law and reaffirmed traditional male domination and female subordination Finally Algeria which gained independence from France in 1962 failed to pass any major laws pertaining to the family for 22 years until its government finally adopted a conservative legal code in 1984 that also reaffirmed support for traditional Islamic law and traditional gender roles These three cases provide substantial variation in family law outcomes an im mediate liberalization in Tunisia an immediate conservative retrenchment in M0 rocco and a two decade delay before a conservative outcome in Algeria Neither variation in cultural attitudes nor variation in the number of women in politics can explain these divergent outcomes Instead two factors related to the way that rul ing elites sought to hold onto political power are crucial 1 the relative cohesive ness of the ruling elite that took power in each country upon independence and 2 the degree to which this elite depended on traditional tribal kinship groups to re tain power Table 84 illustrates the way that these two factors relate to each other In Morocco the postcolonial political elite was cohesive and closely allied with the traditional tribes whose leaders were all men Most tribal leaders wanted to maintain the existing system in which they dominated local politics Following independence Morocco s rulers thus immediately enacted a familylaw code that pleased their conservative supporters In contrast postindependence Tunisian political elites were cohesive but in contrast to Morocco s leaders they did not depend on the country s conservative tribes In fact Tunisia s postcolonial leaders sought to undermine tribal leaders power because they believed the traditional kinship groups threatened their own power Tunisia s new rulers therefore enacted a radical reform of family law that 220 CHAPTER 8 Gender and Politics of whether public policy should encourage Women to focus on having and raising children or to pursue education and a long term career As any Working parent can tell you balancing family and Work is a constant struggle and public policies can make this task easier or harder Should government policy support the single male breadvvinner model that embodies traditional gender roles by encouraging women to stay home and have children or should it support Women who choose to Work outside the home but who also want to have a family Numerous policies influence the degree to which gender roles in Wealthy societies conform to the traditional view or not For example in some countries government policy supports both single parents and dual income families by man dating long paid parental leaves and providing government funded childcare and early childhood education Sweden for example provides universal all day public childcare By Way of contrast by omission the Netherlands encourages traditional gender roles by leaving daycare and preschool responsibilities largely to families compelling many Women to stay home if they have children To illustrate these differences Table 85 presents comparative data on government mandated maternity leave policies To the extent that governments guarantee extensive maternity leave at full pay women who bear children suffer less of a penalty over the course of their careers in terms of salary and professional advancement The availability of TABLE 85 Guaranteed Maternity Leave Policies Wealthy Democracies Duration of Leave Percent of Wage Replaced United States 12 weeks 0 Germany 14 weelts 100 Japan 14 weeks 60 Belgium 15 weelts 7580 Austria 16 weelts 100 France 16 weelts 100 Netherlands 16 weelts 100 United Kingdom 18 weelts 100 Italy 20 weelts 80 Finland 42 weelts 70 Australia 52 weelts 0 Canada 52 weelts 55 Denmark 52 weelts 60 Norway 52 weeks 80 Sweden 52 weeks 80 SourceThe Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child Youth and Family Policies at Colum bia University Table 111 accessed March 2 2009 httpwwwchidpoicyintorgfamiyeavetabes Tabe2011120Vaternity20amp20Parenta20Leavespdf 222 CHAPTER 8 Gender and Politics At the start of this chapter we asked how attitudes about gender explain variation in political outcomes How can we explain such clearcut variation in family policies across these fairly similar countries Political attitudes by them selves cannot provide an answer for example citizens responses to the World Values Surveys in the Netherlands and Denmark are similar but as Table 85 indicates their policies differ a great deal If variation in attitudes cannot explain crossnational variation in policy the relative strength of organized interests in society can help With this in mind some scholars have suggested that the relative size and mobilization capacity of leftist parties and labor unions promotes welfare state policies Others however have concluded that this hypothesis lacks support For example government funding of childcare is far more extensive in France than in Norway where leftist parties have traditionally been stronger Likewise and perhaps surprisingly variation in the size and strength of feminist movements does not explain crossnational variation in government policies related to gender and the family In fact sometimes the expected relation ship runs backwards both Germany and the Netherlands have prominent feminist movements but government policies in those two countries tend to strengthen traditional gender roles In contrast public policy in France strongly supports gender equality even though the feminist movement there is comparatively weak and fragmented Similar to the policy variation across the three Maghreb countries to explain variation across Europe in gender and familyrelated policies we must focus on the relative capacity of traditionminded interests to wield political power In Western Europe the relative extent of support for policies related to gender and the family is rooted in the historical strength or weakness of religious institutions and reli giously inspired conservative political parties In particular church influence has powerfully shaped attitudes about the appropriate relationship between the state and the family The Protestant Reformation the French Revolution and other battles to eliminate religion s political influence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries challenged the political power of national churches whether Protestant as in the Nordic countries for example or Catholic as in Southern Europe The intensity of such conflicts over religion energized mass mobilization over the proper balance of church state rela tions In some countries strong Christian Democratic parties formed in response to defend the role of religion in society In others religious influence was permanently weakened and party competition never focused on religious questions As the table on the following page illustrates the outcome of these conflicts shaped how future generations of politicians would address questions of govern ment involvement in family affairs For example in France Sweden Finland Den mark and Norway secularism largely won out Religious institutions political influence waned and the state assumed responsibility for family and child welfare Secularism also encouraged changes in the way the law treated gender as a cate gory undermining male breadwinners privileged position and institutionalizing genderneutral policies regarding access to social welfare benefits In contrast a more conservative vision of gender roles persisted in such coun tries as Germany the Netherlands Spain Italy and Austria where organized Suggested Readings 225 similar most importantly in that attitudes about gender issues tend to be conserva tive and very few women play a prominent role in politics Even so gender related policy outcomes vary a great deal Likewise the Western European cases are also relatively similar in this case attitudes tilt toward liberal and comparatively more women are involved in politics Yet once again neither numbers nor attitudes ex plain why some countries adopt liberal gender related policies while others retain conservative ones Instead we highlighted how the relative strength of ruling elites and powerful interests in society tribal leaders in the Maghreb Church authorities in Europe play a key role in determining variation in gender related outcomes Attitudes reveal popular sentiment but they do not always directly shape gender relations As with any policy gender relations may evolve as a consequence of power struggles between different political groups Whether the society is generally very liberal or extremely conservative the result of these struggles may have profound effects A KEY TERMS gender 203 modern gender gap 210 gender as a category 204 gender quota laws 212 gender as a political process 204 family law code 218 traditional gender gap 209 wage gap 221 REVIEW GU ESTIO NS 1 Describe the between the different ways we might discuss the idea of gender first as a category and then as a process 2 How does modernization influence the role of women in society 3 Do you think support for egalitarian gender ideals could eventually emerge in Muslim societies If so how 4 What explains the shift from the traditional to the modern gender gap in wealthy democracies 5 What best explains variation in the extent of government support for parental leave and childcare in wealthy democracies SUGGESTED READINGS Baldez Lisa Why Women Protest Women s Movements in Chile New York Cambridge University Press 2002 Focuses on explaining the conditions under which women will mobilize comparing conservative and liberal efforts Blaydes Lisa and Drew Linzer The Political Economy of Women39s Support for Funda mentalist Islam World Politics 60 4 2008 576609 Uses surveys to analyze why women offer support for gender inequalities in some Islamic societies Htun Mala Is Gender Like Ethnicity The Political Representation of Identity Groups Perspectives on Politics 2 3 September 2004 439458 Explains how and why gender differs from other forms of political identity such as race ethnicity or religion Ross Michael Oil Islam and Women American Political Science Review 102 1 2008 107123 Explores the connection between the resource curse religion and attitudes towards gender equality so Study and Review the Post Test amp Chapter Exam at mypoisciabcom Notes 227 17 18 19 20 Feminists Give up on Critical Mass A Contingent Yes Politics and Gender 24 2006 522530 This section relies on Mounira Charrad States and Women s Rights The Maleing of Post Colonial Tunisia Algeria and Morocco Berkeley University of California Press 2001L This section relies on Kimberly Morgan Worleing Mothers and the Welfare State Reli gion and the Politics of Worle Faniily Policies in Western Europe and the United States Stanford CA Stanford University Press 2006 See for example Gasta Esping Andersen The Household Economy in Social Foundations of Postinclastrial Economies New York Oxford University Press 1999 4772 or Mary Daly A Fine Balance Women s Labour Market Participation in International Comparison Welfare and Worle in the Open Economy vol II Oxford Oxford University Press 2000 467510 You can see the wage gap by different professions in the United States at http wwwnytimescominteractive2009O3O1business20090301WageGaphtmlscp 58csqwage20gap8cstcse Research on the subject includes Jane Waldfogel The Effect of Children on Women s Wages American Sociological Review 621997 209217 9 Collective Action 229 Why do people participate collectively in politics irst elected in 1998 Venezuela s president Hugo Chavez has enjoyed substantial popularity and support yet he has also endured considerable controversy In May 2007 Chavez decided not to renew the broadcast license for RCTV a television station that often criticized his policies A similar situation would be if President Barack Obama tried to shut down Fox News via the US Federal Communications Commission Protests erupted in response but they came from an unexpected quarter university students During Chavez s first nine years in power student opposition to his government was inconsequential Yet after decid ing to strip RCTV of its broadcast license huge protests erupted at both public and private universities across Venezuela Students many of whom came from middleclass backgrounds had no beef with Chavez s economic policies which tend to favor the poor Instead they took to the streets to protest against Chavez s efforts to restrict freedom of speech and assembly Many of the students had never protested anything in their lives but they soon faced police repression tear gas arrests and beatings Despite their efforts RCTV still lost its broadcast license Yet later that year when Chavez asked voters to give him additional political powers students again took to the streets This time their mobilization proved successful as Chavez s referendum went down in defeat his first loss at the polls In 2010 when Chavez proposed to completely shut down RCTV stripping away not only its broadcast license but also its cable TV license students again mobilized That year they also broadened their movement s appeal complain ing that Chavez had failed to fulfill promises to end crime and corruption and to redistribute Venezuela s wealth Students used social media to organize protests for example several anti Chavez Facebook pages have hundreds of thousands of fans in a country of only 27 million people In response Chavez called student protesters terrorists Student protest organizers in Venezuela faced a difficult challenge how to get their classmates all of whom have many other things on their minds including studying partying and paying for school to participate in antigovernment pro tests that often become confrontational and frequently turn violent Whether an activist or not most people do not relish the possibility of having to confront riot police Protest organizers in Venezuela thus faced a problem that all political lead ers and would be political leaders inevitably must face how to get people to pay attention get engaged and become active advocates for a particular cause In this chapter we explore a key question about engagement in politics why do people participate collectively in politics The answer to this question will help explain why people often voluntarily participate when the benefits are unclear and the costs potentially severe as in the case of Venezuelan college students The answer also requires that we explore resolutions to the collective action problem the tension between individual and collective interests The state can resolve the problem of political order by threatening to use coercion to keep people in line This chapter however focuses largely on the ways individuals and organizations attempt to mobilize people on the basis of their interests identities or both without the use mRead and Listen to Chapter 9 at mypoIisciIabcom so Study and Review the PreTest amp Flashcards at mypoisciabcom Resolving Collective Action Problems 231 Coercing Coercion involves the use of force or the threat of force In such cases people must participate whether they want to or not States can coerce collective action by imposing taxation jury duty or military service In civil society unionization is sometimes coercive For example many workplaces are known as union shops A union shop is a labor agreement in which the employer has agreed to hire only union members So for example in the entertainment industry the Screen Actors Guild SAG a union that represents more than 120000 TV stage and movie performers prohibits any member from working in a production that does not pay a certain wage and provide certain working conditions The SAG provides health insurance and pension plans defends actors labor rights keeps tabs on unauthorized use of recordings of performances and distributes royalty payments If you want a career in Hollywood you eventually join the SAG whether you want to pay the dues or not If you don t you won t work because most studios will hire only SAG members as performers Apart from unions most civil society organizations such as social movements interest groups and political parties typically do not compel participation Instead individuals volunteer or organizations offer something to encourage participation Coercion does offer an explanation for this chapter s main question sometimes we see collective action because people have no choice but to participate However if coercion is not an option and if incentives to free ride exist how do people and organizations get individuals to volunteer Appealing One way to mobilize collective action without coercion is by appealing to peo ple Appealing involves calling for volunteers to spend their time money or other resources working toward a collective goal without offering anything specific in return Such appeals depend on the emotional or psychological satisfaction that many people gain by working with like minded individuals toward a collective goal rather than on the promise of receiving a personal reward or payoff for participating Sometimes appeals can succeed fantastically For example Barack Obama s 2008 run for the presidency brought in more than 500 million in contributions from more than 3 million people and about 15 million individuals volunteered in some way for his campaign2 In any election a few volunteers may hope to land a job if their candidate wins but many more get involved because they simply like the candidate s personal appeal or what he or she stands for politically Volunteerism with no expectation of getting anything in return is by no means limited to political campaigns and certainly not limited to Americans For example M decins Sans Fronti res a French nongovernmental organization NGO known as Doctors Without Borders in the United States has attracted tens of thousands of medi cal professional volunteers since its founding in 1971 to work in crisis regions around the world where people are in desperate need of medical attention3 It bases its appeal on strict neutrality in political conflicts emphasizing the rights of all victims of violence to medical care This appeal has proven so successful that several other NGOs have ad opted the Without Borders motto such as Engineers Without Borders which sends 234 CHAPTER 9 Collective Action i SUMMARY TABLE Ways to Resolve Collective Action Problems Ways to Resolve Collective Action Problems Example Union shop the union can force you to join before you can start worlting Coercing people participate because they have no choice Appealing organizations call for volunteers without offering anything concrete in return except emotional or psychological satisfaction Youth volunteerism for political campaigns Enticing organizations attract participants by offering private goods in exchange for participation Donors will acquire greater influence in the organization the more money they give Nelson Mandela Adolf Hitler Martin Luther King Ayatollah Khomeini Leadership leaders articulate coherent messages and use organizational skills and charisma to attract followers The same logic explains why it is relatively hard to mobilize large masses of people either for or against some diffuse policy or issue Take antiwar protests for example In contrast to business owners who are all trying to improve their bottom line people who oppose the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy do so for a variety of reasons Antiwar protestors also do not directly and personally benefit from halting the use of military force overseas and they may fear getting arrested in a protest Consequently wouldbe protesters may not even be able to agree on goals much less strategy or tactics In the end even though a large majority of citizens may oppose a particular war sustained and purposeful collective antiwar mobilization may not occur The collective action problem provides insight into abstract questions but it is not helpful at predicting specific instances of group mobilization Indeed because we all have incentives to free ride off the efforts of others if only because there are countless demands on our time the collective action problem presents an extremely pessimistic view of politics implying that relatively little mobilization should ever occur except when groups consist of few members who have resources and who share concrete goals Yet mobilization does occur People get off their couches and get involved To understand how individuals resolve collective action problems we need to look at the ways that 1 political leaders create abstract appeals and pro vide concrete enticements to engage people and 2 the political context shapes the likelihood of sustained mobilization In the next three sections we move from the abstract to the concrete and explore the main ways that people around the world actually do participate in politics through social movements interest groups and political parties Social movements are 236 CHAPTER 9 Collective Action This does not mean that social movements are strictly spontaneous such as riots or street protests Even though they may not be as highly institutionalized as an interest group or political party social movements can and do often endure whereas riots and protests are typically ephemeral Third compared to interest groups and political parties social movements tend to concentrate their activities to the sphere of civil society rather than in the formal institutions of the state Some social movements even distance themselves from the government and engage in consciousness raising or educational activi ties designed to change the way people think about an issue rather than directly lobbying the government to change a policy For example thousands of Christian base communities emerged in Latin Amer ica in the latter part of the twentieth century small informal groups of usually poor people who joined together to study the Bible Leaders of base communities encouraged participants to question the established political and economic order activities that Catholic Church leaders did not necessarily condone The primary goal of Christian base communities was to change the way people think about politics generally and not necessarily to change any particular public policy In contrast the goals of parties and interest groups require engagement with the institutions and personnel of the state Still in many cases social movements end up confronting or pressuring the state in order to advance their goals Social movements relative informality and n g in 1 I E People who have long faced oppression might be unlikely to mobilize Yet in 1986 Ecuador39s indigenous peoples joined together to form the Confederacion de Nacionalidades Indigenas del Ecuador Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador CONAIE In this photo from 2010 indigenous people protest against a proposed law that would reduce local communities control over water and land rights 238 CHAPTER 9 Collective Action Political Context Shapes Social Movement Mobilization Comparing Indigenous Movements in Bolivia and Peru HYPOTHESIS TESTING Bolivia and Peru South American neighbors are very similar for centuries the Inca Empire the largest and most powerful political entity in the western hemisphere before the arrival of Columbus ruled over the future territory of both countries Around 1530 Spanish conquistadores arrived defeated the Incas and established colonies Both countries achieved independence from Spain about 300 years later Economically both are now middle income countries but with tremendous economic inequalities Geographically both countries have extensive mountainous areas as well as vast tropical forest regions in the Amazon basin Politically since the Spanish era a white andor mestizo mixed white and native ancestry elite which comprises a small fraction of the total population has tended to dominate both countries Finally both countries have sizeable indigenous populations However somewhat puzzlingly Bolivia has seen considerable indigenous ethnic social movement mobilization in recent years while Peru has not Given their similarities what aspect of the political context explains the different mobilization outcomes GATHER EVIDENCE Consider Table 91 Based only on the proportion of the national population that identifies as indigenous we might most expect mobilization along ethnic lines in Bolivia and least expect it in Mexico Yet all of these countries except Peru have seen indigenous ethnic social movement mobilization in the last 25 years This outcome is puzzling despite a sizeable indigenous population no influential indigenous movement has formed in Peru Princeton University political scientist Deborah Yashar suggests that indigenous communities in all five countries share political interests which implies that the key factor explaining variation in indigenous mobilization in Latin America is not interests but the political context specifically whether would be social movements have space in the political arena to get their message out and attract adherents TABLE 91 Estimates of Indigenous Population in Latin America Country Percent of Total Population Bolivia 6070 Guatemala 4560 Peru 3840 Ecuador 3038 Mexico 1214 Source Deborah Yashar Contesting Citizenship in Latin America The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Post liberal Challenge New Yorlt Cambridge University Press 2005 21 Let39s consider the similarity of interests first Indigenous peoples in both Bolivia and Peru had similar goals as of the 19805 as a consequence of political and economic reforms governments in both countries undertook that challenged indigenous communities autonomy For example reforms in Bolivia eliminated indigenous communities rights to communal land holding reduced health care and education spending in indigenous communities and eliminated decades old forms of communal representation that indigenous people enjoyed within government agencies These reforms generated discontent because they threatened land security and thus food security undercut social and communal resources and eliminated the means through which indigenous communities could seek redress for grievances Indigenous communities interests in Peru do not differ fundamentally As in Bolivia the Peruvian government undertook reforms that undercut indigenous communities autonomy welfare and ability to seek redress thereby providing motive for collective mobilization For example in Peru 60 percent of communal Continued 240 CHAPTER9 Collective Action mobilization in the countryside by guerrilla groups the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement M RTA and the Sendero Luminoso Shining Path Despite its name the M RTA had no commitment to advancing indigenous identity Instead both the M RTA and Sendero were Marxist movements that deliberately sought to mobilize rural communities on economic class lines downplaying the political relevance of indigenous identity Sendero guerrillas even murdered indigenous activists who opposed its presence in their communities deliberately destroying potential opportunities for indigenous mobilization During the war indigenous communities in Peru were caught between guerrillas and government military forces which also brutally repressed suspected guerrilla sympathizers In this situation indigenous people hesitated to self identify as Indians In short no opportunities for mobilization existed in Peru incipient indigenous movements were squeezed between already mobilized Marxist guerrillas and the repressive force of the state The Peruvian civil war is the key factor that prevented indigenous mobilization Even though the war ended in the 19905 the destruction of potential mobilization networks has endured meaning no indigenous movement has emerged No such devastation occurred in Bolivia giving activists greater opportunities to mobilize In sum although both Bolivia and Peru share key attributes the presence of a sizable indigenous population with strong interests in mobilizing it is the differences in political context that explain why we have seen extensive indigenous mobilization in Bolivia but not in Peru L CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS 1 How did the constriction of political opportunities in Peru shape the possibility of indigenous mobilization 2 Could better leadership have made a difference for indigenous mobilization in Peru or is the quality of leadership secondary to the political context Of course the chances of success also depend on a second key element of the political opportunity structure whether the state allows