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by: Fredrick Marvin MD


Fredrick Marvin MD
Virginia Commonwealth University
GPA 3.76

Christopher Saladino

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Christopher Saladino
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This 46 page Class Notes was uploaded by Fredrick Marvin MD on Wednesday October 28, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to POLI 105 at Virginia Commonwealth University taught by Christopher Saladino in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 13 views. For similar materials see /class/230636/poli-105-virginia-commonwealth-university in Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University.

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Date Created: 10/28/15
Trade MarkeTs any sysTem insTiTuTion procedure social relaTion or infrasTrucTure whereby persons Trade and goods and services are exchanged forming parT of The economy Role of MarkeTs exchange of goods services paymenTs eTc In an InTernaTional PoliTical Economy IPE Trade is relaTionship beTween sTaTes and markeTs TradiTional Theories of MarkeTs and Trade Liberalism origin 2 Adam SmiTh WealTh of all NaTionsquot Free Trade primary policy No sTaTe inTerference in markeTs is besT CapiTalism capiTal is privaTely conTrolled markeTs deTermine cosT and qualiTy Increases compeTiTion efficiency and innovaTion Reduces barriers To markeT such as Tariffs MercanTilism modern day realism Alexander HamilTon STaTe inTeresT in economy for naTional purposes ProTecTionism primary policy Use barriers on foreign Trade flows supporT local producTs Difference in Theories Role of sTaTe MercanTilism economics work for The sTaTe Liberalism The sTaTe works for economics Realism and mercanTilism are similar buT realism can be liberal free Trade for relaTive gain HisTorically sTaTes begin mercanTilisT and move To liberal ProTecTionism Reasons for policies PoliTical demands from special inTeresTdomesTic policies InfanT indusTries NaTional securiTy ResponsereTaliaTion To predaTory policiesdumping MeansmeThods dumping Tariffs subsidies quoTas resTricTionsregulaTions economic naTionalism GlobalizaTion The expansion of free Trade by opening all markeTs and sTaTes To The global economy GoldsTein definiTion of GlobalizaTion AnTiglobalizaTion proTesTs focus on negaTive aspecTs of expanded free Trade EnvironmenT sea TurTles dolphin deforesTaTion indusTrial oquuT Labor condiTions limiTaTions wages eTc Human righTs culTure Liberalism and Free Trade BiggesT problem wiTh free Trade AgriculTure InTellecTual properTy righTs Service secTors policies Trade regime sysTem of Tariff and nonTariff barriers and exporT incenTive schemes aimed aT sTrengThening The compeTiTiveness of local producers GATT General AgreemenT on Tariffs and Trade was The ouTcome of The failure of negoTiaTing governmenTs To creaTe The ITO InTernaTional Trade OrganizaTion 1947 WTO World Trade OrganizaTion replaced GATT in 1995 The BreTTon Woods conference inTroduced idea for an organizaTion To regulaTe Trade To help economic recovery posT WWII ITO failed in 1950 and only GATT was lefT GATT main objecTive was reducTion of barriers To IT WTO designed To supervise and liberalize inTernaTional capiTal Trade Keeps GATT agreemenTs adds permanenT organizaTion MosT Favored NaTion MFN is a sTaTus awarded by one naTion To anoTher in inTernaTional Trade IT means MFN sTaTus granTs all Trade advanTages All MFN equal US allowed China MFN in 2001 conTroversy over China39s sale of sensiTive miliTary Technology Generalized SysTem of Preferences GSP is a formal sysTem of exempTion from MFN principal Purpose To lower Tariffs for The leasT developed counTries Uruguay Round GATT was The 8 round Transformed GATT inTo WTO BiggesT negoTiaTing mandaTe on Trade ever agreed SepT 1986Nov 1992 Who proTesTs WTO free Trade in general Labor human righTs groups environmenTalisTs naTionalisTs Same are againsT as well as proTecTionisTs economic naTionalisTs WTO meeTings SeaTTle Doha Cancun Hong Kong Has a powerful dispuTe resoluTion body Powerful 10 enforces Trade regime Beyond The WTO BilaTeral agreemenTs bn sTaTes Regional agreemenTs free Trade areas Europe EU European Union EFTA European Free Trade Assoc eTc NAFTA NorTh American Free Trade AgreemenT FTAA Free Trade Area of The Americans ASEAN Assoc of SouTheasT Asian NaTions IMF World Bank InTernaTional moneTary fund BreTTon Woods 44 Purpose generally manage exchange raTes balance of paymenTs and lender of lasT resorT IMF lends money and sTaTes pay iT back Exchange raTes specifies how much one currency is worTh in Terms of The oTher fixed a movable or adjusTable peg sysTem Gold STandard medium of exchange 2 fixed qualiTy of gold dollar peg currency value maTched To value of anoTher usually used To sTabilize value of a currency againsT The currency iTs pegged To floaTing currency39s value is allowed To flucTuaTe according To The foreign exchange markeT Problems occur wIMF Gold decreases as economies grow US economy Taxed inflaTion Trade imbalances Energy crisis In 1971 Nixon removes Gold STandard FloaTing exchange raTes deTermined by markeT forces invesTors in currency AT This poinT IMF only purpose is lender of lasT resorT Decides To lend for developmenT poverTy eTc New era of IMF from 1970s on World Bank creaTed by BreTTon Woods IBRD InTernaTional Bank for ReconsTrucTion and DevelopmenT IADB InTerAmerican DevelopmenT Bank IDA InTernaTional DevelopmenT AssociaTion Primary purpose ReconsTrucTion posT war and DevelopmenT World Bank is a bank IMF is a fund Lends To aid counTries in need of purpose Mission Creep Jessica Einhorn Reading World Bank since iTs creaTion has increased iTs agenda and Tasks To an unmanageable amounT biTing off more Than you can chewquot STrucTural adjusTmenT policy changes implemenTed by The IMF and The World Bank in developing counTries These changes are condiTions for geTTing new loans or lower inTeresT raTes on exisTing loans OriginaTed in The laTe 70s due To economic disasTer IMF original mandaTe coordinaTe inTernaTional currency exchange supporT and moniTor fixed exchange raTe balance of inTernaTional paymenTs lender of lasT resorT CreaTed To sTabilize hyperinflaTion afTer WWII Fund condiTionaliTy debT IMF musT Turn To debT forgiveness soluTions are lacking Massive expansion InsTiTuTions and Law World order miTigaTion of anarchy CooperaTion muTual gain sTaTe inTeresT rules of behavior reciprociTy MosT rules norms insTiTuTions developed during a Time of power dominance Norms The expecTaTions held by naTional leaders abouT normal inTernaTional relaTions MoraliTy as an elemenT of power Principle norm of IR had TradiTionally been noninTervenTion buT inTervenTion moraliTy does allow for inTervenTion In rerna rional organiza rions and ins ri ru rions crea re coopera rion Neoliberalism ins ri ru rions ma r rer facili ra re coopera rion reduce prisoners dilemma reciproci ry learning rime exper rise linkage In rerna rional regimes principles rules norms and procedure rha r govern s ra re behavior in specific issue areas of IR In rerna rional organiza rions physicalma rerial Exis r have members wri r ren char rers manda res e rc publicpriva re governmen ralnongovernmen ral NGOs NonGovernmen ral Organiza rions No s ra re members IGOs InferGovernmen ral Organiza rions Always s ra re members Regional ASEAN EU NAFTO Issue OPEC WTO Global Universal UN IMF Concer r of Europe 1815 Inclusive Balance of Power Pos r rrench revolu rionary wars Winners UK Prussia Russia Aus rria Hungary End of concer r sys rem Rise of conflic r WWI e rc Pos r WWI under preven rion League of Na rions Woodrow Wilson 14 poin r speech Paris Peace Conference Jan 1919 Trea ry of Versailles June 1919 league is crea red 44 na rions signed and ra rified ini rially Purpose avoid ano rher war Peace and Collec rive Securi ry disarmamen r global welfare Beginning US signs bu r sena re fails ro ra rify USSR doesn39f Join Germany is prohibi red No universal membership S rrong reliance on collec rive securi ry all s ra res will con rribu re ro s ropping any aggressor 63 s ra res Joined a r some poin r many lef r 1931 major failures and weaknesses become apparen r League failed roo legal forced yes or no decisions roo s rric r needed unanimi ry membership never universal Where did league fail 1931 Manchuria China Japanese invasion league condemns buT collecTive acTion never maTerializes 1935 Abyssinia EThiopia ITaly invades League imposes only economic sancTions fear war wiTh ITaly 1938 Munich Germany Rise of Nazi Germany Germany