IDENTITY THEFT TO THE iPOD TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS IN THE INFORMATION AGE
IDENTITY THEFT TO THE iPOD TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS IN THE INFORMATION AGE COMP 301
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This 63 page Class Notes was uploaded by Cleora Stiedemann on Monday October 19, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to COMP 301 at Rice University taught by Staff in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 36 views. For similar materials see /class/224961/comp-301-rice-university in ComputerScienence at Rice University.
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Date Created: 10/19/15
ELECTRONIC VOTING RISKS amp RESEARCH ELECTRONIC VOTING j i RISKS amp RESEARCH DANIEL R SANDLER DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE RICE UNIVERSITY OCTOBER 27 2008 GUEST LECTURE FOR COMP301 quotIDENTITY THEFT TO THE IPOD electronic voting risks amp research Daniel R Sandler Department of Computer Science Rice University October 27 2008 guest lecture for COMP301 Identity Theft to the iPod why vote please see any number of excellent POLI courses why IS ublic rus In elections Important It is enough that the people know there was an election The people who cast the votes decude nothing The people who count the votes decude everything Joe Stalin mm mm mm 39 2 Convince the electorate wh is this so xcllifficult 1 Failures 2 Fraud OFFICIAL BALLOT GENERAL ELECTION y OFFICIAL BALLOT GENERAL ELECTION PALM BEACH COUNIY FLORIDA 1 PALM BEACH COUNTY FLORIDA NOVEMBER 7 2000 NOVEMBER 7 2000 REPUBLICAN GEORGE W BUSH msmtm REFORM PAI BUCHANAN msmm EZOLA FOSTER ncsmsmm DICK CIIENEY Inc msmm DEMOCRATIC AL GORE nesmm JOE LIEBERMAN mammom V SOCIALIST 35m 439 6 DAVID Manvuows msmm 2quot MM ow 77 quot MARY CAL HOLLIS m mm m ART ouwen m 5mm ICONSTIIUIIUNI M u GREEM 439 8 HOWARD PHILLIPS quotstony I I lhg39m39mI RALPH Autumnqu J cums mmquot mm m WINDNA LIDUKE mumsmm m wgngg SMWUle 00mm ISOCIALIST WORKERS Glam l quotWA mfg JAMES HARRIS mslom MARGARET TROWE Im mum NATURAL LAW JOIIN IIAOELIN quotmom NAT OOLDIIABER mm mm WRIIEIN CANDIDATE Io VOL In a mit n candidate In ow quotIo ultimo on On long null III you ballot cant usability failure equipment failure fraud eg Registration frauds Repeat voting Ballot box stuffing Chain ballots Voter assistance Intimidation and Violence Altering Ballots Substitution of Ballots False Count and False Returns Altering Returns Joseph P Harris Election Administration in the United States The Brookings Institution 1934 Via D W Jones httpwwwcsuiowaedujonesvotingnist2005shtm It s a lot eaSIer If you can ust get everyone oge her In one room this doesn t scale technology when did we start usin machines to help us UNITED STATES SYLVANUS E DAVIS OF ROCHESTER PATENT OFFICE NEW YORK ASSIGNOR OF FIFTYONE ONEHUNDREDTI IS T0 GEORGE WILSON AND GEORGE E SELDEN OF SAME PLACE VOT l N G MACHINE SPECIFICATION arming part of Letters Pnlenl No 526668 dated September 25 1894 Appllnntinn led Jinn 191894 Satin No 514427 No mmlalJ To all whom it may concern 39 that 1 SYLVANUS E DAVE a citizen of the Uniled States residing at Roch ester in the county of Monroe in the State of 5 New York inve invented nu Improved Vot ing Mnchine of which the following is n s ecl catiou reference being had to the accompa nying drawings My invention relates to an improved vot H m ofan39hich are fully described and illustrated in the fullrnvingr speci cation and the accompa nying li nwings lyhe novel fenlures thereof being speci ed in the claims annexed to the said spcei an ion The abject of my invention is the produc tion 0 39 EL voting machinea machine for en abling the public to volt at ordinary elec u n mmquot 01n bi aquot the interlocking rollers and their supporting frame Fig 9 is a longitudinal section of the same on the line 7 i2 quotig transverse suction of the same on the line gs S and f Fig 11 is a longitudi nal section of the interlocking mechanism of he pushes employed for votingnn questions Fig 12 represents the b ock or locks which may be substitutedforone or more of the inn 3 Co rem eroneornmreuf the voting devices ino eraLivo Figs 1 am 14 are respectively a longitudinal section and n