SPEC TOPS IN IRTHEORY & PRACTICE INTR
SPEC TOPS IN IRTHEORY & PRACTICE INTR PS 439G
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Candice Schumm IV
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This 22 page Class Notes was uploaded by Candice Schumm IV on Friday October 23, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PS 439G at University of Kentucky taught by Geoffrey Wallace in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 13 views. For similar materials see /class/228188/ps-439g-university-of-kentucky in Political Science at University of Kentucky.
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Date Created: 10/23/15
PS 438 Readings Main Ideas Week 7 Plotz David 2000 quotGreens Peace A Controversial New Theory about the True Causes of War and Peace 7 In 18 Holes or Lessquot 0 Links countries who play golf do not ght one another 0 Only exceptions are UK and Ar gmtina in Falklands war UK and North Ireland 0 South Korea in an effort to pacify North Korea through building gdf courses Doyle Michael W 1983 quotKant Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs Part 2quot Philosophy and Puhliil im 12 43237353 0 This article highlights the di 39erences between liberal practice toward other liberal societies and liberal practice toward nonliberal societies It argues that liberalism has achieved extra ordinary success in the rst and has contributed to exceptional confusion in the second 0 Foreign Policy Evm though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another 0 Military and economic aspects threaten the US s hedgemonic status which poses dangas to the liberal world Other liberal states will not be able to provide mutual assistance Peaceful transition likely in order to preserve economic status Liberal states have a very different relationship with nonliberal states Week 8 October 12 and 14 The Democratic Peace Continued Economic Interdependence Russett Bruce 1993 Grasping the Demomztii Petite Princeton NJ Princeton University Press Chapter 1 The Fact of Democratic Peace 3723 and Chapter 2 Why Democratic Peace 2442 o Democracies do not ght one another They have other means of resolving con ict More democracies in the world the more peaceful the theoretic system 0 Only exceptions are shakey one side is not very democratic Does not apply very well to intrastate wars like the Civil War 0 Kant s concept of perpetual peace through cosmopolitian law 0 Antithesis Tr ansnational International institutions create peace Distance pr events war Alliances make peace Wealth makes peace Political stability makes peace 0 Many constraints on Democracies prevent war Only go to war with certain result Mans eld Edward D et al and Jack Snyder 2005 Eleiting to Fight Why Emeiging Dememziiex Go To War Cambridge MA Cambridge University Press Chapter 1 The Perilous Path to the Democratic Peace 1719 and Chapter 2 Reconciling the Democratic Peace with Accounts of Democratization and War 2173 7 o Woodrow Wilson s idealistic view of the proliferation of danocracies leading to peace 0 Transition to Demoaacy can be dangerous must be a mature enough system to pr event rogue politicians 39om seizing power Must have institutions of public accountability The political system must be ready for transition of you risk going into unnecessary war Pakistan Rwanda that puts you a step back 0 Democracy requires certain pre reqs such as wealth literacy large middle class Transitions are becoming more dif cult 0 Emerging democracies are more warlike due to lacking the domestic political institutions ensuring democratic accountability to a costconscious public Due to immaturity they tend to pick costly and lengthy wars to ght Rosecrance Richard 1986 The Rise ofthe Trading Xtate Cainineree and Conquest in the Modern World New York Basic Books Chapter 2 The Worlds ofInternational Relations The MilimryiPolitical World the Trading World 2243 0 States must chose between military and territorial gains or economic acquisitions If war is easy to win and assimilation of territory is simple states will be inclined to ght If trading proves to be more productive and war looks gloom trading is the best choice Whichever route is easier to improving their world position is the most likely choice Blainey Geoffrey 1988 The Camer War New York NY Free Press Chapter 2 Paradise is a Bazaar 18732 Week 9 October 19 and 21 E 39 1 I Organizations Copeland Dale C 1996 quotEconomic Interdependence and War A Theory ofTrade Expectationsquot International Xemrz39g 19 55741 o Realists stress such factors as relative power while liberals focus on the absence or presence of collective security regimes and the pervasiveness of democratic communities Economic interdependence is the only factor that plays an important causal role in the thinking of both camps and their perspectives are diametrically opposed 0 Liberals would rather trade than invade o Realists argue interdependence increases war 0 Trade Expectations hing on expectations of trade Ifoptimistic about trade future no war If pessimistic about future trade anyways war Kirshner Jonathan 2006 quotGlobalization and National Securityquot In Glaaalz39zatz39an and National fanny ed Kirshner New York NY Routledge 1733 0 Confused Boehmer Charles Erik Gartzke and Timothy Nordsrtrom 2004 quotDo Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peacequot