mobilization or seeks to repress it A civil rights movement might be easier to form in a democracy while a pro democracy movement might face surveillance and police repression in a non democratic state Under democracy a free press can spread the Word about emergent movements but in non democratic societies such freedoms may not exist and the government may tightly control the media Where the state seeks to control society political leaders and followers mobilize against the state at their own peril So even though social movements tend to be informal organiza tions state institutions and policies wield powerful influence as to their likely success The Dilemma of Formalization Thus far we have explored conditions that encourage or inhibit the emergence of social movements Let us assume that a social movement has successfully mobi lized Now it confronts a tricky problem Like interest groups but in contrast to political parties success may spell social movements doom because it eliminates 242 CHAPTER 9 Collective Action What are interest groups and why do they form interest groups I organized groups of citizens who seek to ensure that the state enacts particular policies Watch the Video quotBanking Interests and Regulatory Reformquot at mypoisciabcom ExpIore the Comparative quotlnterest Groupsquot at mypoIisciIabcom context to new forms of mobilization help explain why social movements form in some places but not in others In the end in democratic states the struggle to exer cise rights and to present new political demands inevitably involves the sphere of formal politics in which social movements lose their preeminent role and parties and more formally organized interest groups gain importance And so it is to this topic interest groups that we turn next INTEREST GROUPS Interest groups sometimes also called lobbies or pressure groups differ from both social movements and political parties Interest groups are defined as orga nized groups of citizens who seek to ensure that the state enacts particular poli cies In this section we will look more closely at the differences between interest groups social movements and political parties We will then explore the reasons why interest groups form again dividing these reasons into internal and external factors Characteristics of Interest Groups The definition of an interest group applies at least in part to social movements and parties as well but interest groups are distinct from social movements in that they tend to focus their mobilization efforts on obtaining concrete benefits for their supporters They also tend to be relatively more formally organized with a professional rather than activist membership Moreover they concentrate their energies on influencing the formal sphere of institutional politics by lobbying legislators and bureaucrats or engaging in lawsuits rather than focusing on grass roots mobilization in civil society Interest groups also differ from political parties in three ways First they tend to focus on a single issue or a narrow set of issues whereas parties must present and campaign on a platform that covers more political terrain Second interest groups do not present candidates for elections Third because they do not need to win votes like parties do interest groups do not require as extensive a formal organization or membership base Instead they often rely on a relatively narrow base of supporters who provide labor andor funding Of course the more mem bers an interest group has the more likely that it will gain credibility and attract attention to its cause Examples of interest groups include employees associations such as the United Auto Workers in the United States the Mexican Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educacion National Education Workers Union SNTE or the French Conf d ration G n rale du Travail General Labor Confederation CGT They also include employers associations or business groups such as the Chamber of Commerce in the United States or the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association and professional associations such as the Nigerian Medical Association 244 CHAPTER 9 Collective Action corporatism I pattern of interest group mobilization in which the state plays an active role in organizing groups and mediating between them Most other democracies do not have such free markets in interest group formation Instead they exhibit a pattern of interest group mobilization known as corporatism Corporatism is a pattern of interest group mobilization in which the state plays an active role in organizing groups and mediating between them The idea is that because different groups in society all perform necessary functions each should have institutionalized channels of representation in the state In theory such institutionalized representation levels the political playing field and promotes social peace Neither corporatism nor pluralism perfectly describes any country most coun tries lean toward one or the other pattern while embodying elements of both The key distinction between pluralist and corporatist patterns of interest group organization is the extent to which the state shapes promotes or impedes the emer gence and persistence of interest groups In the pluralist pattern interest groups form from within civil society from the bottomup In contrast in the corporatist pattern the state influences interest group formation from the topdown Under corporatism the government centrally organizes societal interests espe cially business and labor associations This means the state actively promotes some interest groups while preventing others from forming For example a corporatist system of interest groups may allow only official labor unions recognized by the government and prohibit independent unions from organizing workers In exchange for government recognition official unions gain a direct voice in determining poli cies but they will be expected to compromise they cannot hold to radical positions on wages or benefits Governmentsanctioned business owners associations for their part will also be expected to work with union representatives to resolve disputes and cannot try to break unions or hire nonunion workers Illustrating Corporatism The Case of Sweden To illustrate how corporatism works let us explore a prominent example In a pluralist system business and labor lobbies must jockey for position and fight for influence In contrast in a corporatist system the state guarantees that both sides will have input and influence In Sweden state corporatist institutions have promoted cooperation between workers and employers By law government administrative boards must consult with both business leaders and labor unions to formulate and pass policies Representatives of both sides are guaranteed member ship on these boards and both remain heavily involved in administration of any policy that is enacted This system not only guarantees all major actors a seat at the negotiating table but also guarantees each some degree of influence over policy For most of the twen tieth century the Swedish government coordinated all labor negotiations something highly unlikely in a pluralist state This high level of coordination facilitates nation wide agreement on wages working conditions and labor practices with relatively few strikes or other forms of labor strife The state s role as coordinator of these negotiations pushes both business owners and labor unions to concede when neces sary Corporatism requires something of a cooperative spirit while pluralism implies greater competition between groups for political access and influence Political Parties 247 to a greater extent than members of the party in public office who must grap ple with pragmatic concerns of winning elections and governing Many parties especially socialist communist and other worllters parties on the left of the polit ical spectrum rely on an extensive base of supporters who provide funding spread the party s message and help get out the vote on election day Other parties such as both large American parties as well as many conservative parties around the world have never depended on a large formal membership base for their existence Finally the party organization is the party s central office or national headquarters and the party s professional staff The motivations of members of the party orga nization tend to fall somewhere in between the pragmatic concerns of members of the party in public office and the ideological or policy commitments of members of the party on the ground On the one hand people who work for the party organi zation face no direct electoral incentives and may adhere more tightly to ideological principles than members of the party in public office Yet on the other hand a party organization cannot afford to completely ignore electoral concerns If the party orga nization ignores what its supporters want the party in public office will lose votes and as a result the party organization will lose its financing Some parties have relatively small professional staffs This reduces the influence of the party organization relative to the party in public office For example both major American parties have comparatively few permanent personnel who work directly for the party organization In contrast other parties especially those with large and widespread membership bases have large staffs For example the Ger man Social Democrats had more than 1200 fulltime employees in the 1990s17 All parties have the three core elements described above but the relative importance of each element can vary considerably from party to party Elite parties are dominated by the party in public office and have weak organizations and rela tively few active members in the electorate Such parties seek and obtain power based on their leaders personal fame arising for example due to their success in business or their family s longstanding prominence These parties also frequently rely on their leader s personal wealth or their connection to wealthy people to finance the party s activities Elite parties such as Italy s Il Popolo della Libertci People of Freedom founded and led by billionaire businessman Silvio Berlus coni typically invest relatively little energy and money in building a wide base of activists in the electorate or in developing a strong party organization because the leader wishes to remain free to change policy positions as he or she sees fit and wants to avoid as much as possible being held hostage to the interests of their most active and vocal supporters In mass parties by contrast the members in the electorate and the party organi zation are relatively more important and play a more active role in determining the party s policy commitments and ideological profile Mass parties rely relatively less on leaders personal prominence and wealth and more on members willingness to commit time energy and money and they tend to seek to adhere closer to ideologi cal appeals than elite parties In many countries mass parties formed as extensions of labor unions Prominent examples include socialist and communist parties of Western Europe that formed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such as the Labour Party in the UK or the German Social Democratic Party party organization I a party39s central office or national headquar ters and the party39s professional staff elite party I a politi cal party dominated by leaders who hold office in govern ment rather than the party in the elector ate or the party organization mass party I a politi cal party in which the party in the electorate and the party organi zation are relatively important playing an active role in decid ing the party s policy commitments or ideological profile Political Parties 249 Italy39s charismatic former Prime in ister Silvio Berus coni makes his last campaign speech in April 2008 Ber Iusconi was elected prime minister for the first time in 1994 just three months after found ing his party Ber Iusconi rose to fame due to his charisma and business acu men not due to the hard worlt of grass roots supporters and a large party n organization Patterns of party system competition tell us first about the extent to which a country qualifies as a democracy Democracy requires more than one competitive party because at least one alternative group must be willing and able to assume power should the voters remove the incumbent party Thus one party systems in which the government actually prohibits contestation are non democratic For many years debate existed as to whether Japan should be classified as a democ racy or not because one party the Liberal Democrats LDP almost always won The government did not prohibit contestation and in fact in 2009 another party finally beat the LDP This means that oneparty systems can be democratic even if a single party retains power for considerable time just so long as contestation is Political Parties 251 such electoral institutions reward larger parties and punish smaller parties in terms of the way votes are translated into seats As a result these electoral institutions tend to reduce the number of viable political parties to two or three In contrast proportional representation rules tend to disperse political power more and result in coalition government because they do not punish smaller parties as much as alternative electoral institutions Proportional electoral systems thus tend to have relatively more viable political parties For example in an electoral system like Israel s where the whole country is a single electoral constituency a party needs only about 3 percent of the national vote to win a seat in parliament The institutional context in Israel gives politicians the opportunity to carve out a small electoral niche Because of this we expect many parties to form In contrast in the UK a party needs a plurality to win the seat in any parliamentary constituency typically about 35 percent or more of the votes This context offers fewer opportunities to carve out an electoral niche making it harder for newcomers to gain entrance to the party system A second political institution that impacts party system formation is federalism Federalism can counteract the effects of the electoral system by offering space for politicians to promote regional autonomy in their electoral campaigns Given this it tends to increase opportunities for regional political parties to form which in turn tends to increase the overall level of party system fragmentation India and Nigeria for example have numerous regionbased political parties and highly fragmented party systems Although not every federal system has a great number of regional parties to explain why a country has few or many parties a good place to look is at the relative opportunities that the electoral system fed eralism and other political institutions offer The more spaces the institutional context provides for entrants to gain a toehold the more parties we are likely to see in the system19 Identities and Party Emergence Institutions are a good place to start but they do not tell the whole story To understand the number and nature of parties in a party system we also have to take into account the relationship between the num ber of salient dimensions of political identity that divide citizens of a society from one another and the relative degree of fragmentation of the party system Dimen sions of identity that have supported party formation include class race ethnicity religion region and language The relationship between identity and the party system is the following the more homogenous the society the fewer parties we expect to form The more diverse the society the more parties we expect In ho mogenous societies there are fewer dimensions of political identity around which to organize and mobilize partisan support In contrast the more heterogeneous the society the more opportunities politicians have to encourage voters to follow an identitybased political party Exploration of the way political identities shape party formation started with a question about the relative importance of economic class identity Class identity emerged as a result of conflict between workers and owners during the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries In every country in the 254 CHAPTER 9 Collective Action so lStudy and Review the Post Test amp Chapter Exam at mypoisciabcom social movements and interest groups In contrast a corporatist state may take the initiative to organize collective action in particular ways in order to institutionalize representation of relatively weak groups and to promote social peace The political context also includes additional factors that offer or foreclose opportunities for political mobilization the existence of rival organizations and or potential allies the impact of political institutions such as electoral rules and federalism and the number and relative salience of different forms of political iden tity This means that successfully resolving collective action problems whether for a social movement an interest group or a political party depends on crafting appeals and providing incentives that will work best given the broader political environment This context delimits the opportunities and constraints for collective mobilization meaning that efforts at collective mobilization are both shaped by politics and seek to shape and reshape it Our next chapter continues this analysis of the relationship between institutions identities interests and collective action by considering various explanations for civil wars K KEY TERMS free ride 230 political party 246 private goods 232 party in public office 246 public goods 232 party in the electorate 246 social movements 235 party organization 247 political opportunity structure 237 elite party 247 mestizo 238 mass party 247 interest groups 242 party system 248 pluralism 243 coalition governments 250 corporatism 244 REVIEW GU ESTIO NS 1 What are the main ways to resolve collective action problems 2 How do would be social movement leaders attempt to mobilize followers 3 What are the main differences between pluralist and corporatist forms of interest group organization 4 What is the main difference between an elite party and a mass party 5 What are the key factors that explain why certain countries have many political parties vying for power while other countries have relatively few SUGGESTED READINGS Cox Gary W Maeing Votes Count Strategic Coordination in the World s Electoral Systems New York Cambridge University Press 1997 Classic reference for understanding the relationship between electoral institutions and party systems Dahl Robert A Who G01erns New Haven CT Yale University Press 1961 A classic description of pluralist interest group mobilization 256 CHAPTER 9 Collective Action 16 17 18 19 20 21 9 See Richard Katz Party Organizations and Finance in Comparing Democracies Elections and Voting in Global Perspective ed Lawrence LeDuc et al Thousand Oaks CA Sage Publications 1996 107133 See Gerard Braunthal The German Social Democrats since 1969 Boulder CO West view Press 1994 58 See for example Herbert Kitschelt Party Systems in The Oxford Hanclboolc of Comparative Politics ed Carles Boix and Susan Stokes Oxford Oxford University Press 2007 522554 The definitive statement of this argument is Gary W Cox Maleing Votes Count Stra tegic Coordination in the World s Electoral Systems New York Cambridge University Press 1997 This example is derived from Adam Przeworski and John Sprague Paper Stones A History of Electoral Socialism Chicago University of Chicago Press 1986 The classic statement of this argument comes from Seymour M Lipset and Stein Rokkan Cleavage Structures Party Systems and Voter Alignments in Party Systems and Voter Alignments ed Seymour M Lipset and Stein Rokkan New York The Free Press 1967 164 258 CHAPTER 10 Political Violence Read and Listen to Chapter 10 at mypoIisciIabcom so tudy and Review the PreTest amp Flashcards at mypoisciabcom What is political violence political violence I the use of force by states or nonstate actors to achieve political goals interstate warfare I the use of violence by states against other states to achieve political goals Watch the Video quotThe Litvinenko Affairquot at mypoisciabcom What causes political violence ay 2009 saw an end to one of the world s longest civil wars when Sri Lanka s government finally defeated a rebel army known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam LTTE the Tamil Tigers Sri Lanka an island off the southern coast of India with a population of about 20 million gained independence from Britain in 1948 Ethnic Tamils who are mostly Hindu were on the political defensive right from the start because they comprise only about 15 percent of the population About 75 percent of Sri Lanka s people are ethnic Sinhalese and they are mostly Buddhist The Tamil Tigers took up arms in 1983 seeking to secede from Sri Lanka and set up an independent Tamil state Yet given the imbalance of forces the Tam ils were vastly outnumbered were virtually surrounded and had the sea at their backs it is puzzling why they took up arms in the first place and how they man aged to sustain armed conflict for decades Many countries confront ethnic tensions but only some of these erupt into civil war The question is why we see violence in some places and not in others In this chapter we explore the question what causes political violence Like peaceful collective action in the case of collective political violence the potential benefit to mobilization often remains unclear Yet unlike peaceful mobilization the poten tial cost of collective violence is obvious death In the face of potentially mortal danger it is not obvious why people would take up arms against the established authority of their own state In this chapter we first define collective violence and then explore the opportunities and interests that create the conditions for civil conflict to emerge DEFINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE The daily news brings so many reports of bloodshed around the world that it is hard to isolate and understand what causes the violence Political violence is defined as the use of force by states or nonstate actors to achieve political goals Historically political violence has predominantly occurred between states In interstate warfare states use violence to achieve political goals which include the subordination or even conquest of another state For example in World War II Germany and Japan initiated hostilities against other states in order to expand territory and resources under their control You might study interstate violence in greater depth in an International Relations course However in this course and in this text we focus on political violence that occurs within states even if such vio lence is transnational in nature in that other states or nonstate actors are some how involved Governments often perpetrate political violence upon their own citizens in order to consolidate power by repressing imprisoning or even murdering individuals or entire groups In some senses violence committed by states is easy to understand because states claim a legitimate use of force to maintain law and order Powerful incentives exist for governments to claim that their use of force is always legitimate Particularly in nondemocratic regimes rulers wield violence as 260 CHAPTER 10 Political Violence health care or education Law and order exist in strong states while state weakness facilitates violence and lawlessness This means that in a strong state there are few opportunities for would be insurgents to organize and sustain collective violence while a weak state offers greater opportunities to organize mobilize and obtain supplies and weapons Let us consider the factors associated with state weakness in more detail Colonial Legacies States that gained independence from European colonial pow ers in the second half of the twentieth century tend to be weaker and more vulner able to civil war The reason lies in the flimsy political institutions that Europeans implemented solely to achieve their goals to extract valuable natural resources coopt local elites and repress local opposition When the colony gained inde pendence colonial institutions retained little legitimacy and little of the sort of effectiveness that enhances legitimate rule such as provision of public services for all citizens and an ability to foster economic development Many former colonies have never managed to overcome this legacy Instead their leaders are often caught in a vicious circle reforms designed to overcome the colonial legacy only work over the long term if they work at all And most rul ers are reluctant to risk fundamental political reforms especially if their hold on power is tenuous Because European powers established stability in their colonies through a combination of repression and the corruption of local elites leaders of newly independent states are often drawn into the same dynamic to maintain themselves in office This perpetuates the cycle and leaves the state with ineffective and illegitimate institutions It follows that when leaders have weak authority and little legitimacy an opportunity exists for competition over who should control the state and such competition often leads to violence Consider the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo DRC a separate country from its neighbor known simply as the Congo Belgium colonized the DRC in 1885 and set up institutions and economic infrastructure with one purpose in mind to profit from extraction of valuable natural resources in the region such as gold rubber and copper and from the export of cash crops such as cotton and palm oil The Belgians built bridges and railways not to help grow the local economy but only to increase the ability to export raw materials and send profits back home The local people were brutally exploited forced to work for the Belgian authorities under threat of punishment When the DRC gained independence in 1960 it had few educated and expe rienced administrators capable of leading uniting and maintaining the territorial integrity of their diverse country which is larger than Mexico in terms of land area State institutions were ineffective and universally regarded as illegitimate Given the situation a violent separatist movement immediately emerged in the country s southern province A strong central government only managed to consolidate au thority in the middle 1960s led by the corrupt and brutal Mobutu Sese Seko Mobutu concentrated power in his own hands and made no effort to create endur ing and legitimate political institutions When he was finally forced from power in 1997 the DRC again collapsed into civil war Since that year violence in the DRC 262 CHAPTER 10 Political Violence rich countries like Japan or Norway and perhaps for this reason poverty and in equality are among the most popular explanations for such conflicts Scholars have confirmed that civil wars occur more often in relatively poorer states particularly where the economy is stagnant The connection between poverty state weakness and civil war lies with the limited economic opportunities available to young men In poor countries where young men have few opportunities to earn an honest living joining an insurgent group offers the prospect of a steady paycheck even though the job comes with great danger As a result where poverty is endemic rebel leaders can build an army on the cheap because more able bodied men need a job In a poor and weak state governments may lack the resources to dissuade men from joining the insurgents However if poverty were the most important cause of civil war we would see more conflict than we do Poverty poor economic performance and inequality certainly give people reasons to gripe about government but they provide at best only a partial explanation for conflict5 Even in the DRC one of the world s poor est countries it is not clear that economic grievances can explain the violence Civil war has never engulfed the entire country combat is concentrated in particular regions which implies that not everyone who is poor has felt compelled to take up arms against the government The bottom line is that civil wars are only rarely initiated by groups of poor people who seek to change the economic structure of their society This brings us to the final opportunity that contributes to civil war natural geography Geography Compared to the effect of poverty geography is a more important source of state weakness