rearms wHiTler war in 1939 End of League of NaTions conTinues inacTively unTil 1946 UniTed NaTions UN begins before war ends and before US enTers Jan 1942 UN DeclaraTion 26 naTions DumbarTon Oaks DC 1944 creaTe formal sTrucTure InTernaTional CourT of JusTice World courT Bureaucracy does work UN secreTariaT One sTaTe one voTe UN General Assembly UN SecuriTy Council permanenT members where power is UN is a HUGE IGO Do IGOs work RealisTs No no collecTive goals seek self inTeresT Liberals Yes noT perfecT buT They work UN mainTains peace and securiTy economic developmenT and human righTs Purpose seTTle conflicT wleasT use of force collecTive securiTy respecT sovereignTy UN charTer based on principles ThaT add up To The norm of non inTervenTion UN issue areas peace and sTabiliTy economic prosperiTy and human righTs STrucTure of The UniTed NaTions General Assembly GA ECOSOC UN Economic and Social Council 54 members voTed in and ouT by GA All sTaTes one sTaTeone voTe Focus on budgeT debaTe and more humaniTarian issues Needs 23 majoriTy InTernaTional CourT of JusTice ICS or World CourT CourT of UN Only hears sTaTe v sTaTe SecreTariaT Included The SecreTary General Does work bureaucracy of The UN Keeps member sTaTes informed SecreTary General 5 year Terms middlelesser powers NominaTed by Sec Council elecTed by General Assembly Try Gve Lie Norway 4652 resigned Dag Hammarskjold Sweden 5361 died in plane crash U ThanT Burma 6171 reTired Two Terms KurT Waldheim AusTria veToed by China for 3rd Term Javier Perez De Cuellar Peru 8291 declined 3rd Term nominaTion BouTros BouTrosGhali EgypT 9296 Kofi Annan Ghana 9707 Ban KiMoon S Korea currenT Sec General US essenTially fired BouTrosGhali dispuTes over peace keeping SecuriTy Council Where power lies in UN Deal wiTh all maTTers of force or sancTion Power heavily weighTed Towards PERM 5 China France Russia UK US They have power To veTo any subsTanTive resoluTion ResoluTions are lawlike 10 oTher members elecTed by Gen Assembly 2 year Terms sTarT Jan 1 5 replaced each year PERM 5 are only naTions recognized as having nuclear weapons Brazil Germany India and Japan make sTrongesT demand for permanenT seaTs Peacekeeping PK is noT in UN charTer LaTe 1940s need UN To inTervene in posTconflicT sTaTes This goes againsT The norm noninTervenTion 1948 need ground force in middle easT UNTSO UN Truce Supervision OrganizaTion 1949 UNMOGID UN MiliTary Observer Group in India and PakisTan Key figures in peacekeeping idea Ralph Bunche US LesTer Pearson Can and Dag Hammarskjold Swe Hammarskjold39s version of peacekeeping is TradiTional Tradi rionalClassical PK peacekeeping Ligh rly armed pos r conflic r small missions Moni ror and observe buffer repor r da ra unbiased repor ring Donquotr engage unless selfdefense PK His rory 19401980s Very few missions abou r a dozen from la re 50s To la re 80s Cold War domina res li r rle agreemen r in Sec Council UN canquotr in rervene in bipolar Cold War conflic rs Many ve roes When Cold War Ends beginning of 1989 i rs expensive bu r UN may be able To help Coopera rion in Securi ry Council PK expanded bc s ra res could coopera re wo fear of securi ry dilemma failed s ra res need help ex UNSC Coopera rion and Collec rive Ac rion in Iraq New Secre rary General Bou rros Bou rrosGhali 1992 Ghali wri res an agenda for peace calling for massive expansion UNDPKO UN Dep r of Peacekeeping is crea red UN fully commi r red ro PK Missions and examples of PK expansion Somalia YugoslaviaBosnia Kosovo Cambodia El Salvador Wes rern Sahara UNTAC Cambodia UN Transi rional Au rhori ry in Cambodia Huge manda re securi ry and civil 22000 rroops 17 bil 19921993 occupy CambodiaRefugee Repa rria rion 470000 disarmamen r of mili rary fac rions elec rions Hold an elec rion crea re poli rical par ries build economic and social ins ri ru rions wri re cons ri ru rion crea re a governmen r Leave in 1993 ini rially seen as a major success Bu r Khmer Rouge go back To being a Guerilla army wi rhin a year less op rimis ric Ini rial percep rions of success led ro Somalia in 1992 UNSC Resolu rion 751 crea res UNOSOM UN Opera rions in Somalia Manda repro rec r humani rarian mission of ge r ring food ro people UNITAF Unified Task Force US led opera rion Res rore Hope UNOSOM II UNSC Resolu rion 814 UNOSOM expanded mission To go af rer warlords Peacebuilding occurs bu r so does Mission Creep BaTTle of Mogadishu Black Hawk Downquot effecTively Turns US off of peacekeeping Role of MandaTes UNTAC was a huge mandaTe buT cosTs are a huge problem as are ouTcomes Somalia Cambodia and Bosnia are perceived as failures because ouTcomes were noT accepTable relaTive To The cosT Mission fail BouTros Ghali fail For modern peacekeeping To succeed There musT be inTernaTional consensus domesTic consenT and achievable realisTic mandaTes 199599 DownTurn New Sec General and conflicT conTinues ReTurn To peacekeeping STill expensive EasT Timor Kosovo Liberia sTill requires force sTill requires greaT power supporT All ends SepT 11m 2001 New world order for peace and securiTy new cooperaTion US pays dues several norm Powerful sTaTes pay Their duesquot InTernaTional Law laws ThaT apply To sTaTe acTors and scross borders There are Two imporTanT sources TreaTy Signed bilaTeral mulTilaTeral openbuilding block on inTernaTional law PacTa SunT Servanda TreaTies Should be Obeyed CusTom MusT be accepTed as a cusTom by sTaTes open leads To TreaTies Opino Juris CusTom Should Lead To TreaTy sTronger law 2 addiTional sources legal scholarship and lead principles Legal posiTivism posiTive law wriTTen codified signed InTernaTional law is based on sTrong inTernaTional norms These norms can change ReciprociTy muTual exchange of privileges Problems wiTh concepT BiggesT EnforcemenT difference beTween domesTic and inTernaTional law Who enforces Why ExTraTerriTorialiTy STaTe of being exempT from JurisdicTion of local law JurisdicTion When does inTernaTional law have JurisdicTion ICJ or World CourT InTernaTional CourT of JusTice is noT The mosT effecTive organ of The UN IT funcTions only for sTaTes ArbiTraTion body 15 JusTices 9 year Terms More Than a courT To hear crimes OpTional clause Allows sTaTes To make deliberaTions accepTing The courTs JurisdicTion aT compulsory required forced Nicaragua V US 1986 ICJ ruled in favor of Nicargua ICJ found US violaTed inTernaTional law by supporTing conTra guerillas in Their war againsT Nic GovernmenT and mined Nic Harbors US refused saying ICJ had no JurisdicTion over case End resulT Nic Gov wiThdrew Their complainT in 1991 OpTional clause doesn39T work so well Laws of war war crimes a body of law ThaT concerns accepTable JusTificaTions for war Jus Ad Bellum and The limiTs To accepTable warTime conducT Jus en Bello Tribunal sysTem Germany and Japanwar crimes commiTTed by individuals Nuremberg Nazi war criminals and some German MiliTary officers DoeniTz Tokyo appear To be successful buT There are problems VicTor39s JusTice whaT abouT crimes commiTTed by winners ADHOC for This purpose Tribunals occur afTer conflicT and genocide in Yugoslavia Rwanda ICTY InTernaTional Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia creaTed by UN Charged Milosevic Prez of Serbia and Yugoslavia wcrimes againsT humaniTy violaTing laws of war breached Geneva ConvenTions and alleged genocide He resigned died wiThouT verdicT ICTR InTernaTional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Akayesu sTood Trial for 15 counTs of genocide crimes againsT humaniTy and violaTions of Geneva ConvenTion GuilTy for 9 counTs life imprisonmenT AgreemenT There needs To be a permanenT courT To hear These cases InTernaTional Criminal CourT ouTlined in Rome STaTuTe 1999 IT covers crimes againsT humaniTy genocide war crimes crimes of aggression TreaTy binging in April 2002 when 60 counTries had raTified Now 105 counTries have Joined all of Europe LaTin America Japan Korea and a furTher 38 sTaTes have signed buT noT raTified Israel Sudan and US have quotunsignedquot China India and Russia are also noT members Iran Iraq PakisTan US and Rome STaTuTe ClinTon signs buT never pushes To SenaTe for raTificaTion Bush elecTed and pulls signaTure off documenT in 2002 SOFA STaTus of Forces AgreemenT an agreemenT beTween a counTry and a foreign naTioni sTaTioning miliTary forces in ThaT counTry ComplemenTariTy Principle ThaT highed Judicial body can only Take prosecuTorial jurisdicTion or auThoriTy in cases where The lower Judicial sysTem is noThas noT been invesTigaTing or prosecuTing a crime CourT has only invesTigaTed 4 siTuaTions N Uganda Dem Republic of