WorldPalz39tz39m 57 11738 Focus on theory and substantive results don t get bogged down in the smtistics o IGO CAN promote peace or they can be a nonfactor depending on the structure of the IGO Cautious optimism as to their e ects Depends heavily on manber s cohesiveness Must look at goals of the IGO o IGOs can incite con ict when they add to international uncertainty PART III SYSTEMLEVEL EXPLANATION S Week 10 October 26 and 28 The Security Dilemma and Its Consequences Arms Races OffenseDefense Balance and Deterrence Jervis Robert 1978 quotCooperation Under the Security Dilemmaquot World Politim 30 21677 214 0 Although actors may know they are after the same goal they may not be able to reach it Rousseau s Stag Hunt Lack of international enforcement permits anarchy in the system 0 An increase in one state s security means to decrease another 5 o In order to control territory sometimes states must expand their territory further 0 Geography a border which is easy to strike over are typically unstable 0 No way to determine which offense or defense is dominate in warfare 0 Nuclear warfare no such thing as defense only deterrence 0 Weapons that threaten civilians are offensive Both sides possessing weapons and second strike capabilities becomes defensive Weapons that depend on surprise are always o 39ensive o Defensive weapons must be immobile forts moving weapons can become offensive AA covering tanks as they can advance into enemy territory 0 Many military of cials place the warfare s center of gravity on destroying the enemy s economy Sagan Scott D 1989 quotOrigins of the Paci c Warquot In The Origin and Prevention ofMajor WW5 ed R l 0 An irrational adversary will throw deterrence out of the picture Japanese in WWII 0 Paci c Theater a deterrence failure 0 Deterence requires both CREDIBILITY and CAPABILITY o Underdog bad to ght when the opportunity best presented itselfrather than try for a diplomatic Victory 0 Rosevelt s inability to control the government lead to an embargo on Japan sowing the seeds of dissension leading to a pessimistic strike by Japan 0 If both sides believe they can escalate nuclear con ict and the other will back down can lead to a situation where they force themselves into conflict Countries CAN and DO launch themselves into war out of desperation Could be coerced in to nuclear war Rotberg and T K Rabb New York NY Cambridge University Press 3237352 Week 11 November 2 and 4 Distribution of Power and Polarity Waltz Kenneth N 1964 quotThe Smbility ofa Bipolar Worldquot Daedalm 93 38817909 Deutsch Karl and David Singer 1964 quotMultipolar Power Systems and International Stabilityquot 0 Alliance requires one member to be superior in order to operate 0 World many powers is easier to remain stable 0 Smbility within a Bipolar system entails No peripheries Range and intensity of competition OOO Constant presence ofpressure recurrence of crises O Preponderant ofpower keeps smtes from all our war 0 Defend so that one loss may not lead to another 0 Fear drives a lot of choices 7 fear of the enemy s intentions capabilities 0 Smbility is not everyone s highest value 0 United Europe ofThe Seven could add to our hegemony status by allowing them to help us in times of economic need 0 No other countries come close to the clout of the US and Russia 0 Characteristics ofa bipolar system should push US and Russian leaders to act in appropriate manners 0 It is easier for two smtes to get along than 3 World P012222 16 33907406 Blainey Geoffrey 1988 The Camex War New York NY Free Press Chapter 8 The Abacus of Power 1087124 and Chapter 12 Vendetta of the Black Sea 1777185 0 Multi7polar system diminishes likelihood ofwarl 0 Machiavelli Zero7Sum Peace can come through cycling out the most powerful state creating long term peace No balance ofpower system has lasted longer than a few centuries Instability ofbipolar systems are greater than those ofmultipolar If the spread of nuclear weapons were slowed we could transition to multipolar Wohlforth William C 1999 quotThe Stability ofa Unipolar Worldquot International Jean2y 241 5741 0 US Backed away from creating unipolar system due to criticism 7 inherently dangerous 0 For neorealists 7 the concentration ofpower is incredibly dangerous 0 Argument 7 US is the unipolar state unipolar is prone to peace the peace is durable 0 Chief threat 7 US becoming complacentl 0 The current unipolar system is embedded in material conditions ofworld politics 0 Given current balance ofpower 7 the US has a right to be interventionist 0 Power must be clear to all challengers 7 discourages arms races and crisis because they don t stand a chance waste ofmoney 0 Biggest threat to US pole is weak and near sided domestic structure Week 12 November 9 and 11 Power Transition Theory Revisionist States Gilpin Robert 1981 War and Change in World Politics Cambridge Cambridge University Press Excerpts of Chapter 1 The Nature of International Political Change 918 and all of Chapter 4 Equilibrium and Decline 156185 and Chapter 5 Hegemonic War and International Change 186210 0 Actors who bene t most from changes in the system will push the hardest for changes 0 Political change is driven by states self interest and the composition of the system will re ect the underlying changes 0 Key Assumptions 0 International system