contributing to civil war In some countries nature cre ates opportunities for rebels to mobilize and sustain conflict Specifically civil war is much more likely in countries with 1 rough terrain mountains or dense for ests and 2 highly dispersed populations Rough terrain and a dispersed popula tion tend to weaken states capacity to control their borders provide public order prevent smuggling and deliver services to citizens These same factors give insur gents a military advantage over the state s security forces as they will have lots of opportunities to hide and to obtain supplies and support far from the central gov ernment s military bases In the DRC both rough terrain and a dispersed population contribute to state weakness by giving insurgents opportunities to survive attacks by government forces Of the population of 70 million twothirds are spread around rural areas that the government has difficulty controlling The DRC is crisscrossed by rivers and drenched by torrential rains and much of it is covered with forest To this day the country has very few decent paved roads and its railway system is limited and decrepit Such geographic isolation gives insurgents the opportunity to mobilize outside of the reach of the state s authority The table on the following page summarizes the hypotheses that explain civil war as a function of opportunities Each hypothesis focuses on the central point state weak ness gives insurgents the opportunity to strengthen their position In contrast strong states are more likely to nip an insurgency in the bud Having considered opportuni ties let us now turn our attention to how interests contribute to civil war 264 CHAPTER 10 Political Violence cultural polarization I intergroup hatred fos tered by cultural ex clusion or repression The logic here is like the story of Goldilocks and the Three Bears on the one hand in culturally homogenous countries apan for example cultural griev ances are minimal or nonexistent and cannot spark a civil war On the other hand in extremely diverse countries Where the largest ethnic group comprises only a tiny percentage of the population Tanzania or Papua New Guinea for example civil war is also unlikely6 This is because in extremely diverse societies no single ethnic linguistic or religious group can dominate forcing all groups to come to an accommodation Also in highly fragmented societies disgruntled minorities may never be able to recruit enough troops to achieve their goals through violence7 Like Goldilocks s porridge certain conditions may be just right for caus ing civil war Specifically we are more likely to see violence when the largest ethnic or religious group comprises between 50 and 90 percent of the popula tion Groups this large typically believe they should dominate politically Not surprisingly the efforts of dominant groups to assert themselves make minor ity ethnic groups feel politically insecure Such situations sometimes lead to cultural polarization defined as intergroup hatred fostered by cultural exclu sion or repression When cultural polarization occurs civil war grows more likely because both the majority and minority come to think that peaceful solu tions are impossible The Tamil and Sinhalese ethnic groups in Sri Lanka illustrate this dynamic The majority Sinhalese led the independence struggle against the British in 1948 and dominated government thereafter In 1956 they declared Sinhalese the coun try s official language making it difficult for Tamil speakers to obtain government jobs This and other discriminatory lavvs hardened the Tamils sense of oppression The concentration of the Tamil population in the northern and eastern part of the island gave wouldbe insurgents greater opportunities to organize a rebellion In cases like Sri Lanka cultural grievances provide a useful albeit incomplete explanation for civil war The problem is the same as with poverty there are many more cases of cultural polarization than there are cases of civil war In some cases minority groups silently endure discrimination or even brutal oppression believing that resistance is futile We notice their resentment when grievances lead to War fare but there are many cases of grievances that pile up decade after decade with no conflict It remains unclear why aggrieved groups sometimes grudgingly tolerate oppression And even when violence does break out it is often unclear which griev ance transformed cultural polarization into cultural vvarfare Grievances certainly motivate political conflict but their existence does not explain why political vio lence emerges in some places and not others To understand why civil war occurs We need to look beyond cultural grievances and consider the material interests of individuals and groups Greed Some insurgent leaders use the rhetoric of cultural grievances to mask shadier motivations they may claim grievances exist in order to stir up their fol lowers and legitimize the use of violence Yet in many civil wars even those that 266 CHAPTER 10 Political Violence coercive recruitment I where individuals are forced to take up arms to sustain an insurgent army in a civil war resources exist and the state is weak civil war is more likely Still greed and state weakness do not completely explain civil war Another factor that casts light on a dark side of politics is also critical coercive pressures to join insurgent movements Pressure to Join Another important explanation for civil war focuses on how insurgents encourage individuals to join their group Tactics can run the gamut from relatively benign peer pressure to outright kidnapping At the peer pressure end of the spectrum individuals will have a stronger interest in joining a rebel lion if members of their own community are already active in the movement and if their community supports the movement Like street gangs or mafias insurgent militias do not typically recruit troops based on their resumes or educational qual ifications Insurgencies are more likely to succeed if they emerge from communi ties characterized by networks of individuals who share values and beliefs Such communities are also more likely to support insurgents with food clothing and shelter against the forces of the state Still even in a tight community peer pressure may be insufficient to mobilize enough volunteers In many cases it is a mistake to assume that individuals have volunteered to fight against the state instead coercive 1 ecruitment where indi viduals are forced to take up arms often sustains insurgent armies In such cases an individual s only interest in joining the fight is in not getting shot for not j oin ing10 Even if recruits are not actually forced to enlist at gunpoint they may fear that not joining would endanger their families or property In other cases insur gents use systematic abduction to obtain new troops Members of rebel armies many of whom were kidnapped earlier themselves simply kidnap new recruits at gunpoint and tell them that if they do not participate in the violence they will be killed Fear is a powerful motivator it can push people to do things they would not otherwise do Consider the Tamil Tigers In July 1983 Sinhalese mobs rioted causing hun dreds of Tamil deaths and destroying thousands of Tamil houses and businesses This mob violence known as Black July in the Tamil community provided the LTTE with a useful recruitment tool Nonetheless the LTTE never exclusively relied on volunteers It forcibly recruited thousands of adults and children despite acknowledging that such practices undermined its support within the Tamil com munity Every family in an area controlled by the LTTE was required to volun teer one person to serve in the rebel army and larger families were required to provide two or more To avoid forced recruitment many Tamils would leave an area that came under LTTE control To discourage such efforts LTTE leaders would arrest up to ten relatives of anyone who dodged their draft and use those family members for hazardous duty on the front lines Coercive recruitment suggests that in many civil wars most combatants do not volunteer to join the fight out of self interest except to avoid being killed by the people supposedly fighting on their behalf If rebel leaders sanction coercive recruitment then all other supposed causes of civil war cultural grievances a call for social justice or just plain greed may be completely irrelevant Still in some cases of civil war we cannot point to grievances greed or coercive recruitment Revolutions 269 Armed conflict Civil War 1 Armed conflict Revolution Within state Within state boundaries Be Ween I0aquot ieS boundaries W Subject to a tnsurgents at lcll common the state both oti authority whnch etmgoy some A 3 popular support FIG U R E 101 Civil Wars versus Revolutions The Core Differences All revolutions start out as civil wars However revolutions are different because combat is specifically targeted at the state in some civil wars two insurgent groups fight each other and because the insurgents win and impose wholesale political change The simplest and most important distinction is the fact that a revolution is a civil war in which the insurgents win and gain control of the state In many civil wars the insurgents lose or a stalemate results Yet in a revolution insurgents articulate a political grievance that resonates with a significant proportion of the population And after winning on the battlefield and gaining control of the state they follow through on their promises to remake society by implementing dramatic political cultural and economic changes Because revolutions combine insurgent victory and popular support for dramatic political changes examples are historically rare scholars debate about whether a particular example qualifies as a revolution or not but almost always include France 1789 Russia 1917 China 1949 Cuba 1959 and Nicaragua 1979 Note that the first element of the definition of revolution is the definition of civil war This means that all revolutions are civil wars but not all civil wars end up as revolutions Revolutions differ from civil wars in two ways First it is not always the case in a civil war that both the state and the rebels enjoy widespread support For example a conflict between an unpopular dictator and an equally unpopular warlord who wants to declare himself president can become extremely bloody but is not a revolution To qualify as a revolution each party in a civil war must enjoy considerable popular support Second not all civil wars result in a forcible transfer of authority over the state from one side in the conflict to another Many civil wars end in defeat for the insur gents in a stalemate or in compromise All of those outcomes leave the incumbent rulers at least partially in control of government after hostilities cease To qualify as a revolution a civil war must involve a clean break with the past in terms of who holds power When the government loses a civil war the insurgents and their supporters call their victory a revolution the losers call the outcome a national tragedy This definition also distinguishes revolutions from other forms of political violence Military coups d tat are not revolutions Many coups are violent but most involve relatively little armed combat and few involve mass popular mobilization revolutions I armed conflict within a sovereign state between insurgents and the state in which both the insurgents and the state claim the allegiance of a significant proportion of the population authority over the state is forcibly trans ferred from the state to the insurgents and the insurgents subse quently bring about wholesale political change 272 CHAPTER 10 Political Violence Widespread Popular Grievances As in civil wars interests are also important explanations for revolutions Two sorts of interests that help explain civil wars are relatively less important explana tions of revolution greed and coercion This is not to say that revolutionary armies never engage in plunder or looting or that revolutionary armies never traffic in drugs weapons or valuable commodities It is also not true that social pressures or outright coercion are absent from rebel army recruitment patterns Neverthe less it is important to remember that revolutions are successful insurgencies they are civil wars that result in the defeat of the government With that in mind recall the second element of revolution s definition both sides must enjoy considerable popular support The key to a successful insurgency lies with the fact that those who wish to defeat the state must take care not to alienate average people by forcibly recruiting children raping or stealing To succeed a rebel army must cultivate citizens support by combining appeals about what is just and right with appeals to people s concrete material interests For example the Chinese Communist Party did not simply lecture peasants and workers about the supposed evils of capitalism and the wonders of communism Such ideological appeals often fall on deaf ears among average citizens Instead the com munists focused on two simpler ideas both of which found a receptive audience First they appealed to the patriotism of their fellowcitizens accusing the Nationalist Party of treason by failing to resist the Japanese invasion Because during World War II the nationalists had in fact chosen to concentrate on fighting the communists rather than the Japanese many Chinese concluded that the nationalists were more interested in fomenting chaos at home than they were in ridding China of a hated invader The communists hit a raw nerve Chinese people s sense of wounded nationalist pride Patriotism proved a useful recruitment tool15 Second the communists appealed to the material interests of China s hundreds of millions of peasants by engaging in massive land redistribution As communist forces advanced they would confiscate wealthy landlords property and distribute it among the area s peasants The communists also lowered peasants taxes and increased taxes on the wealthy Confiscating landlords property and raising taxes on the rich fit with communist ideology but it also fit the material interests of China s poor Communist leaders knew peasants would not willingly support the insurgency unless they made it clear that they were fighting for peasants interests16 This approach generated the widespread popular support that proved necessary for the revolution to succeed There is no simple explanation for why a revolution succeeds or fails However as in civil war both opportunities and interests are important In particular state weakness typically a result of loss in an international war provides a key opportunity for insurgents to mobilize against the state Interests also prove important However in the case of revolution both greed and coercion by insur gent leaders appear less important Instead to build popular support insurgent leaders appeal to widely held popular grievances whether cultural or economic Only with widespread popular support can a revolution succeed and when the insurgents win a wholesale transfer of power occurs bringing about deep and long lasting political change Let us now turn to the political consequences of revolution 274 CHAPTER 10 Political Violence The Iranian Revolution Constitutes a HYPOTHESIS TESTING In 1979 Iranians forced their king Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to abdicate his throne and depart his country to exile luch lilte the overthrow of Egypt39s President Hosni Mubaralt in 2011 the shah had ruled for decades and was regarded as the fulcrum of the country39s entire political system Before 1979 few observers would have guessed that the shah would be out of power within a year Indeed most believed that he was safely in control as he had been since 1941 Often when a leader is forced from power observers call the outcome revolutionary But this term loses meaning if we apply it to every instance in which a dictator is tossed from office Given the guidelines this chapter establishes how would you go about confirming or disconfirming the Iranians clamoring to glimpse Ayatollah Kho meini the leader of the Iranian Revolution crowd into a building under construction in Teheran 1979 Case of Real Revolution hypothesis the Iranian revolution constitutes a case of real revolution GATHER EVIDENCE Let39s explore both sides of this case On the one hand the evidence seems clear that the overthrow of the shah differs from other well ltnown cases of revolution First no one believed that the Iranian state was particularly weak the shah had powerful and modern police and military forces and the country had not just lost an international war as had Russia in 1917 or China in 1949 Second the shah s overthrow was not nearly as violent as the toppling of the pre revolutionary Russian and Chinese cases Considerable violence was directed at the shah s government but an all out civil war did not precede the shah s overthrow17 On the basis of these two pieces of evidence we might conclude that the shah s overthrow was just that one case among many of a dictator being tossed from office ASSESS THE HYPOTHESIS However if we test the hypothesis further other facts lead to a different conclusion First as in other cases of revolution the shah s regime confronted widespread popular opposition Opposition emerged because by the 1970s Iran39s economy was stagnating and because the shah s regime had grown increasingly repressive Opposition also emerged because the shah had sought to undermine the authority of Iran39s Islamic clergy which had historically controlled educational legal and social welfare activities Religious Iranians increasingly viewed the shah as anti Islamic In short opposition to the shah intensified among secular and religious Iranians for different reasons secular Iranians wanted a democratic regime while religious Iranians wanted to impose Islamic law Public opposition to the shah exploded in summer 1978 following government repression of protests against the visit of US President Jimmy Carter The success of the protests exposed the shah s weakness Continued 276 CHAPTER 10 Political Violence When do insurgents resort to terrorism guerilla wars I wars in which small groups of insurgents use irregular military tactics such as sabo tage and ambushes to engage the state s military forces terrorism I threat ened or actual use of violence for political purposes by non state actors directed par ticularly against civil ian targets Watch the Video quotBin Laden Killed in Pakistanquot at mypoisciabcom suicide terrorism I acts of violence perpetrated against either combatants or non combatants by individuals who are aware that they are unlikely to survive TERRORISM Some civil wars are fought like conventional wars with troops engaging each other on the battlefield Others are fought as guerilla wars in which small groups of insurgents use irregular military tactics such as sabotage and ambushes to engage a state s military forces Since the attacks of 911 Americans have become increasingly aware of the use of another form of political violence terrorism which is the threatened or actual use of violence for political purposes by non state actors particularly against civilian targets21 States sometimes use coercion to terrorize citizens and they sometimes sponsor militias or insurgent groups in other states However the definition of terrorism focuses on the actions and goals of non state actors Terrorism occurs when non state actors target civilians for political purposes Avoiding military targets is a political tactic Terrorists believe that attacking civil ians is more likely to achieve their goals instead of a conventional attack on the state s military forces This distinguishes terrorism from civil war in which non state actors attack the state s military capabilities Terrorists use violence not to overthrow the state directly but to undermine state strength to chip away at the appearance that the state is legitimate and effective Terrorism is frequently transnational in nature Many terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda find safe havens in weak states such as Afghanistan Somalia or Yemen in order to plan and train for attacks they will undertake in other states For example the terrorist organization LashkareTaiba based largely in Pakistan coordinated a series of brazen attacks in downtown Mumbai the largest city in India in November 2008 killing 166 and wounding more than 300 civilians22 Lashkar seeks to establish an Islamic state in South Asia particularly over Muslim majority areas ruled by India which is dominated by Hindus To achieve this goal it attempts to stoke fear among the Indian population so that India s government relinquishes control over the areas Lashkar contests Terrorists whether operating transnationally or purely domestically rarely achieve their longterm political goals However terrorism has dramatically reshaped many countries security policies In particular terrorism impacts democratic states more than non democratic states because both domestic and foreign terrorists force democracies to reconsider how best to address the tradeoff embodied by Madison s Dilemma between limited and effective government To prevent terrorist attacks many democracies have ramped up their security policies something we all see and experience when we go to the airport This potentially weakens the freedoms that are central to democratic governance Terrorism has never destroyed democracy but it has forced citizens in democratic states to reevaluate their willingness to trade off national security and individual liberties No explanation exists for why insurgents resort to terrorism However we do have a good explanation for the incidence of suicide terrorism the use of violence for political purposes against civilian targets by individuals who are aware that they are unlikely to survive Despite the prominence of shattering events like 911 relatively few groups employ suicide terrorism Indeed multiple suicide attacks occur in only one of every ten civil wars23 Still because of the prominence of ter rorist groups that employ suicide terrorism such as LashkareTaiba al Qaeda and Genocide 279 relatively wealthy countries with strong states and tends to be sponsored by insur gent groups that engage in warfare and welfare This information is useful in that it helps identify the conditions under which suicide terrorism is more or less likely to occur as part of civil conflict GENOCIDE Victims of political violence sometimes claim that aggressors are guilty of genocide a deliberate and coordinated effort to eliminate all members of a particular ethnic religious or national group through mass murder Genocide differs from combat ant or civilian deaths in international or civil war no matter how severe be cause it deliberately and systematically targets every man woman and child in a particular group And it differs from terrorism in that it is systematic rather than random in targeting civilians for murder Genocide also differs from episodes of mass murder that rulers sometimes commit for ideological reasons27 Since the United Nations codified the definition of genocide in 1948 numerous groups have claimed status as genocide victims The UN discourages using the term loosely because of high demand for international intervention to prevent geno cide Partly as a result relatively few widely accepted cases exist Those that are generally accepted as meriting the label include Turkey s murder of up to 15 mil lion Armenians 19151920 the murder of millions of Jews Gypsies and other minorities during the Holocaust Serbian ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims in the early 1990s the ongoing violence against residents of the Darfur region in Sudan and Hutu efforts to exterminate the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda in 1994 In Rwanda upwards of one million Tutsis were murdered at the urging of the Hutuled government Rwanda had been a Belgian colony in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries The Belgian administrators had favored the Tutsis over the Hutus giving Tutsis privileged access to the few benefits the colonial administration provided The Tutsis were a minority of Rwanda s population but they retained political power after the country gained its independence in 1962 However a Hutuled rebellion overthrew the Tutsi government leading to a period of civil war in the early 1990s The UN intervened in 1993 and the Hutu president agreed to a ceasefire and a power sharing deal However hardline Hutu leaders refused to comply Later that year unknown attackers shot down the Hutu president s airplane and his death gave Hutu hardliners an excuse to encourage members of their tribe to murder Tutsis What explains why genocide occurs As with the other sorts of political violence we have explored in this chapter let us turn to opportunities and interests at both the domestic and international levels using the case of Rwanda to illustrate the logic Ethnic War and Absent International Response Most cases of genocide occur under a narrow set of conditions First ethnic divi sions must exist In Rwanda Hutus and Tutsis recognized differences between their ethnic groups although prior to the genocide neither group held a particularly deep hatred for the other In fact Rwanda was an ethnically integrated society Hutus and Tutsis lived and worked together frequently intermarried and speak Why does genocide sometimes occur during warfare genocide I a coordi nated plan seeking to eliminate all members of particular ethnic religious or national groups through mass murder Watch the Video quotWestern Arm Sales and the Rwandan Genocidequot at mypoisciabcom Genocide 281 SUMMARY TABLE Causes of Political Violence Comparisons and Contrasts Form of Political Examples Violence Definition Opportunities Interests Discussed Civil war Armed combat within A wealt state I Grievances Sri Lanlta the boundaries of a due to I Greed DRC sovereign state between I Colonial I Pressure to parties subject to common legacies join authority at the start of I International I Individual hostilities environment psychology I Poverty I Geography Revolution Armed combat within A wealt state I Grievances China the boundaries of a due to with wide sovereign state between I International popular parties subject to common environment support authority at the start of I Poverty I Individual hostilities I Geography psychology in which each party claims the allegiance of a significant proportion of the state39s population and which results in an insurgent victory Suicide Acts of violence I Strong I Specifically Israel terrorism perpetrated against states hard religious Palestine either combatants or non targets conflict combatants by people who I Insurgent are aware that they are groups that unlikely to survive combine warfare and welfare Genocide A deliberate and I Ethnic I Leadership Rwanda coordinated effort to divisions that sees eliminate all members of a I Ongoing mass murder particular ethnic religious warfare as politically or national group through I Permissive useful mass murder international environment Notes 283 REVIEW GU ESTIO NS 1 What are the most important causes of civil wars 2 What is the difference between civil war and revolution 3 What is the key to understanding why revolutions occur 4 Under what conditions are we likely to see suicide terrorism 5 What factors increase the likelihood of genocide SUGGESTED READINGS Brass Paul Elite Groups Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia Primordialist and Instrumentalist Interpretations of Ethnic Identity In Ethnicity and Nationalism Theory and Comparison edited by Paul Brass 6989 New Delhi Sage Publications 1991 A simple constructivist explanation of how elite competi tion can shape mass beliefs and behavior Cohen Robin The Making of Ethnicity A Modest Defense of Primordialism In People Nation and State edited by Edward Mortimer and Robert Fine 311 London I B Tauris 1999 A brief argument defending the use of primordialism to explain the sources of ethnic conflict Elbadawi Ibrahim and Nicholas Sambanis How Much War Will We See Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War The oarnal of Conflict Resolution 46 32002 307334 A heavily empirical study of when wars start and how long they last identifying ethnic diversity and democracy as key causes of civil conflict Humphreys Macartan Natural Resources Conflict and Conflict Resolution Uncovering the Mechanisms oarnal of Conflict Resolution 