plan of the Suppor or euppel eul soft xe resettingrods of the gran ushes em 39 0 or more candidates or the same of ce are presented 1 the slime party Fig 15 in a reme evtionpartially in seamen ca Ln oi the counter its C Slllquot being partially quot 39 o n lunlrnn IYt7 Am n ma man nlnvnl m at No lllndel No 526668 voe 8 Sheets Sheet 3 S E DAVIS VOTING MACHINE Patented Sept 25 1894 6 FR 2009 e votlng two flavors of electronic voting optical scan OS 5 aka mark sense RS 3 O N Longwnml marks made on paper scanned by a computer Source httpwwwcsuiowaedujonesvotingoptical plus everything you might ever want to know about mark sense direct recording electronic DRE input made on a mechanical or computer interface recorded directly to electronicdigital media benefits of DREs human factors feedback prevent overvoting point out undervoting voter can review amp correct mistakes accessibility eg vision impairment administrative ease of running amp canvassing elections strong voter preference technical fast results replace failure prone mechanical systems replace ambiguous analog systems can support more sophisticated voting styles hazards of DREs human factors voting user experience may be poor more things for administrators to mess up too modern humans are pretty good with paper technical electromechanical failures software bugs software malice fraud retail gt wholesale human factors issues below ballot screens from a DRE pop quiz quot 1 are shown IIH ll l l lxllefHHf EH1 THIN HHHHY iHHH x HTH quot39IIHNW I39HIHII39IH MI39HCHHL39H Hf CDHGRES HHE Hquot I m hw I izw H411 1 7 GWM39WWR EM quotquotVIZWHHW tiHlUfWUVIL v r VJ39JAH Hnmy39 w H m 3quot u r 112314 1in 71 Hay 1 w 39 I V i 1 WW Ini lh h 5e L I39al39U39H f39 Man39an C He39itn 1 I39a Lanny Page 1 of 39 5 391 L wquot i V 3iquot Public Count 9 v Public Cnuuti a ADVERTISING REDUNDANT INFORMATION JOHNNY HANSON CiREIiJELF A condo so pricey it won39t be built I A Houston towerwith limo service maid suites 393 and residences with 9 39ii392 bathrooms This replica is as close as you39ll get Here39s why 3939 Outside inside How it would ve been Did Houston need this anyway Already built Houston condos for sale highlights gt Election 20 VOTE your stories 8 photos a i Home World 1 Politics t39i iti39i Charles hutiner Candidate 0ampA Robert Scha er Learn about candidates get election news see Chronicle endorsements El Voting locationssample ballots DJIA 826012 1 NASD 1511265 55 OIL 031 M WESt 1301181111161 con dence index shows consumers most pessimistic since monthly records began The outlook signals oonsum rspending will deteriorate further deepening the US slump v i1 El US stocks oil higher as global shares jump El Elicity home price index drops record 166 in August Our economy Check stock prices on Houston companies 10 rules to help navigate conflicting campaign data HPD Teen in car pretends to choke on seat belt realty dies 33 Phone found in Texas death row cell brings wider seizures MAM to settle last lawsuit stemming from Bonfire collapse Houston man dies in motorcycle crash on Texas 249 Collision with dump truck pickup kills Harris County driver 5 ADVERTISING EXTRAN EOUS Houston inspectors examine site of toddler39s drownin Houston getting rid of law39 that made criminals of most kids topics Pets Moms Belief Gardening Texans chat today Talkto McClain at 11315 iii How team got 3 wins boil Canthey beatVikes your pro le forums taq Latest reader photos V i REDUNDANT INFORMATION DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN LU1 Swap Indicated in State Buyc Leads in City MFUEHL39M 7L1mt1a RECORD CITY mum 6n MEIth 39 39r pm Hp mm mm 11131371 quotHi SEEN IN quot am In M Gfiguynn UH Hum m1 HOUSE vuth 5 u m 7 ml a w you may have heard about this 2006 ballot in Sarasota County Florida FL CD 13 massive underwote in the congressional race massive 391 f votes 15 typical is 1 4 margin of victory 369 after certified recount possible causes banner blindness touchscreen calibration issues other undiscovered software problem an official explanation voters skipped the race intentionally because of its negative tone Vern Buchanan the winner technical failures faulty hardware amp software Ly 6 j 5 quotix7 quotii y x V x 72 V W m E51 1 W 2 y 7 Cl f 