Congo ConTral African Republic and Darfur CourT indicaTed 14 people 7 free 2 died 5 are in cusTody Major differences beTween ICC and Tribunals ICC clears some of Tribunals problems VicTor39s JusTice ADHOC Tribunals noT sTanding no clear posiTive law deals wiTh individuals deals wiTh new crimeshumaniTarian US wanTs Tribunals because They are deTermined by UNSC essenTially US and PERM 5 have power UNSC in 2005 sends Sudanese suspecTed was criminals To ICC obviously US wanTs Tribunal UNSC says no could be major issue in fuTure ICC based on complemenTariTy based on US law UCMJ Uniform Code of MiliTary JusTice IS does invesTigaTe prosecuTe convicT and senTence ExTraTerriTorialiTy is respecTed Human RighTs AfTer WWII human righTs an issue UN creaTes a commiTTee universal declaraTion of human righTs Eleanor ReesevelT 1948 ITs Truly universal in coverage and applicaTion buT iT is hard To implemenT noT enforceable Unique sTaTemenT of clariTy 30 arTicles specifying human righTs To all people Human righTs are basic freedoms and righTs To which all humans are enTiTled Civil and poliTical righTs are a class of righTs and freedoms ThaT proTecT individuals from unwarranTed gov acTion and ensure one39s abiliTy To parTicipaTe in civil and poliTical life of The sTaTe wo discriminaTion or repression Economic social and culTural righTs To food To parTicipaTe in culTure To be TreaTed wiTh respecT and digniTy To work and To educaTion in some counTries The Cold War makes quotuniversalquot difficulT To enfore BaskeTquot Approach group issues inTo caTegories for consideraTion by member sTaTes Dealing wiTh one baskeT aT a Time Three views of human righTs Universal righTs Jack Donnelly Based on all righTs for all people ComponenT of human digniTy Basic RighTs Henry Shue Privileges cerTain righTs as necessary for any righTs SecuriTy subsisTence and poliTical CulTural RelaTivism culTure maTTers To ID righTs CulTural ExcepTionalism US Islam eTc DeaTh PenalTy FGM eTc STaTes use culTure for Their purposes Human righTs are subjecT To sTaTe inTeresT ArgumenTs beTween views occur CulTural relaTivism argues for accepTance of differenT culTures ThaT may have pracTices ThaT conflicT wiTh human righTs Universalism has been described as culTural economic or poliTical imperialism Imperialism means unequal relaTionship quotempirequot Female circumcision is an example of The before menTioned argumenT IT39s noT mandaTed by any religion buT iT has become TradiTion IT39s considered a violaTion of women39s human righTs and ouTlawed in some counTries US DeaTh PenalTy CulTural relaTivism used by sTaTes To JusTify Their policies European Union developed very slowly Today iT is The mosT supranaTional member sTaTes Transcend naTional boundaries or inTeresT To share in decisionmaking and voTe on issues perTaining To The wider grouping insTiTuTion The EU was creaTed gradually over decades FuncTionalism BoTTom Up Vs Top Down InsTiTuTion NexT IndusTrial CooperaTions Schumann Plan 5139 6 European Coal and STeel Commission IT39s The firsT insTiTuTional sTrucTure of currenT EU IndusTry CooperaTion W Germany France ITaly Belgium NeTherlands Luxembourg Coal and STeel FOREIGN POLICY REVIEWKeywords and concepts for exam 2 Key Difference between IR Theory and Foreign Policy 0 Role of the individual they make decisions INDIVIDUALS MATTER 0 IR Meanwants to predict general outcomes war peace trade cooperate etc 0 Foreign Policy determines how and when specific outcomes will take place So while foreign policy can be guided by theoretical ideas about realism liberalism constructivism etc ie you can have a realist foreign policy HOW it is made is more concerned with PROCESS and the individual and state level variables DECISIONMAKING Foreign Policy is o a strategy Foreign Policy defined as a process 0 spells out goals and objectives 0 spells out tactics or methods Three primary variables to consider looks a lot like levels of analysis Individuals making the process H v 2 Type of state and society that they function in size wealth type of regime population size natural resources history political culture 3 International context within which they operate Biggest problem with foreign policy decisionmaking RATIONALITY In IR Theory states are rational In For Pol Decision making individuals are supposed to be rational BUT they are subject to values and beliefs unique personalities and experiences and different levels of RISK AVERSIONACCEPTANCE STILL RATIONALITY IS ASSUMEDactors ARE rational THREE SYSTEMATIC WAYS THAT INDIVIDUALS DIVERGE FROM PURELY RATIONAL MODELS OF DECISION MAKING 1 Misperceptions and selective perceptions how you see things 2 Affective biases 0 how individuals FEEL about the other 0 the other is psychological for the adversary or who the policy is directed at o likedislike caredon t care etc w 0 Examples include Does Bush HATE Saddam Why does US intervene in Genocide in Bosnia but not in Rwanda is there a preference for the people does the US like or care more for Bosnians is there a bias Cognitive biases defined as how rationality might be limited by cognitive or each individuals brain may create bias towards the other justi cation of effort wishful thinking enemy image mirror image historical analogies Vietnam Munich etc Appeasement in Munich Quagmire in Vietnam how do these apply to US action in Iraq Models of decision making Come from Graham Allison Allison suggests three models What are they Allison s models Bureaucratic Politics model notes that different agencies with competing interests are involved in the decision making process and they ultimately bargain for outcomes they are rational but seek their own interest as the best means to national interest examples include State Department vs Department of Defense DOD or Afghanistan Specialist in State vs Counterterrorist specialist in State etc interest and bargaining are key Government Bargaining Model Organizational Process Model sumes goal and objectives are already established Makes decisions based on standard operating procedures SOP s that already exist Competing SOP s can result in 1 compromise of SOP s or 2 one dominant SOP But this is most relevant to the vast majority of lowlevel decisions which usually leave out the top level of decision making ie midlevel appointments within embassy structures ceremonial practices with other states in their countries etc RATIONAL MODEL or RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL Assumes the process is rational and predictable clarify goals 2 prioritize goals 3 list alternative policies 4 investigate consequences of likely policies 5 select the best or most rational policy Uncertainty is still factored in RISK is still factored in Multiple goals of decisionmakers are a big problem which goal is most important or most achievable H v NixonKissinger model NOT Allison 0 unique because of its structure 1 must have harmony between advisor and president 2 must have president completely active in foreign policy 3 must have a context that allows for this type of decision making Cold War is good example 0 Examples US invades Cambodia bombs Cambodia Nixon to China Nixon to USSR role of Secretary of State William Rogers Presidential Management model not Allison ultimately accepts much of other models but reduces to most trusted advisors o collegial invites all salient opinions up front 0 presidential management system excomm 0 still depends on RISK aversion of most trusted group 0 Examples Bush I Kennedy possibly W Bush SOyou can see why there are systematic ways that individuals diverge from rationality but we can modify rationality to fit with reality a bit more 1 Bounded rationality 0 Optimizing preferred but not always possible with incomplete information etc o satisficing becomes common practice good enough to make decision GROUP DYNAMICS Comes from the book Positive and negative effects both have to do with rationality Psychological dynamics can occur within groups GROUPTHINK individuals will side with the group rather than present a dissenting opinion in the group Group Structure Goldstein Rules who makes them what are the procedures etc Whose preferencesinterests matter the most for agenda setting rule making Who is in the group Who decides who is relevant to the decision is it going to be the Afghanistan specialist the South Asia specialist the Undersecretary of State for regional affairs or Colin Powell himself or ALL of them the role of roles Public opinion in foreign policy in democracies does the public have a strong influence on foreign policy not so much NH vv