American State and Local Government
American State and Local Government PSCI 3010
Popular in Course
Popular in Political Science
This 49 page Class Notes was uploaded by Kelly Rodriguez on Sunday October 25, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PSCI 3010 at University of North Texas taught by Staff in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 12 views. For similar materials see /class/229179/psci-3010-university-of-north-texas in Political Science at University of North Texas.
Reviews for American State and Local Government
Report this Material
What is Karma?
Karma is the currency of StudySoup.
You can buy or earn more Karma at anytime and redeem it for class notes, study guides, flashcards, and more!
Date Created: 10/25/15
Political Science 4821 International Con ict Professor Dr Michael Greig 9405654996 Office hours Tuesdays amp Thursdays 2pm330pm in Wootan 158 email at greiguntedu Class webpage is ecampusuntedu TuesdayJ Janua 19a 2010 War in the International system V V V V V V V Changes in Con ict o Diminution of major power con ict I Most con ict ends on European landmass 0 Cold War had many proxy wars 0 Post Cold War I Civil wars I Asymmetric warfare I Africa Our focus 0 Why does war occur 0 What conditions encourage 0 What conditions prevent it o What conditions limit it Initiation of War 0 Eritrea sends a group of soldiers into disputed territory for talks 0 Local Ethiopian militia fire on soldiers o Eritrea sends more forces 0 Ethiopia responds Costs of War 0 Two bald men fighting over a comb 0 Military casualties 50000 0 Displaced citizens 700000 0 Economic turmoil Outcome of Con ict 0 Ethiopia retakes its territory occupies some Eritrean territory 0 Border tensions continue today Why Con ict 0 Why do states fight in the international system The Iran Nuclear Issue 0 Obama You cannot have nuclear weapons 0 Ahmadinejad Nuclear power is our sovereign right How can we settle this issue 0 Obama I demand we settle out dispute with a DanceDance Revolution danceoff o Ahmadinejad Bring it 0 Result Winner gets to pick revolution Other settlement approaches 0 Coin ip o Duel among leaders V V V V V V o Hungry Hungry Hippos o Negotiation o Mediation Military solutions 0 Us uses its military force to destroy Iranian nuclear program 0 Iran uses military force in opposition to American action in the Middle Eastern region 0 Result Winner imposes its terms Why con ict 0 Con ict serves as a dispute resolution mechanism Theory building 0 What is atheory o A gt B I A set 0 propositions specifying relations between observable relations I A story What do we want to do with theory 0 Prediction 0 Description of phenomenon o Explanation How do we evaluate theories 0 Test main propositions against reality 0 Logical consistency o Paradigm 7 overarching assumptions about the world Tautology 0 She is a witch 0 Why is she a witch 7 because she is dressed like one 0 Why did you dress her like a witch 7 because she is a witch The logic I 0 Witches burn 7 p gt q 0 Wood burns 7r gt q 0 Therefore Witches are made of wood 7 p gt r 0 But lots of things burn that are not made of wood The logic 11 Wood oats 7p gt q Duck oat 7r gt q Therefore if something weighs the same as a duck it is made of wood 7 r gt p Conclusion not supported by premises 0 And therefore a witch P gt w Rethinking the logic 0 All things that oat weigh the same as a duck f gtd 0 Witches oat w gt f 0 Therefore witches weigh the same as a duck w gt d Assumptions 0 Theory Witches burn because they are made out of wood 0 That which burns is made out of wood 0 This assumption is untested OOOO o If not true theory falls apart 0 Because ducks and wood oat they are equivalent Logical consistency 0 Wood oats o Ducks oat 0 Why does weighing the same as a duck mean something is made of wood V gt Poor theory 0 Even if prediction is correct 7 It s a fair cop o Unjusti edunrealistic assumptions 0 Not logically structured gt Poor testing 0 Did she really weigh the same as a duck gt What we want in a theory 0 Parsimony 0 Logical consistency o Explanatory capability 0 Creativity gt Where do we look for answers 0 International relations can be examined at different levels of analysis I Systemic structural I State I Individual 0 Fun with theorizing I Why did the US invade Iraq gt Defining concepts 0 What is power What are its components 0 What is a state 0 What is a war gt What is a War 0 Clausewitz says war is a duel on a grand scale 0 the goal is to place the adversary in a situation which is more oppressive that the sacrifice we demand gt Rationality of War 0 In effect impose costs in order to force acquiescence 0 War is politics by other means 0 Subduing the enemy is a means not an ends gt Resistance of War 0 Capabilities means 0 Will 0 Paradox of unrealized power Tuesdax1 January 26 2010 gt Nature of the International System 0 Key features of the interstate system 0 Anarchic no centralized authority I Distinction between domestic and intemational politics 0 Hobbiesian world survival of the ttest o Is there room for morality gt Why Does War Occur at All 0 Puzzle Wars are costly why do states ght them at all 0 Potential explanations I Peopleleaders often behave irrationally I Who pays for war vs who bene ts from war gt Irrationality as Explanation 0 Problems with irrationality explanation I Does not provide much theoretical leverage I How frequent do leaders behave irrationally I Why aren t crazed leaders replaced gt Leader CostBene t Explanation o Unresolved puzzle Why don t those who pay the costs impost costs upon those who bene t from war 0 Democracies are not any more peaceful than nondemocracies I Athens I United Kingdom I United States gt Rationalist Explanations o Rationalist assumes actors weigh choices and choose the best possible given other options 0 Explanations would be I Anarchy I Bene ts gt Costs I Preventive war I Miscalculation where there is a lack of information I Miscalculation where there is a disagreement on power gt Anarchy o No central enforcement to hold states back from engaging in war 0 Hobbesian state of nature 0 Why don t con ict costs compel a peaceful agreement 0 Anarchy is necessary sometimes if not suf cient gt Preventive War 0 State A arms its military 0 State B becomes develops insecurity with by State A arming up security dilemma 0 State B attacks State A to prevent a possible threat 0 Why can t they nd a bargain o Rising and declining powers gt Bargaining in the Face of Con ict o For any potential con ict there are always agreements that leave both parties better off by not ghting than by ghting 0 Example I Divide 100 I Go to war for which costs 20 for which you have a 5050 chance of winning EU Estimated Utility 50 x 100 50 x 0 720 30 The bargaining range is 31696931 gt So why War 0 0 Sounds good but war still occurs War is among rational decision makers arises due to three key problems I Misrepresentation Commitment problems Issue indivisibility The example of dividing 100 gt Misrepresentation O 0 International Relations IR is much like a poker game under anarchy both sides have incentives to misrepresent I Capabilities Is your military strength Resolve Will to ght moral Key to preventing war is signaling I You can use bluffmg your strength when it may not be strong enough PRKROK demilitarized zone This took and still takes place in South Korean South Korean and the US was an form of signaling by have soldiers from both countries along the borders of the demilitarized zone If ghting broke out and US as well as South Korean troops The US will be unwillingly be dragged into con ict because of an outrage by the American people 0 Case in point is that you give a clear signal like presence of troops to help enforce your alliances gt Commitment Problems 0 000 o gt 1939 F o o o 0 Under anarchy even if parties want to agree the lack of enforcement prevents it I Nothing is binding them to an agreement it s more of a shoot them before they shoot you Prisoner s Dilemma Gunslinger in the oldWest 1939 FinlandSoviet Union Winter War I Dr Greig s favorite war and a good one for my paper Commitment problems cause suboptimal outcomes inlandSoviet Winter War 4 Soviet armies 23 divisions vs 160000 Finnish troops Children were sent to Sweden Finland decided to fight because there is no way to foretell if the Soviets will demand more of F inland s territories Finland cedes 10 of its territory Soviet Union Thought it would be a easy f1ght V V V V V V V V I Losses 127000 troops 0 Finland I Losses 23000 troops Issue Indivisibilities 0 Some disputed issues cannot be divided and bargained away I Jerusalem 0 Israel vs Palestine who will not compromise for a part of but want all of it I Generally rare I Possibility of side payments Implications o This argument suggests that the limitation of war is not rooted in retraining or re ning humans natural impulses but in developing mechanisms to ensure compliance transfer of information etc 0 International institutions Brining Human Nature Back In 0 Rationalist explanations may understate the role of human nature 0 Assumes goal of states is the goal being pursued at initiation of con ict 0 This may change as con ict continues 0 Goals morph from achieving objectives to punishment General Evidence of Human Violence 0 Damaged skeletons o Nonhurting weapons 0 Violence amp Art 0 Cannibalism Language Hobbes on Humanity s Predicament o Humans sufficiently equal in mind amp bod o This equality produces equality of hope expectation 0 Each represents a threat to every other in single or in number Hobbes on Humanity s Predicament 0 Causes of human violence I Competition I Diffidence I Glory 0 The outcome is perpetual war 0 In Hobbes s view human violence is a natural reaction to the state of the world Hobbes s Trap 0 In Hobbes s view without commonwealth individuals achieve suboptimal outcomes I No art I No industry I No learning I Only violence and the threat thereof Solving Hobbes s Predicament 0 Each gives over power to the collective group o Imbue this commonwealth with sufficient power to be more powerful than any individual or collection of individuals 0 Implications for international systems 0 Does Hobbes have it right 0 What if violence is learned not strategic gt Is Violence Learned o The argument is that violence is not rooted in human nature pathology learned by individuals 0 Violence in uence by culture gt War as an Invention o Mead argues that war is an invention like cooking marriage and etc 0 Some groups of people have no conception of war 0 War as an invention is selfsustaining gt Ending the Invention of War 0 Keys I Recognition of defects of invention I Replacement o