POLS 112 Lecture: Cooperation, Conflict and the Commons
POLS 112 Lecture: Cooperation, Conflict and the Commons 8616
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This 2 page One Day of Notes was uploaded by Julia Gladding on Tuesday January 6, 2015. The One Day of Notes belongs to 8616 at California State Polytechnic University taught by Michael Latner in Winter2015. Since its upload, it has received 130 views. For similar materials see POLS 112- American and California Government in Political Science at California State Polytechnic University.
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Date Created: 01/06/15
Monday January 5 2015 POLS 112 Week 1 Monday Lecture Cooperation Conflict and the Commons Goods things we requiredesire for survivalsatisfaction private exclusive with rivalry Exclusive primary way to make it exclusive put a price on it qualifications Rivalry if someone is using a good it becomes less useful for someone else ex cars in education when there are too many people trying to get the same education positivenegative externalities positive externalities in education government subsidizes education typically try to rely on market club exclusive without rivalry gaining value from participation or the more its used the better it gets ex social media Wikipedia Siri common nonexclusive with potential rivalry where we start running into collective action problems ex pasture beach water what is rational from an economic perspective in the short term if we all maximize our individual utility in the long run we end up in a situation where no one can use the utility because of overuse we create governments to solve this problem public nonexclusive without rivalry ex public art sunlight Monday January 5 2015 Collective Action when more than one individual is required to contribute to an effort in order to achieve an outcome Many of the benefits sought by thing things are disproportionately available to cooperating creatures Axelrod and Hamilton 1981 cellular level bacteria international UN safety the fundamental good government provides Collective Action Problems Collective Dilemmas whenever there is conflict between collective and individual goals collective action problem when individuals have incentive to defect as others are cooperating coordination problem when cooperation is beneficial but there is disagreement between which choice is optimal coordination costs conformity costs conformity costs difference between individual goal vs group goal unstable coalition a voting coalition in favor of one alternative can be divided by another winning coalition Majority Cycling prisoner s dilemma when players have no incentive to cooperate even though cooperation gt mutual defection
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