cow v Readings Madeline Albright Bridges Bombs or Bluster Foreign Affairs SeptemberOctober 2003 httptinyurlcomkt2p cut and paste this URL into your browser for fulltext of the article what is her point generally KNOW THIS READ THIS ARTICLE What did the world think about US policies For that section on Foreign Policy I am adding a set of important readings The journal Foreign Affairs has published the foreign policy statements of the primary candidates for the 2008 US Presidential election I am posting this link 1 httpWWW 39J 39 nrg parinlllrnmpnign7nn International court of 39ustice ICJ1 As opposed to the permanent court of international justice from the League of nations PCIJ o didn t work because too powerful too rigid ICJ is the world court in the UN Can only hear cases of states 15 justices 9 year term 2 PERM 5 0 any act of enforcement goes through the security council not the court mostly advisory although quotcontinuous issuesquot No power to enforce 0 Nicaragua V US 1980 s anticommunist regime hard on the N people but good for us bc they get rid of communism 0 US sends illegal weapons and guns Evidence went to court 0 US lost amp they sanction the US UN Security Council Where the power lies in the UN 15 members 11 members originally 5 PERM I 0 Course of 2 years 0 2 comes in at the same time but never fromt he same region 0 some in latin america some in africa some in eastemwestem asia PERM have the veto can veto any substantive issue Resolution UN Security Council resolutions are lawlike they are powerful I 0 114 super majority o 96 vote is sufficient o no vote is vote against it Calls for expansion of the SC has been made I 0 countries like india japn germany brazil 0 the PERM has no interest in expanding o from 15 members to 23 members were some suggestions All peacekeeping I o N Korea expands South which cause it to be brought to the UNSC Soviets said theres gonna be not vote UN Peacekeeping Peacekeeping not in UN Charter In late 1940 s it was obvious that there is a need for UN Peaceeeping Goes against the norm of non0intervention 1948 need a force on the ground in the middle east UNTSO UN truce Sup Pearson strong in peacekeeping spent a lot on peacekeeping Chapter 6 of UN Charter How they are going to use negotiations to keep peace Chapter 7 how to use for to enforce peace Chapter 65 Developed from NEED hammarskij old expands in the 195039s Suez Crisis 5657 around the Suez Canal 0 British France made a 10 mile radius 0 Egypt doesn39t get the canal o if Russian solders land American solders will land Nuclear War TraditionalClasssical 4080 s blue Helmet lightlyequiped multinational force don t intend to change anything they are just in the way must sign a cease re before they can come in they watch and report whats going on they are the quotbufferquot 0 Must ask for permission to attack When cold war ends it will change a lot 0 O O O O O Peacekeeping l940 s80s very Few missions cold what dominates little agreement in th secuirty council All con icts are part of the bipolar cold war structure New era ofpeacekeeping 1 End of cold War means states can cooperate without the fear of security dilema 2 End of cold war means states are pulling out of other areas there is a vacuum and a new need for peacekeeping Failed states example of unsc cooperation and collecte acrtive in iraq 3 New secretary General Boutris Boutros Gali 0 An agenda for peace 1992 quotthe time of absolute sovereignty is passedquot 0 which means they borders are passed more now then they have ever been Moved from postcon ict to getting in the new way Massive 139 ofI 39 39 9095 they now actively engage in con ict a shit load of money 3 billion Gulf War is a collective action Missions expand in terms of O O O 0 Size Mandate Expense Extent of use of force Cambodia and UNTAC Case Study Given independence in 1954 King of Cambodia wants to rule as prime minister O O 0 Has mixed feelings of whom he likes France China Loas Rejects all thing capitalist but like elections 1970 he went to France and cant come back because it was aken over by VN O they quotinvitedquot the US over They start cambodia year Zero no tech no industry etc sent out into country side and just grow crops and if they dont they get killed Autogenocide Cambodians killing other Cambodians based on different beliefs Most VN around Cambodia were killed so they wont infect the purity of the new state 0 197879 VN attacks Cambodia short war of3 months and VN occupies Cam VN tries to stabilize cam Cambodian Peoples Party The most mined Country in the world They representation in the Cambodia is made up of O The royal party the Khmero Rouge 7 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 19911993 0 0 00000 0 Massive peace building they Enforce troops well armed engineers political scientist road bulder police lawyers doctors etc they try to get refugees out of camp and put them where they want to go they reach 998 of refugees 470000 They create an electoral system by creating political parties they register populations without telephone lines the elections are monitored by UN election monitors they got 982 people to vote They rebuild cambodia entirely in 15 years 17 billion Intial evalutaions were very positive I 0 quotJewel in the crown of UN PKquot 0 elections were held refudges returned most polical vilence was ended government created etc 0 but Khmer Somalia 1992 theres not government in somolia ran by warlords they also have Famine and Drought UN tries to help by providing food but warlords take the food to quotwinquot the quotwarquot UNOSOM Protect humanitarin mission of getting food to people convoy protection Bush loses elcetion Dec 92 UNITAF US Led Force 0 expanded the mission of UNOSOM and was successful 25000 troops UNSC Res 814 UNISOM II 0 turn Somalia into a democracy 0 try to destroy loser and nd best quotwarlordquot Mission Creep o expanded mandate on what was originally designed 0 go in feed the people get it done 0 do things on the found and expanding it people getting killed Battle of Mogadishu quotBlack Hawk Downquot effectively turns US off of Peacekeeping Former Yugoslavia Ethnic Con ict atrocities on all sides UNPROFOR Feb 1992 protect all parties in key ares of con ict Mixed Effort LONG TERM pk ops are still in BosniaNATO 1995 Srebrenica Massacre Requires great power agreement Dayton 1995 Show LONG TERM DIFFICULTY of pk Rwanda political con ict postcold war con ict tribal con ict hutustutsis Peace keeping led by Canadian Romeo Dallaire o wants to stop whats going on but SC wont let him 8200001 million killed that was broadcasted on the news The SC still said they weren39t sure it was genocide but instead civil war the French and Americans were not in Rwanda When the UN got around to do something it was late 0 the genocide was done in a very short amount of time if peacekeeping isn39t doing anything then they are in trouble End of Euphoric period of PK up until 1990 few PK ops classical in nature 1990 1995 nearly 2 dozen major operations it stops because there are no missions US wants to spend less they don39t want to start war bc they want to start peace us stop paying dues dues crisis and budgetary problems Conditions needed for Modern PK to succeed 1 Must have domestic consent of parties Cambodia Somalia Rwanda Must Have International consensus great powers regional powers west Sahara Bosnia Yugoslavia 3 Must Have realistic or achievable mandates Somalia Western Sahara N 199599 US dues crisis new UN sec General Perceptions of failure Rise of Regionals Nato mission creep EU AU etc 19901 In 99 UN tries it againin East Timor Kosovo Liberia 0 Still expensive requires force great power Seems to work pretty well until 2001 when US and great powers shift their attention to the War on Terror theres still PK but its just less supported by the great powers International Law Laws that apply to stste actors and across borders I o we have it because states want it 0 they want a written document Based on strong int norms they change Reciprocity we sign it because we dont want you to do but its okay of we do it serious inherent problems in concept Biggest Problem 1 Enforcement 0 difference between domestic and international law who enforces it is very difficult to enforce 3 EXtraterritoriality O the laws of one states shall not stand in judgment of international law if it goes with our law then it doesn39t work for us 5 Jurisdiction Who tries where for what contractors aren t protected from court Source of International Law 2 most important sources 0 treaty what we mostly focus on