4942005 508537 Seeks out the precise way in which natural resources contribute to the onset of civil wars Wood Elisabeth Jean The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador In Passion ate Politics edited by Jeff Goodwin James Jasper and Francesca Polleta 267280 University of Chicago Press 2001 Useful case study that attempts to unpack the puzzle of civil war in the absence of clear opportunities or interests NOTES 1 See Stathis Kalyvas The Logic of Violence in Civil War New York Cambridge University Press 2006 17 2 See for example the Correlates of War Project httpcorrelatesofwarorg 3 See James Fearon and David Laitin Explaining Interethnic Cooperation American Political Science Review 9041996 715735 and Nicholas Sambanis Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War Perspectives on Politics 222004 259279 4 Fearon and Laitin Explaining 717 5 See for example Paul Collier Anke Hoeffler and Nicholas Sambanis The Collier Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design in Understanding Civil War Evidence and Analysis ed Paul Collier and Nocholas Sam banis Washington DC World Bank Publications 2005 chapter 1 6 See James Fearon and David Laitin Ethnicity Insurgency and Civil War American Political Science Review 971February 2003 7590 7 Collier Hoeffler and Sambanis The Collier Hoeffler Model 8 See for example Adam Hochschild Blood and Treasure Mother Jones March April 2010 accessed December 15 2011 httpmotherjonescompolitics2010O2 congo gold adam hochschild Political Economy of Development A protester outside Irelan s overnment buildings makes his opinion c ear after learning of a series of tax increases and budget cuts in December 2 1 States and Markets 287 Ireland and China represent very different economic paths Because we cannot predict the future we do not know whether China will come to regret the heavy hand of government in the economy over the long run or whether Ireland will recover and regain its economic footing Which approach best promotes long term sustained growth Consider three key ways we can compare and contrast China and Ireland the timing of state formation democracy versus non democracy and experience with colonization Both Ireland and China have had to overcome a historical legacy of colonial ism Ireland only gained independence from the UK in 1922 and remained quite poor up through the 1960s China was exploited and partially occupied by foreign powers from the 1800s through World War II and its state remained extremely weak until 1949 due to a violent civil war Only in the last 30 years has China managed to grow out of poverty Today Ireland is a democracy and has based its recent growth on free market principles an economic system in which private individuals and firms rather than the government own and have rights to make all decisions about buying and sell ing property and goods such as land financial assets such as stocks and bonds and productive industries In contrast China is a nondemocratic interventionist state in which the central government allocates resources makes investment decisions and owns many of the country s productive industries and resources Variation on all states experience with these three factors democracy or non democracy the degree of state intervention in the economy and experiences with colonialism helps explain diverging patterns of economic development Before delving into these three factors let us first explore the fundamental question of political economy why all states intervene in the market STATES AND MARKETS If asked what kind of state best promotes economic development many Ameri cans might respond by arguing that the state has no business promoting economic growth and if only the government would get its sticky paws out of the economy the United States would grow by leaps and bounds creating good jobs and generat ing a better standard of living for everyone Unfortunately a complete separation of market and state is unrealistic because politics and economics influence each other at every level from individual shopping decisions to international financial flows In theory an economic market is a system of choice individuals and firms choose how to produce the goods that consumers seek to purchase Ideally markets function SUMMARY TABLE Main Factors Influencing Paths of Economic Development Democracy versus Non Democracy Degree of State Intervention in the Economy Colonial Legacies free market principles I an eco nomic system in which individuals and firms rather than the government have rights to make all decisions about buy ing and selling private property such as land stoclt commodities or productive industries interventionist state I an economic system in which the central government allocates resources makes investment decisions and owns many of the country s produc tive industries andor resources What is the relationship between states and markets economic market I mechanism of choice as to how firms produce goods and how consumers consume goods Watch the Video quotEnvironment and Economic Growth in Chinaquot at mypoisciabcom States and Markets 289 Even in the midst of total war patriotic posters fail to help governments raise sufficient resources The state must use coercion to raise taxes to avoid the free rider problem Public Goods The key reason states compel contributions is because the most important services they supply are public goods Recall that public goods are things that by their very nature no one can be excluded from consuming they are available to all citizens not just to specific groups For example clean air is a public good no matter how heavily you breathe no one else will suffocate Other common examples include transportation systems roads bridges highvvays rail ways subways and airports public schools and hospitals national parks librar ies and national defense systems Once a public good is created nobody can be States and Markets 291 failure because in the absence of competition one firm can set prices for its prod uct above what a competitive free market would allow Under these circumstances members of a society are limited in their access to that product or service and when this occurs the monopolistic firm profits but consumers lose Monopolies are inefficient because prices are not determined by supply and demand and for this reason politicians justify government regulation over par ticular markets For example Microsoft was forced to settle a lawsuit in the United States about whether its practice of inserting and giving away the web browser Internet Explorer created a monopoly that destroyed competition in that segment of the software industry a similar suit resulted in 15 billion in fines from the European Union Most governments around the world regulate mo nopolistic practices in some circumstances because of the potentially negative political consequences for consumers as well as the government that result when private sector companies inflate prices beyond what a competitive market would bear Externality A third form of market failure is called an externality An externality is something that an individual or organization does that affects the welfare of others whether on purpose or not A common example of an externality is pollu tion For example British Petroleum BP invests a great deal of money sinking oil wells into the ocean floor under the Gulf of Mexico in the hope of profiting by finding large supplies of petroleum However if an oil spill occurs as in summer 2010 when a BP oil platform caught fire and sank releasing hundreds of thou sands of barrels of crude oil into the Gulf the pollution imposes costs on nearby individuals businesses and property owners expenses that the polluter may not have to pay For example those who wish to sell their homes face lower property values due to the presence of the pollution and likely recurrence of future pollution and those who face health problems from the effects of pollution must pay for additional medical care In this example BP is the source of the externality all else equal if it had never built that oil well the people in the region would not have incurred those additional costs Because the disaster was so massive and damaging individuals and the government sued to force BP to clean up and provide compensation However in many cases responsibility for an externality is unclear The BF oil spill generates the impression that all externalities are bad but this is not true Some externalities impose unforeseen costs but others generate unfore seen benefits For example that BP oil well generates jobs and income for the same people affected by the pollution Economic activities can produce both positive and negative externalities depending on who is affected how and to what extent The point is that private economic decisions to drill for oil for example may be optimal or suboptimal from a public point of view depending on the total costs and benefits of both the positive and negative externalities When positive externalities occur everybody is happy But if the negative externalities outweigh the positive we have externality I an action that affects the welfare of others whether on purpose or not 294 CHAPTER 11 Political Economy of Development Watch the Video quotChina39s New Richquot at mypoisciabcom command economy I an economy in which the central government controls and coordinates virtually all economic activity Figure 111 charts democratic and non democratic states according to their level of intervention in the economy On the horizontal axis we have the degree to which a country is democratic or not while on the vertical axis we consider the extent to which the state intervenes in the economy Free market systems see relatively limited government intervention in the economy At the other end of the vertical axis command economies are highly interventionist states in which the government controls and coordinates virtually all economic activity Placement of any country on this figure will be imprecise However we can put Ireland in the upperright corner as a free market democracy and place China towards the lower left as a non democracy where the government intervenes relatively heavily Note the placement of Ireland and Germany Both are democracies like the United States but Ireland is slightly more laissez faire than the United States while Germany intervenes in its economy relatively more Of the non democracies Sin gapore takes the same hands off approach as Ireland while South Korea s govern ment like Germany s takes a more interventionist approach North Korea a totalitarian non democracy most closely resembles a command economy and has almost no free market whatsoever In the rest of this section we focus on the question Is democracy or non democracy the best way to promote rapid and efficient economic development Given the rapid growth of countries like Singapore South Korea which was a non democracy until 1987 and now China many observers believe that non democra cies are better than democracies at solving market failures and promoting economic growth Let us consider why this might be the case and then assess the evidence Free Market I I d Singapore Desi Leave of South Korea G Intervention democracy after 1987 quotmany China Command Economy North Korea NonDemocracy Democracy State FIGURE 111 Levels of State Intervention under Democracy and NonDemocracy This figure shows where democratic and non democratic countries are situated on the spectrum of market and command economies Notice the positions of China and Ireland Consider where other countries might fall 296 CHAPTER 11 Political Economy of Development The debate about the merits of democracy and non democracy has wideranging realworld implications It figures for example in political discussions within the World Bank the International Monetary Fund the United Nations and other international organizations about how best to lift developing nations out of pov erty In the 1970s and 1980s many analysts in such organizations suggested that although nondemocracies in Latin America Africa Asia and elsewhere such as Singapore or South Korea violated human rights at least they grew their econo mies After all the argument went one cannot enjoy the rights and privileges of a democracy if one cannot eat The implication was that poor countries could only afford the luxury of democracy after they had experienced sustained economic development justifying World Bank IMF and US policies that overlooked citi zens rights in numerous non democratic regimes around the world Despite the recent rapid growth of China and slowdown in the United States scholars have never found clear empirical evidence that democracy undermines or slows development and that non democracy speeds it Given this the argument for tolerating dictators loses validity because there is no evidence that govern ments have to sacrifice citizens rights for the economy to grow The lack of clear empirical findings in this debate provides democracy with powerful moral sup port non democracy provides citizens with no economic advantage but it certainly offers political and social disadvantages Democracies perform much better than nondemocracies on indicators of human welfare such as individual liberties SUMMARY TABLE Economic Development Democracy or NonDemocracy Hypothesis Arguments for Arguments against Democracy impedes Leaders must Property rights broadly development respond to considered are better special interest protected under democracy pressures for where rule of law exists spending raising taxes and spending on economically unproductive activities Non democracy Leaders are Leaders are rarely purely impedes development insulated from public minded they are special interest often corrupt wasteful and pressures for inefficient managers of the spending thus economy more efficient managers of the economy 298 CHAPTER 11 Political Economy of Development economic liberalism I an ideology that favors minimal state involvement in the economy as the best recipe for growth Free Markets versus Command Economies Advocates of the free market have long trumpeted the benefits of limited government intervention in the economy In classical political thought liberalism emphasizes individual political and economic freedom of choice equality of opportunity Consequently economic liberalism is an approach that favors minimal state involvement in the economy as the best recipe for growth Economic liberals pro mote laissez faire economic policies such as minimal government regulation of the economy low tax rates low government expenditures and low tariffs and other barriers to imports as the best ways to both protect private property and encourage productive investment This approach suggests that states should only provide the minimum necessary public goods for the market to flourish In short economic liberalism favors individual freedom of choice The United States is the world s most prominent example of economic liberalism in action other examples include Ireland and Singapore Despite the ideology of minimal government even economically liberal states see extensive government involvement in regulating the market and establishing rules and legal procedures for investment and economic production For example the US government sets interest rates controls the money supply imposes trade barriers grants subsidies to producers of certain goods and enacts countless rules and regulations governing every aspect of the economy Moreover the US government does not simply let the chips fall where they may during severe economic crises A truly non interventionist government would let companies that make mistakes go out of business However after the collapse of several major investment banks in 2008 the US government under Republican President George W Bush initiated a program to bail out several Wall Street financial corporations with taxpayer money Even freemarket economies see considerable government intervention Even so many countries governments intervene far more extensively in the market Let us now consider the argument in favor of a heavily interventionist state At the extreme such systems are command economies In command economies the market does not determine supply demand or prices the government does Communism and socialism are examples of political ideologies that advocate heavy state intervention to reduce economic inequalities and they thus advocate an approach towards the command economy end of the vertical axis in Figure 111 The Soviet Union until its collapse around 1990 China before the 1980s contem porary North Korea and Cuba are examples of command economies Although few truly command economies exist today many states remain heav ily interventionist owning important companies or controlling entire industries The government of China for example owns at least 143000 corporations which account for about 20 percent of all Chinese corporate assets4 Many of these com panies are quite small but some are among China s largest businesses including China Mobile the world s largest cell phone company by number of subscribers Baoshan Steel the third largest iron and steel company in the world and the largest in China and PetroChina an energy conglomerate that in 2010 was the most valu able corporation in the world in terms of stock price5 The Chinese government also owns businesses that employ millions of people in such industries as shipbuilding electronics avionics power generation vehicle manufacturing transportation 300 CHAPTER 11 Political Economy of Development stateled development I a strategy to promote economic growth that includes such policies as government coor dination of private sector investment forced savings and preferential treatment to certain industries regarded as essential for national economic development degree of state intervention in the economy than liberalism recommends in an effort to ameliorate the economic inequalities that the free market tends to create Social democracy has been put into practice in several Western European states In contrast to communism social democracy advocates reforming rather than destroying capitalism by creating generous public pension systems and unemploy ment benefits free or heavily subsidized public health care systems and subsidized public education all the way through graduate school Such efforts to redistribute wealth encourage social mobility and protect the relatively poor through social welfare expenditures mean higher tax rates The second middle ground approach is the path taken more recently by poor countries that seek to develop their economies as rapidly as possible such as Japan South Korea and China This path is stateled development in which the govern ment coordinates private sector investments encourages individuals to save rather than spend their income and gives preferential treatment to certain industries regarded as essential for national economic development State led development strategies are less concerned than social democracy with questions of inequality and redistribution for example Japan South Korea and China do not have particularly large welfare state policies that protect the economic and social well being of the poor and focus most on growing the economy Countries that have adopted stateled development are not command econo mies but they do enact considerable state intervention in the market much more than Ireland the United States Singapore or other free market economies To be sure individual private enterprise has been thriving in China especially in manu facturing and exporting industries Since the 19803 China has pulled back from communism s command economy Its government in effect admitted that com munism had failed and that a dose of free market capitalism would help grow the economy However in no sense can we say that China now has a free market economy like Ireland In comparative perspective China s government remains far above average in terms of state intervention in the economy Identifying precisely where a state falls on the vertical axis of Figure 111 is difficult However comparing states on a continuum of more or relatively less state intervention in the economy allows us to consider what sort of state best promotes economic development Where along the vertical axis of Figure 111 is best The relative advantages of the free market versus intervention have driven centuries of debate In recent years many observers have concluded that the rapid success of countries such as South Korea and China provides evidence that a relatively strong interventionist state is best rather than a free market liberal state6 Should states do more than minimally setting the conditions for a free market to flourish Can state intervention in the economy quickly solve market failures and generate rapid economic development Let us see what the evidence says Earlier we noted that democracy appears no better than non democracy at promoting economic development Yet what degree of state intervention is best Can a state be too interventionist or not interventionist enough Let s see whether empirical evidence supports prescribing a strong state or a weak state or something in between Take a look at Table 111 which shows the level of per capita income 302 CHAPTER 11 Political Economy of Development Gross Domestic Product GDP I a measure of a country39s total economic output in the world s 20 richest and 20 poorest countries in 2008 and also shows the proportion of Gross Domestic Product GDP a measure of a country s total economic output that each government takes as tax revenue If you were to place all the wealthiest countries from Table 111 on the ver tical axis of Figure 111 you would find that the degree of state intervention in the economy measured by the proportion of GDP taken as taxes varies con siderably Bahrain and Equatorial Guinea both have populations of less than one million and sit upon immense supplies of oil so it is no surprise that they are wealthy but tax their citizens very little As for the rest the tax burden ranges from 13 percent of GDP in the bastion of freemarket economic liberalism of Singapore all the way up to 50 percent in Denmark a social democracy This means that the world s wealthiest countries can be placed at various points along the upper half of the vertical axis in Figure 111 As for the poorest countries on the righthand side of Table 111 here we see more consistency in terms of the tax burden all the world s poorest countries are low tax states According to the ideology of economic liberalism the lower the tax rate the better the environment for business and investors to profit However in global perspective this is not the case Instead most of the wealthiest countries in the world have relatively high overall tax rates higher even than the United States This relationship between high taxes and high wealth which contradicts the ideology of freemarket economic liberalism holds up when one considers all the countries in the world in general the higher the tax rate the wealthier the country Figure 112 reveals this relationship with data from the Heritage Foundation a freemarket think tank The horizontal axis is the Heritage Foundation s Economic Freedom score for 176 countries higher scores represent a free market economy like Ireland while lower scores represent heavy intervention like North Korea The vertical axis maps the proportion of taxes as GDP in each of those countries The cloud of points seems to slope upward indicating that even the Heritage Foundation regards higher tax economies as more competitive In fact the average proportion of taxes as GDP in the top half of the competitiveness ranking is 261 percent while in the bottom half of the ranking it is 184 percent taxes are higher in more competitive economies Taxes apparently do not stifle economic growth Why not The reason is that many of the world s poorest states are also among the world s weakest states Weak states are ineffective and illegitimate they fail to provide public goods such as political stability and law and order which means they fail to create the con ditions necessary for economic growth These states do not have the capacity to extract higher taxes even if they wanted to Not all of the world s poorest states are weak states some relatively poor states such as Zimbabwe North Korea and Cuba are among the world s strongest in terms of effectiveness but only in the sense of having overwhelming coercive control over society and the economy In these countries governments deliberately crush most if not all private sector initiative None of the world s wealthiest states today have the degrees of political control over the economy that these three countries do not even China 304 CHAPTER 11 Political Economy of Development m How do colonial legacies influence economic development High LongTerm Economic Development Low Low High Degree of State Intervention FIGURE 113 State Intervention in the Economy and the Prospects for LongTerm Economic Development This figure suggests that the optimal level of state intervention is neither too high nor too low Consider where countries such as the United States Ireland China or Germany might fall along the curve considerably from economically liberal freemarket states to fairly interventionist social democracies or countries that have adopted stateled development policies All states intervene in the market to some eXtent and differences in the degree of state intervention underlie variation in long term economic performance across countries and over time What we ve discovered in this section is that governments can intervene too little as in weak states such as Somalia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC or they can intervene too much as in North Korea or Cuba Too little or too much intervention destroys the conditions necessary for sustained long term economic development However along the vertical axis from free market to interventionist in Figure 111 there appears to be no single institutional recipe that will eliminate poverty and promote development States can succeed by adopting freemarket principles like the United States Ireland or Singapore or they can succeed by taking a more interventionist approach like Ger many South Korea or China This finding may be somewhat unsatisfying but it also warns against the uncritical acceptance and application of any particular one size fits all economic ideology COLONIAL LEGACIES Thus far we have considered two political factors that might be associated with economic development the difference between democracy and non democracy and the degree of state intervention in the economy To answer this chapter s main question about the sources of economic development however we must turn to our final factor colonial legacies Modern states first emerged in Western Europe Colonial Legacies 307 deter the development of local trade and discouraged private sector investment in the local economy For example British colonial authorities in Kenya enacted poli cies that encouraged whites to settle buy land and begin farming but in Ghana the same authorities enacted policies that discouraged settlement7 When extractive and settlement colonies gained independence they did not wipe the institutional slate clean Doing so would have made a bad situation worse by re placing inadequate government institutions with complete political chaos Instead they began their histories as sovereign states with the institutions they inherited from their colonizers which meant that they also inherited the colonizers patterns of doing busi ness and conducting government affairs As many extractive colonies gained indepen dence the existing systems which lacked checks and balances and focused on resource extraction and exploitation of labor facilitated the establishment of nondemocratic states and in many cases permitted the newly empowered indigenous authorities to maintain the extractive political and economic system This process simply replaced a greedy and unaccountable foreign elite with a greedy and unaccountable domestic elite perpetuating economic inequalities and stifling economic growth8 To the extent that this argument is true it is critical to understand what origi nally determined a European country s colonization strategy Why would a Euro pean government set up a settlement colony in one place and an extractive colony in another To be sure even in the absence of its longstanding civil conflict the DRC would be a relatively difficult place to live due to