POLS 112 Lecture: Political Institutions as Solutions for Collective Action
POLS 112 Lecture: Political Institutions as Solutions for Collective Action 8616
Popular in POLS 112- American and California Government
Popular in Political Science
This 4 page One Day of Notes was uploaded by Julia Gladding on Thursday January 8, 2015. The One Day of Notes belongs to 8616 at California State Polytechnic University taught by Michael Latner in Winter2015. Since its upload, it has received 181 views. For similar materials see POLS 112- American and California Government in Political Science at California State Polytechnic University.
Reviews for POLS 112 Lecture: Political Institutions as Solutions for Collective Action
Report this Material
What is Karma?
Karma is the currency of StudySoup.
You can buy or earn more Karma at anytime and redeem it for class notes, study guides, flashcards, and more!
Date Created: 01/08/15
Wednesday January 7 2015 POLS 112 Week 1 Wednesday Lecture Political Institutions as Solutions for Collective Action Introduction The FreeRider Problem t s beneficial for us all to cooperate But why don t we all cooperate As soon as we involve ourselves in cooperation we make ourselves vulnerable to exploitation by others PBS Public Broadcasting System an example of a common good This public good is brought to you by the support of viewers like you unless you are a free rider Other examples of freerider problem people who don t pay taxes group projects relatively recent problem in social science Harden points out a fallacy collective interest individual interest even if we all want clean water or civil rights then there is always an individual interest that is not accounted for Used to be thought that individual interest is simply a function of collective interest identity is fundamentally collective Examples of selective incentives selective rewards selective punishment where individual goods are tied to collective goods discount on some service by paying duesmembership to unions pay people a salary to make sure other people stay in line cops military service Wednesday January 7 2015 scholarships jail time Examples of people being uniformed and often misunderstand their own interests empirical evidence people have little knowledge very poor knowledge about policy consequences Examples of people being altruistic and are inclined dot anonymous donations voluntary enlistment in a war young men during the Civil War WWI WWII Moral Norms Do people have a civic obligation or duty to vote Yes fight for it finding common good better public policy can be measured by performance opinion what if nobody voted protecting your own interests No only informed people should vote unethical to vote History Women s suffrage Let men make the decisions African Americans are uneducated stupid animals Why don t we let children vote uniformed no harm done Wednesday January 7 2015 indifferent abstention to abstain How to secure cooperation Rights and Coordinating Mechanisms Elinor Ostrom property rights the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one s claim to a benefit stream Bromley 1991 when you start to set up a relationship exchange governing collective management ie voting reciprocity set up relationships of trust I trust you are going to comet through on your end called institutionalizing norms the longer organizationsinstitutions are set up the stronger they are because it becomes more normal Pie Game Treating people fairly is a profound principle in making collective decisions Majority Three Models of Democracy Responsive model reflection of the public without the right to vote we can t get this Participatory model self development makes you a better citizen the more people participate in the process the better informed they become Deliberative model transformative what is really important is the actual process of determining what our values are Wednesday January 7 2015 people can collectively come up with what is best for all of us leaving selfinterest out of it this is what I deserve
Are you sure you want to buy this material for
You're already Subscribed!
Looks like you've already subscribed to StudySoup, you won't need to purchase another subscription to get this material. To access this material simply click 'View Full Document'