O we agree to it signed biaterateral multilateral binding and has teeth broken might lead to war pacta sunt servanda treay should be obeyed pacta sunt servanda treaties should be obeyed 0 Custom customary Law 0 theres a strong opinion that its illegal but its not written down opinio juris custom should lead to treaty stronger law 1 customary law cant but 2 let if happen to yourself 3 there has to be a historical record on customary law Two additional Sources legal scholarships look at great writers philosophers over time and use what they say to apply law and legal principles Legal positivism positive law written codified signed 0 clear agreed upon enforceable and believable international law International court of justice UN world court is not th most effective organ on the UN optional clause US signed it for US and others to adhere to the court If the court offers up something then you basically agreed to what they say 0 after US opted out so did half of the UN states 0 US vs Nicaragua Doesn t work so well US What are you going to do about it Laws of War War Crimes Jus ad bellum laws of warlaws to go to war legal justification to go to war 0 States cannot go to war for self gain 0 What you cannot do in war Look at PPT O POW39s cannot be tortured abused and cannot be killed 0 Why do we agree Jus in bello war crimes End of WWII shows the need to prosecute these crimes Germanygenocide holocaust Japan Bataan Death March etc Tribunal System Develop from need Germany Japan who commits war crimes Individuals Not States No Laws No courts then the courts and the law were created they just make one up as needed most of the japanese and german defendants did not seen as fair William Hawsey I o Doenitz Case Doenitz accused of war crime H gets a medal D gets screwed Important Cold War no tribunals 0 due to grid lock and security Tribunals and call for a new Court Post cold war failed states Rwanda and Yugoslavia Genocide prosecute via Tribunals UN Creates ICTY ICTR o hear cases for people in just that are who has been convicted of war crimes and humanitarian Etc They have jurisdiction of over individuals and not states Ad Hoc No standing court not fair doing pretty good work but there is still ad hoc O O O 0 not happening where bad stuff is happening US state Dept ask for permanent court to hear cases that matters AGAINST INDIVIDUALS International Criminal Court ICC 1999 internationals actors lawyers etc out together the Rome Statute I 0 what does it seek to do Read This is what the court should do how they should do it and what a crime does I 0 major states sign the treaty Clinton signed it even though that he knows the Senate would not ratify it I 0 they believe that the ICC and the senate should not be in the same room 0 both the republicans and democrats did not agree with the treaty It clearly de nes genocide war crimed and crime of aggression has 114 members and dozens more seeking to ratify next year 119 Who s in it all of Europe Latin America japan Indonesia Malaysia Korea Who is not in it Iran Iraq Russians Pakistan China 0 US believes that theres a CHANCE that they will hear cases against Americans taking away due process 14th amendment against humanity genocide war crimes etc SOFA agreement status of force agreement between two states laws of jurisdiction Complementarity the court is there to supplement and fix the glitch in the the international not not to replace but to complement it o for court to hear jurisdictional case they first have to 2 l the country solder does the the country here he is from have a robust active Judical process Yes 2 is the country in question willing try the the person with their law is there evidence that the US will prosecute Yes 3 is the countrystate ever say they will refuse to prosecute for political purposes No 0 As long as we maintain those three standards they will not go to international court We are the trend setters we are good and not bad VERY hard for the ICC to get a case since 2002 they only had 5 cases came from Sudan and Democratic of Congo ICC vs Tribunals Advantages of ICC what happens the ICC has things we have to deal with Laws of War War Crimes Victor Justice Ad Hoc No standing court not fair There must be written law deals with individuals new crimes humanitarian Human Rigl1ts Universal declaration of human rights 1948 UDEC what do we mean Its a straight forward list a statement with no legal binding authoritylaw life liberty security no slavery o torture or inhumane actions against others Cold war dominates the argument basket I 0 civil and political US 0 economic social and cultural rights soviets Many countries have signed both states still use human rights for their own interests because it happens all the time I 0 Cold War 0 War on Terror Patriot Act 0000 3 Views of Human Rights Universal Rights Jack Donnelly o All rights to all people at all times 0 Component of Human dignity to have human rights is to have access to rights rights at all times reguardless Basic Right Henry Shue o guarantee the most important rights and the others will follow 0 subsistence shelter and food security right not to be killed and political US Position Cultural Relativism o that varieties of cultures can argue out rights if it part of their culture eg Islam womens right to vote 0 death penalty 0 states use culture for their purposes 0 HUman rights are subject to state interest Intro to IPE 9 a Role if institutions Mercantislisimneomercantilism supply and demand states have signi cant role in what market should do and not Vice versa pertectionism pertectionism a policy or strategy of how international trade regulation should be I 0 you should protect your own domestic goods 0 Why should we protect O political demands from special interest domestic politics US and the tariff on foreign steel for political gain infant industries mayasian cars national security responseretaliation to predatory policies dumping one states dump one product into another state without want of pro t but to wipe out other companies underwear Methods of protectionism I o tariffs mostly illegal with manufactured good 0 free trade try to stop this quotas establish limitation on size weight measurement etc 0 spashottubs subsidies a cash despersment from the state the states give money to the companies allowances tax breaks to apply to marketing and shippment costs 0 most prominent form of protectionism restrictionregulationsred tape nontariff barriers any excue we come up with to get around tree trade 0 toyota high luX surfs does not meet standard regulations it also protects the American auto mobile industry WTO asia shrimp boats and saVing turtles gt red tape 0 O O o dumping one states dump one product into another state without want of profit but to wipe out other companies undenNear 0 economic nationalism buy American 0 illegal to say quotdon t buy Japanese carsquot but saying quotbuy Americanquot is okay Japanese case study on protectionism 0 Japan was developed but destroyed in WW1 o soon it might beat the US in the most powerful economic state in the world 0 due to protectionism they are going to create a ministry MITI O which crates a partnership with business to make their business work give them money an export based model not only in japan but around the world Infant industry for new business in japan state is going to pay and do everything they can from the start so they wont get picked off 0 rst you need to have a rm domestic consumer by putting tariffs and quotas on American cars 0 The Japanese then target the American suburbs O they pay Americans to sell Japanese cars 196970 gas prices double Japanese cars are more fuel ef cient 0 After they have est a reliable market they now tried to stop tariffsquotas etc on cars Globalization and free trade Regime Globalization knocking down barriers to free trade The expansion of free trade everywhere by opening up all marketd and states to the global economy Antiglobalization focus on negative effects of expanded free trade I 0 environment sea turtles dolphin deforestation industrial output 0 labor conditions limitations and wages etc 0 human rightsculture Logic of free trade v protests I 0 why protest institutions why not the states themselves quot 39 quot quot quot39 quot and free trade Bretton woods no ITO so you need GATT general agreement on tariffs and trade 0 they seek to lower tariffs 0 nal round Uruguay 19861994 Biggest problem with free trade SO9039s and in the GATT REVIEW SHEET CHAPTER 1First Exam POLI105 INTRO TO IR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IR