its climate and harsh ter rain compared to say Belgium But two centuries ago the British authorities also considered Australia similarly inhospitable it was precisely for that reason that they gave Australia s first settlers convicted criminals a oneway ticket Scholars have suggested that colonization strategy was a function of the long term feasibility of European settlement9 In potential colonies where Europeans faced a high likelihood of death from disease such as malaria or yellow fever they couldn t settle As a result they set up extractive states imposing order by military force and using coerced labor provided by natives as in the tin and silver mines in Bolivia or the rubber plantations in the DRC or by imported slaves as on Carib bean and Brazilian sugar plantations In contrast in places where Europeans were more likely to survive their gov ernments set up settlement colonies as in North America and eventually in New Zealand and even Australia where convicts survived longer than predicted so set tlers gradually started arriving of their own free will Australia and New Zealand are critical cases because in those colonies the English authorities initially opposed the creation of institutions that would promote economic development Such insti tutions did not arise naturally simply because the settlers were English and carried their cultural baggage with them instead the settlers had to fight for those rights This argument suggests the following 1 the feasibility of Europeans settling outside Europe during the period 15001850 determined the sorts of political institutions that colonial authorities initially established 2 Upon independence in the midtolate twentieth century former colonies inherited these institutions and the practices associated with them and 3 this inheritance continues to shape these countries economic development In short the experience of colonization and in particular the institutions inherited from European colonialism has profoundly shaped the fortunes of countries in today s world Colonial Legacies 309 Pilgrims arriving in Massachusetts 1620 and slaves in the Congo circa 1905 In climates where they could survive Europeans set up settlement coonies as in Massachusetts Where Europeans were less lilltey to survive due to the harsh climate they set up extractive coonies as in the Congo Continued Conclusion 311 SUMMARY TABLE Impact of Colonial Legacies Establishing sovereign authority over territory gave certain states a head start in terms of economic development ability to exploit territories without sovereign states Example U K Early forming states Colonized states Absence of Extractive colonial legacy few sovereignty constraints on government economy meant designed only to export wealth vulnerability harder to overcome Example Congo to foreig Settlement colony legacy strong dommatio a d constraints on government eXp39 itati economy designed to promote local Example Chi a development relatively easier to overcome Example United States and political exploitation by more powerful countries Still the argument is not completely fatalistic For example Ireland and Botswana both former British colonies have both at least partially overcome the institutional legacy of colo nization In both countries since about 1950 politicians have fostered politi cal stability and helped overcome or transform its institutional inheritance and international political constraints Despite the economic crisis since 2008 Ireland remains a fairly wealthy country Botswana is a middle income country with a per capita income on par with Argentina or Brazil also former colonies and Russia The Asian Tigers such as South Korea and contemporary China provide additional proof that poor countries are not doomed to a miserable fate Both countries were exploited by foreign powers and both were poor just 50 years ago Yet both have overcome their histories If institutional legacies were per manent and if the world were simply full of haves who could permanently exploit the have nots we never would have seen such amazing growth The Asian Tigers did not become rich because they were early forming states or because they suddenly discovered oil or even because they changed their cultural ways but because they changed their political institutions and strengthened the political role of the state in the economy Early state formation certainly offered some states a leg up on the competition and colonization has hindered development in many states However colonization is not necessarily a permanent barrier to economic development CONCLUSION How do states promote economic development The real world relevance of this question is important to the wellbeing of hundreds of millions of impover ished people around the planet All states take actions that impact the economy even relatively weak states engage in some political coercion to provide public goods and prevent market failures Notes 313 Gross Domestic Product GDP 302 settlement colony 306 extractive colony 306 command economy 294 economic liberalism 298 social democracy 299 state led development 300 REVIEW GU ESTIO NS What in theory do states provide in return for taxation Why might democracy promote development better than non democracy Why might non democracy promote development better than democracy What are the main differences between economic liberalism and state interventionism What is the likely long term impact of settlement colonies versus extractive colonies on long term development U1IgtUJ3 SUGGESTED READINGS Almond Gabriel Capitalism and Democracy PS Political Science September 1991 467474 Discusses the hypotheses relating free markets versus interventionist states and democracy versus non democracy to economic development Easterly William White Man s Burden Why the West s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good New York Penguin 2006 Argues that efforts to pro mote economic development by organizations such as the IMF and World Bank have been counterproductive Hochschild Adam King Leopold s Ghost A Story of Greed Terror and Heroism in Colo nial Africa New York Mariner Books 1999 A moving historical account of the impact of Belgian colonialism on the Congo Polgreen Lydia 2008 Congo s Riches Looted by Renegade Troops New Yorle Times November 16 A1 Journalistic exploration of how a weak state warfare and greed com bine to undermine development in the Democratic Republic of Congo Przeworski Adam and Fernando Limongi Political Regimes and Economic Growth Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 1993 5169 An empirical comparison of the im pact of democracy and non democracy on economic development NOTES 1 Samuel Huntington Political Order in Changing Societies New Haven CT Yale Uni versity Press 1968 Also Stephan Haggard Pathways from the Periphery The Politics of Growth in Newly Industrializing Countries Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1990 262 2 See for example Mancur Olson Autocracy Democracy and Prosperity in Strategy and Choice ed Richard J Zeckhauser Cambridge MA MIT Press 1991 131157 3 See Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi Political Regimes and Economic Growth Journal of Economic Perspectives 731993 5169 4 National Bureau of Statistics of China Communiqu on Major Data of the Second National Economic Census No1 2009 accessed July 2 2010 httpwwwstats govcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20091225402610168htm 5 Financial Times Global 500 Report accessed July 2 2010 httpwwwftcon reports ft500 2010 6 See for example Alice Amsden Asia s Next Giant South Korea and Late I ndustrializa tion Oxford Oxford University Press 1989 Robert Wade Governing the Marleet Economic Theory and the Role of Government in Asian Industrialization Princeton 316 CHAPTER 12 The Political Economy of Redistribution mRead and Listen to Chapter 12 at mypoIisciIabcom so Study and Review the PreTest amp Flashcards at mypoisciabcom economic inequality I The extent of the wealth gap between rich and pooh Why do some wealthy democracies engage in more economic redistribution than others t an Ohio campaign stop during the 2008 presidential election campaign a man named Joe Wurzelbacher asked then Senator Barack Obama about his smallbusiness tax policy Wurzelbacher said he was thinking of buying a plumbing company and asked whether Obama s plan would raise taxes on small businesses that earn more than 250000 a year Obama replied candidly that yes it would Three days later Obama s opponent Senator John McCain referred to Wurzelbacher as Joe the Plumber in a presidential debate and made Wurzel bacher s question a central point in his campaign Joe became a media sensation as McCain tried to bolster his flagging poll numbers by painting Obama as a tax and spend liberal a Democrat whose tax plan would hurt average Americans like oe individuals chasing the American dream In the heat of election politics it did not matter that fewer than 2 percent of all smallbusiness owners declare an income of more than 250000 a year1 or that oe s actual income in 2006 about 40000 which was about average for plumbers in Ohio at that time would ve qualified him for a tax cut under Obama s plan2 Taxes are a hot button political issue in the United States and they have been since the founding of the American republic Advocates of small government like Joe the Plumber and John McCain fervently believe that the best government is minimal government one that intervenes in the economy as little as possible in order to maximize individual choice In contrast others believe just as fervently that government intervention in the economy can be a force for good and that such efforts cause less damage to society than do not using the government s power to intervene Similar debates echo around the world between advocates of economic free markets and advocates of greater government intervention Yet research in com parative politics suggests that there is little point to these discussions when it comes to the overall long term growth rate of the economy States around the world have proven that they can grow whether they embrace the free market or adopt inter ventionist policies States that govern legitimately and effectively can and do vary considerably in terms of their degree of intervention in the economy In this chapter we turn from questions about whether different degrees of state intervention promote economic growth and instead ask why do some wealthy democracies engage in more economic redistribution than others This question highlights a fundamental tension between capitalism and democracy Capitalism tends to produce some degree of economic inequality the extent of the wealth gap between rich and poor even though democracy distributes political power equally in principle at least by giving each person one vote Given that the poor always outnumber the rich philosophers and political economists have long supposed that democracy should threaten the very existence of capitalism After all under democ racy what stops the poor from soaking the rich by voting for highly interventionist Robin Hood like policies that redistribute wealth to the poor Doing so would surely dampen the incentives to invest that capitalism requires 318 CHAPTER 12 The Political Economy of Redistribution TABLE 121 Welfare State Spending in the World s Wealthiest Democracies 2005 Social Welfare Spending Country Percent of GDP Sweden 294 France 292 Austria 272 Denmark 271 Germany 267 Belgium 264 Finland 261 Italy 250 Portugal 231 Norway 216 UK 213 Spain 212 Netherlands 209 Greece 205 Switzerland 203 Japan 186 New Zealand 185 Australia 171 Iceland 169 Ireland 167 Canada 165 USA 159 Source OECD Social Welfare Expenditure database 19802005 accessed December 15 2011 http statsoecdorgIndexaspxdatasetcodeSOCXAGG The government of Sweden for example redistributes the equivalent of about 30 cents of every dollar earned in all of Sweden while the US government redis tributes about 16 cents of every dollar Americans earn Before we attempt to explain this variation let us learn a bit more about the nature of welfare state programs in the United States Sweden and Germany Remember that the welfare state includes only government spending on programs such as health care retirement pensions unemployment insurance and poverty relief Comparing HealthCare Spending Perhaps the most noticeable difference across the United States Sweden and Ger many is in terms of public health insurance provisions In the United States about two thirds of the population has private health insurance Two government funded programs Medicare and Medicaid provide health care support for the elderly and the poor However until the 2010 health care reform about 15 percent of the 320 CHAPTER 12 The Political Economy of Redistribution Minimum wages are on average much higher in Europe than in the United States and labor standards and job protection laws are far more stringent as well For example in Germany and Sweden governmentfunded disability benefits are more generous than comparable benefits in the United States Government programs in Germany and Sweden also provide for paid sick leave at between 7080 percent of a person s salary In Germany such benefits last up to a year and a half while in Sweden there is no time limit for sick leave In contrast the United States has no federal guaranteed sickleave policy5 To illustrate variation in the nature and size of the welfare state across the world s wealthy democracies Table 122 provides the total amount of government social welfare spending in the United States Germany and Sweden as a propor tion of all economic activity and breaks spending down by the categories discussed in this section It also provides a comparison with the average for 33 member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD a group of wealthy democracies The table shows that the United States spends only about 80 percent of what other OECD members spend on social welfare pro grams about 16 percent of GDP versus about 20 percent and about half of what Sweden spends Moreover it reveals that the difference between the United States Germany and Sweden arises not because of differences in healthcare spending but because Germany and especially Sweden spend more on child and family pov erty relief and on the jobless the latter a function of cross national differences in labor laws The fact that the US government spends proportionally about as much as Germany and Sweden on health care even though many Americans have pri vate health insurance suggests that US spending is relatively inefficient Variation in welfare state spending can generate substantial differences in redis tributive outcomes in the United States government welfare state policies in 1994 led to a decline in the poverty rate of 13 percent the comparable figure for Sweden that same year was 82 percent6 This means that without government redistribution programs economic inequality would have been 13 percent worse in the United TABLE 122 The Size of the Welfare State as a Proportion of GDP 2005 Total Of Which Old Age Health Family Unemployment Other Survivors Care Support Benefits and and Disability Training Benefits Programs Sweden 294 158 68 32 25 11 Germany 267 135 77 22 27 08 USA 159 74 70 06 04 06 OECD Avg 206 128 62 20 15 08 Source OECD Social Welfare Expenditure database 19802005 accessed December 15 2011 httpstatsoecdorgIndexaspxdatasetcodeSOCXAGG 322 CHAPTER 12 The Political Economy of Redistribution TABLE 123 Average Income Tax Rates in Wealthy Democracies Percent 2009 Tax Rate as a Percent of Wages For Someone Making 23 For Someone Making 123 Country the Average Wage the Average Wage Netherlands 112 500 Sweden 225 565 Ireland 217 427 Denmark 341 548 UK 200 400 New Zealand 210 380 Japan 87 256 Germany 294 443 Spain 225 370 Canada 196 330 Switzerland 140 268 France 180 301 Norway 280 400 Austria 256 370 Portugal 235 340 United States 217 317 Italy 292 387 Greece 210 294 Australia 355 415 Finland 355 405 Belgium 408 453 Source OEC D Marginal Personal Income Tax and Social Security Contribution Rates on Gross Labor Income accessed July 4 2010 httpwwwoecdorgdocument6003343 en2649345331942460 1 1 1 100htm often provide subsidies investment incentives and tax breaks to investors and corporations in efforts to promote economic development or to protect powerful interest groups Still Table 123 clearly establishes that income taxes one of the largest sources of government revenue are somewhat progressive across the world s wealthiest democracies Democracy and Redistribution Debates about taxation and redistribution are frequently framed in moralistic terms like progressive and regressive for in tuitive reasons most people believe taking from the poor to give to the rich would be cruel and wrong Moreover the principles of democracy which re quire political equality frown on policies that promote economic inequal ity Scholars have puzzled over the tension between capitalism and democracy in principle democracy distributes power equally through universal suffrage while historically for a variety of reasons capitalism has tended to create 324 CHAPTER 12 The Political Economy of Redistribution Average Bottom 99 Income 2008 dollars 50000 1000000 45000 900000 Bottom 99 average income 40000 800000 A Top 1 average income M g 35000 700000 E 00 30000 600000 E 25000 500000 3 20000 400000 2 9 0 15000 300000 E 395 10000 200000 3 5000 100000 0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I W 00 W 00 W 00 W 00 W 00 W 00 W 00 W 00 W 00 W 00 I I l I 39I 39I W W ltI39 ltI39 Ln Ln D D I I 00 00 O O 3 0 O O O O O O C O O O C O O O C C C 3 l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I l I 39I 39I FIGURE 121 Average Income of the Bottom 99 and Top 1 United States 19172008 The average income of the bottom 99 percent of the US population indicated in the left axis which follows the line with diamonds more than quadrupled from 1933 to 1973 going from about 9000 to about 40000 per year Over the same period the average income of the wealthiest 1 percent of the US population indicated by the right axis only doubled from about 168000 to about 335000 During that period income inequality was on the de cline Yet since 1973 the average income for the bottom 99 percent has stagnated increasing only about 8 percent through 2008 while the average income of the wealthiest has tripled to almost 1 million per year Inequality has increased in the United States since 1973 primarily because the richest 1 percent are getting richer while everyone else s wages remained flat Source Emmanuel Saez University of California Berlteley accessed March 12 2011 httpwwwecon berlteleyedusaez mobilize for such policies would be thwarted by the counter mobilization efforts of the wealthy Faced with the threat of higher taxation the wealthy can choose not to invest or even save in their home country and move their money elsewhere The ability of holders of capital to place their money in offshore banks or to invest in countries with lower tax rates dampens political pressures for redistribution In less established democracies the wealthy can pressure governments to violently repress political parties or social movements that favor increased redistribution and they can even threaten to overthrow the government The average voter mitigates his or her own demands for redistribution believing that upward mobility is possible for themselves or their children Therefore individuals may not vote on what they are earning today but rather on what they hope to earn in the future Poor voters oppose redistribution because they believe one gets what one de serves in life and should not ask for a handout 326 CHAPTER 12 The Political Economy of Redistribution Medicare and financial insurance against the possibility that you will experience a drop into poverty through Supplemental Security Income and Temporary Assis tance for Needy Families payments In many countries public sector or social insurance provision is more impor tant than is private sector insurance Moreover although the US government funds a wide array of social insurance through tax revenue most other wealthy democra cies fund even broader forms of pension health family and employment insurance For example some countries completely fund job training which lowers the risk of long term unemployment childcare which insures that parents can keep their jobs if they want and some countries subsidize extensive maternal and even paternal employment leaves following the birth of a child to replace lost income and insure that having a child does not cost new parents a loss of economic status Why do all democratic governments provide these kinds of insurance And why isn t this job left to the private sector Would the private sector provide old age pensions or healthcare insurance if the government did not Let us consider three potential answers political identity avoiding depopulation and providing public goods by preventing market failures As we shall see the political implications of market failures provide the most satisfactory answer Political Identity A feeling of solidarity might potentially justify the welfare state That is perhaps citizens feel they share a common fate with others in their country based on nationalistic or patriotic feelings or on sympathies for their less fortunate fellow citizens Thus perhaps the relatively wealthy keep their compatriots healthy and out of poverty because they feel it is the right thing to do Many people might not only feel sympathy but also recognize that they too might one day be down on their luck and need a helping hand from the government If such sentiments were widespread many citizens might voluntarily contribute a portion of their income to the state However no state has ever survived on voluntary contributions And if people really had such strong feelings of solidarity the government would have little reason to take action because communities would care for their own without need ing the state to compel contributions Feelings of solidarity based in shared political identity do not provide a solid explanation for insurance provision and thus welfare spending Avoiding Depopulation In the 1930s Swedish social scientists Alva and Gunnar Myrdal noted that many European governments sought to increase their country s populations for reasons of nationalism and national security a large population meant an ability to field a big army and to gain recognition as a major player on the world stage By the 1920s the birth rate in many countries including Sweden had fallen drastically endangering economic growth The Myrdals used this demographic trend to support an argument in favor of social welfare They suggested that one way the Swedish government could encourage its citizens to have more babies was to guarantee that children would have access to health care education and job training Avoiding a dramatic decline in population provides a second potential rationale for government insurance provision 328 CHAPTER 12 The Political Economy of Redistribution incomplete explanation for government insurance provision For a more satisfac tory political explanation let us return to the concept of market failure Market Failures Recall that a market failure occurs when an economic market fails to supply a product for which demand exists Each of us confronts some risk of losing our jobs getting sick or injured or retiring in poverty Of course people face different degrees of risk people with fewer assets skills or education confront relatively greater risks of unemployment or poverty Still even welleducated or wealthy people face some degree of risk of catastrophe Over an entire lifetime no one can predict with absolute certainty his or her degree of risk For example while a blue collar factory worker s job might get outsourced or downsized so might the job of the corporate vice president of finance And both the hourly worker and the corporate executive have equal probabilities of slipping on an unseen patch of ice and breaking an arm Many individuals may believe they confront low risks over the long term but this is an illusion The free market fails to provide insurance to cover these kinds of risks for the following reason in order to cover its expected losses and still make a profit pri vate sector insurance companies charge a higher premium on higher risk people As a result many highrisk individuals are unable to find insurance at any price Insurance premiums are only affordable when scores of low risk people pur chase insurance policies Of course people who believe they are low risk types are unlikely to want to purchase insurance that insures everyone because they recognize that their premium subsidizes highrisk types This means that private insurance companies have interests in identifying and excluding highrisk people from their pool of potential customers in order to convince more low risk types to purchase insurance In the end although everyone wants insurance the cost for many highrisk people remains too high and the private sector will not provide the product Of course many people cannot afford a Lexus but that does not mean the government should give everyone a Lexus A political rationale for government pro vision of social insurance which necessarily entails coercing people to pay taxes that fund such programs as social security unemployment insurance Medicare and Medicaid for example derives from the idea that such programs generate a criti cally important public good by making society as a whole better off and minimizing everyone s exposure to an unknown future degree of risk If insuring everyone serves a socially desirable purpose governments should compel everyone including both highrisk and low risk people to contribute In theory compulsory taxation to provide universal insurance programs gener ates public goods That is in theory forcing everyone to contribute a little makes everyone in the end a lot better off whether directly or indirectly The basic idea follows the notion that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure People without health insurance are loath to visit a doctor precisely because it is expen sive Consequently uninsured people tend to be more susceptible to illness because they don t go in for regular checkups And when uninsured people get sick enough to be admitted to the hospital they go to a public hospital one funded by all 330 CHAPTER 12 The Political Economy of Redistribution even supposedly public colleges and universities charge tuition In contrast in several European democracies such as Sweden and Germany university educa tion is free In recent years a similar debate has raged in the United States about adopt ing national healthcare a policy long in place in Canada the UK and many other countries Such systems do not necessarily prohibit private healthcare insurance or provision but they do compel everyone to pay for health insurance just like Social Security compels everyone to save for their own retirement whether they want to or not One side of the debate suggests that national health insurance would save billions of dollars in healthcare costs for all Americans in the long run those on the other side argue that national health insurance would generate unforeseen economic inefficiencies The point here is not to resolve this debate but to highlight how in many countries the possibility of government provision of insurance has just like redistribution provided politicians with ideas that enjoy broad popular appeal This helps explain why governments provide various forms of social insurance in many cases the market fails to do so but politicians suspect that old age pensions SUMMARY TABLE Why Welfare States Element of the Welfare State Definition Hypothesis Progressive Tax burdens that Democracy necessarily implies a tension between Taxation go up as income political equality and economic inequality there goes up Example are always more poor people than rich people income tax rates which gives politicians an incentive to create Robin Hood lilte programs Social Forms of insurance I Political identity governments provide social Insurance available to all insurance because the wealthy feel solidarity citizens regardless with the poor Evidence for this hypothesis is of ability to weak pay Examples I Avoiding depopulation governments provide unemployment social insurance to encourage people to have insurance old age more children Some support for this hypothesis pensions exists but it is an incomplete