remains stable as long as all states believe it is not pro table to attempt change 0 If there is expected gain in the system states will try to change it States will try to expand territorial political and economic until marginal costs outweigh gains 0 Systems strive for equilibrium distribution of power will re ect new equilibrium 0 One hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth expansion and eventual decline The law of uneven growth continues to redistriubute power thus undermining any type of equilibrium in the system Even if equilibrium is established it is only temporary O Schweller Randall L 1994 quotBandwagoning for Pro t Bringing the Revisionist State Back Inquot International Jenn2y 19 1 Excerpt 857107 0 Only in smtes satis ed with their current position is the rst goal of the state security 0 Revisisionist states seek constant growth ofpower must have relative growth 0 Most important determinant of alignment is compatibility ofpolitical goals not imbalances ofpower or threat Satis ed states will join the statusiquo oriented side while dissatis ed power motivated by pro t more than security will join the bandwagon side 0 Bottom Line 7 bandwagon effects are feared by those who are content with the smtus quo since it threatens it and is welcomed by those who are not satis ed with the status quo Some states will bandwagon at the end ofa war in order to achieve peaceful settlements Arab states with Israel Johnston Alastair Iain 2003 quotIs China a Status Quo Powerquot Internationald emn39y 27 45756 0 Engagers argue that China is becoming socialized though mainly in the sphere of economic norms eg free trade and domestic marketization Skeptics either conclude that this is not the case due to the nature of the regime for some China is still Red China for more sophisticated skeptics China is irting with fascism or that it could not possibly happen because China as a rising power by deanition is dissatis ed with the U Sdominated global order a powertransition realpolitik argument 0 Unable to classify China as Status Quo nor Revisionist 0 China does not yet wholly endorse global norms of conduct Moreover a rising dissatisaed China presents a lndamental challenge to the international order established and preferred by the United States 0 Severe domestic turmoil can push a state towards revisionism 0 Security dilemma can cause states to become wearier of one another must be careful in either side viewing and taking action against the other s military moves Induces uncertaintystress into the system PART IV SPECIAL TOPICS ON THE CAUSES OF WAR Week 13 November 16 and 18 Nuclear Weapons Sagan Scott D and Kenneth N Waltz 2003 The spread oaneleW Weaponxl Denate Renewed New York NY WW Norton Chapters 173 37124 Week 14 November 23 The Environment Demographics and International Security I IomeriDixon Thomas E 1994 quotEnvironmental Scarcities and Violent Con ict Evidence from Cases quot Internationald einrig 19 15740 Salehyan Idean 2008 quotFrom Climate Change to Conflict No Consensus Yetquot fonrnalof Peaee Rexeareb 45 33157326 Krebs Ronald R and Jack S Levy 2001 quotDemographic Change and the Sources of International Conflictquot In Demography anal National Xeinriy ed M Weiner and S S Russell New York NY Berghahn Books 627105 Week 15 November 30 and December 2 Environment and Demographics continued Preventing Wars from Recurring Can Peace Treaties and Peacekeeping Keep the Peace Haas Mark L 20022003 quotA Geriatric Peace The Future of US Power in a World of Aging Populationsquot International Seinrig 32 11127147 Fortna Virginia Page 2003 quotScraps of Paper Agreements and the Durability of Peacequot International Organization 57 2337r3 72 Fortna Virginia Page 2004 quotDoes Peacekeeping Keep Peace International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil Warquot International tholiernarter 48 22697292 For both Fortna pieces focus on theory and substantive results don t get bogged down in the statistics According to Blainey how does economic interdependence affect the likelihood of war How does the successfailure of economic sanctions inform the merits of commercial liberalism Direct vs Extended Deterrence Machiavelli Zero Sum What are the ways in which democracy affects the quotprincipleagent problem PS 439 12102010 22400 AM Democratic Peace a The pacific 39 p wan public What the required for Dovles Liberal Peace 0 Four institution described as essential market and private property economies polities that are externally sovereign citizens who possess juridical rights and republicans What are the ways in which A affects the principleagent problem Veto Players m player is a political actor who has the ability to decline a choice being made Speci cally in Tsembelis analysis a veto player is one who can stop a change from the status quo This is analogous to players in a bargaining game where all players must reach agreement A key feature of veto players is that they have preferences over public policy outcomes and these are continuous across the continuous policy choices the veto player faces SpanishAmerican War 0 Was a con ict in 1898 between Sm and the United States6 Revolts against Spanish rule had been endemic for decades in Cuba and were closely watched by Americans there had been war scares before The Selection Effect which there is an