1 quot E u incqinpetence malice malice no evidence as of yet incompetence evidence abounds Diebold AccuVote TSx the moststudied voting machine until 2007 s source code audits 39lTBR CA EVEREST OH thanks to source code leaked on the internet findings by Kohno et al 2004 poor software engineering incorrect cryptography amp crypto protocols possible for voters to cast multiple votes vulnerable to malicious software upgrades now Premier Election Systems eg encryption define DESKEY deskeyquotF2654hD4quot one key for every voting machine everywhere originally discovered by Doug Jones 1997 defense but the bad guys don t know what it is analogy anyone else own a Scion still the case as of 2007 although cipher is AES and key may be changed by officials Source CA 39ITBR httpwwwsoscagovelectionsvotingsystemsttbrdieboldsourcepublicjul29pdf eg voter smartcards protocol I am an authentic voting machine and my password is 8b tes y AccuVote Terminal Okay card Are ou valid y gt Yu J P Cancel yourself please Oka y it gets worse Feldman et al 2006 citpprincetoneduvoting before the TFBR so they had to reverse engineer much of the then current AccuVote TS findings malicious evil software could stealalter votes without detection we have no way of knowing physical access eg a voting session is all that is needed to install malicious software the software can be designed to 1 spread to other voting machines 2 alter the tally 3 remove all traces on the topic of viruses 2007 DieboldPremier machines used in OH found to have problems thanks to e voting researchers EVEREST study httpwwwnytimescom20071215us15ohiohtm httpsiiscsepsuedueveresthtm hundreds of votes found to have been lost in 2004 Diebold s original explanation McAfee antivirus software installed on the tabulation machines they are after all everyday Windows PCs think about this for a second how ridioulous is that PREMIER ELECTION SOLUTIONS FORMERLY DaEBow HAS BLAME OHIO VOTING MACHINE WSON mm mm ms MACHINES39 HCAFEE ANTIVIRUS SOFTNARE VAIT WHY SECURITY trIAGINE YW39RE AT A PARENT AH smcmr 5PEAKING 1 us 5000 RIGHT TEACHER mszsmg MD THE 11 s BETTER THAN QNTIVIRUS WARE TEACHER REASSURES YOU THAT THE Ammvs N VOTING HINES g OF COURSE HE ALWAYS WERRS A CONDon YET SOMEONE W96 WM VVW W at WHILE TEACHING 5 CLEARLY 39 Dowemm J39OB W M httpwwwxkcdcom463 can t we do thlS ij homny right J l 39 quotKM1 ACCURATE A CENTER FOR CORRECT USABLE RELIABLE AUDITABLE AND TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS accuratevoti ng org NSF funded multi institution research center Dan S Wallach Rice University associate director goals technology research policy research education explicit nongoal build a voting machine and yet MTG BOX CI Tamper evident verifiable voTing sysTem DANIEL R SANDLER KYLE DERR DAN S WALLACH RICE UNIVERSITY EXCERPTED FROM SLIDES DELIVERED AT USENIX SECURITY 08 AUGUST II 2008 why oTsof reseqrch on indIVIdual pgeces of The e vohng problem VOTE Box LIV infegrdres These Techniques In 0 Single system trustwprthy relgable tampereygdent verifiable goals minimed software stack less code to audit gt more practical so ware audits resistance to failure 8 tampering prevent or minimize data loss tamperevidence if resistance is futile verifiability castasintended countedascast techniques used in VoteBox 1 PRUI prerendered user interfaces DRE user experience minimized software stack 2 AUDITORIUM network layer resistance to failure tamperevidence 3 immediate ballot challenge veri ability I R U I prerendered user interfaces very restricted graphics API b1itbitmap x y nextevent keyboard or x y input what s not here windowing system widgets fonts amp text rendering inspiration onte pioneering work on PRUI in evoting Yes EVT 06 amp 07 Hummu President and Vice President Of the United States Race 1 on7 To make vow chotce ctth on the canotoate uame or on the box next to hisher name A greeu checkmark Wm appear next to vow choice ifyou Want to Chang vow choice1ust cth on a ottterent canotoate or box President and Vice President of the United States You may vare for one E Gordon Bearce REP Nathan Maclean DVernon Stanley Albury DEM Richard Rigby M Janette Froman LIB Chris Aponte Cthtu go back to mstmcttoms CHcKto g0 faward to next race LABEL DL51 r