Dueling I She uses this as a replacement for war I In modern times dueling is not very useful because it kills useful people 0 What if violence is innate not learned gt BiologicallyRooted Violence 0 Some evolutionary evidence of an inclinations toward violence I Physical structure of men I Testosterone I Anger I Fight or Flight I Play 0 Anthropologist look at children and how they play gt Freud on Human Violence 0 Violence is hardwired into humans I Used to determine ownership I First basis for rules 0 Two based instincts Love amp Hate 0 Does warfare pave the way for peace Tuesdax1 Februag 02a 2010 Power distribution system structure amp con ict gt Explaining intemational relations Realism 0 Key tenets of realism I International con ict I States 0 They are the only actors I Survival and power 0 Power is the most important I Anarchy and selfhelp gt gt V V V o No one can help you I Use of force I How does change occur Realism 0 International relations is a struggle for power 0 Rooted in the ideas of Hobbes and the writings of Thucydides I This is the first time that a real sort of analysis of a realist dialogue Peloponnesian War 0 431404 BC 0 Athenian league Athens vs Peloponnesian league Sparta The growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon made war inevitable Thucydides The Athenians claim that they had no choice but to take over the Malians land for if they don t the Athenians will come across as weak by other nations in the region I But the Malians want to remain neutral Should the government be able to make decisions of morality without the people s consent In this case realists would not try to use morality just have the most power to protect your lands Realism 0 Seek to explain recurring pattern of con ict 0 Why are nations continuously preparing for actively involved in or recovering from war View of States 0 States are the fundamental actors I Other groups like the MNCs IGOs or NGOs don t matter because they have no power In the case of NATO and the UN they may matter if they are allowed to have a say I Realists are primarily focused on states 0 Behave as if they were unitary rational actors o Calculating costs and bene ts of actions before acting Rational Actor Assumption 0 Realism assumes that states behave as if they were rational actors I They identify and prioritize objectives I Develop policy options I Use resources for implementation I Learn 0 O O 0 Goals 0 National security is viewed as the highest priority of states 0 States are continually seeking to increase power I Focus upon relative power 0 This is measuring how much power you have in comparison to the states around you Why Power 0 Human nature con ict is inherent V V V V V gt gt 0 Power is fungible I Power is easily convertible into other forms 0 EX Military power can lead to pushing around other states 0 Because other states represent threats I Realists believe that power is need for your own defense An untrustworthy bunch o No monopoly on force 0 Anarchy means that each side determines whether or not to use force 0 Capacity not intentions matter Explaining change in the intemational system 0 Strong states make the rules 0 Power resources continually change 0 Wars deplete resources cause changes in the distribution of power Implications of Realism o No cooperation only strategic interaction 0 3 types of interaction I Con ict I Harmony Realism summarized 0 Politics governed by objective laws rooted in human nature 0 Power and interests matter 0 Intentions and desires do not matter 0 Power in the fundamental goals of states Neo Realism 0 Moves away from the assumption of human nature as a causal factor 0 Emphasizes the importance of structure as an in uence upon international relations Key forces upon State behavior 0 Anarchy forces actors to rely on selfhelp 0 Distribution of power among actors I Cooperation among states is very difficult Impact of structure upon cooperation o Anarchy gt selfhelp gt survival concern gt relative gains gt avoid cooperation gt little interdependence 0 States fear exploitation and gaining less than others 0 Outcome from trade I 100 vs 100 o Acceptable because they don t have more than you I 120 vs 130 0 Not acceptable because they have 10 more than you I 0 vs 250 Structural realism amp power 0 Power is viewed as a means not an end 0 Power is sought as a means of guaranteeing security Differences between realism amp structural realism 0 Role of human gt Structure and international relation 0 2 poles o 3 poles o 5 poles Has two major powers Bipolar world 0 Was the cold war 0 Neorealists see this as a relatively peaceful world 0 Both sides knew where threats came from because there were only to major players Has three major power Often referred to as a multipolar world 0 Is considered inherently dangerous because they all have power the need for security 0 Unclear rise in possible con ict 0 Alliances will start to form Was the world before and after WWI Thursdaya F ebruagy 04 2010 gt Power Transition Theory Rejects realism EnVision change as a function of uneven growth rates Key idea Satisfaction O O O O O Creates two type of powers Satisfied states Dominant states 0 These states are usually hegemonic states 0 Great powers 0 Strong states that are weaker than the hegemon 0 Russia Great Britain Dissatisfied states Middle powers 0 Middle powers 0 Canada Australia Small states 0 Costa Rica and others 0 This theory tries to explain why wars happens gt Power transition amp war 0 Why should PT cause war 0 Hegemon wants to keep rules rising power wants change The hegemon is already at the top so it doesn t or rather can t increase its rate of growth ex US The hegemon doesn t want to change the rules or norms that it has set in place A rising power whom has room to grow and rapidly expand will eventually catch up the hegemon This is usually a dissatisfied power who want to see change ex China 0 When will war occur I This is more likely to occur when the rising dissatis ed power comes closer to the level or surpasses the hegemony Where they begin to meet in the middle 0 Who will attack gt Key ideas of power Transition theory 0 Order eXists in the international system 7 furthers interests of dominant power 0 Goals 7 maximize gains 0 Two groups of states satis eddissatis ed gt Role of the Hegemon 0 Crafts rules for intemational system 0 Defensive alliances economic opens gt Challengers o Rising powers 0 May be dissatis ed or satis ed with the status quo gt Testing power transition theory 0 Some BIG wars support this pattern WWI and WWII Germany passes UKamp then states a war but the story is not that clear WWI does not begin with UK amp Germany Many other PTs have no wars I USUK USSR UK Germany Japan Dissatis ed powers 0 But who is dissatis ed gt The future 0 Us amp China gt Applying perspectives 0 Contemporary Iran gt Is all military power equivalent 0 War amp the offense defense balance 0 Ties the occurrence of to the balance between offensive and defensive military forces When offensive forces dominate war becomes more likely When defensive forces dominate war becomes less likely I Offensive forces are strategic bombers or missiles I Defensive forces are things like fortresses or forts I There are things like tanks which are both offensive or defensive forces Tuesclay1 Februa 09a 2010 This week is all about deterrence gt What is Deterrence o A policy that seeks to persuade an adversary through the threat of military retaliation that the costs of using military force to resolve political con ict will outweigh the bene ts gt Costs amp Deterrence O O O O O OO 0 Components of costs I Battle eld casualties I Destruction amp depletion of equipment I Occupation amp damage of territory I Opportunity costs I Loss of domestic support gt Types of deterrence 0 General deterrence 0 US vs USSR I A broad range uses for deterrence I Cuban missile crisis is a good example I Day to day crisis average 0 Immediate deterrence 0 Israel vs Syria I States are in crisis mode they are more likely to go to war I Not a day to day crisis immediate situations 0 Direct deterrence I The state that 0 Extended general deterrence 0 Cold War Europe 0 EXtended immediate deterrence 0 UK Germany vs Poland I Where an outside party issues a threat UK to a possible advisory Germany to protect or secure a partnering state Poland gt Necessary conditions for deterrence success 0 Commitment I You must have the resolve to follow through 0 Capability I Is the ability to have the power to punish your enemy o Defeat attackers on the battle eld 0 Even in defeat you will cause unacceptable losses 0 Credibility I Defender must show resolve the will to punish your enemy 0 Build reputation for resolve 0 Follow through on your statements 0 Audience costs 0 Politicians want to get reelected so them must use their leadership help reinforce their political positions so that they have public support behind that politicians threats or statements 0 Costly signals 0 Is a means to communicate to the opposing side that your intentions are legitimate 0 Making your adversary believe that you have the ability to rain down hell on them if they make the foolish decision to attack you 0 This will make them question themselves I Type of issue 0 Communication I Must be able to communicate your resolve capability and credibility to your enemy o If any of these conditions fail then deterrence fails EXtended Immediate deterrence failure 0 Attacker commits its armed forces on a large scale to a con ict o Defender accedes to demands under threat of war EXtended Immediate deterrence success 0 Attacker refrains from military force or o Engages in small scale combat with the protege amp fails to force the defender to capitulate Extended deterrence Israel Syria amp Jordan 0 Extended igeneral deterrence fails in 1970 0 Syria threatens military intervention into Jordan in support of PLO Failure of deterrence o Deterrence can fail for reasons beyond an evaluation of military capabilities o 1973 Israel Egypt October 1966 Dangers of deterrence o Capabilities are necessary to deter but I Can lead to an arms race I Can lead to a pattern of military escalation I Creates a security dilemma V V V V V Nuclear Deterrence gt Types of Nuclear weapons 0 Strategic I Most familiar I Usually include ICBMs 0 Can be launched from multiple platforms 0 Intermediate range 0 Short range I Nuclear artillery gt Nuclear strategy 0 Structural stability I This is the ability to control and secure a nuclear arsenal o Prevent accidental launches o Prevent thefts 0 Both the US amp Russia have very elaborate systems to prevent that I Making sure that your state is the only state and