error in choosing the individuals or groups to take part in a scientific studyl It is sometimes referred to as the selection effect The term quotselection biasquot most often refers to the distortion of a statistical analysis resulting from the method of collecting samples If the selection bias is not taken into account then any conclusions drawn may be wrong In what ways might regime type affect battlefield performance he best available study on the subject maintains that regime type is largely irrelevant Politically capable governments can mobilize vast resources from the society un der stress of war but totalitarian democratic and authoritarian regimes do not determine the level of performance 62 In short democracies are no better than nondemocracies at transforming economic might into military power Acc rdin to Russett how do structural political norms account for the J peace In the modern international system democracies are less likely to use lethal violence toward other democracies than towards autocratically governed states or than autocratically governed are toward each other Wealth makes peace distance prevents wars alliances make peace political stability makes peace According to Mans eld and Snyder how con ictprone are democratizing states relative to other regime types and why 0 According to Mans eld and Snyder what types of regime transitions are most con ict prone and why 0 Democratization transition is con ict prone because the government is not yet complete making them susceptible to attacks They now have larger targets on their backs ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE According to Copeland how does economic interdependence affect the likelihood of war 0 But my argument also rejects the stark view of realists who automatically equate continued high interdependence with con ict if leaders can sustain positive expectations for the future then trading will indeed seem more rational than invading The Manchester School 0 Manchester was at the time the hub of the world s textile manufacturing industry and had a high population of factory workers who were disadvantaged by the Corn Laws the protectionist policy that imposed tariffs on imported wheat and increased the price of food According to Commercial liberals how does economic interdependence affect the likelihood of war 0 Trade provides valuable benefits or quotgains from tradequot to any particular state A dependent state should therefore seek to avoid war since peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war The European Steel and Coal Community 0 A precursor to the EU Norman Angell s Great Illusion o 1933 edition argued that the debacle simply con rmed the unprofitability of modern wars He thus upheld the common liberal view that wars especially major wars result from the misperceptions of leaders caught up in the outmoded belief that war still pays According to Rosecrance what factors in uence whether states will lean toward the military world or the trading world 0 Minimizing dependence on the entire world 0 Want to rely on economic interdependence o Mutually bene cial connections According to Blainey how does economic interdependence affect the likelihood of war 0 How does the successfailure of economic sanctions inform the merits of commercial liberalism Security DilemmaI Arms RacesI Deterrence 0 When Defensive weapons differ from offensive ones it is possible for a state to make itself more secure without making others less secure And when the defense has the advantage over the offense a large increase in one state s security only slightly decreases the security of the others and statusquo powers can all enjoy a high level of security and largely escape from the state of nature Suggests that while arms races don t necessarily lead to wars directly they may play an important intervening role in the escalation of disputes to war Arms races do not directly initiate con agrations According to the indirect effects relationship for arms races why are some arms races so much more dangerous than others General v Immediate Deterrence General Deterrence 7 a sentencing objective which aims to discourage persons other than the offender from committing a similar offense Immediate Deterrence Does a strong general deterrence make an 39 J39 deterrence success more likelv Whv or why not 0 Willingness and Ability o Commitments should be c2d2 o If you don t communicate then it doesn t show the importance 0 Convince the other side that this is very important to you 0 You commitment has to be defensible o What is the commitment that you want to defend the more speci c the better 0 Big Problem talk is cheap 0 Make a costly signal that its not just talk our public is going to demand a response Direct vs Extended Deterrence w 0 Clear communication and credible commitment o Defensible commitment De ned in your own terms of what it is How do you determine when the spiral or deterrence model is more appropriate 0 Spiral or Deterrence Which is Right 0 They present opposite predictions 0 Only way to get opponent to back down is to make rm and credible threats The US oil embargo against Japan Polaritl Power Transitions What are the main sources of change leading to power cvcles The power transition zone Whv did the 30 Years War break out when it did 0 Initially the war was fought