LABEL DL52 LABELDLID w L n 1 L H L LABEL DL13 39 BUTTON DB39IOD LABEL DLI4 LABEL 39D39 LABEL IDL1002 LABEL 39D39 3 EQEE DRglIJND r PREV PG DLIDOD quot3me NEXT PG where The pre rendering happens 6 O 0 VoteBox Preparation Tool File Edit President of the United States United States Senator Pms den al Race Proposition A 0 0 0 Languages Title President of the United States First Position President Select Languages Second Position Vice President Candidates English Spanish E L I French 2 German H I I Italian Candidate39s Name Running Mate39s Name Kyle Derr Ted Torous Suntory Corey Shaw Technocrat quot PreView H l Russuan H I Chinese 0 Japanese 9 Korean Arabic El Kyle Derr Ted Torous El Corev Shaw nglishl Mlssmg translation information AUDITORIUM even honest voting machines tail we can t trust voting machines with critical election data at least not without redundancy 9me 6 08 E 00023000 c0000 2080 02900800 000m r E 2550 new quotcoon h 05 v ag uErr example event log Votronic PEB Type I5140052161061 SUPI 160999 SUP 160980 SUP Date 03072006 0 o 905 03072006 03072006 03072006 03072006 03072006 03072006 03072006 03072006 03072006 03072006 Time Event Terminal clear and test I Terminal open Print zero tape Print zero tape Normal ballot cast Normal ballot cast Normal ballot cast Normal ballot cast Super ballot cancel Normal ballot cast Normal ballot cast Terminal close PKDUGW 1 ogs starting mIdday 39 g 1529 3 Terminal clear and test quot 1531 Terminal open Polls opened around 7 AM across Webb Co What happened to this machine beiween 7 and 330 Were votes cast and then lost 10 total machines probem 2 election events on wrong doy Votronic PEB Type Date Time Event 5142523 161061 SUP 02262006 190705 01 Terminal clear and test 161115 SUP 03062006 065723 09 Terminal open 03062006 070147 13 Print zero tape 03062006 070341 13 Print zero tape 161109 SUP 03062006 100826 20 Normal ballot cast 9 more ballots cast 161115 SUP 03062006 192900 27 Override 03062006 192900 10 Terminal close The election was held on 0307 olhenNise a preliy normal voting poilern 4 machines 4i voles l03 F IMPOUNDED MACHINES E H F O F L A H U 0 B A I it 1 II 7 frquot AUDITORIUM mucus and mu coding W In momnwlum M07 vvi the AUDII ORIUM polling place neiwerk Joins all vo ng machines Together call elec on wants are signed and broadcast each broadcast ls logged by even machine hash chains key ingredient in AUDITORIUM every signed broodcost includes SHAedrlier events events entdngled between mdcnines we can now reason about our audit logs provoble ordering amp completeness of the record crucid in the voting con text query the log at runtime or offline Sondler et Cil Finding the evidence in tamperevident logs SADFE 08 cast as intended The biggest challenge for DREs how can The voTer be sure The crompuTer capTLred The voTer s choices foiThfuIy enCIypTed The baIOT correcTy and broadcasf if in The AudiTorum unlike counTed C18 COST ho omOUhT of procedure or posT facTo oudiTihg con correCT This ballot challenge N voter makes selections i V r quot voter s chouce big finish WIII next weeks election Q9 hacked WIII next week s election results be trustworthy er E MT HALEMEN 39 CD STUNE SCREEN EL EET EEIHl V011 HE HarpMt I M AWEJEW df39h39gFIITER ElF39EET39E HAWE EE EH WAEHIHE FaE TEASE THiLT TH39E39iE THREE AH E39E EA39E IL II39 HAEKE D M WITFHLIT A 39PM EF TEle THESE 39339 Wh l TD SELF EHE E STE QDL39HT39J WEREN T Tm nm wmL 39 1 WW HERE WE ARE NINE 139ng BERFE Hirammas Amu i39EPaETEDL r warnI39m IF ALL um39 wfl m W39aLL USE W51 u m tm D Sawinu ur 42m TE U THINK quot MWTHIHIT EEA39E39IER 7 3mm was FEGHE D H39T MET AWUT Tm STUFF HMF I THAT WAS A FEET Emil mama FoxTrot Octo ber 29 2006 39L39LLL LLLLLL LLLL by TOM TOMORROW wow Do fou LIKE MY HALLO WEEN COSTUME I39M A TOUCH SCREEN VOTING MACHINE sum HA HA HA HA BIROOLD um me commas rm mute me me owueo mo OPERATED av INTENSELY PARTISAN RE PUBLICANS I39M PHONE to mum GLITCNE x um woe SECURITY PLAN AND 1 LEAVE Assownau no PAPER TRM c i T v quot V I C see ma Palm I5 mus IS A g REALLY SCARY man To ocmo q 1 CRACYu 33 j TEML YEAH 1M GOING E 1 60139 mm 10 BE A PART 63091quot m 39 E A v 1 a I T r L g 5 V 9 o o g E This Modern World October 28 2003
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