a certain amount of personnel that can access arm and fire a nuclear arsenal 0 Crisis stability I Ability to make rational or smart choices whether or not to use nuclear weapons in the time of crisis 0 During the Cold War both sides almost went to nuclear war I Different weapons have different effects 0 Diversifying where and how your nuclear weapon arsenal This prevents your enemy from destroying all of your weapons in a first strike which gives you more time to respond in the event of an attack The US developed a nuclear triad which spread out the platforms and ways it could use its nuclear arsenal o ICBMs 0 Bombers o SLBMs Tuesclay1 Februa 16 2010 gt Military strategy in the Nuclear world 0 Compellence I Early American Cold War strategy 0 This is basically when the US was the only state that had nuclear weapons And could use the threat of a nuclear strike 0 Ultimately shifted deterrence to MAD which is short for Mutual Assured Destruction I Massive retaliation I Secure second strike capability o Is a mechanism to where you could absorb a first nuclear strike and not have you total arsenal destroyed so you can shoot back gt Cuban Missile Crisis 0 SummerFall of 1962 Soviets began placing MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba I MRBM 1000 miles I IRBM 2200 miles 0 Octl415 US U2 spy plane s photos shows evidence ofthese sites 0 US Executive Committee meet to discuss options I Air strike I Blockade I Allow missiles to stay 0 From Oct 15 28 1962 I Soviets bluff no missiles later only defensive I US blockade tensions escalate air strike planned I US amp Soviets closest ever to nuclear war I US agrees to withdraw obsolete missiles from Turkey I Soviets agree to withdraw missiles from Cuba gt Nuclear Communication 0 Communication depends upon signaling Signals can be unclear Signals can be manipulated Chicken 000 V Nuclear Targeting o Counterforce I ABM treaty of 1972 I Hardened silos I Star Wars 0 Countervalue 0 Cold War security was built upon countervalue gt What effects did Nuclear weapons have upon IR 0 They made the world less safe 0 They made the world more safe 0 They did not matter gt General effects of Nuclear weapons 0 Reduced likelihood of total war 0 Increased likelihood of regional wars 0 Increased devastation of war gt How can Nuclear weapons be used 0 Deterrence of total war 0 Rarely used for compellence o Deterrence against other countries using power against you gt Nuclear weapons and Peace 0 Pass the weapons and peace will reign Nuclear weapon Proliferation 0 North Korea 0 Iran Guarding against missile attacks 0 National Missile Defense 0 Rationale Prevent strikes against the US and its allies by rogue states 0 What will the consequences be 0 Is this a good idea TuesdayJ Februa 23a 2010 Arms Races 0 Do arms races cause con ict or are they simply a manifestation of con ict gt Arms amp Peace 0 If you seek peace prepare for war 0 Assumes that policymakers rationally calculate the costs of action I You want to make the other person second guess how much con ict will cost if they do decide to attack 0 What if they do not I Perhaps misjudge the initial cost of war I What if they see someone else arming themselves to defend from someone other than you gt What is an Arms Race 0 Situation in which 2 or more states involved in a conflictual relationship compete with each other over the strength of their armed forces I Con ictual relationship arelationship that already has some kind of con ict over something else V V I Compete this is a way that opposing sides try to oneup the other constantly gt State Armament Goals 0 Absolute goals I To accumulative resources weapons resources and etc only for themselves they are not competing together its for themselves 0 Relative goals 0 If all states had absolute goals there would be no arms racing gt Arms Race 0 Requires the progressive increase from domestic sources of the absolute military power of a state 0 Can be done I Quantitativer 0 Each side tries to outdo the other with some sort of numerical size How many I Qualitatively 0 Each side tries to outdo the other but not by having the largest arsenal but the best trained equipped and well feed How good are they 0 Today s militaries use a combination of qualitative and quantitative Unlike militaries of old which weren t as advanced in technology used a quantitative approach gt Key Features of Arms Races o Simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in military outlays by 2 or more states I In this sense think of abnormal rates of growth occur when 0 States take funds from other public services and institutions to channel money and resources to the military 0 Competitive pressure from the military itself Thursday March 04 2010 gt When Do Arms Races Occur I This usually occurs when states are rather unsure of what the other state arming itself plans on doing ie the Prisoners Dilemma 0 Little shadow of the future 0 Favorable preference structure I DCgtCCgtDDgtCD 0 Example 0 the Prisoners Dilemma I DC You talk and you friend goes to jail I CC You both keep your months shut and both go home I CD You keep silent and you go to jail I DD You both talk and both go to jail gt Necessary Conditions for Arms Races o Armament capacity I Have the ability to arm itself able to buy or produce armaments 0 Fear I Can create the element of fear among other states or your opponent o Salience I There must be a set of issues that they disagree over that they are willing to ght over It must be worth ghting over for them to want to match the other s military capability 0 Information about relative capabilities I States should have the resources or ability to gain information on the types of military arsenal your opponent can use against you 0 Some sort of CIA MI S o Reciprocity I A willingness to respond to the armament of your opponent gt Richardson Arms Race Model 0 d dt ayimx r I dXdt is the change in military for state X I d is the amount of cost for the military I y is the military capability for state Y I a is the amount of fear from within state X I X is the current level of military capability for state X I m state X s sensitivity to the current level of military spending 0 The costs taken away from the public to be used by the military 0 dydt bxiny s I dydt is the change in military Y I n is the level of military capability for state Y 0 Three elements I Fear I Domestic costs I Grievance o r amp s is the amount of grievance that the nation is willing to put up with gt Changes in Armaments 0 mx gt ay r I Arms decrease I Domestic costs is greater than the amount of fear it can place on its enemy o ay r gt um I Arms increase I Fear outweighs the domestic costs gt Causes of Arms Races 7 Repeated Prisoners Dilemma o Arms races occur because of the structure of relations between players 0 Encourages titfortat interaction I This is a mutual agreement that if you do it then I ll do it So long as the other person doesn t violate the mutual agreement then you ll mostly likely punish them 0 Key determinants I Shadow of the future 0 Is like a relationship between two groups that has a beneficial future or a future payoff o Ifthe shadow of the future is very large than an arms race is less likely to happen But the chance of an arms race greatly increases if the shadow of the future is low No mutual future between nations I Preferences gt Causes of Arms Races 7 Spiral Model 0 Arms race is driven by mutual fear I States continually live in fear of other states 0 Security dilemma develops between actors I When a security dilemma occurs than one states action can effect on the actions that other states will take in response 0 This leads two or more states in a spiral of back and forth competition 0 Actions to promote security breed insecurity Causes of Arms Races 7 Bargaining Deterrence Model 0 IR is inherently competitive I Because there is no international referee 0 States bargain over goods 0 When agreement fails war 0 Better options 9 Leverage gt Arms Races amp War V o Arms Race No Arms Race 0 War 12 14 o No war 12 61 gt Arms Races amp War 0 Potential relationships I Direct amp causal I Indirect amp causal I Spurrious gt Direct amp Causal Relationship 0 Arms Race 9 War 0 DM trust opponents less become more likely to preempt o Unlikely to respond to conciliatory gestures gt Indirect amp Causal Relationship 0 Arms Race 9 Variable X 9 War gt Indirect amp Causal Relationship 0 Arms Race 9 Power Distribution 9 War I 9is the in uence 0 Change in power distribution I V Spurious Relationship 0 What appears to be a causal relationship is not 0 Arms Race leads to War Spurious Relationship 0 What appears to be a causal relationship is not 0 Enduring Rivalry leads to V I Arms Race I War Stop here for Exam 1 Stalt here for Exam 2 Tuesday1 March 23 2010 Take Two Democracies and Call Me In the Morning 0 Democracy a prescription for peace gt Competing Perspectives on Liberalism 0 Liberal paci sm 7 War is costly I Kant o Argued that the spread of con ict helps to restrain the outbreak of war I Schumpeter 0 Liberal imperialism 7 War is pro table I Machiavelli o Argued that pro ts can come from con ict which inevitably leads to greater amounts of con ict gt Link between politics and con ict by American viewpoints o Democracies rarely wage war on one another 7 President Clinton 1993 I This isn t exactly true because if a democracy is threatened it will ght other countries even if they are democracies Ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere 7 President Clinton 1994 American foreign policy must be more than the management of crisis It must have a great and guiding goal to turn this time of American in uence into generations of democratic peace 7 President Bush 2001 gt Realist Expectations 0 DemocracyDemocracy High war I Democracies act just like any other state would in the international system 0 DemocracyNonDemocracy High war 0 NonDemocracyNonDemocracy High war gt Democracies and War 0 Question Do democracies behave differently that other types of states 0 Challenges realist theories of IR gt What is a Democracy 0 Executive constraints7must have an elected legislature I The elections must be able effective enough to change the government as well as fair and free 0 Political rights and freedoms I This is difficult if people do not have the ability to speak freely or free press as well as being able to meet to discuss issues I Also the government must not be able to have unlimited rule 0 O gt gt VVVVVV 0 Can t commit to war without approval 0 Can be removed 0 Regular elections 0 Participation amp contestation o A system of government in which parties lose elections Explanations for the