largely as a religious con ict between Protestants and Catholics in the Holy Roman Empire although disputes over the internal politics and balance of power within the Empire played a significant part Gradually the war developed into a more general con ict involving most of the European powers Should WWI count as a power transition war Whv or Whv not 0 The Leaders Dilemma How can a hegemon trv to reduce the appeal of the emer ence of a counter 39 39 39 coalition against it 0 Hub and Spoke System 0 It is extensively used in commercial aviation for both passengers and freight and the model has also been adopted in the technology sector as well Delta Airlines pioneered the method in 1955 but it wasn39t until the 1970s when the FedEx company took advantage of the concept that the method really took hold revolutionizing the way airlines were run The Double Blind o is a dilemma in communication in which an individual or group receives two or more con icting messages with one message negating the other The Trilemma of decline 0 Increase resources for security 0 Reduce Commitments o A three triangle approach 0 Top Protection 0 Left Consumption 0 Right Investment Whv is it particulaer difficult to f quot v identifv revi inni 1 states 0 N If you identify a revisionist state then you should notice that soon and then try to neutralize it N Indicators of commitment to SQ N Preference for major redistribution N Clear performance for recasting shared standards Big Dif culty Adherence to norms is instrumental If you re really strategic then you want to lay low until you have the power to have a good shot of changing the system then you ll have the shot to show your true colors The cone of con ict What factors make regional power 39 39 39 39 relativelv more A Peace Treaties and Peacekeeping Demilitarized Zones 0 is an area usually the frontier or boundary between two or more military powers or alliances where military activity is not permitted usually by peace treaty armistice or other bilateral or multilateral agreement Scraps of paper 0 According to Fortna what are two ways peace treaties can improve the prospects for peace 0 states can act to improve the chances for peace Ihave focused on measures that alter incentives by raising the cost of an attack either physically or politically reduce uncertainty by specifying compliance regulating activities that are likely to cause tension providing credible signals of intention or help prevent or manage accidents from spiraling back to war How does Ethiopia s e nerience with wars support imnu u Fortna s ar uments on 39 39 peai 0 These commissions worked well in their early years to settle disputes over land use and fishing and farming rights as well as to handle small incidents between soldiers Conversely the breakdown of these regimes both signaled and contributed to increasing hostility on both sides Putting it all together The funnel of causality o is a model used by theorists in many disciplines chie y political science to explain decision making among large groups of people When drawn out for visual learners a funnel of causality looks like this Acc rdin to lecture what were the permissi 39 quot imate causes of the Falklands Con ict Leopold Galtieri 0 was an Argentine general and President of Argentina from December 22 1981 to June 18 1982 during the last military dictatorship known officially as the National Reorganization Process The death squad Intelligence Battalion 601 directly reported to him He was removed from power soon after the Britishretook the Falklands Islands whose invasion he had ordered 12102010 22400 AM 12102010 22400 AM 12102010 60200 PM The League of Nations and the invasion of Abyssinia Mussolini got ready to invade Abyssinia Ethiopia He wanted war and glory Abyssinia asked the League to help The League talked to Mussolini but he used the time to send an army to Africa The League suggested a plan to give part of Abyssinia to Italy Mussolini ignored the League and invaded Abyssinia The League banned weapons sales and put sanctions on rubber and metal The Abyssinian Emperor Haile Selassie went to the League to appeal for help but it did nothing else in fact Britain and France secretly agreed to give Abyssinia to Italy the HoareLaval Pact Italy conquered Abyssinia The League had failed Direct vs Extended Deterrence Clear Communication credible commitment defensible commitment defined in your own terms of what it is The US oil embarqo aqainst Japan The American oil embargo caused a crisis in Japan Reliant on the US for 80 of its oil the Japanese were forced to decide between withdrawaling from China negotiating an end to the conflict or going to war to obtain the needed resources elsewhere In an attempt to resolve the situation Konoe asked US President Franklin Roosevelt for a summit meeting to discuss the issues Roosevelt replied that Japan needed to leave China before such a meeting could be held While Konoe was seeking a diplomatic solution the military was looking south to the Netherlands East Indies and their rich sources of oil and rubber Believing that an attack in this region would cause the US to declare war they began planning for such an eventuality Power transitions Why did the 30 Years War break out when it did o The war began with the resistance and eventual revolt of Protestant nobles