explanation I Providing public goods by avoiding market failures governments provide social insurance to make society as a whole better off by minimizing everyone s exposure to unforeseen risks As with progressive taxation politicians recognize that social insurance programs have broad electoral appeal Explaining Variation in Welfare State Spending 333 their behalf If unions and leftist parties are strong and well organized policies regarding taxation and redistribution will reflect that strength In contrast if big business is well organized but labor is small and divided and without a place at the government negotiating table policies will tilt in favor of big business The extent of interest group representation is particularly important In Western Europe labor unions emerging strength in the early twentieth century led to their being incorporated directly into the apparatus of the state where they now partici pate in the creation development and administration of social policy This situation virtually guarantees that labor s voice will be heard alongside business As a result in countries with extensive labor incorporation into the apparatus of the state such as Germany and Sweden we generally see greater government spending on social welfare programs Business and labor have varying strength around the world and this variation has political consequences for the development of welfare state policies Generally to the extent that labor is well organized and well represented in politics or even directly incorporated into the state we ought to see larger welfare states The Left Right Economic Divide and Political Identities We sometimes think that politics is dominated by left right competition between liberals and conservatives The left right political spectrum ranges from liberal to moderate to conservative with those on the left favoring greater government The strength of organized labor supports welfare state spending in Germany Here union members stand amidst boxes labeled austerity package in a late 2010 Berlin protest against a proposal to increase the age at which German worlters become eligible for government pensions Explaining Variation in Welfare State Spending 335 In contrast in a twoparty system each of the main parties is a diverse coali tion of social groups This tends to dilute the influence of each particular group in the government process which limits upward pressures on spending Multiparty systems are associated with proportional representation electoral rules while two party systems are associated in many cases with plurality electoral rules The elec toral system in the United States and UK single member district plurality has worked against the growth of the welfare state by diluting group demands In con trast in most continental European states PR electoral systems facilitate the birth and growth of socialist and labor parties alongside a far broader and more varied constellation of political parties This fragmentation of the party system has encour aged the growth of the welfare state Federalism also seems to be associated with smaller government while unitar ism is associated with bigger government This is perhaps because federal systems require a second legislative chamber Bicameral legislatures make passing any legis lative proposal more difficult simply because each proposal requires two separate and potentially nonoverlapping majorities Under these circumstances the passage of welfareenhancing legislation becomes more difficult All else equal federal systems should see somewhat smaller states However because some federal systems such as that of Germany tax and spend relatively heavily we can see that political institu tions such as federalism and electoral rules provide only partial explanations for crosscountry variation in levels and taxation The Impact of State Strength A fourth factor helping explain variation in state intervention in the economy is the relative strength of the state State strength focuses on legitimacy and effective ness while the degree of state intervention in the economy is measured in terms of the amount of taxes the state takes from citizens as a proportion of all economic activity These two concepts are related because the degree of state intervention is a function of state strength State strength refers to the capacity of the people and the institutions of the government bureaucracy to 1 efficiently collect taxes and 2 effectively imple ment spending programs to avoid corruption and get the job done Politicians in democratic states with high legitimacy and effectiveness can intervene to tax and spend more heavily They know that if they win an election based on a pledge to increase spending in a certain area they will be able to both raise the funds and effectively implement the new public policy Sweden provides an example of a highly effective state there is little corruption and the government bureaucracy is relatively efficient In contrast the bureaucracies of weak states are unlikely to have the capacity to collect sufficient tax revenue to fund social welfare programs and even if taxes were collected much revenue would likely be lost to waste corruption or ineffi ciency Moreover in weak states it does not matter if citizens or politicians want the government to engage in taxation and redistribution because such policies could never be well implemented Tax evasion might be high corruption might be rampant or bureaucrats might be poorly educated and trained Explaining Variation in Welfare State Spending 337 Globalization has the biggest effect in countries most exposed to the world market smaller countries such as Sweden In larger countries such as the United States the hypothesized effect of globalization on government redistribution and insurance provision is more limited While some research suggests that economic globalization drives wages down and tends to increase economic inequality exten sive empirical research has found no evidence linking globalization to a shrinking welfare state at least in advanced capitalist democracies Instead scholars have found that long standing national social welfare policies institutions and practices tend to successfully resist the forces of globalization Tax burdens in high tax states such as France or Sweden have not declined as one might expect given the forces of globalization and as a result welfare benefits have not declined as predicted either16 Such findings imply that criticism of globalization may be overblown However these findings only hold for the world s wealthiest democracies global ization has different effects in poorer countries Five factors summarized in the table below shape the extent to which the state engages in redistributive welfare state taxing and spending the organization of societal interests primarily capital and labor the impact of political identity the impact of political institutions the relative strength of state institutions and the impact of globalization These factors all reflect aspects of societal or state strength In democracies where organized labor is strong where no other form SUMMARY TABLE Factors That Lead to Variation in Welfare State Spending Factor Key Hypothesis Value Example Relative strength If labor unions are large cohesive Strong labor Germany of business and incorporated into the state unions versus labor redistribution should be higher Weak labor United States unions Relative salience Non economic political identities Homogenous Sweden of left right can dilute the salience of society economic divide economics in politics which tends Dquot 39 quott d t t to reduce redistribution Verse soclety Um e S a es Political Proportional representation allows Yes Sweden institutions more parties into government each party presses to deliver resources No United States to its supporters increasing the chances of redistributive spending Federalism is associated with Yes United States bicameralism making passage of Germany redistributive spending proposals NO Sweden more difficult Continued Explaining Variation in Welfare State Spending 339 Greater Ethnic Diversity Explains Low Levels of Welfare Spending Sweden HYPOTHESIS TESTING and the United States Both the United States and Sweden are among the world39s wealthiest countries and both are strong and stable democracies However such similarities aside several key differences explain why social welfare spending is much higher in Sweden than in the United States Organized labor is stronger in Sweden and Sweden uses proportional representation while the United States has a single member district electoral system the United States is federal while Sweden has a unitary system and Sweden39s economy is more globalized However the starltest difference may be in terms of ethnic diversity and some scholars argue that this last difference rather than any other explains why social welfare spending is so much higher in Sweden Let39s puzzle through the following hypothesis the higher the ethnic diversity the lower the social welfare spending GATHER EVIDENCE Sweden is and has historically been an ethnically homogenous society In the last two decades Sweden has experienced a wave of immigration but most immigrants have tended to come from other European countries Only in recent years has the country experienced arrivals of large numbers of non Europeans from countries such as Iraq Iran and Turkey In 1998 98 percent of the population was either of Swedish origin or other European ethnic origin this number had dropped to 94 percent by 201017 Still Sweden remains ethnically homogenous in comparative perspective In contrast the United States is and has historically been a more ethnically diverse society and racial divisions have been the source of great conflict In 2010 partly as a result of recent waves of immigration from outside of Europe and partly as a result of the history of African American slavery the US population was estimated to have the following characteristics whites comprised 65 percent Latinos about 16 percent African Americans about 13 percent and Asian Americans about 5 percent The US Census Bureau estimates that whites will comprise a minority by 205018 ASSESS THE HYPOTHESIS Could the different levels of diversity in Sweden and the United States account for differences in levels of social welfare spending This hypothesis suggests that ethnic diversity undermines political mobilization that seeks to increase redistributive spending Let39s consider what might explain this connection The argument begins with a general proposition an individual s willingness to support welfare programs is stronger if the programs benefit members of that person39s ethnic or racial group and wealter if the programs benefit members of different groups Evidence of such in group bias a tendency to trust people whom you know or even people who loolt lilte you more than strangers andor people who loolt different from you comes from research from social psychology One way to explore this hypothesis is with survey data from the General Social Survey GSS and the World Values Surveys WVS19 Using these surveys scholars have found evidence connecting ethnic diversity to lower public support for social welfare spending In the United States support for welfare spending is higher among people who live near welfare recipients of the same race but lower among people who live near welfare recipients of a different race Given these findings the more diverse a country the lower public support for welfare spending should be Scholars have found evidence supporting this connection among wealthy democratic countries the higher the ethnicracial diversity measured using census data the lower the level of welfare spending The implication is that white Americans Continued Conclusion 341 TABLE 124 Swedish and American Responses to World Values Survey Questions on Redistribution United Sweden World Values Survey Question States People who don39t worlt turn lazy 55 40 It is humiliating to receive money without having to worlt for it 43 31 Hard worlt brings success 31 20 tend to dislike welfare programs they associate with spending on ethnic or racial minorities It is possible that the connection between diversity and variation in welfare spending is not due to racism per se but with Americans belief that poverty and laziness are connected Americans tend to think that poor people are poor because they don39t worlt hard and as a result they do not deserve taxpayer support In contrast Europeans tend to think that poor people are unfortunate and thus deserve some compensation Consider the comparisons in Table 124 of responses to questions in the 2006 World Values Surveys in Sweden and the United States Like other Europeans Swedes are more liltely to believe that people are poor because of society not laziness In contrast Americans are more liltely to believe one can get out of poverty through hard worlt and the poor remain poor because they refuse to put in the effort Race and poverty have always been linlted in the United States but not historically in Europe More American blaclts are poor proportionally than are whites a legacy many attribute to systematic economic discrimination a laclt of equality of opportunity for education and jobs long after slavery was abolished Such legal barriers to social mobility never existed for whites Yet given Americans belief that individuals can worlt their way up the ladder CONCLUSION many whites interpret persistent poverty among racial minorities as a sign of laziness and so oppose welfare spending In short it is not simply the existence of diversity in the United States but the connection between race and poverty that has undermined the construction of a political coalition favoring greater government social spending This argument continues to spark debate in academic circles as well as on tallt radio and on the web It is difficult to determine whether the comparatively low level of welfare spending in the United States is a function of Americans sentiments about other races or Americans equation of poor people with laziness because it is difficult to tease out the difference between in group ethnicracial bias from feelings about whether poor people deserve government support CRITICAL THINKING GU ESTIONS 1 What is the hypothesized connection between ethnicracial diversity and social welfare spending 2 To what extent do you think racial diversity is important in explaining the comparatively low level of social welfare spending in the United States relative to federalism the electoral system wealt unions and globalization States tax citizens so that they can spend money on all sorts of programs that encour age economic development invest in infrastructure and provide for national defense In this chapter we focused on welfare state spending the extent to which states engage in income redistribution and the provision of social insurance Welfare state Notes 343 ADDITIONAL READINGS Alesina Alberto and Edward Glaeser Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe A World of Difference New York Oxford University Press 2004 A comprehensive examination of the historical reasons that most European states spend more on social welfare programs than the United States does Bartels Larry Homer Gets a Tax Cut Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind Perspectives on Politics 3 12005 1531 Finds that even though most Americans are aware that inequality has increased and regard that development as bad most still support tax cuts for the very wealthy largely because they think that their own tax burdens are too high Gilens Martin Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness Public Opinion Quarterly 69 52005 778796 Using public opinion surveys finds that redistributive policy in the United States reflects the preferences of affluent voters not poor or middle income Americans Kenworthy Lane and Jonas Pontusson Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redis tribution in Affluent Countries Perspectives on Politics 3 32005 449471 Ex amines the relationship between rising inequality and rising redistribution in wealthy democracies Shorto Russell Going Dutch How I Learned to Loved the European Welfare State The New Yorle Times Magazine April 29 2009 An insightful first person account of an American reporter s experiences dealing with a very different health care system NOTES 1 See the report from the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center accessed January 14 2009 httptaxvoxtaxpolicycenterorgblogCampaign08archives20081 020393 8265 html 2 Larry Vellequette and Tom Troy Joe the Plumber Isn t Licensed Local Man Focus of Presidential Debate Toledo Blade October 10 2008 accessed January 14 2009 wwwtoledobladecon appspbcsdllarticlePAID20081016NEWS09810160418 3 US Census Bureau Income Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States 2007 2008 accessed December 15 2011 httpwwwcensusgov prod2008pubsp60 235pdf 4 See Peter Grier Health Care Reform Bill 101 Who Gets Subsidized Insurance Christian Science Monitor March 20 2010 accessed December 15 2001 httpwww csmonitorcomUSAPolitics20100320Health care reform bill101 Who gets subsidized insurance 5 See Alberto Alesina Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote Why Doesn t the US Have a European Style Welfare State unpublished paper Harvard UniversityNational Bureau of Economic Research 2001 710 Alesina and Glaeser later expanded on this research in a book entitled Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe For a reaction from a European scholar to their arguments see Jonas Pontusson The American Wel fare State in Comparative Perspective Perspectives on Politics 422006 315326 6 See Torben Iversen Capitalism and Democracy In The Oxford Handhoole of Politi cal Economy ed Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman New York Oxford University Press 2006 601623 7 The discussion in this section owes a great deal to Adam Przeworski States and Mar leets A Primer in Political Economy New York Cambridge University Press 1991 CC 346 CHAPTER 13 Globalization How has globalization shaped politics in the world39s states U l39Retad Ed Listen n November 1999 government representatives from around the world gathered in to ap er at mypoIisciIabcom 4O IStudy and Review the PreTest amp Flashcards at mypoisciabcom What globalization globalization I the spread of political economic and cul tural dynamics among governments groups and individuals beyond the borders of any one particular country ExpIore the Comparative quotEconomic Policyquot at mypoIisciIabcom Seattle for a planning meeting of the World Trade Organization WTO to discuss technical issues pertaining to international trade barriers Conferences on arcane in ternational policy issues typically attract little attention from the media However more than 40000 antiglobalization protesters had assembled and they managed to shut down traffic force the cancellation of the conference s opening ceremonies and impede delegates from attending meetings A few rowdier protesters caused property damage that attracted a heavy police response and intense media scrutiny of the protesters and of the WTO and its aims precisely what the protesters sought to accomplish Protests against the WTO continue to are around the world In 2005 thousands of French and German farmers clambered aboard their tractors and drove into downtown Strasbourg France a city near the German border that hosts the European Union s EU legislature to protest a WTO meeting to be held later that month in Hong Kong The farmers sought to defend European agriculture against what they perceived to be unfair competition from producers in the United States Canada Brazil and elsewhere Without EU subsidies many farmers across the continent would be uncompetitive and as such they fear the WTO s efforts to promote free trade in agricultural commodities The issue of free trade in agriculture is but one issue the WTO discusses and it is but one element in debates surrounding globalization Why has this issue become so contentious debated in classrooms corporate boardrooms and legis latures all over the world How does globalization impact politics in the world s states How do political institutions identities and interests in the world s states respond to foreign influences In the next section we clarify the meaning of the word globalization and in the remainder of the chapter we explore its political economic and cultural consequences DEFINING GLOBALIZATION What do we mean when we refer to globalization and politics Globalization works at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations it re fers to the increase in the scope and extent of political economic and cultural connections between governments organizations and individuals across state bor ders Such connections are hardly new people have come into contact with other cultures to exchange goods and ideas for thousands of years However the reason globalization has become such a buzzword in recent years is because the scope and extent of such interactions have expanded and deepened so dramatically By the scope of global connections we mean that in the contemporary world an everincreasing number of issues are transnational their causes and effects cannot be confined to the borders of any single sovereign state Such issues which include terror ism environmental degradation human rights violations international migration drug and human trafficking and trade disputes cannot be considered simply a matter of domestic politics No single state can resolve any of these problems whether for itself or for all other states Transnational problems require transnational solutions and the responses to such issues have spawned new forms of crossborder interaction between individuals and groups Transnational networks of citizens and governments including Political Globalization 349 European democracies are even more open to foreign economic political and cultural flovvs Overall since 1970 the scope and extent of international com munication and exchange has increased dramatically Globalization represents a profound increase in the nature and extent of human interconnectedness This intensification of cross border linkages and activity tends to break down the distinction between domestic and international politics as forces outside any state s borders increasingly impact politics within each and every state This means that to explain comparative politics we must consider how globalization impacts the world s states2 In the next section we focus on the political impact of these transnational forces POLITICAL G L0 BALIZATIO N Sovereign states first emerged centuries ago but it was not until the final collapse of European empires in the 1960s that nearly every populated territory in the world gained status as an independent state Ironically very soon after states covered the world s territory observers began to wonder whether globalization would make the concept of sovereignty irrelevant Political globalization involves the growth in the number and scope of transna tional political and economic issues and the increasingly transnational responses to such issues In the contemporary world states increasingly cannot solve the problems that affect their territory or citizens on their own In response two kinds of trans national political institutions have gained importance Both the rise of transnational issues and the nature of the reaction to those issues may vveaken state sovereignty The first kind of transnational political institutions that have arisen as global ization has advanced are called international governmental organizations IGOs IGOs are political institutions made up of memberstates that have a transnational presence and that take on governmental roles They are not technically govern ments and do not have sovereignty but they play increasingly important roles in managing transnational political and economic problems Well knoWn IGOs include the United Nations UN which is committed to promoting world peace the World Trade Organization WTO which regulates commerce between countries the European Union EU which governs finance and other policies across bor ders in Europe and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC which seeks to regulate the supply and price of oil The second kind of transnational political institutions that have gained prominence recently are international nongovernmental organizations INGOs INGOs are voluntary associations that form independently of any state s authority made up of citizens from several states who engage in political activism within or outside their own states borders Thousands of INGOs have been formed in recent decades around the vvorld3 No one knows how many exist and their numbers are constantly growing Prominent examples include Amnesty International the International Red Cross and Greenpeace Many are religious in nature such as Caritas backed by the Catholic Church the International Islamic Relief Organi zation which has operations in more than 100 countries and World Vision an evangelical Christian organization INGOs can also include criminal organizations and terrorist groups such as al Qaeda What are the consequences of political globalization for sovereignty and democracy political globalization I the growth in the number and scope of trans national political and economic issues and the increasingly trans national responses to such issues international governmental organizations IGOs I political institutions made up of member states that have a transnational presence and that talte on gov ernmental roles international nongovernmental organizations INGOS I voluntary organizations that form independently of any state39s authority made up of citizens of several states engaged in political activism within or outside their own states borders Political Globalization 351 in IGOs such as the EU can involve tradeoffs some of which may involve signifi cant sacrifices of political autonomy Globalization Does Not Weaken Sovereignty Despite the growing importance of transnational issues IGOs and INGOs many do not accept that globalization truly limits state sovereignty For one IGOs always represent at a basic level the interests of memberstates While it is true that EU members lack full autonomy over economic policy membership does bring considerable benefits For example although Greece has been asked to make deep budget cuts it along with every other EU member benefits from billions of dollars in agricultural subsidies The EU distributes about 70 billion a year to its members about 40 percent of its en tire budget and about four times what the United States provides to its farmers5 Such subsidies keep European farmers in business in the face of competition from countries that can cheaply export food such as the United States Russia and Brazil Membership in the EU does not eliminate sovereignty it serves member states interests by providing benefits they would not obtain were they to remain outside the EU system A second reason IGOs and INGOs may not threaten state sovereignty is that they do not possess the resources to solve many difficult transnational issues For example although terrorists and criminals pose transnational threats only sover eign states possess military and police forces to fight them So although the EU may be the most powerful IGO on the planet it lacks an army the one thing essential to establish sovereignty over territory Each EU member maintains military forces In fact EU memberstates frequently divide on questions of national security or foreign policy For example the UK and Spain initially supported the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 while France and Germany did not In this crucial case no European foreign policy existed only the diverse policies of sovereign states Third many states continue to ignore the advice of IGOs such as the Inter national Monetary Fund IMF and WTO which advocate free market economic policies For example countries such as Russia Venezuela Saudi Arabia Brazil South Africa and India continue to maintain at least partial government owner ship of key industries such as petroleum mining and telecommunications despite pressure to sell off government assets One observer has recently suggested that the future will see increasing competition between the US model of limited government intervention in the economy versus the Chinese model of heavy state intervention6 If China continues to grow while the United States stagnates