Democratic Peace 0 Structural o Normative o Informational Structural Argument 0 Kantian perpetual peace I The people ght wars are the same people that pay the cost of war 0 Two elements I Public Opinion I Institutional Checks and Balances 0 Under this structural argument democracies tend to avoid war at all costs because they do not want to be struck with the burden of paying for the war or wars it ghts DYAD TYPE PROPENSITY FOR WAR Democracy Democracy Low Democracy Non Democracy Low Non Democracy N on Democracy High Voter control 0 Median voter pays cost of war but does not bene t 0 Politicians want to be reelected 0 Voters can control politicians by voting retrospectively How effective are constraints 0 Opponents of the MexicanAmerican War in Congress were siX times more likely to retire Opponents of WWI were twice as likely Gulf War of 1991 Second Gulf War Since 1789 the US has used force over 200 times it has declared war ve times Normative Argument 0 Democratic Norms amp Culture I Argues that democracies don t deal with all contentious issues with violence towards other democracies Often time they try to use compromising or cooperation or negotiations because they expect that from other democracies This often does not happen with non democracies because they 0 Supported by democratic learning OOOO DYAD TYPE PROPENSITY FOR WAR Democracy Democracy Low Democracy N ori Democracy High Non Democracy Non Democracy High gt Normative Argument 2 o Owen s theory I Simply states the democracies are usually more peaceful with other democracies so they often can avoid war But put that democracies are however ever more violent towards nondemocracies more prone to ght nondemocracies because they are not democracies o A reason for this is because nondemocracies have few people making decisions so they can move faster like deciding to go to war Unlike democracies which move much slower because decisions have more consequences if they make the wrong decisions 0 So democracies see nondemocracies as athreat because of the speed they can change This gives them an incentive to attack first DYAD TYPE PROPENSITY FOR WAR Democracy Democracy Low Democracy Non Democracy Extremely High Non Democracy Non Democracy High gt Informational Argument 0 Democracies shape expectations about behavior 0 Democracies shape expectations about actionresponse time I Democracies are slower with decisions than a nondemocracies o Democracies can signal better I Democracies have a better understanding and practice of signal gt Information 0 Audience costs I Candidates face the chance of not getting voted back if they don t come through with promises or lie political consequences 0 Transparency O O I A means of showing the other side your intentions by using audience costs to reaffirm them what you plan on doing Impossibility of strategic surprise Cheap talk signaling gt Audience costs 0 OOO Incomplete information 9 War Resolved less likely to be challenged Democratic leaders can signal resolve Voters punish them if they back down gt Transparency o The preferences of democracies are transparent I Democratic leaders nd it hard to bluff 0 Democratic leaders put the steering wheel out of the window to signal to others that they are being truthful Using audience costs as a means of proving its intentions I Foreign leaders rarely misinterpret signs of resolve gt Impossibility of Surprise 0 Free press amp separation of powers make surprise attack very difficult 0 Democratic leaders are less tempted to start wars 0 Potential opponents are less insecure o The security dilemma is less binding gt Who is Correct 0 If democratic peace theory is correct we should observe I Peaceful effect of public opinion I Few threats last resort I Attempts at compromise I Statistics gt Who is Correct 0 Ifrealists are correct we should see I When issues are important democracies behave like other states I More attention to security than politics Thursday March 25 2010 War criterion 0 Must involve two intemationally recognized states 0 Over 1000 battle deaths I This number is the usually it was charted consisting of all the modern battles These are formal official military personal they do not count civilian casualties 0 Must be overt not covert wars gt Empirical Observations o Democracies rarelynever fight other democracies o Democracies are no less likely to fight autocracies o Democracies are more likely to initiate war than autocracies o Transitional democracies are more likely to fight than stable regimes I Because these are fairly new states attempting to change their type of government they can be plagued with intemal con ict or outside interference for a potential landgrab or take over War No War with War Democracy 0 169 0 NonDemocracy 37 1045 3 4 Force No Force with Force Democracy 8 161 47 V V V gt gt NonDemocracy 229 853 212 Dispute No Dispute with Dispute Democracy 12 157 71 NonDemocracy 257 825 23 8 Possible Wars Between Democracies 0 American Civil War 0 SpanishAmerican War 0 Weimer Germany 0 War of 1812 I The con ict between the British and the US isn t considered a war between democracies because 1812 is before the modemday state system Challenges to the Democratic Peace 0 De nitions 0 Small sample 0 Low war probability 0 Issues Alternative explanations 0 Geography 0 Alliances o Bipolarity The Horse Before the Cart 0 Does peace cause democracy or does democracy cause peace I United States amp United Kingdom 0 The UK was separated from the rest of Europe via the English Channel 0 No need for a large land a1my They just needed a good navy o The US was better separated by the Atlantic and Paci c oceans combined with weak neighbors to the north and south Democratization and War 0 Democratizing states more likely to fight war I Competing coalitions I In eXible interests I Weakened central authority The Imposition of Democracy 0 Effects of bright amp dim beacons I In order to have a successful transition you must get it right the first time a high level of democracy in a short amount of time I But if a high level of democracy in a short amount of time fails then the country will have an even tougher time transitioning 0 Development of political legitimacy 0 Use of existing political structures I Use what works and replace what needs to be 0 Ethnic heterogeneity I Having a low level of divisions among the people Helps keeps people from having divided opinions when changing to democracy gt Democratic Peace and Foreign Policy 0 Should the democratic peace guide foreign policy 0 Are there any negative effects of applying the democratic peace Diversionagx uses of force gt The Scapegoat Hypothesis 0 What IS a diversionary war 0 War begun in order to divert attention from domestic problems 0 Many alleged examples of such wars I Gulf War 1990 I US invasion of Greneda 1983 I Falklands War 1982 o Risks are losing the con ict loss oflife or etc TuesdayJ March 302 2010 gt The Idea 0 Leaders failing at home will use con ict abroad in order to gain domestic support 0 By prompting a crisis leader will encourage a rally round the ag effect 0 Temporary effect I Rallying is not permement I Why would political leaders use military force is there is a risk of it turning into a bad situation gt Why Might this Work 0 Success in a crisis provides information to the electorate I Political leaders want to communicate that they are effective 0 EX People care about terrorism so leaders need to be 0 Provides leaders an opportunity to show they are competent gt What s the Problem 0 Leaders may be diverting attention from a variety of problems I Sluggish economy 0 People care about their and other people s economic positions I Domestic Scandal I Leadership challenge 0 Regardless of the problem the logic of diversion as a solution is the same I It is a way to distract the public from problem s that may hinder leaders ability to get reelected gt InGroup OutGroup Logic 0 Basic argument draws on sociological ingroupoutgroup theory I Fundamental human drive for social identification 0 Most people want to identify with others humans have a need to have somewhat of a belonging especially when in different surroundings I We identify in opposition to others 0 A way of identifying with others not in your normal surroundings but rather in not so formal surroundings V V V V V gt gt 0 Con ict with an outgroup increases cohesion within the ingroup I Instinctive social response to threat 0 EX When in the place of Olympics it is a case of us as Americans versus them Canada Russia or other countries 0 We nd safety in numbers with those that are similar to us The Limits of Diversion 0 Key limitation ingroup cohesion must remain above a minimum threshold or leaders cannot evoke ingroup identity 0 We prioritize social identities meaning choosing how far one is willing to go in protecting your identity I EX American dying for their country is acceptable but students dying for the glory of UNT is not seen as acceptable Systematic Evidence 0 US used forced in 85 of presidential election years with a weak economy 0 Some weak correlations between election cycle and uses of force 0 Cold War 45 presidential approval increase I When military force was used Not much but helps when a leader is trying to get reelected o Other research nds no systematic relationship Con icting Evidence on Diversion 0 Clear logical argument eXists for why leaders may engage in diversion o LOTS of historical and anecdotal evidence for this process as a cause of war 0 Systematic statistical studies have found little evidence 0 Diversion use may have it uses but not frequently Possible Reasons for Lack of Consensus 0 Perhaps historical evidence is just not generalizable I Selecting on the dependent variable 0 Perhaps measurements of unrest in quantitative studies are poor 0 Perhaps researchers have not thought about the conditions under which diversion is likely Conditions for Diversionary Wars 0 Diversion depends on the type of Government I Both democracies and autocracies o Democracies more likely to divert than autocracies I Autocracies use DF less because they have less to do in order to change peoples unhappiness I The tools at your disposal are more accessible than in a democracy 0 Must consider the alternatives to diversion I Repression is easier and more reliable I Democracies are less able to repress Difficulties Evaluating Diversionary Theory 0 Inferring causation 0 Determining who s decisionmaking counts 0 Measuring the rally round the ag effect difficult Diversion is for the Powerful 0 Powerful States more likely to use diversion 0 Costs of using force are low for these states and they are likely to win 0 Diversion