in Bohemia which was under Hapsburg domination against the Catholic king Ferdinand later Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II The revolt began in Prague where two royal officers were hurled from a window by Protestant members of the Bohemian diet the socalled Defenestration of Prague May 1618 Ferdinand was declared deposed and the Bohemian throne was offered to Frederick V o A double bind is a dilemma in communication in which an individual or group receives two or more conflicting messages with one message negating the other This creates a situation in which a successful response to one message results in a failed response to the other so that the person will be automatically wrong regardless of response JackalWolfLionLamb one of Schweller s animal kinqdom Just as the lion attractsjackals a powerful revisionist state or coalition attracts opportunistic revisionist powers The goal of quotjackal bandwagoningquot is profit Specifically revisionist states bandwagon to share in the spoils ofvictoryBecause unlimitedaims revisionist powers cannot bandwagon they are the bandwagon offensive bandwagoning is done exclusively by lesser aggressors which Icall limitedaims revisionist states Aside from the desire to acquire additional territory the motivation forjackal bandwagoning may also be security from the lion itself As Roy Douglas remarks quotStalin merits Churchill39s famous epithet 39Hitler39s jackal39 as richly as does Mussolini to whom it was applied Pickings from the lion39s kill were succulent and satisfying for lesser beasts but they also afforded these creatures strength to resist the greater predator should he later turn his attentions to themquot Countervalue is the targeting of an opponent39s cities and civilian populations In contrast counterforce refers to the targeting of an opponent39s military personnel forces and facilities The stabilityinstability Qaradox is an international relations theory regarding the effect of nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases This occurs because rational actors want to avoid nuclear wars and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts For instance during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged each other in warfare but fought proxy wars in Korea Vietnam and Afghanistan and spent substantial amounts of money and manpower on gaining relative influence over the third world The Kargil conflict The Kargil War was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control LOC The conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay Victory in Hindi which was the name of the Indian operation to clear the Kargil sector The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC12 which serves as the de facto border between the two states During the initial stages of the war Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan39s Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces led by General Rashid The Indian Army later on supported by the Indian Air Force recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LOC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops and militants With international diplomatic opposition the Pakistani forces withdrew from the remaining Indian positions along the LOC The NPT s all but the bomb problem Toothless tiger if violator wants to get put forward in a short amount of time it actually gets decided in a very long time Weak Inspection Regime Based on self declaration of nuclear sites The All But the Bomb Problem Balance of Terror The phrase quotbalance of terrorquot is usually used in reference to the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during War It describes the tenuous peace that existed between the two countries as a result of both governments being terrified at the prospect of a worlddestroying nuclear war The term is usually used for rhetorical purposes and was probably coined by Lester Pearson in June 1955 at the 10th anniversary of the signing of the UN Charter quotthe balance of terror has replaced the balance of powerquot Able Archer Able Archer 83 was a tenday NATO command post exercise starting on November 2 1983 that spanned Western Europe centred on SHAPE39s Headquarters situated at Casteau north of the Belgian city of Mons Able Archer exercises simulated a period of conflict escalation culminating in a coordinated nuclear release The 1983 exercise incorporated a new unique format of coded communication radio silences participation by heads of state and a simulated DEFCON 1 nuclear alert The realistic nature of the 1983 exercise coupled with deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the anticipated arrival of Pershing II nuclear missiles in Europe led some members of the Soviet Politburo to believe that Able Archer 83 was a ruse of war obscuring preparations for a genuine nuclear first strike1234 In response the Soviets readied their nuclear forces and placed air units in East Germany and Poland on alert This relatively obscure incident is considered by many historians to be the closest the world has come to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 19627 The threat of nuclear war abruptly ended with the conclusion of the Able Archer 83 exercise on November 11 12102010 60200 PM 12102010 60200 PM
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