more countries may come to emulate China s policies further confounding the notion that states have lost control over economic policymaking in this globalized era Finally it is worth noting that in contrast to EU efforts to eliminate frontier controls many states in recent years have strengthened their national borders in reaction to perceived threats from terrorism drug trafficking and immigration7 American efforts to bolster border security is just one example of rebordering occurring even as globalization advances In short although the traditional bound aries between domestic and international politics are weakening one should not exaggerate globalization s political consequences The evidence does not sug gest that increased international cooperation means the end of state sovereignty Political Globalization 353 Globalization Strengthens Democracy The growing influence of INGOs par ticularly those that focus on human rights and civil conflict such as Amnesty In ternational or Human Rights Watch HRW could also support a different conclusion that political globalization can strengthen democracy The rise of such groups makes it more difficult for rulers to hide their actions from outsiders and from their citizens For example governments sometimes ratify international treaties believing they will face little pressure to comply However research has shown that ratification generates greater protections against human rights abuses because both domestic and international NGOs work to hold abusers to accounts9 Several IGOs are also designed specifically to defend democratic principles For example the International Criminal Court ICC created in 2002 by an act of the United Nations and based in The Hague Netherlands claims legal jurisdic tion over sovereign states to prosecute genocide and human rights violations Any H u M A Mi lGHT5 w A T cf H w Rlrwfs Executive Director Kenneth Roth presents Human Rights Watch s annual report to the press in January 2011 H RW has its headquarters in New York but operates in more than 90 countries It focuses on researching documenting and drawing media attention to cases of systematic human rights violations around the world and on lobbying for policy change International Criminal Court ICC I an IGO created in 2002 and based in The Hague Nether lands which claims jurisdiction to pros ecute genocide and human rights violations worldwide 356 CHAPTER 13 Globalization Foreign Direct Investment FDI I the purchase or creation of assets in one country by an individual firm or government based in a different country multinational corporations MNCS I firms with headquarters in one country but with oper ations and employees in many countries International financial flows have also skyrocketed Foreign Direct Invest ment FDI is the purchase or creation of assets in one country by an individual firm or government based in another country For example the Japanese car company Toyota spent approximately 800 million recently to build a factory in Blue Springs Mississippi where it expects to eventually employ 2000 people As Figure 134 reveals total global FDI increased from about 55 billion in 1970 to a peak of almost 22 trillion in 2007 FDI declined after the attacks of 911 and again during the global recession in 2008 but the global volume of FDI in 2009 was still more than three times as great as it was 20 years earlier15 Expanding global trade and investment has been accompanied by the growth of multinational corporations MNCs firms that are headquartered in one coun try but that have operations and employees in many others McDonald s is perhaps the most ubiquitous MNC it has more than 31000 restaurants in 119 coun tries16 AB InBev is another it makes Budweiser Bud Lite and Michelob controls 25 percent of the global beer market and employs more than 1 16000 people in 23 countries This MNC resulted from the merger of Brazilian Belgian and Ameri can brewers it is headquartered in Belgium today which technically makes those popular brands foreign beers 2500 2000 A 1500 A 1000 Billions of Dollars 500 O I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 FIGURE 134 Volume of Foreign Direct Investment Over Time Despite dips after 911 and the global recession of 2008 another component of economic gobaization Foreign Direct Investment remains three times as great as it was in 1988 Source The World Banlt Databanlt online resource accessed June 5 2011 httpdataworldbanltorg 358 CHAPTER 13 Globalization neoliberal economic policies I policies which seek to limit governments role in setting economic policy Washington Consensus I neoliberal economic agreement between lI NCs the main IGOs and the U8 govern ment regarding how to promote economic stability and growth in poorer countries Today the IMF World Bank and WTO are the main IGOs shaping the rules of international trade and finance Along with MNCs they promote neoliberal economic policies which seek to limit governments role in setting economic policy In the 1980s these policies came to be known as the Washington Consensus an agreement between MNCs the main IGOs and the US government about how to promote economic stability and growth in poorer countries The policy recom mendations included balanced budgets promotion of free trade and reduction of barriers to foreign investment privatization of government owned enterprises and deregulation all of which worked to promote economic globalization18 The Washington Consensus embodied free market capitalism with few gov ernment restrictions on international trade and finance Critics argue that MNCs IGOs and the US government promoted these policies to maintain leverage over poor countries and that such policies hypocritically forced poorer countries to adopt austerity budgets even as social welfare spending continued to increase in the wealthy countries It is certainly the case that MNCs technology and IGOs proved a powerful mix of forces let us now consider how they have impacted global economic growth and inequality Globalization and Poverty The most important question about economic globalization focuses on whether it increases or reduces prosperity particularly for the world s poorest Our point of comparison is whether a less economically integrated world would be richer or poorer If globalization stopped tomorrow would more people be lifted out of poverty Let us consider the potential answers to this question Does Economic Globalization Increase Global Poverty Protesters in Seattle Strasbourg and elsewhere believe that economic globalization generates only nega tive consequences working to keep poor countries on the periphery of the world economy for example This argument suggests that increased foreign direct invest ment strengthens MNCs and puts developing countries at a disadvantage to the ex tent that openness makes it easier to move money jobs and factories around the world globalization helps MNCs find the weakest regulations the cheapest labor and the lowest tax rates hurting workers and weakening governments tax base Pes simists conclude that globalization enhances corporate power over workers and gov ernments A more open world means greater poverty and inequality Optimists derive a different conclusion Most economists for example believe that eliminating trade barriers generates opportunities for new industries to emerge creating jobs and lowering prices thereby enhancing consumer purchasing power In this view free exchange generates prosperity and lowers inequality Optimists point out that economic openness has pulled hundreds of millions of people out of poverty particularly in Asian countries that have benefited from growth of export industries They acknowledge that globalization has not created enough prosperity or equality because hundreds of millions of people remain mired in poverty around the world However they argue that an open markets lead to a wealthier world Who is right 360 CHAPTER 13 Globalization 1 SubSaharan Africa East Asia 1 South Asia 1 Latin America Percent of Absolute Poverty 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 FIGURE 135 Absolute Poverty Levels by World Region Countries in Latin America and sub Saharan Africa have not globalized as successfully as China and India As a result their levels of absolute poverty have not diminished as drastically as they have in East Asia and South Asia Source The World Banlt PovcalNet Online Poverty Analysis Tool accessed December 15 2011 httpweb worldbanltorg In 1980 China was the world s most populous country but its economy was the world s eleventh largest smaller than Mexico s Thirty years later China still had the most people but its economy had become the world s second largest behind only the United States23 China s astonishing growth rate along with recent sustained economic growth in such countries as India Brazil and Indonesia means that it makes little sense to argue that globalization is a plot by rich coun tries to exploit the poor Today the media in the United States sometimes portrays China as a global bad guy because overseas branches of Chinese MNCs exploit local workers24 Has economic integration helped or hurt the world s poorest On the one hand globalization does bring rapid change which means social disruption and economic instability the kinds of things that bring protesters to the streets against the WTO or IMF Some critics suggest that the rapid pace of change has not allowed countries to adapt on their own terms On the other hand the evidence is clear that greater and more open trade and financial flows have benefited hundreds of millions of poor people in countries such China and India In short global ization increases opportunities for growth but also increases economic risks and uncertainties 362 CHAPTER 13 Globalization service sector I jobs outside of manufac turing and agriculture that include medicine law transportation retail sales tourism and entertainment conditional cash transfer program I welfare programs that give people a small amount of money based on certain required conditions Of course wealthy countries do face challenges to their social welfare programs The most important is demographic the aging of the population Many European democracies such as Greece Denmark and Italy are facing huge public pension system deficits because the number of workers paying into the system is declining relative to the number of retirees receiving benefits due to a longterm decline in birthrates27 Another challenge comes from technological change Wealthy countries have experienced a longterm shift away from manufacturing and agriculture as the main sources of jobs and an expansion of the service sector which includes medicine law transportation retail sales tourism and entertainment For example the man ufacturing sector in the United States accounted for 283 percent of GDP in 1953 but only 110 percent by 200928 The shift is driven by technological change which improves productivity and reduces prices for consumers but which also destroys jobs in industries that become inefficient and generates a constant demand for unemployment insurance education and job retraining programs However like declining birthrates technological change is unrelated to globalization The Race to the Bottom in Developing Countries Globalization has not caused a race to the bottom in the world s wealthiest states However developing coun tries tend to have relatively weaker state capacity and as a result they may be less able than wealthier states to maintain or even increase social welfare spend ing as pressure to open up their economies mounts That is perhaps globalization causes a race to the bottom only in developing countries The poor in any country are extremely vulnerable to downturns in social spending However developing countries have historically spent relatively little on the poor to begin with29 Instead government spending on social security pensions and secondary or higher education for example has typically benefited the middle or upper classes Obviously globalization cannot eliminate welfare programs for the poor if they never existed in the first place In fact in developing countries the poor may benefit most from economic opening because free trade tends to lower consumer prices and generate job opportunities Leaders of developing countries also appear able to address the needs of the poor through social welfare spending if they so desire30 For example in the early 1990s Brazil s government began a conditional cash transfer program which gives poor families a small amount of money based on certain conditions called B olsa Familia Family Grant Bolsa Familia provides families up to 120 per month on the condi tion that their children stay in school rather than work Bolsa Familia now covers more than 124 million families almost 50 million people and about 25 percent of Brazil s population and it is currently the largest program of its kind in the world Brazil has long had one of the highest levels of economic inequality in the world and a great need to address poverty malnutrition and lack of education Brazil s leaders implemented Bolsa Familia after they liberalized the country s economy and the program has helped reduce inequality and the number of people living in absolute poverty31 Bolsa Familia is such an obvious success that other 364 CHAPTER 13 Globalization Poor People in Developing Countries Oppose Economic Globalization The Case HYPOTHESIS TESTING of Bolivia Conventional wisdom supposes that economic globalization hurts the world39s poor Like protesters at the Battle in Seattle in 1999 masses of angry citizens in many poor countries lend support to this view by talting to the streets to oppose free trade agreements and privatization of government owned enterprises believing that the social and economic costs of such changes dramatically exceed the promised benefits Is economic globalization really such a bad thing How would you go about confirming or refuting the hypothesis that Poor people in developing countries have strong incentives to oppose globalization GATHER EVIDENCE One example that appears to confirm the connection between poverty and opposition to globalization comes from Bolivia In 1999 the World Banlt threatened to withhold millions of dollars in debt relief if Bolivia did not privatize the publicly owned water distribution company in Cochabamba a city of about one million people The company provided residents with subsidized drinking water meaning they paid less than it cost to filter and distribute The bank argued that ridding Bolivia of such inefficiency would improve its economy and suggested that Bolivia sell the water company to a consortium that included Bechtel an American multinational corporation After the sale the new owners raised the monthly household fee for water delivery by 35 percent to about 20 a month33 This made clean water unaffordable for many of Cochabamba s residents the average Bolivian earns only about 1000 per year In response to the price hikes thousands of poor Cochabamba residents took to the streets and bloclted access to the city for days The government sent in the army and violent clashes erupted resulting in dozens of injuries Bolivians in other cities joined the protests blocltading major highways and causing widespread economic disruption The president then suspended constitutional liberties such as freedom of assembly and freedom of the press but this did nothing to stop the protesters who began to demand government action on a range of other issues such as unemployment racial discrimination and inflation Because of the violent protests the multinational s executives fled the country This allowed the government to declare that the corporation had abandoned the water company meaning the privatization could be rescinded Jubilant Bolivians celebrated and leaders of the protests became prominent in Bolivian national politics including Evo Morales who would leverage his role in the protests to win Bolivia39s 2005 presidential election I A man with Die Aguas Tunari the foreign water distribution company written on his chest holds a sign saying What is ours is ours and cannot be talten away during a protest against water rate hikes in Cochabamba a city of about one million in southeastern Bolivia in April 2000 Continued 366 CHAPTER 13 Globalization For example in Brazil huge rate spikes followed in the walte of electric and telephone company privatization in the 1990s However prices of TVs washing machines and clothing fell by more than 50 percent in real terms between 1989 and 2006 a period in which Brazil reduced trade barriers and opened up to FDI3quot Wal Mart appreciated by consumers but feared by competitors because of its cutthroat approach to competitive pricing opened its first store in Brazil in 1995 and had 450 stores just 15 years later37 The poor can see the positive effects of globalization in their purses and wallets greater affordability availability and quality of consumer goods such as processed foods computers refrigerators and cell phones Moreover they can distinguish the positive from the negative effects brought about by privatization In Latin America and by extension elsewhere globalization does not have uniform effects Globalization brings pressure to reduce barriers to foreign trade and investment and to reduce the size and scope of government by selling off government assets The poor see the positive impact of some aspects of globalization but also recognize the negative effects of other aspects The hypothesis that the poor have strong incentives to oppose globalization is only half correct x CRITICAL THINKING GU ESTIONS 1 Why do poor people in developing countries tend to oppose privatization 2 Why do the poor in developing countries tend to favor free trade 134 How has cultural globalization shaped politics in the world39s states Watch the Video quotAntiGlobalization Protestsquot at mypoisciabcom C U LTU RAL G L0 BALIZATIO N Antiglobalization activists are not just preoccupied with the economic or political consequences of global integration They also believe globalization replaces local re gional or even national identities with a homogenous cosmopolitan global culture a bland Americanization of the world that is disconnected from local traditions and history Skeptics of this view respond that the backlash against globalization has reenergized established forms of political identity and even generated new cultural practices That is as the world becomes more integrated politically and economi cally people adopt aspects of other cultures they find appealing and cast off elements of their own culture that they disdain Does globalization homogenize the world or does it create opportunities for even greater global cultural diversity Globalization Homogenizes World Culture About 200 years ago the rise of nationalism and the sovereign state weakened local forms of identity based on family clan tribe village or religion National ism tended to broaden the horizons of people who lived in isolation from other communities linking local cultural attachments into a larger community Many believe that globalization exacerbates cultural assimilation extending this process beyond national and state boundaries so that eventually indigenous local and national cultures will disappear The increased volume and speed of global trade and finance the rise of MNCs IGOs and INGOs the spread of communication technology and the yearly flow of hundreds of millions of people via tourism and migration all contribute to this process Cultural Globalization 369 TABLE 131 World Values Survey Question 14 European Countries Which Geographic Group Do You Belong To First 1980 2000 Locality 484 493 Region 134 149 Country 290 260 Continent 29 35 The World 64 62 Source World Values Survey Onine Data Analysis accessed June 5 2011 httpwwwwvsevsdbcom wvsWVSAnaizejsp Evidence from the World Values Surveys dispels this hypothesis As Tables 131 and 132 reveal there was virtually no decline in nationalist sentiment across 14 European countries for which data exist in surveys taken in 1980 and again in 2000 Europeans remain proud of their national identity as well as tightly bound to their local roots to a city village or region within a country such as Wales in the UK or Catalonia in Spain Despite the ever eXpanding web of regional political social and economic ties that the EU has created the proportion of Europeans with a continent wide or global identity remains minuscule In short even where globalization has advanced the most nationalism remains a potent political force Evidence from other countries confirms the findings from Europe local regional and even national identities are not giving way to a global cosmopolitan culture or to American culture This is not to say that American culture is not influential and one can hardly deny the fact that certain cultural traits have become global Still evidence suggests that local regional and national political identi ties remain powerful In fact while some believe globalization weakens local or national political identities others believe it creates new identities and reinvigorates old ones creating new borders and boundaries between groups TABLE 132 World Values Survey Question 14 European Countries How Proud Are You of Your Nationality 1980 2000 Very proud 444 427 Quite proud 378 440 Not very proud 127 101 Not at all proud 51 32 Source World Values Survey Onine Data Analysis accessed June 5 2011 httpwwwwvsevsdbcom wvsWVSAnaizejsp 371 Conclusion SUMMARY TABLE Potential Consequences of Cultural Globalization Hypothesis Evidence Globalization homogenizes world cultures Globalization allows cultures to flourish Globalization of commerce and technology undermine efforts at cultural and political isolation and erode existing forms of cultural identity Globalization simultaneously causes both cultural homogenization and a backlash in defense of On the one hand American culture McWorld is widespread On the other hand local and national cultures have not disappeared Nationalist and other movements for autonomy have flourished along with the rise of political and cultural distinctiveness and autonomy economic globalization tion Given the number and strength of movements demanding cultural autonomy around the world it seems as if the reactions against globalization are stronger than its homogenizing imperatives CONCLUSION What impact does globalization have on politics economics and culture Protesters in Seattle Strasbourg Cochabamba and elsewhere see the growth of worldwide connections between governments businesses and individuals very differently from executives on Wall Street or bureaucrats in Washington DC Yet globalization is neither purely good nor had proponents tend to overlook its negative consequences while opponents tend to ignore its benefits For example in terms of its political consequences although the growing importance of transnational issues and of IGOs and INGOs can complicate states ability to exercise sovereignty globalization has not eliminated state sovereignty Globalization certainly has enhanced the influence of unaccountable IGOs and INGOs but it has also helped spread democratic norms of government around the world Economically globalization has increased job market volatility and the pace of change in industry and agriculture in both developed and developing countries These transformations generate fear that governments will lose the ability to pro tect citizens from impoverishment Economic damage due to globalization also tends to draw media attention as well as the sorts of protests that we have seen against the WTO However evidence suggests that poverty declines most in those countries that have embraced economic globalization and there is little evidence that economic globalization has eviscerated the welfare state despite critics fears The cultural consequences of globalization also appear similarly exagger ated It is certainly true that the rapid spread of consumer culture and information Notes 373 brought increased budgetary pressures on the generous social welfare benefits in Europe with an emphasis on the potential impact of globalization Friedman Thomas The World Is Flat A Brief History of the 21 Century New York Farrar Straus and Giroux 2005 A best selling description of key factors said to be leveling the playing field in terms of global economics and politics A good read and useful for engaging classroom debates Naim Moses Think Again Globalization Foreign Policy 2009 accessed December 15 2011 httpwwwmoisesnaimconMwritingsthink again globalization A useful review of pro and antiglobalization arguments applied to the global economic crisis that began in 2008 Rodrik Dani Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate Foreign Policy 107 1997 1937 A readable exploration of the issues surrounding debates about economic globalization Stands up to the test of time NOTES 1 These figures are based on data from the KOF Index of Globalization available at httpglobalizationkofethzch 2 For space reasons we do not consider the reverse and similarly important question How do states shape the nature and extent of globalization 3 See for example John Boli and George Thomas eds Constructing World Culture International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875 Stanford CA Stanford University Press 1999 4 See for example Michael Steininger Denmark Imposes New Border Checks to Keep out Immigrants Criminals Christian Science Monitor July 5 201 1 accessed July 15 201 1 httpwwwcsmonitorcomWorldEurope201 10705Denmark imposes new border checks to keep out immigrants criminals 5 New Yorle Times Europe s Vast Farm Subsidies Face Challenges Stephen Castle and Dorreen Carvajal December 30 2009 B4 6 See Ian Bremmer The End of the Free Marleet Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations New York Portfolio 2010 7 See for example Peter Andreas Redrawing the Line Borders and Security in the 21 Century International Security 2822003 78112 8 See for example Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU A Response to Majone and Moravcsik journal of Common Marleet Studies 4432006 533562 9 See for example Beth Simmons Mobilizing for Human Rights International Law in Domestic Politics New York Cambridge University Press 2009 10 Daniel Schweimler Cavallo Case Sets Precedent BBC news online June 29 2003 ac cessed August 27 2010 httpnewsbbccould2hiamericas3030030stm 11 Shashank Bengali Detainee Torture Cases Proceed Overseas as US Stonewalls August 22 2010 accessed August 27 2010 httpwwwkansascitycom2010 O 8222 1 6 625 2 detainee torture cases proceedhtml 12 See for example David Held Democracy and the Global Order From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance Stanford CA Stanford University Press 1995 13 The World Bank Databank online resource httpdataworldbankorg 14 Brittany Stack Toyota Plant to Resume Construction June 21 2010 accessed August 23 2010 httpwwwthedmonlinecon articletoyota plant resume construction 15 United Nations Council on Trade and Development World Investment Report httpwwwunctadorg Notes 375 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 Baker 9597 Baker 176 182183 Wal Mart Brasil accessed December 2 2010 httpwwwwalmartbrasilcombrinsti tucionalnobrasilaspXeXpandable0 Behind the Scenes Internet Police out in Force for the Olympics CNN Online accessed September 17 2010 httparticlescnncom20080807worldolympicspress freedom orcruz1great firewall internet access chinese goVernmentsPMXORLD China Quake School Critic Receives One Year Sentence Reuters online accessed September 17 2010 httpwwwreutersconMarticleidUSPEK1 O5 816 Benjamin Barber Jihad Versus McWorld Atlantic online accessed September 17 2010 httpwwwtheatlanticcorrMmagazinearchive199203jihad Vs mcworld3882 Elisabeth Rosenthal Buicks Starbucks and Fried Chicken Still China New Yore Times February 25 2002 accessed December 15 2011 httpwwwnytimes condlO02O225internationalasia25 CHINhtml Barber Jihad Versus McWorld See for example Suisheng Zhao A Nation State by Construction Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism Stanford CA Stanford University Press 2004 chap ters 67 378 Glossary corporatism pattern of interest group mobilization in which the state plays an active role in organizing groups and mediating between them correlation a measure of observed association between two variables corruption the illicit use of public authority to achieve private gain cultural polarization intergroup hatred fostered by cultural exclusion