will be ineffective if war becomes costly or state begins to lose 7 increases internal dissent I This is especially true if it is a weak state which may not have much in the way of resources And added to the cost of losing a con ict will hurt even more I Especially true for democratic states gt Diversion is Done at Low Cost 0 Diversionary uses of force should be relatively small and short lived I Best example would be Grenada employed by the Reagan administration 0 Reap the bene ts of the rally effect 0 Must rally support in a short period of time can t be an extended con ict I Ingroup cohesion o Begins to fade away after extend periods of time 0 End war before costs and losses threaten cohesion of ingroup again gt How Common is Diversion 0 Very Difficult to judge frequency of diversion o For diversion to work constituents cannot know that they are being manipulated 0 Thus leaders will only pick or create cases where they have a plausible alternative reason for going to war 0 Thus diversion is often one among several motives I Should be careful about making unfounded accusations Beyond Democracies 7 Diversionary Autocracies o Consolidating autocrats use force in response to elite unrest I Capability limited 0 Consolidating autocrats use force only in response to extreme mass unrest I Repression tools limited gt Why Divert at All 0 Rally effect limited in impact amp duration I Small spike a matter of months 0 Why rally at all gt Just know 0 What diversionanry theory is 0 Rally around the ag 0 Why autocracies use diversionary theory less than democracies Reading How Can Politics Make 1 39 Make L quot 39 whim o A Walk Through Alastair Smith s World gt Government Choices 0 EUdIntervention fv lf0 7 cost 0 EUdNonIntervention 0 gt Government Choices 0 EUdIntervention fv lf0 7 cost 0 Means Benefit Likelihood of successValue fv Cost V V V V V V V V V o EUdNonIntervention 0 o MeansNothing risked nothing gained Intervention in an optimal world 0 Intervention only occurs when 0 fv gt cost 0 Intervention occurs when the expected bene ts gt the costs of intervention Foreign Policy Competence in an Optimum World 0 Two types of governments FP competent and FP incompetent o FP competent HI 0 FP incompetent fL o fH gt fL Foreign Policy Competence in an Optimum World 0 Two types of governments FP competent and FP incompetent FP competent fH FP incompetent fL fH gt fL Competent governments get better results than incompetent ones The Electorate o Cares about two things I The economy I Foreign policy I Rewards and punishes political leaders accordingly How the Electorate Votes 0 EUParty DlQP Q P ehel7td 1Q 2w iud lP 0000 How the Electorate Votes 0 EUParty DlQP Q P eh el7td lQ 2w ud lP 0 Utility for Part Economic Performance Payoff from International Event I no intervention0 I winvcost I losecost How the Electorate Votes 0 EUParty DlQP Q P 1eh el2td 11 2wld lgPl 0 Utility for Party Economic Performance Payoff from Intemational Event Value for Econ C0mpetenceBeliefs about Econ Competence Value for FP Competence Beliefs about FP Competence How the Electorate Votes 0 EUParty RlQP Q P geh ell r 0 2wlr 0 o Electorate has no prior observation of either economic or foreign policy competence Government Decisions 0 Governments only care about two things Reelection amp foreign policy I EUReelected FP competent E P 2w I EUReelected F P incompetent E P I Reward for election gt Government Decisions 0 Governments only care about two things Reelection amp foreign policy I EUReelected FP competent 2 I Q 2w I EUReelected F P incompetent 2 I Q I Reward for election FP payoff gt Government Decisions 0 Governments only care about two things Reelection amp foreign policy I EUReelected FP competent 2 I P 2w I EUReelected F P incompetent 2 I P I Reward for election FP payoff Value of FF competence gt Government Decisions 0 Governments only care about two things Reelection amp foreign policy I EUReelected FP competent 2 I P 2w I EUReelected FP incompetent 2 I P I EUN0t reelected I P 2w 1110 gt CounterIntuitive Results I o Hypothetical costfL gt v gt cost I o Incompetent leaders should not intervene competent leaders should intervene 0 But the Public does not elect FP incompetent leaders 0 Therefore nonintervening leaders will be removed 0 Therefore Incompetent leaders choose to intervene gt CounterIntuitive Results II o Hypothetical vlt cost I o It is not in the nation s interest to intervene o Unpopular FP competent governments however may choose to intervene in order to demonstrate competence o Unpopular FP incompetent governments seek to mimic o Unpopular FP competent governments seek to distinguish themselves from FP incompetent governments 0 Both government types push the other toward more extreme interventions Wednesday March 3 2010 Con ict Management gt Means of Con ict Management 0 Unilateral o Bilateral o Multilateral gt Conceptions of Mediation o The assistance of athirdparty to con icting parties 0 A form of negotiations in which a mediator aids the disputants in finding a solution 0 Mediators represent a form of catalytic agent gt Fundamental Characteristics of Mediation 0 An extension of peaceful con ict management OOOO Outsider Noncoercive Ad hoc Bias gt What Do Mediators Do 0 000000 Facilitate communications Act as solution innovators Clarify the issues and positions between parties Provide a solution to the bargainer s dilemma Provide a means of facesaving Resource providers Service providers Tuesday1 April 5 2010 Who Mediates O O O 0 Individuals I Usually high pro le people such as former politicians States Institutions Organizations gt Mediators and Bias 0 Must mediators be unbiased I Having a neutral mediator helps the overall process but that is rather hard to do since people having incentives Such instant would be the US mediating in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine but the US and Israel have close relations But that doesn t mean that mediators can t be fair 0 Sometimes having a biased mediator is better than a neutral mediator Simply because they will more than likely will have stake or signi cant investment that neutral mediators would not have gt Strategies of Mediation O O 0 Integration 7 searching for a common ground amongst the warring parties I Make both sides feel good and gives a sense of trust between the warring parties Building trust can enable the resolving of minor issues Pressing 7 reducing the range of alternatives thus limiting the amount options so that an agreement can be reached Or pressure both sides to come to an agreement I EX the US pulling out ofa region forcing both sides to choose an agreement as an alternative to continued fighting Compensation 7 enhancing the attractiveness of options buying off both parties to broker a peace agreement I Offering access to resources funds or political inclusion I However an often problem is credible commitment problem 0 Both sides want to make an agreement but there is not garuntee that both sides will live up to their portion of the agreement Having mediators is a way to help resolve credible commitment problems because they for the most part have nothing at stake o Inaction I Mediators can do absolutely nothing thus forcing the warring parties to start beginning a peace deal a powerful tool it by not attempting a move towards peace the wa1ring party leaders may face audience costs at home 0 Mediators switch between strategies depend gt Motivations for Mediation o Mediators are motivated by interests I Defensive 0 Protect your interests from the other parties who might try to mediate in a given area or region I Offensive I Domestic politics 0 Leaders to take steps in settling con icts which is cheaper than sending troops to fight gt One Mediator or More 0 Multiparty mediation I Representatives from various organizations or states 0 Advantages I Capabilities vary I Create new avenues of dialogue I Increase leverage 0 Countries that fit well are Sweden and Norway gt Multiparty Mediation o Drawbacks I Communication problems 0 Too many voices and not enough ears I Mixed messages 0 Send a message that may con ict with someone else s message I Wasted resources 0 Each putting resources where they see fit as opposed to where resources are needed I Buckpassing o Mediators pass off responsibilities on to others much like group projects gt When Does Mediation Take Place 0 Mediation is used strategically I High con ict severity I Long duration I Stalemated con ict I Political changes I Increased threats gt When Does Mediation Take Place 0 Mediation is used as con ict triage 0 Simply trying to place a bandaid to manage the con ict as best as possible I Ongoing con ict I Previous war gt Who Gets Mediated I Who gets help and who doesn t 0 Former colonies I They have some former relationship The Brits and French usually help mediate in their former colonies sometimes motivated by guilt 0 Major power allies 0 Alliance partners I Help even when they are not Major powers 0 Previous mediation gt Why Accept Mediation o More favorable outcome 0 Reduce risk of the continuation of con ict which will hurt nances or other things 0 Maintain positive relations w 3rd part I Have a valved relationship with the 3rd party 0 Devious objectives I Enter mediation so they can rearm and buy time to ght back gt Who Does Not Get Mediated 0 Major powers I These powers are not willing to hand over power over to another state seeing they have it and want more of it o The power preponderant gt Necessary Conditions for Mediation Success 0 Disputant motivation to settle or resolve the con ict 0 Mediator opportunity to intervene in the con ict 0 Mediator skill gt In uences Upon Mediation Success 0 Ripeness I Hurting stalemate I Power parity 0 Absence of ideological issues 0 Clear identi cation of parties to a dispute Thursday April 7 a 2010 Peacekeeping gt What is Peacekeeping o PKOs Thirdparty military intervention to assist the transition from violent con ict to stable peace 0 Peacekeeping o Peacemaking 0 Peace enforcement gt Evolution of UN PK 0 First Generation Traditional Peacekeeping 19481990 I Peacekeeping missions that were lead by the UN to quell usually not armed much con icts between nations and after the con ict ended Second Generation Expanded Peacekeeping that included peace enforcement operations 1990 1995 I Moves beyond the lightly armed traditional peacekeepers that are better armed and can enforce the rules while the con ict is still under wa Third Generation Expanded peacekeeping within the limits of the UN s ability More complex smaller in size and focused on peace building I Instead of trying to impose peace they attempt to rebuild institutions