As subfield of POLITICAL SCIENCE a SOCIAL SCIENCE Issue areas of IR scholars and foreign policy makers focus attention on global trade environmental issues or specific con icts IndiaPakistan and ArabIsraeli con icts A mix of con ict and cooperation Subfields Security studies The movements of armies and diplomats the crafting of treaties and alliances the development and deployment of military capabilities IPE International Political Economy international security studies Study trade relations and financial relations among nations and how the cooperation politically to create and maintain institutions that regulate the ow ofinternational economic and financial transactions Theory explanations applied across cases logical with good empirical evidence Social science theory seeks to explain social phenomena NOT PROVE Goal of IR theory Logic and debate Solve or predict problems to improve the world Generalizability generalize explanations apply to as many cases as possible What should theory do Provide a Causal explanation Use empirical evidence Work from a solid and coherent core logic Logic and Evidence are key Independent variable X the cause Dependent variable Y the outcome ex Dictators X cause war Y X Y X is the first best cause Causal chain causal tale Causal mechanisms PARSIMONY Least amount of variety in explanation of the outcome The smaller amount ofX variables that cover the most outcomes the stronger the theoretical explanation International system States interact within a set of welldefined and long established quotrules of the game governing what is considered a state and how states treat each other The State key unit of analysis what is a state States are separate from territories autonomous answer to no higher authority States should pay attention not to the intention of other states but to their capabilities They are sovereign actors World Views or core principles from Goldstein Dominance relates to realism Solving collective goods problems by imposing solutions hierarchically those at top control those below Reciprocity relates to liberalism Effective strategy for in uencing another actor whose plans are not known A response in kind to the other s actions Uses positive forms of leverage as promises of rewards if the actor does what one wants but also uses negative forms ofleverage as threats ofpunishment if the actor doesn t refrain from doing what one does not want Identity relates to constructivism Changing participants preferences based on their shared sense ofbelonging to a community How do they relate to theories Anarchy Not complete chaos yet a lack of central government that can enforce rules what is it No authority over a state Difference between international anarchy and domestic politics SOVEREIGNTY At least in principle the government has the right to do whatever it wants in its own territory most important international norm When does it appear Genocide Treaty ofWestphalia 1648 official start of sovereign state system Is sovereignty the absolute authority in 1648 Is the concept of the state weak or strong from the beginning When does it appear Do all states have it Is it equal among states KRASNER reading Levels of analysis What explains or causes outcomes under each level of analysis Unit level analyses Individual Domestic Systematic Structural First image level Individual Level A person or small group that causes international outcomes Great man theory of international relations EX Hitler rebuilt German war machine took over Nazi Party established himselfas a dictator He was a strong motivator and a large in uence Second image level State Level domestic Inside the sovereign state State centric whatever goes on in the state or is attributed to the state is causal What are the attributes of domesticstate level domestic politics regime change crisis or change WITHIN THE STATE nationalism WITHIN THE STATE ANYTHING THAT IS CENTRAL TO THE STATE not an individual or something beyond the state Domestic and Individual levels are considered UNIT LEVEL not STRUCTURE but UNITS WITHIN THE STRUCTURE EX Germany wanted to expand back to original boundaries Germany had eXtreme nationalism Third image level Systematic Structural Level level of causation is beyond state level eX Waves of nationalism around Europe Structures or system wide causes power interdependence etc more general quotSystems theory means SYSTEMIC OR STRUCTURAL variables are CAU SALLYANALYTICALLY PRIOR to unit level variables Structure of any given system is what matters as an independent variable EX WWII the fear ofweak Germany turning into strong Germany set in fear across the world EX2 Global financial depression GOLDSTEIN has a different view oflevels of analysis He sees the third image or structuralsystemic level as divided into the interstate and global levels Most scholars do not agree with a 4th level instead seeing the international system as a system of all states Kenneth Waltz know this guy Waltz notes the levels of causation or analysis Man the State and War Three quotImagesquot of causation he favors the 3rd image or systemic level Actors in international relations States NONSTATE ACTORS Multinational corporations Nongovernmental organizations NGOs Intergovernmental organizations IGOs International organizations IDs Blurred line of state vs nonstate HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF IR Pelopennesian Wars Thucydides Treaty ofWestphalia 1648 state system move from religious to secular quotpoliticalquot units 30 Years War States not really solid actors until end of Napoleonic Wars New organization of Europe NATIONALISM know this from Goldstein and lecture what it means Industrial revolution Selfdetermination First World War Interwar Period League of Nations Depression Second World War Cold War Post Cold War Post September 11th Proxy wars Geography and Chapter 1 Where are the major states Where do the wars take place In other words look at the mapsget a feel for the world Ioseph Lepgold Theorypolicy debate Believed there should be a balance between theory and policies you need policies to make theories 4 key arguments 1 IR is composed of many groups beyond this rift 2 institutions support integration 3 Shared goals of these groups and institutions make better policies based on good assumptions about actors motivations etc HELP THE STATESMEN to HELP THE STATE which informs theory 4 Some theories are more helpful Where does Lepgold position scholars and decisionmakers I II III IV Understand the role ofpower in IR Rational self interest States strive for the most power Are theorists informed by policy Important questionBush Nixon Kissinger Rice Powell all explicitly informed by students and professors of IR theory Falsifiability to falsify a theory all theories can be falsified because they are SOCIAL in natureno laws in social world Theoretical degeneration to add to the independent or add more independent variables hurts the strength of the explanation hurts parsimony Trying to explain every case by adding to the independent variable is DEGENERATION REVIEW2 Liberalism and alternatives to Realism Realist theory is posed against idealism Idealism is not a theory but more of a philosophical approach Realists say idealists are quotutopianquot or NOT REALISTIC Thus a theory of realism is grounded in science and logic not in what quotought to be So the response is a theory that says idealist underpinnings are okay but theory must be scientific and grounded in core assumptions logic and empirical evidence New way to explain international outcomes bunch of theories that are LIBERAL NOT TO BE CONFLATED WITH liberal as in perception ofleftwing These are different theoriesworldviews Major aws in realism 1 Static not over time 2 Does not explain cooperation and the international system is mostly about cooperation 3 Does not explain change very well end of the cold war 4 Only explains shortterm gains relative gains Philosophically LIBERALISM follows the ideas of Kant Adam Smith I S Mill Woodrow Wilson New Idealism the League ofNations post WWI Liberalism is generally based on 5 principles Law Morality Economic Institutions Collective Security In a single word liberals are about COOPERATION provides better security than power Dos address state interest but notes that a states interest is dependent on other states interests Power is not sufficient to explain cooperation Liberals see the role ofpower as less absolute grounded only in militarysecurity area States cooperate especially in economics trade but in spite