Chapter 8 and 10
Chapter 8 and 10 CPO 2002
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This 2 page Class Notes was uploaded by Sabrina Notetaker on Tuesday October 27, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to CPO 2002 at Florida State University taught by Quintin Beazer in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 18 views. For similar materials see INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS in Political Science at Florida State University.
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Date Created: 10/27/15
1013 amp 10 15 Chapter 8 Democratic Transitions o TopDown transitions 0 many democratic transitions are the result of a 0 many transitions to democracy are preceded by a period of liberalization o the period of liberalization often results from split in the dictatorial elite o liberalization is a controlled opening permission for political parties holding elections establishing judiciary o The goal of liberalization process is NOT to bring about democracy 0 The goal is a broadened dictatorship to enhance the o BUT liberalization is risky unstable 0 If liberalization occurs then the oppositions has 2 options enter a broadened dictatorship do we want to be in the game with them and play nice 0 weak opposition are coopted mobilize against the regime or do we choose to revolt 0 strong options will mobilize If the opposition mobilizes the authoritarian elites have 2 choices 1 Repression 2 Allow a democratic transition Whether repression is successful depends on the strength of the oppression groups 1 If opposition weakgt repression successful 2 If opposition strong gt repression is unsuccessful Strong opposition no liberalization no opening the authoritarian govt won t risk a possible rebellion Weak opposition then Opposition s commitment to not taking advantage must be credible and it often isn t Bu what if the regime doesn t know opposition s true strength Complete vs Incomplete information complete information is when each player knows all the information that there is to know about the game incomplete information means the players are uncertain about key aspects of the game We model uncomplete information by incorporating an actor called nature Softliners know that nature chooses a weak opposition with probability p an chooses a strong opposition with probability 1p Dashed lines mean incomplete Transition game with incomplete information Expected utility expected payoff payoffs associated with each outcome multiplied by the probability with which each outcome occurs Democratic transitions from above are not possible under complete informationthey can occur only when there is some uncertainty Chapter 10 0 Types of Dictatorships A monarchy relies on kin and family network to come to power and stay in power The royal family typically determines successions Military dictatorships are often ruled by committee or junta The size of the junta varies depending on the ruler needs to build support to consolidate power the biggest threat to stability is more military coups A civilian dictatorship relies on regime parties or personality cults to stay in power 0 A dominantparty dictatorship is where one party dominates office and control over policy one party is just holding the power 0 a personalistic dictatorship is where the leader controls all policy decisions and selection of regime personnel weakens others and prevent challenges 0 weak parties military press Personality cults help leaders hold on to power by altering citizens beliefs Why do citizens believe this 0 preference falsification prevents leader from knowing true levels of societal support 0 Public belief of outrageous stories represents credible signals of support Dictators use elections in a number of ways to stabilize their rule There is a great deal of variation in elections in dictatorships competition suffrage competitiveness electoral system How stable are these regimes dominantparty dictatorships will be quite stable personalistic dictatorships will also be stable
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