structures and social systems This is an attempt to improve a country by means of rebuilding it rather than what a state needs to survive education elections and government 0 In Cambodia the UNPKFs ran the country for almost a year gt Assumptions of Traditional Peacekeeping o Belligerents are states 0 O I For most of the con icts now are civil wars within states Hierarchically organized parties I However in a civil war there may be multiple groups fighting Also rebel groups may not be as organized as states and reluctant to relinquish their arms Disputants have a desire to end con ict I Now the international community cannot wait for the con ict end they must step in and to help regardless if they are asked to or not gt Characteristics of Interposition Forces Traditional Peacekeepers o Neutrality I In rst generation neutrality was important but in 2nd amp 3rd generation are not so focused on being so neutral 0 Light military equipment I Until the start of the 2quotd generation this was the case 0 Selfdefense I A former use of this method is seen as inhuman 2quotd amp 3rd generation peacekeepers create safe zones 0 Consent I A thing of the past since there may not be a central government to ask 0 Ceasefire 0 Voluntary contribution gt Who Keeps the Peace 0 UN I Mostly closely associated with 0 States 0 International and regional organizations 0 GOs gt Do Mediation and Peacekeeping Complement One Another 0 Sometimes I If peacekeepers do their job really well may inhibit the success of a peace agreement by mediators 0 Ex Cyprus 0 Former Yugoslavia 0 Cyprus I By peacekeepers doing such a good job of separating and ending the violence that both warring sides have no incentives to establish a peace deal since you have forces keeping the peace Tuesday April 12 2010 Insurgency 0 An organized protracted politicomilitary struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government occupying power or other authority while increasing insurgent control I This de nition helps distinguish terrorists from insurgents Insurgents not on have a military capabilities but also political means 0 An organized rebellion I Not all rebellious groups are organized but most are 0 Deliberate actions designed to cause the downfall of governmental or ruling authority I Insurgents can do acts of terrorism 0 Ranges from conventional military action to guerrilla tactics I Guerilla is the use of nontraditional means of ghting consisting of smaller groups with some civilian structures military installations or political structures 0 Insurgents usually comprised of irregular military forces gt Political Violence Continuum 0 Revolution Insurgency Coup I Revolution I A coup is an even smaller groups usually consisting of people elites from within the military Insurgencies want to spark a movement against the government try to gain the support of the people in order to obtain weapons funds persons or information gt Insurgent Mobilization o Persuasion I Communicate their intentions to the population who will hopefully support them 0 Coercion I Using force to gather the numbers weapons and etc in order to achieve you goals 0 Reaction to abuses I Coercion is costly also it can backfire due to frustrations by the population Persuasion is profitably because you make the opponent the bad guy 0 Foreign support I Can be the stimulant that spawns the birth of an insurgency o Apolitical motivations I Insurgent groups are looking to make money by means of sellings arms people or narcotics gt Facilitating Factors 0 Geography I Base of operations are heavily wooded areas mountainous region or mostly inaccessible by the government Overall places where the government has little to no control Cities are also good places because the lack of a uniform enables ghters to blend into the civilian population 0 Experience 0 Support I Support come from civilian or foreign groups gt Elements of an Insurgency 0 Movement leaders I Thinkers 0 Combatants I Most hardcore believers true believers that are willing to die 0 Political cadres I Help reinforce ideas to the group to get them the motivation to participate in the groups PR reps o Auxiliaries 0 Mass base I Usually located in a remote place or region where the government has limited it as ability of gt INSURGENT TACTICS o Asymmetric Warfare I Tactics that accept the insurgency s capabilities are unequal to the authority s capabilities o Bombings kidnappings raids ambushes o Attacks against both military and civilians 0 Leadership of insurgency may or may not be visible or forthright gt Why Insurgency o What are the advantages of insurgent violence 0 What does success mean I The over through of the government or the persuasion people to join or contribute to the gt From Syria to Yemen IuIzl e armAug Frrlwall lj du Hm gt Key Ideas Erorn T E o rmles were llke plants lmmoblle as awhole flrmrrooted and nounshed through long sterns to the head We rnrghtbe ayapour blowmg where we lrsted Our klngdoms la m eaeh rn 39s rnrnd and as we wanted nothrng rnatenal to llve on so perhaps we offered nothrng rnatenal to the kllllng 1t seerned that aregular soldermrghtbe helpless wrthout atarget He would ow ground at on and whathe eould poke hls n e at quot T E Lawrenee vlewedlarge rnrlrtanes strength as therrweakness by needlng supplles sueh as food arrns or equrprnent Eut saw rnsurgents as lrght and moblle that are able to appear flght then dsappear Saw that soldlers Just oeeupy preees ofland needlng a target Lawrenee saw the ablllty ofrnsurgent39s small slzequot was to not attaek arm on But ratherthe b oodllne herngthe tratns that bnngln neededresourees to sust n a large my gt T E Lawrenee on Strategy 0 Ourwar shouldbe awar of detaehrnent we were to eontatn the enemy by the a ofattackquot o Taeues shouldbe uprandrmn not pushes but strokesquot wrth use ofthe srnallest force In the qurekest urne at the farthest plaeequot 0 Never on the defenslve gt T E Lawrenee on Insurgene o How does rnsurgent eonthet dlfferfrom Clausewrtz39s vlew ofwar7 How ls rt slmllar Eoth emphaslze the rrnportanee ofcontrolllng resourees andto do enough damage to your opponentto they see flghtlng as alarge eost they eannot eontrnue to rnatntatn o What targets does Lawrenee focus upon attachng7 Why7 Logrstres eornrnunreatrons ports and supply llnes ratl roadllne Eeeause those elernents ar what fuel and power not the armedforce head on o What do vretones look llke for lnsurgents7 I Victories are not about gaining territory but slowing strangling the large military into submission Not clear in most case unlike in the time of TE Lawrence gt TE Lawrence on CounterInsurgency 0 Fighting a rebellion is like eating soup with a knife 0 What does this mean I This says that a knife is a great tool but it is wrong for the job Case in point having a large conventional army was good when ghting other states but it practically useless when it comes to combating an insurgency Thursday April 15I 2010 gt Mao on Guerilla Warfare 0 Three phases I Attacks on machinery of government and distribution of propaganda to gain popular support 0 Trying to show what amount of military capacity your group has I Escalating attacks on military and other vital targets 0 Again showing the government and population of your ability to strike any target Discrediting the govemment s ability to protect itself and the people I Conventional attacks to seize infrastructure and the government 0 gt Winning Hearts amp Minds 0 Insurgents and guerrillas will rely on a friendly population for supplies and intelligence I Both insurgents and governments are dependent o Insurgents and guerrillas will tend to melt into the population or environment as a military tactic I Works well in a hit amp run tactics 0 Local populace primarily punished or killed for collaboration with ruling authority I Is a way to coerce the civilian population into helping you but is vastly more costly and possible for the population to turn on you 0 Insurgents sometimes labeled as Terrorists as part of a Hearts and Minds campaign I An attempt by the government to discredit insurgency groups gt CounterInsurgency COIN 0 Strategy involves both conventional and nonconventional military tactics o Nonconventional tactics include I Propaganda I Psychological Operations I Paramilitary Action I Economic Action I Information Warfare gt Stages of COIN 0 Stop the bleeding I Trying to being the protection of the population and your own security forces Overall very nonviolent Break the momentum of the insurgency o Inpatient care I More aggressive stage an aggressive campaign to root out the insurgency both physically and by raising public support for the government 0 Outpatient care I The capacity of the home government to deal with the extermination of the insurgency group is high gt Synchronization in COIN o Militaryparamilitary 0 Political 0 Economic 0 Civil action gt CounterInsurgency o What does success mean for a government 0 High COINinsurgent ratio 0 Repression gt Tools of COIN 0 Combat ops 0 Host security forces 0 Establishrestore essential services 0 Governance 0 Economic development gt COIN Targeting 0 Lethal I Insurgent leaders 0 Nonlethal I Community leaders I Swayable insurgents I Corrupt leaders CounterInsurgency Tactics 0 Oil Spot Strategy I The concentration of troops in the certain area to control the area then building upon that success the troops are spread out o Draining the Water Strategy I A way of removing the civilian populous to a different area leaving the insurgents behind to deal with o The downside is that the populous will more likely be angry that they have been moved 0 Must win over the Hearts and Minds of the local population TuesdayJ April 202 2010 Terrorism gt What is Terrorism V O O A policy to strike with terror against those toward whom it is adopted One man s freedom ghter is another s terrorist The difference between terrorists and freedom ghters is more closely rooted in the nature of their targets and their means A more useful definition I Terrorism is a fear inducing method of repeated violent action conducted for political reasons in which the direct targets of violence are not the main targets The direct targets of violence are generally chosen from a target population and serve as message generators for the broader population 0 For example in the 911 attacks the target was not the US government as a whole but more of a message to the American public to terrorize the public s faith in their governments ability to protect them from such attacks 0 The distinction between insurgent groups and terrorist groups is that I Insurgents like TE Lawrence attack targets to cripple or