of relative power considerations WHY LIBERALS say power is not enough They point to a fundamental problem THE GAINS debate Relative vs Absolute gains Know the logic of each For liberals absolute gains are what states seekPROFIT GENERALLYLiberalism explains IPE and nonsecurity issues better Realism does better with security stuff BUT each is a paradigm and each claims causal precedence over the other in all of IR Some Key differences between international and domestic politics Enforcement and institutions sovereignty and anarchy But for Liberals it is about cooperation vs con ict Collective Action Problem know the logic of collective action problem free riding incentives etc liberals say relative gains make states DEFECT this is bad all states who seek relative gains will defect thus NO COLLECTIVE ACTION again bad liberals note that 1 this is bad and 2 states DO commit to absolute gains in collective action realists cant explain this Neoliberalism approach that stresses the importance of international institutions in reducing the inherent con ict that realists assume in an international system Based on the core liberal idea that seeking long term mutual gains is more rational than maximizing individual short term gains The most powerful and competing strand ofliberalism THEORETICALLY SOUND COMPETITION TO NEOREALISM Robert Keohane 1984 quotAfter Hegemony Neoliberalism structural liberalism neoliberal institutionalism all the same Share basic core assumptions of neorealism ACTORS anarchy rationality states as unitary actors PRERENCES as fixed and even security seeking states They see nature and durability of institutions as the explanatory variable especially in explaining cooperation that results in absolute gains Does not accept distribution ofpower as the source of cause in IR For neoliberals INSTITUTIONS MATTER Neorealism Neoliberalism Actors States Actors States Preferences fixed security seeking Preferences fixed security seeking Ordering principles are different Ordering principles are different Distribution of material capabilities Powerful well ordered Institutions Primary difference is motivated by logic of absolute vs relative gains Game theory is helpful in spelling out the dilemmas and noting the choice setsPart of RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Need good and standardized conceptual tools to make good theories Prisoner s DilemmaDraw it logic of Realist vs liberal defect or cooperate Generally accept anarchy rationality state actors LONG TERM vs SHORTTERM gains Liberals want to Move away from the DD box The Game DEFECT or COOPERATE The prisoner s dilemma box is always going to have the same payoff Different payoffs are different games and thus different logic See the handout on the web for more details DC 4 No Iail CC 3 30 Days DD 2 5 Years CD 1 10 Years Defect not going to jail Look at model in notebook Equilibrium Nash equilibrium what is that Which equilibrium is quotbetterquot which box For liberals vs for realists How is this different ITERATED iteration Logic of PD is to defect for realists or maximizers But there is cooperation CC or 3 3 box WHY How to overcome uncertainty realists say it is Tit for tat but because ofpower issues liberals say it is reciprocity to cooperate similar logic different reasoning For realists it is still about power So how do liberals explain this CC33 cooperation or what facilitates or what is the mechanism of cooperation for neoliberals INSTITUTIONS They Matter but HOW Neoliberals RELY ON THEM AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE What is Keohane s argument duh read it They matter but how do they effect outcomes 1 expand time horizons slow down the ashpoint to overcome uncertainty 2 facilitate learning provide information to mitigate uncertainty provide data 3 transparencyinterdependencereciprocity 4 do the work monitoring make rules create standards norms etc from an unbiased reciprocal point ofviewsometimes just get in the way 5 mediationnegotiation space 6 LINKAGE Issue linkage State linkage Linkage is important because it forces states to think about how actions effect other issues and states makes states look more at longterm rather than short term balances power and gains through other interaction ie we might lose now but the power we gain from a linked interaction will add up to status quo or better LINKAGE matters a lot Regimes Krasner Regime Theory Issues institutions and organizations Krasner s definition of a regime Goldstein book quotinstitutions possessing norms decision rules and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations Theory of Collective Security All states contribute to the extent of their relative capabilities Collective security Assume all states will participate Alliances are not collective security It does not distinguish between states All states provide collective support against any aggressor Iraq 1991 is collective security Also Golf War and League of Nations universal membership aggressor is not predetermined failures of collective security collective action problem Collective defense State is pre determined as an aggressor Iraq 2003 is collective defense aggressor is defined alliance Democratic Peace Theory Democrats are more peaceful than non democrats Read Michael Doyle quotLiberalism and World Politics concurs with Kant s Views on liberal internationalism Monadic Democratic Peace less convincing democracies DO fight wars Dyadic Democratic Peace Groups of 2 empirically powerful few or not cases of dem ocracies ghting each other Clinton administration believes this explicitly Bush administration seems to have some faith as well REGIME CHANGE Liberals and core assumptions neoliberal vs neorealist liberal vs realist liberal sees states as individuals realists see states as one Liberal cooperation not anarchic the interaction between states hold a broders notion of power like cultural capitol Realist anarchic states must arrive at relations with other states on their own there is no higher executive power States are determined by a comparative level on power based on military and economics Faux Realism Legro amp Moravosik What does the Bush administration say about balancing power Says there are power threats around the world that Americans don t know about N Korea Iran Iraq Afgan Pakistan Lybia Seria Cuba Problem with theory In year 2000 those states aren t powerful goes againt realism non democracies are not a material threat What should they balance against if they are realist Material threats From what theory do we find the variables in Bush administration quotrealismquot in early 2001 Balance against what Immigration Ideology Regime type Race Culture none of these are material threats Feminism Goldstein don t get too bogged down in this Basic point for Feminist IR theorywhat is it scholars who have sought to bring gender concerns into the academic study ofinternational politics READINGS What is Tickner s point Who is she critiquing Keohane on International Regimes Legro and Moravcsik Faux Realism Wendt Important CRITICAL THEORY AND POSTMODERNISM Postmodernism is less salient Critical theory subsumes feminism postmodernism and to some extent Constructivism CRITICAL THEORY is a critique ofPOSITIVISM to a great extent a critique of positive theoretical cause and effect relationships Challenges the ideas ofparsimony and explicit causal relationships Positivism Research methodology Rigor Ontology RationalistMaterialist CONSTRUCTIVISM is the important critical theory in IR ConstructivistIdeational What is the debate about Alexander Wendt quotAnarchy is What States Make ofIt IMPORTANT central argument positive research program real theory Anarchy does not logically lead to power politics or selfhelp Power politics and selfhelp are institutions based on a social construction of anarchy Wendt s idea of constructivism is not about criticizing cause and effect it is about criticizing material structure vs ideational structure an ONTOLOGICAL debate Ideational Structure Social Construction of Politics Ideas Socialization processes Norms Constructivist critique of realism rationalism Rationalist Critique of constructivism Critical theories critique of constructivism Critical theoretical critique of rationalism Interest Formation Identity Mutually constituted construction ofpolitics and interestidentity Fixed versus socially constructed interests Stephen Walt as constructivist balance of threat N Korea vs UK Different identities of each actor Ideas all the way down REVIEW3 REVIEW SHEET POLI105 INTRO TO IR