or repression democracy a political system in which the rulers are accountable to the ruled democratization a shift from a non democratic to a democratic regime divided government occurs in presidential systems when the president comes from one party but a differ ent party controls the legislative branch dual executive in hybrid democratic regimes an executive branch of government characterized by a division of authority and responsibility between a president and a prime minister economic development sustained increase in the standard of living of a country s population resulting from changes and improvements in education infra structure and technology economic inequality the extent of the wealth gap between rich and poor economic liberalism an ideology that favors minimal state involvement in the economy as the best recipe for growth economic market mechanism of choice as to how firms produce goods and how consumers consume goods electoral system the political rules that translate citi zens votes into legislative seats andor control of a directly elected executive electorate a group of citizens eligible to participate in the election of government leaders elite party a political party dominated by leaders who hold office in government rather than the party in the electorate or the party organization ethnicity a group of people who share an under standing of a common heritage based on religion language territory or family ties externality an action that affects the welfare of others whether or not on purpose extractive colonies colonies established primarily to exploit their abundant natural resources Examples include Bolivia Brazil the Congo the Gold Coast now Ghana and the Ivory Coast Cote d Ivoire failed state a state where sovereignty over claimed territory has collapsed or was never effectively estab lished at all falsifiable the possibility that a hypothesized rela tionship can be shown to be incorrect family law code a set of laws governing marriage divorce inheritance of family property responsibility for children and other related matters fascism a totalitarian ideology based in racist prin ciples that glorified militarism violence nationalism and the state over individual interests and identities usually led by charismatic individual political leaders federalism the constitution grants two or more governments overlapping political authority over the same group of people and same piece of territory feudalism a form of political organization in which no single political entity or ruler held unambiguous territorial sovereignty and in which political rule involved multiple and often overlapping lines of authority foreign direct investment FDI the purchase or cre ation of assets in one country by an individual firm or government based in a different country free market principles an economic system in which individuals and firms rather than the government have rights to make all decisions about buying and selling private property such as land stock commodi ties or productive industries and they undertake all their own investment for the future free ride to reap the benefits that collective action provides after other people have put in the time energy or money to generate collective mobilization free trade the elimination of tariffs quotas and other measures that make imports more expensive than domestically produced goods gender a concept used to distinguish the social and cultural characteristics associated with femininity and masculinity from the biological features associated with sex such as male or female reproductive organs gender as a category a form of socially constructed political identity that considers variation in the social meaning of masculinity and femininity around the world gender as a political process individual involvement in political institutions to either preserve or change gender relations or ways that existing social context 380 Glossary method of difference compares and contrasts cases with the same attributes but different outcomes and determines causality by finding an attribute that is present when an outcome occurs but that is absent in similar cases when the outcome does not occur military coup when elements in a country s armed forces overthrow a democratically elected civilian government military regime a non democratic regime in which the selectorate is typically limited to the highest ranks of the military officer corps mixed electoral rules combine a plurality or majority electoral rule to elect some members of the national legislature with a PR electoral rule to elect the remainder mixed methods research uses both quantitative and qualitative techniques in an effort to build convincing claims about the relationships between attributes and outcomes modern gender gap a situation in a country in which women are more likely to be more liberal and vote for more liberal parties than are men modernization theory suggests that democracy is not simply a function of economic growth but rather that it is a function of the cultural changes that accompany economic growth monarchy non democratic systems in which rulers assume power via birthright and are removed from power when they die monopoly a situation in which a single firm controls the production distribution or sale of a particular good forcing all others out of business and preventing new competitors from emerging multinational corporations MNCs firms with head quarters in one country but with operations and employees in many countries nation a cultural grouping of individuals who associate with each other based on collectively held political identity nationalism nation a subjective feeling of membership in a neighborhood effect when countries in a particular geographic region follow their neighbors in terms of adopting a regime type neoliberal economic policies policies that seek to limit governments role in setting economic policy noconfidence vote a parliamentary vote which if successful terminates the prime minister s appointment offshore jobs the movement of jobs outside a corpo ration s home country oligarchy a non democratic regime in which the selectorate consists of a small social economic or political elite which selects a leader to represent their interests parliamentary supremacy a principle according to which judges decisions remain subordinate to deci sions of the legislative majority parliamentary system a constitutional format in which the executive and legislative branches have nei ther separation of origin nor separation of survival partition the creation of two separate sovereign states out of a territory that initially comprised only one state in order to separate antagonistic groups party in the electorate comprised of a party s supporters in the electorate its card carrying members and its local or regional level party organi zations but not its national level organization party organization a party s central office or national headquarters and the party s professional staff party in public office made up of 1 party mem bers who voters elected to the executive or legislative branches of government or 2 party members appointed to high level bureaucratic posts for example in the cabinet party system the typical pattern of political competi tion and cooperation between parties within a state peasants poor rural farmers who typically rent land from wealthy landowners personalistic regime a system built around the glori fication and empowerment of a single individual pluralism a pattern of interest group mobilization in which societal interests organize freely in an unregu lated fashion plurality rule the candidate who receives the larg est share of the votes in the district wins even if that share is less than a majority of 50 percent 1 of the votes political cleavage a deep and lasting salient dimen sion of political conflict and competition within a given society such as religion ethnicity ideology or other forms of identity political economy the study of the relationship between economics and politics political equality citizenship offers both equal rights and equal obligations 382 Glossary selectorate in non democratic regimes a subset of the population that chooses and removes the leader semipresidential hybrid a constitutional format in which the president and parliament enjoy separation of origin but only the president enjoys separation of survival separation of origin voters directly elect the members of the legislature and also cast a separate ballot di rectly electing the chief executive the president separation of survival members of both the executive and legislative branches serve for fixed terms of office service sector jobs outside of manufacturing and agriculture that include medicine law transportation retail sales tourism and entertainment settlement colonies colonies established primarily as a place for people from Europe to settle Examples include the United States Canada Australia and New Zealand Sharia the body of Islamic religious law that governs individuals public and private lives singleparty regime in which a single political party dominates all government institutions and restricts political competition to maintain itself in power social contract a theoretical political agreement in which everyone agrees to limit their ability to do as they please in order to achieve some collective benefit social Darwinism the idea that certain races are inherently superior to others and that the superior races would inevitably conquer the weaker ones social democracy a political ideology practiced widely across contemporary European states that tries to balance capitalist markets and private property with some degree of state intervention in the economy to ameliorate problems of economic inequality social insurance forms of insurance that are available to all citizens regardless of their ability to pay social movements organized sustained and collec tive efforts that make claims on behalf of members of a group challenge the power of government authori ties or other groups in civil society contest the legitimacy of established ideas or practices or advance new ideas or practices society a term for all organized groups social movements interest groups and individuals who attempt to remain autonomous from the influence and authority of the state solidarity the feature of a civic culture related to a general trust and respect among citizens and a will ingness to lend a helping hand even when they might disagree on matters of public policy sovereignty defined as ultimate responsibility for and legal authority over the conduct of internal affairs including a claim to a monopoly on the legiti mate use of physical force within territory defined by geographic borders spillover effect when violence in one state spills over into neighboring states because the latter are weak and cannot control their own borders state a political legal unit with sovereignty over a particular geographic territory and the population that resides in that territory stateled development a strategy to promote economic growth that includes such policies as government co ordination of private sector investment forced savings and preferential treatment to certain industries regarded as essential for national economic development state of nature term coined by Thomas Hobbes to describe an imaginary time before human beings organized into governments or states for the collective good suicide terrorism involves acts of violence perpetrated against either combatants or noncombatants by indi viduals who are aware that they are unlikely to survive terrorism threatened or actual use of violence for po litical purposes by non state actors direct particularly against civilian targets theocracy a non democratic regime in which leaders who claim divine guidance hold the authority to rule totalitarian regime a type of non democratic government that attempts to shape the interests and identities of its citizens through the use of ideology coercive mobilization and severe repression traditional gender gap a situation in a country in which women are more likely to be conservative and vote for conservative political parties than are men traditional values people who value traditional forms of political authority such as kings tribal chiefs and religious leaders tend to be more religious and nation alistic express respect for hierarchical authority relations and express a belief in a clear difference between good and evil This page intentionally left blank This page intentionally left blank 388 Subject Index coercion see also political violence coercive mobilization 9698 to collective action 231 to genocide 280282 by non democratic regimes 95 of political identity 161 societal restraints on 3738 state authority and 3334 coercive recruitment 266 Cold War 45 100 collective action interest groups 242246 characteristics of 242243 corporatism 244246 formation of 243244 245 political parties 246254 characteristics of 246248 origins of 250 party systems 248250 25 0 political institutions and 251253 social movements 235242 characteristics of 235237 formalization of problems with 240242 formation of 237240 241 collective action problem 3034 defined 30 Hobbes problem 3134 Prisoner s Dilemma 3031 solutions to 230235 234 appealing 231232 coercion 231 enticements 232233 political leadership 233235 collective memory 166168 colonialism effects of see decolonized states command economies 294 examples of 298 vs free market 298299 state intervention in 305 communism 100101 defined 100 vs fascism 102104 study of 7 in today s world 101 Communist Manifesto Marx 152 comparative method 817 16 asking questions 910 11 challenges of 1719 19 defined 5 13 hypothesis formulation 1013 method of agreement 1315 method of difference 1517 obtaining evidence 2223 comparative politics defined 5 foundations of 58 importance of 24 overview of 45 questions asked by 58 comparative research approaches to 1317 2223 challenges of 1719 19 controlling conditions impossibility of 18 qualitative 23 quantitative 22 conditional cash transfer program 362363 consent as means of legitimizing government 3133 constitutional courts 78 see also judicial review constitutional monarchies 105 constitutions defined 66 formats for 7071 7478 77 unitary vs federal 6769 constructivism 159171 1 70 defined 155 European national identity 168171 in gender 203204 individual choice 159160 vs primordialism 162 racial identity in 163165 social context 160163 contestation of power 6163 participation and 62 required for democracy 248 corporations multinational see multinational corporations MNC corporatism 244246 correlation and causation separating 1718 corruption 1 141 1 7 Costa Rica democracy in testing hypothesis for 134135 women in legislature 214215 countries see states coups d etat see military coups court system see judicial review cults of personality see personalistic regimes cultural diversity 87 cultural globalization 366371 see also globalization consequences of 371 cultural strengthening by 370371 homogenization 366370 cultural homogenization 366369 cultural identity see also civic culture as basis for nations 3537 context for early state formation 42 context for later state formation 4647 Weber theory of 153 data gathering 2223 see also comparative method decolonized states see also formation of states civil war susceptibility 260261 colonization strategies effect on 306307 cultural identity and 4647 economic development of 304311 Ireland as 287 testing hypothesis for 4850 weakness of 4546 305306 defining concepts difficulty of 19 democracy comparative questions about 78 defined 59 elements of 6063 63 gender attitudes and 207208 globalization and 352353 origins of 60 religious compatibility with 177 see also religion democratic regimes 5889 accountability of 60 balancing limited and effective gov ernment see Madison s Dilemma change to non democratic regimes see regime change climate and 2021 constitutional formats parliamentary system 70 7576 presidential system 70 7475 semi presidential hybrid system 71 7678 contestation of power in 6163 economic development in 293297 electoral processes 7987 majority rule 84 mixed electoral rules 8687 plurality rule 8083 proportional representation 8486 elements of 6063 executive legislative power distribu tion 6978 federal vs unitary 6769 gender gaps in 209211 390 Subject Index executive legislative power distribution 6978 hybrid systems 71 list by region 7173 parliamentarism 70 presidentialism 70 externalities 291293 293 extractive colonies 306310 see also decolonized states F failed states 5254 defined 29 measuring risk of 5254 Somalia as 29 failure of markets see market failure fair elections 64 falsifiable hypotheses 11 see also hypotheses family law defined 218 in Maghreb countries 217219 in vvealthy European countries 219221 fascism 101102 charismatic leaders in 102 vs communism 102104 defined 100 judicial review and 79 nationalism and 102 study of 7 in today s world 102 federal states 6769 federalism defined 68 economic redistribution and 335 effect on party systems 251 Federalist Papers Madison 67 feudalism defined 39 demise of 128 force see political violence Foreign Direct Investment FDI defined 354 volume over time 358 formalization of social movements 240242 formation of states early history of 3844 44 natural environment and 4344 political interests and 4042 later history of 4451 51 consequences of 5051 natural environment and 4750 political interests and 4447 population density and 43 foundations of comparative politics 58 fragility index 5254 fragmentation of parties 253 France 2007 election results 84 free market 294 vs command economies 298299 principles of 287 state intervention in 305 free ride problem 230 288 see also collective action collective action problem free trade 354 Freedom House 6466 freedoms see civil liberties frequency of elections 64 G gender 201225 constructivist approach to 203204 defining 203206 as a category 204 206 as a process 204205 206 gender gaps 209211 roles modernization of 21021 1 political shaping of 217224 wage gap 221 women in politics and 211216 world attitudes 206209 economic modernization and 206 209 support for democracy and 207208 gender discrimination see also women s rights in Afghanistan 202 in Muslim countries 185186 207209 political factors in 217224 religious influence and 222223 underlying reasons for 205 gender quota laws 212 214215 generalizing from the specific avoiding 13 qualitative research and 23 genocide 279282 civil wars and 280 defined 279 government pressure for 280282 historical examples of 279 international response to ethnic war 279280 geography see also natural environment as civil war factor 262 as revolution factor 271 Germany 2009 election results 87 economic intervention by 294 as social democracy 299300 welfare state spending in 318321 global government 350 globalization 346372 average level of 347 348 cultural 366371 consequences of 3 71 cultural strengthening by 370371 homogenization 366370 defined 136 346 defining 346349 economic 354363 explanations for 354357 poverty and 358361 social welfare and 361363 effect on regime change 138139 global language 367 measuring by country 348 political 349353 democracy consequences 352353 356 sovereignty consequences 350352 356 protests against 346 364366 368 welfare state spending and 336338 governments 35 39 grading democracies 6466 grass roots organizations see social movements greed as motivation for civil war 264266 Gross Domestic Product GDP 302 guerilla wars 276 see also civil wars Hamas 278 hard targets 277 head of state 35 healthcare spending 318319 debate over 330332 globalization and 361 historical trends in regime change 123124 history of comparative politics 58 history of state formation see formation of states Hobbes Thomas identification of collective action problem 3133 social contract solution of 3334 Subject Index 393 political identity 150172 247 class cleavage and 154 collective memory testing hypothesis for 166168 constructivism 159171 170 European national identity 168171 individual choice 159160 racial identity in 163165 social context 160163 creation of 150 defined 151 forms of 151155 left right political divide and 333334 Marx vs Weber 154 Marxist economic theory regarding 152153 nationalism and 168170 party systems and 251252 politicians effect on 161 primordialism 155159 159 Clash of Civilizations theory 156157 evaluating as theory 157159 kinship bonds 155156 restrictions on 161162 as social insurance justification 326 welfare state spending and 333334 political interests early state formation and 4042 late state formation and 4447 political leadership see also leadership succession collective action initiated by 233 effect on social movement forma tion 237 political opportunity structure 237 political organizations 126 political parties 246253 characteristics of 246248 defined 246 in the electorate 246247 elite vs mass 247248 vs interest groups or social move ments 246 party organization 247 party systems 248250 political institutions and 251253 in public office 246 political regimes see democratic regimes non democratic regimes political science 4 political views by gender 209211 political violence 252253 257282 see also coercion causes of 281t civil wars 259268 motivations for 263268 268 opportunities for 259263 defining 258259 definition of 258 fascism and 102 genocide 279282 government pressure for 280282 international response to ethnic war 279280 legitimate use of by governments 3435 non democratic regime use of 9899 revolutions 268275 consequences of 273 popular grievances and 272 state weakness and 270271 spillover effect 261 terrorism 276279 hard targets 277 religious conflict and 277279 politics 4 population density effect on state formation 43 Portugal 2009 election results 85 post colonial states see decolonized states poverty absolute level of 359 as civil war cause 261262 economic globalization and 358361 by region 360 as revolution cause 270 poverty relief programs 319 presidential system defined 70 list of 7173 power under 7475 pressure groups see interest groups pride in nationality 369 see also nationalism prime ministers 70 primordialism 155159 159 vs constructivism 162 defined 155 evaluating as theory 15 715 9 Huntington s Clash of Civilizations 15 615 7 kinship bonds and 15 515 6 Prisoner s Dilemma 3031 private goods 232 290 private sector 317 progressive taxation 321325 defined 321 lower than expected 323325 reason for 330 proletariat 152 property rights economic development and295 proportional representation 8486 334335 Protestant Reformation 179 Protestantism and democracy 179181 public goods 232 289290 293 328 public sector 317 Q qualitative research 23 quality of democracy assessing 6466 quantitative research 22 questions asked by comparative politics 510 R race 151 race to the bottom theory 336 361 in developing countries 362363 in wealthy countries 361362 racial identity 163165 see also political identity racism of fascists 102 reciprocal accountability 94 106 redistribution of wealth see economic redistribution regime change 122146 causes of 122123 135 domestic causes of 125136 civic culture 125127 economic change 127131 military role 131136 future prospects for 141144 144 historical trends in 123124 international causes of 136139 140 Catholic Church changes 137138 European Union 138 globalization 138139 Soviet foreign policy 137 US foreign policy 136 shortterm catalysts for 139141 waves of 123 124 regimes 92 see also democratic regimes non democratic regimes regressive taxation 321 Subject Index 395 taxes average rates in democracies 322 as collective action problem 31 288 compared to per capita income 301 progressive vs regressive 321322 technology effect on globalization 347348 356 367 terrain see geography terrorism 276279 defined 276 hard targets 277 purpose of 276 religious conflict and 277279 suicide terrorism 276 277 testing hypotheses 13 2021 4850 8183 see also hypotheses Thailand military coup 131132 theocracies 1091 10 1 12 totalitarian regimes 9599 vs authoritarian regimes 95 104 coercive mobilization by 9698 communism 100101 comparisons between 102104 defined 92 fascism 101102 ideologies of 9596 North Korea as 92 pluralism minimization by 9899 regime party 9899 Soviet Union as 101 theocracies as 109110 in today s world 103104 traditional gender gap 209210 21 1 transnational issues 346347 transnational political institutions 349350 Treaty of Westphalia 38 42 Tunisian family law 217219 U UK election results 2005 election 80 2010 election 81 unforced participation 6061 unionization 231 see also interest groups unitarism defined 67 economic redistribution and 335 unitary states defined 67 effectiveness of 69 vs federal states 6769 United Nations growth of 44 United States civilian control of military 133 cultural impact on world 367368 distribution of wealth in 329 economic crisis of late 2000s 288298 effect on democracy in Arab Islamic states 191192 effect on international regime change 136 ethnic diversity 339341 globalization effect on 337 globalization of 349 income inequality in 324 inconsistent support for democracy 144 racial identity in 163165 religious participation 194 welfare state spending in 318321 universal jurisdiction 353 universal suffrage 60 unreliable information assessing 1819 V Venezuela gasoline subsidy 299 as illiberal democracy 142 student protests in 229 violence see political violence volunteers calling for 231232 W wage gap 221 warfare 4041 see also civil wars interstate warfare Washington Consensus 357 weak states civil war susceptibility 260263 263 colonization and 305306 economic growth and 302303 military regimes in 108 revolutions in 270271 wealth correlation with democracy 130 wealth inequality see economic inequality wealthy societies and family law 219221 Weber Max cultural identity and 153 vs Karl Marx 154 welfare states 317321 330 childcare and poverty relief programs 319 comparison of spending by 31 8 debate over 331332 defined 317 healthcare spending by 318319 labor laws 319321 measuring size of 317318 320 purpose of 321332 progressive taxation 321325 social insurance 325332 spending variation factors 33 7 339341 globalization 336338 labor unions 332333 political identities 333334 political institutions 333334 state strength 335336 women legislators 211216 212 women s rights see also gender discrimination in Islam 185186 questions provoked by 8 World Trade Organization WTO protests 1999 346 World Values Surveys WVS 194 206207 Z Zimbabwe comparing to Botswana 4850 NAME INDEX A Abdullah II king 105 Acemoglu Daron 308 Akihito emperor 35 Allende Salvador 122 124 Aristotle 6 Barber Benjamin 367368 370 Berlusconi Silvio 247 249 Bokassa Jean Bedel 1 11 1 13 Bov Jos 368 Brown Gordon 75 Bush George HW 136 Bush George W 298 C Cage Nicolas 265 Cameron David 39 7576 Carter Jimmy 274 Chavez Hugo 142 228229 Chinchilla Laura 134 Chirac Jacques 77 Clegg Nick 75 Columbus Christopher 158 Debret Jean Baptiste 167 DiCaprio Leonardo 265 E Engels Friedrich 100 Erdogan Recep 12 F Fillon Francois 77 Franco Gen Francisco 140 Franklin Benjamin 167 G Gandhi Mahatma 233 Gates Bill 323 Gorbachev Mikhail 137 Gregory XVI pope 181 Hitler Adolf 99100 102103 107 124 127 133 180 233 234 Hobbes Thomas 6 8 3135 38 52 55 288 Huntington Samuel 156157 176 184187 Hussein Saddam 104 Hussein bin Talal king 105 I Isabel Princess 164 J Jesus Christ 178 185 John Paul II pope 137 182 183 Johnson Simon 308 Jospin Lionel 77 K Kabila Laurent 261 265 Kagame Paul 213 Kennedy John F 166 Khomeini Ruhollah 233 234 274 Kim Il Sung 92 110 113 140 Kim Jong Il 9192 110 113 King Martin Luther Jr 233 234 L Lasswell Harold 4 Lenin Vladimir 101 Locke John 6 8 Luther Martin 179 Madison James 6667 79 Maliki Nouri al 176 200 Mandela Nelson 215 233 234 Marx Karl 7 100101 151 152155 160 171 McCain John 316 Mobutu Sese Seko 260261 265 Montesquieu Charles de Secondat Baron de 6 2021 Morales Evo 239 364 Mubarak Hosni 5859 274 Mugabe Robert 50 Muhammad 105 109 185 Mussolini Benito 102 Myrdal Alva 326 328 Myrdal Gunnar 326 328 0 Obama Barack 74 160 229 231 315316 321 323 Orwell George 99 P Pahlavi Mohammad Reza 274275 Paul VI pope 182 Pedro I emperor 164 167 Pedro II emperor 164 Pinochet Augusto 121122 Pius IX pope 181 Q Qaddafi Muammar 13 1 R Reagan Ronald 136 Revere Paul 167 Robin Hood 321 330 Robinson James 308 397 tgtt ttatntutt ttmtuwt t T t D m 5 A 0 p p Hm jiP D I isci Lab 39With MyEPaIiSciLab stuxdentt mwe 39fmm stundgsr txng ai39m appIying ctzn epts ta part39Ecipa t ing in 1 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