severely weaken a army or organization Terrorists like Al Qaeda attack civilian targets that place fear among the general public of a state gt Forms of Terrorism 0 O O O O O O O Bombings Assassinations Hostage taking Threats and threatening behavior Murder Attacks on infrastructure CoupsOverthrow Ecoterrorism gt Nature of Terrorism 0 O 0 Terrorism blurs the line between interstate and intrastate con ict I Some operate within their own country of origin who want to challenge a government or regime 0 Example the IRA I Some are transnational who attack countries beyond their original borders 0 Example Al Qaeda Terrorist killing is instrumental in nature I The goal is not to kill as many people as possible but the killing of people can materialize into a change in policy by a government Terrorist targets tend to emphasize symbolic over strategic value I Symbolic targets are things like statues building Twin Towers or other targets that have an emotional value I Strategic targets are things like railroad supply trails military bases or any other place that has a value to an army to keep it functioning at maximum efficiency gt Who Engages in Terrorism 0 Individuals 7 Unabomber Richard Reid 0 Groups 7 London Subway bombers 0 Organizations 7 Al Qaeda Shining Path 0 States 7 Stalin s murders of military high command who challenged his authority also there is statesponsored terrorism gt Types of Terrorist Groups 0 Religiousbased 7 Al Qaeda Hamas Hezbollah IRA o Ideologicallybased 7 Shining Path Red Brigade militia groups some from the United State 0 Ethnicallybased 7 ETA gt Terrorist Groups amp Free Rider Problem 0 How do groups overcome the free rider problem 0 Free riders are those who gain all the bene ts without suffering any of the participation costs I Selective incentives o Perks terrorist groups like other groups must come up with perks of their own 0 Some are death benefits payment and etc I High eXit costs 0 Make it hard to leave or dismembership I Collective rationality gt What is AlQaeda 0 Diffuse organization of radical Islamic terrorists I Wahhabi sect of Islam I Founded during Afghan resistance to USSR I Funded in part by the US 0 US support of Saudis and US troops in Saudi Arabia in Gulf War turned him against US I Attacked US Embassies USS Cole 911 and more gt What is AlQaeda o The McDonald s of Terrorism I Terrorist groups discovered that hierarchal system having a leadership pyramid can be easily toppled So they found that having a franchise system that can be developed for the specific region has proved very successful for Al Qaeda This has allowed Al Qaeda to spread its goals to other nations as well as hard to pin down since there is no clear leadership since groups are divided into sells or sects o Harakat al Muj ahideen Kashmir 0 GIA Algeria 0 Jeemah Islamiyah Indonesia 0 Ansar al Islam Iraq 0 Freelancers 7 Richard Reid London subway bombers gt Who is Al Qaeda o 200 members who have sworn bayat 0 Several thousand holy warriors I Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi 0 Ten of thousands trained in Afghanistan I John Walker gt What Ties AlQaeda together 0 Ideology I The ideology commits people to a cause 0 Technology I Because of advances in communication and the intemet it is one of the most important ways in which Al Qaeda has spread across the globe Thursday April 22 2010 gt Why Terrorism 0 Speci c grievances vary from one case to another I AlQaeda wants the US to withdraw from the Middle East 0 Generally re ect poor state control of territory I State cannot maintain monopoly on control of violence 0 Generally a strategy of weaker parties I asymmetric warfare gt Aims of Terrorist Acts 0 Coerce target I Trying to get your adversary to do what you want them to do 0 Mobilize additional recruits and nancial support I Attacks can communicate a groups legitimacy of their intention to mobilize support for their group Also terrorist group compete amongst themselves to gain support from potential investors o Terrorists communicate with 1 government and 2 supporters gt Terrorism amp Signaling 0 Terrorism is costly signal I Terrorist use violence as a means to communicate their legitimacycommitment to use violence to obtain their goals It separates them from nutty groups 0 Aims to persuade audiences o Alters beliefs about I Terrorist capacity I Terrorist commitment gt Terrorist Strategies 0 Attrition I Wearing down of the govemmentsociety to give into your demands The use of violence forces the government to give up it s not worthy it because they see fighting futile o Intimidation I Try to dry up support of the government by using violence to convince people that the government can t protect them Or can use intimidation toward the population to fear the terrorist group over the government 0 Provocation I Trying to force an over response by the government in a way of violence to sway support from the population Example the government does mass arrests or mass killings that start an uprising within the population driving support to the terrorist group 0 Spoiling I Use of violence as means to make it harder for peace deals to take place look at peace studies notes 0 Outbidding I Competition among groups terrorists or nonterrorists to bolster support for their cause or group as well as proving the amount of power they have gt Strategies amp Targets of Terrorism Figure 1 Emmagigs Pl Tmmnaz 39IquotJJ39F39I39IIL39F Target o Fwsuasan Enemy Dwn F DpuL h m F mwr mtm ahon aluman 31331151 ul Ulmmlainly 91413414 unthinking Tru worlhin s spuhng prmwa iim gt Fitting the Strategy to the Situation 0 Attrition I When it works 0 Low level of government commitment o Retaliation constraints 0 Low costtolerance o Intimidation I When it works 0 Weak states 0 Tough terrain 0 Pakistan indigenous areas 0 Provocation I When it works 0 Constraints on retaliation o Repressive government 0 Governments that use force to suppress public dissatisfaction since they cannot buy of the population 0 Spoiling I When it works 0 Moderates appear strong enough to come to the table to discuss a potential peace agreement 0 Split in government in terms of whether or not you can trust the other government enables spoilers to derail the peace process gt Forms of Terrorist Acts 0 Demonstrative terrorism I A strategy where the aim is to demonstrate the capacity of the group without killing or destroying 0 Ex IRA planting a bomb then allowing it to be diffused o Destructive terrorism I The goal is to maximize the destruction inducing the most amount of damage 0 Suicide terrorism I Maximizes both demonstrative amp destructive effects 0 Uses the demonstrative capability to be anywhere but also uses the destructive aspect because of its ability to be in public places maximizing the amount of damage among civilians gt Suicide Terrorism 0 West Bank amp Gaza Strip 0 Tamil Tigers 0 Al Qaedai Saudi Arabia 0 Chechnya gt Misconceptions about Suicide Bombing 0 Religion I Believe to the most devout But are not in reality 0 Gender I Men are more likely to participate but women are increasingly becoming suicide bombers 0 Education I Thought to be poor and uneducated but are now relatively very educated and understand the aspects Tuesday April 27 2010 gt Logic of Suicide Terrorism 0 Maximize coercive leverage I Key expectation of future damage I Provides convincing signal of pain to come 0 Most likely to be used against democracies 0 Most likely to be used to restore homeland gt Group Rationality amp Suicide Terror 0 Promotes three goals I Coercion gt gt V V V I Mobilize recruits I Mobilize nancial support 0 Demonstrates credibility amp resolve Coping with terrorism 0 Terrorism calls into question traditional methods of in uence 0 Key question is terrorism a security threat or a lawenforcement problem 0 Neither strategy has shown clear results Terrorism and Coercive Bargaining 0 Traditional military coercive threats are dif cult to apply effectively I Impose enough pain to in uence a terrorist group to stop the problem 1s 0 Where should one target the offensive Who should be targeted as a combatant I Is hard because they look like regular civilians 0 They can retreat and regroup inde nitely o Indiscriminant force becomes counterproductive Terrorism and Coercive Bargaining 0 Traditional diplomatic tools of in uence are not effective 0 Terrorist organizations are desperate and extreme 0 May lack control of splinter groups The risks of a military approach 0 Terrorist mobility I Terrorist groups are very small and agile I Large militaries like the US use UAV s 0 But kills both terrorists and civillians 0 Terrorist or civilian o Grassroots support The risks of a lawenforcement approach 0 Legal processes are slow 0 Legal standards of proof and rules of evidence make prosecution dif cult or dangerous to national security 0 Terrorists often operate in failed states without rule of law Mixing Strategies 0 Lawenforcement is clearly central to making homeland secure 0 Military action may be needed if law enforcement fails abroad 0 Should we negotiate with terrorists 0 How We Got There Where We Are Where We Are Going The Iraq War gt gt gt Competing Logics for the War in Iraq 0 How we got there Logic 1 1 Doctrine o If there is a 1 chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or develop nuclear weapons we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response I Vice President Dick Cheney 0 Lowprobability highimpact event 1 Doctrine and Iraq V V V gt gt o Hussein is building WMD o Terrorists seek WMD o Hussein has a history of supporting terrorists I Not weapon support but payments 0 Therefore Hussein and his regime pose a direct and unacceptable risk to the US 0 Therefore the US has the right to take preemptive action Logic 2 Henry Kissinger Linking Iraq amp Terrorism 0 Focus on overview of the Hussein regime in order to show American commitment to defend regional stability 0 Were we to inch the success in Afghanistan would be interpreted in time as taking on the weakest and most remote of the terrorist centers while we recoiled from unraveling terrorism in countries more central to the problem Kissinger on Iraq 0 Goal of Phase II should be the destruction of the global terrorist network 0 Antiterrorism policy is empty if it is not backed by the threat of force Logic 3 Iraq Regime Change and Regional Stability o The United States has important strategic interests in the Middle East I Israel I Saudi Arabia I Gulf States 0 Democratization in the Middle East is in American interests 0 A peaceful prosperous democratic Iraq would be a beacon of hope Iraq Germany and Japan 0 There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values Well they were wrong Some say the same of Iraq today They are mistaken President George W Bush February 27 2003 0 quotSome skeptics of democracy assert that the traditions of Islam are inhospitable to the representative government This 39cultural condescension as Ronald Reagan termed it has a long history After the Japanese surrender in 1945 a socalled Japan expert asserted that democracy in that former empire would 39never work Another observer declared the prospects for democracy in postHitler Germany are and I quote most uncertain at best he made that claim in 1957 President George W Bush November 6 2003 Imposed Democratic Polities 0 Democratic political regimes in which the political institutions are established and supported by an external power 0 Both democratic 0 Examples I West Germany I Japan Lesson from History 0 Historical experience of postWorld War 2 West Germany and Japan I Political liberalization I Prosperity gt gt I Regional peace 0 Prominent historical examples for Iraq and Afghanistan Similarites 0 Highly repressive authoritarian states 0 Regional con ict 0 Externally imposed polity Logic 4 Uneccessary War 0 Historical record shows that the US could contain Iraq 0 Hussein was rational and deterable I But WMD use against population 0 Distributing WMD to terrorists I No evidence of help in WTC planning I No guarantees from Al Qaeda Iraq Today Where we are gt VV V V V Political SituationApril 2010 o Largely secular Shiite Sunni coalition party Iraqiya wins most parliament seats 2 in March elections I Led by former prime minister AyadAllawi o Iraqiya is well short of the 163 seats needed for a majority o Rival State of Law Coalition nishes 2nd and immediately challenges legitimacy of vote I Led by current prime minister Nuri alMaliki Election Result March 2010 Election Positives 0 With only limited American assistance Iraqi security forces maintained a largely safe environment for elections 0 Both UN amp US praised elections as largely fair and free of widespread fraud 0 Both secular and religious parties attracted voters o A coalition party won most seats Political Situation April 2010 0 April l9Iraqi court orders a partial recount 0 April 26Court disqualifies a winning Iraqiya candidate I Court also disqualifies 51 losing candidates Votes must be recounted 0 High likelihood that Iraqiya will lose its victory Election Worries o More than a month after election a new government has not been formed 0 Lack of clarity regarding who security forces answer to o Recount process places election in doubt o No prior history of power transfer 0 Concerns that political con ict will yield to violence Iraq 20082009 Improved Security Situation 0 Success ofthe surge o Contributed to by I Deals with local Sunni groups I Restraint by Shiamilitia groups 0 December 2009 no US troops killed gt Security Situation April 2010 0 Following a sharp decline in violence attacks have increased both leading up to and after elections 0 April 430 killed 240 wounded in bombings of diplomatic buildings in Baghdad 0 April 6Series of bombings of Shiite and Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad kill 35 April 23 Coordinate explosions hit 2 mosques market shop kill 58 o gt U S Withdrawal Plans 0 July 2008 7 New security agreement between US and Iraq Called for gradual US withdrawal June 2009 7Vast majority of US troops withdrawn from Iraqi cities January 1 2009 7 control over military operations returned to Iraqi military and police 0 August 2010 7 US withdraws all combat troops I Only a residual force of 3500050000 troops remain December 2011 7All US forces withdrawn OO 0 Challenges to Success in Iraq Why Iraq is atough case gt VVVV V The Fragility of Imposed Democracy Key Destabilizing Forces 0 Poverty 0 Ethnicreligious differences I Exacerbated by democracy 0 Population size 0 Neighborhood support Imposed Democracy Survival and Prosperity Imposed Democracy Survival and Social Divisions Ethnic groups Strong vs Weak Democracy Key Question for Policymakers 0 Not are Iraq and Afghanistan similar to West Germany and Japan BUT o What are the consequences of the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan and West Germany and Japan with respect to the success of democracy and political stability Differences The War in Afghanistan gt gt Beginning of US intervention in Afghanistan 0 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists o a IN GENERAL That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations organizations or persons he determines planned authorized committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred onSeptember 11 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons OO inorder to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations organizations or persons b War Powers Resolution Requirements 1 SPECIFIC STATUTORYAUTHORIZATION Consistent with section 8a I of the War Powers Resolution the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute speci c statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5 b of the War Powers Resolution 2 APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution gt US Ultimatum to Afghanistan September 20 2001 0000 0 Deliver to the US all of the leaders of alQaeda Release all imprisoned foreign nationals Close immediately every terrorist training camp Hand over every terrorist and their supporters to appropriate authorities Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps for inspection gt Operation Enduring Freedom 0 O O Begun October 7 2001 AIM Destruction of terrorist infrastructure capture of Al Qaeda leaders stopping of terrorist activity in Afghanistan Air strikes on key targets in Afghanistan Northern Alliance seizes initiative against Taliban o gt Operation Enduring Freedom 0 000000 gt Leg ON 0 Mazari Sharif falls November 9 2001 Kabul falls November 13 2001 Kunduz falls November 26 2001 Kandahar falls December 2001 Much of Taliban ees to Pakistan 1st presidential election October 2004 1st parliamentary election September 2005 1 Foundation for Intemational Involvement UN Security Council Resolution 1386 December 2001 The Security Council Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan in particular its resolutions 1378 2001 of 14 November 2001 and 1383 2001 of6 December 2001 I 1 Authorizes as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment 2 Calls upon Member States to contribute personnel equipment and other resources to the International Security Assistance Force and invites those Member States to inform the leadership of the Force and the SecretaryGeneral I 3 Authorizes the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to ful l its mandate gt Who Is the Taliban o Pashtun dominated Sunni Islam 0 Creation enabled by both US and Pakistani intelligence 0 Not monolithic o Imperfect overlap with Pakistan Thursday May 06 2010 gt Warlords in Afghanistan 0 Haqqani Network 0 Hezbe Islami Gulbuddun o Warlords built around Afghanistan s existing tribal and clan social divisions I They see themselves as representatives their group or areas 0 Loyalties generally not fixed I This can be exploited by US and UN forces that the Afghan government can better help them rather than the Taliban But unfortunately the US and UN will leave and the Afghan government may not be able to do things properly so this makes it very difficult to come to some sort of compromise gt Al Qaeda in Afghanistan 0 Significantly disrupted by US amp coalition post2001 attacks 0 Key leaders believed to have been displaced to Pakistan 0 Doubts about global reach Limited Afghanistan effect 0 Strength of TalibanAl Qaeda link I Because they are not linked heavily can this be exploited by coalition forces Current Conditions in Afghanistan Afghanistan Elections 2009 0 1st Round August 2009 o Widespread accusations of fraud 0 Runnerup Dr Abdullah Abdullah demands election reforms improved transparency 0 2nd Round Runoff scheduled November 2009 o Abdullah withdraws runoff cancelled gt Current US Plans February 2009US orders 17000 additional troops to Afghanistan December 2009US orders 30000 additional troops to Afghanistan in 2010 o Aim Safeguard population centers and speed training of Afghan security forces I Also enable peace deals to actually develop and defend against spoiler violence 0 Withdrawal scheduled to begin summer 2011 likely take 23 years for completion I This depends on how much the Afghanistan government has progressed O O gt Afghanistan 7 Chief Worries o Instability Safe Haven I This is what worries most states in the international system because it can affect them as a result of globalization o If the state of Afghanistan fails then a terrorist black hole may develop drawing in groups from all over 0 Talibanization of Pakistan I If Afghanistan falls does Pakistan 0 The fear is that if the Taliban control Afghanistan is bad but if the Taliban controls a nuclear state like Pakistan is worse As a result of a fundamentalist regime happening other nations within the region may go more on the defensive sense result in other nations being drawn into the con ict of the Middle East gt Afghanistan 7 Central Question 0 0 How much does fighting al Qaeda require a large force deployment and sustained statebuilding I Do we have smaller force to hunt down and fight the Taliban or do we have a larger force to ensure that statebuilding can happen Taliban doesn t have to win they only need to outlast the Americans and other coalition forces Like Vietnam almost gt Afghanistan Priorities 0 O O O O Kabul security so that the government can grow Expand territorial control since the Afghan government has vast amount of territory it has little control over Ring Road road building to connect the people to other cities and thus can bolster communication between the people and the government Also resources can more easily be transferred throughout the country Border with Pakistan which is largely unprotected or controlled by the Pakistani government Which makes it easier for the Taliban to travel into the mountainous regions of Pakistan Corruption and opium production this is hard to deal with because opium can directly fuel Taliban efforts but at the same time it is a very prosperous crop for many farmers hurting the farms hurts public support Corruption is very hard to deal with because it would encompass rebuilding the entire political and economic systems
Are you sure you want to buy this material for
You're already Subscribed!
Looks like you've already subscribed to StudySoup, you won't need to purchase another subscription to get this material. To access this material simply click 'View Full Document'