REALISM This is IR Theory again Logic and empirical evidence Predictive good theories should be Paradigm 2 ways for realism 1 as a collection of strong theories that share basic assumptions and a independent variable this is a definition of a paradigm 2 as the most accepted and critiqued theoretical tradition in IR the top dog of IR In other words Realism is a paradigm because ofl and 2 Power for all realists for classical realists matters a lot Relative Power know what this means Measures of Power for realists material military economic these are the primary measures for realism potential power less urgent important for DDT Realism where does it come from Idealism not a theory but an approach or worldview Realists believe biggest problem in IR is UNCERTAINTY Historical roots of realism Thucydides Peloponnesian War Goldstein Sun Tzu Machiavelli Hobbes Bismarck E H Carr 20 Years Crisis IIans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations Core assumptions of early realists CLASSICAL REALISM 1 states rational actors 2 states seek to have more power 3 balance of power is key determinant ofinternational politics For classical realists POWER is an end It is rooted in the balance ofpower systemic but also in a humanphilosophical idea that men lust for power individuals and states might matter and this aggregates up to the state there is something very prudent about classical realism Kenneth Waltz quotTheory of International Politics 1979 neorealism This is Waltz s second contribution to our study Introduction of neorealism is a HUGE tweak in the paradigm Differences between neorealism vs classical realism Core assumptions ofneorealism or structural realism 1 states are still rational unitary actors under condition of anarchy 2 states don t seek POWER they seek SECURITY power is not the preference or the deep interest it is the MEANS to the end not an end in itself 3 the system is ordered by the distribution of material capabilities balance of power Balance of Power distribution of material capabilities Relative Power and zerosum Core Assumptions of classical realism SEEK POWER vs Neorealism seek security Rationality Interest state interest PREFERENCES quotSelfhelpquot realists rely on Distribution ofpower or distribution of material capabilities IS the independent variable Classical Realism Power as an end and as a means in classical realism Morgenthau quotPolitics Among Nations E H Carr quotThe Twenty Years Crisis States seek power it is the Preference lust for power accept anarchy and the competitive nature of international system unit level causation is possible diplomacy individuals etc but usually systemic philosophy and science Neorealism structural realism systems theory rationality and anarchy unit level is reductionist all explanation is at the structural or systemic level of analysis state preferences are fixed states seek security not power for neorealist structure is the key variable Polarity poles of power determine the configuration of any international system Multipolar system Bipolarity Cold War Unipolarity today Kenneth Waltz Theory of International Politics Waltz and his gang of Neorealists want the least amount ofpoles of power bipolar is most stable or maybe even unipolar hegemonic Important distinction between classical realism and neorealism prudence vs automatic scientific nature ofneorealism Waltz poses neorealism as a microeconomic theorytheory of firms MUCH MORE SCIENTIFIC Lawlike Theory is about the system Units preferences of the units and ordering principles Units of the systemstates Preferences of the Unitssecurity Ordering principle of the system distribution of material capabilities balance of power power HOW states are ranked in the system is a relative measure ofpower vs other states in the system THUS in a given system the most powerful states matter the most Walt on Alliances Two options Balancing behavior important Bandwagoning important FAUX REALISM when are they writing right BEFORE 911 Axis of Evil speech what is the argument problems with quotnew realism logic quotAxis of Evilquot logic what is the independent variable in this article according to L amp M what is the US balancing against for realists the X variable must be POWER based relative power REALPOLITIK classical realism Kenneth Waltz as neorealist Waltz s primary contributions Man the State and War levels of analysis Theory of International Politics Neorealism We read Waltz in Aamp Three main Problems of realism 1 tend to be snapshots or static theory 2 long term is not well considered doesn t explain change well end of Cold War 3 Realism explains con ict but not cooperation Hegemony and hegemons Power Transition Theories basic idea of Power Transition Theories power over time is a better measure Hegemonic Stability Theory general logic of in a multipolar system a state with overwhelming or preponderant power will lend stability to the system a rising challenger will attack if it gains sufficient power to supplant the hegemon Dynamic Differentials Theory Dale Copeland Basic logic Bipolarity is less stable Perceived deep and inevitable decline Potential power perceived OVER TIME is very important The declining power will preemptively attack the rising challenger Is neorealist but not in favor of bipolarity These are systemic theories All realists speak to the SECURITY DILEMMA based on idea of uncertainty any increase in the securitypower of state A may create fear in state B that state B will then increase its relative power making A less secure this continues and creates a worst situation arms races spirals see also Goldstein text Iohn Mearsheimer quotAnarchy and Struggle for Powerquot Do states struggle for relative power What is his answer What is the ultimate goal for a state to be most secure what kind of system Iack Snyder quotOne World Rival Theoriesquot Thucydides quotMelian Dialoguequot How does this represent realism Power matters Hans Morgenthau quotA Realist Theoryquot Major problem in IR is uncertainty especially reinforcing ANARCHY know this definition and the need for selfhelp among sovereign states Prisoner s Dilemma and Realism 1 why is realism a quotdefection strategy what is the defection box all about 2 what is the motivation for realists in Prisoner s Dilemma relative gain 3 why can t they cooperate UNCERTAINTY ANARCHY 4 what is the Nash equilibrium DD box no player can get a better outcome with a single unilateral move Only can achieve gain through cooperation Realism argues against Idealism but Liberalism argues against logic of relative gains and failure to explain cooperation Realism is great at explaining con ict security but LIBERALISM is the theory that explains cooperation International Political Economy Human Rights International Organizations International Law etc Blackboard Notes History of Political Parties Republicans formed in 1854 over the issue of slavery 17901816 Federalists strong national government 18251829 National Republicans 18361852 Whigs 1854 Republican party formed Democrats 17961800 Ieffersonian antiFederalist didn t want the ratification of the Constitution 18011828 DemocraticRepublicans 1830 Democratic formed Struggle for democracy 1944White Primary ifyou didn t vote in the primary you couldn t vote in the regular election whites only 24th Amendment abolish poll taX 26th Amendment 18 year old vote Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed segregation in schools public places Voting Rights Act of 1965 African American vote Characteristics of two parties 2 Party system single member districtwinner take all decentralized no quotthequot political party in the US Democrats and Republicans dominate Causes of two party system History Moderate views ofvoters Structure of electoral system Flexibility ofparties when a third party comes the other 2 adopt their issues to wipe them out Functions of political parties 1 Select candidates 2 Conduct election campaigns 3 Articulate and debate major issues 4 Formulate and implement programs 5 Organize public opinion 6 Bring interests together form coalitions Conditions for an election to be a Mandate 1 Competing candidates offer clear policy alternatives 2 Voters concerned with policy voters usually don t care 3 Method to ascertain the preference of the majority the majority doesn t even vote 4 Elected officials who abide by the position they took during the campaign voting for the quotleast bad candidate 4 stages of Presidential Elections 1 Positioning logrolling support issues fundraising etc 2 Primary Kennedy was the first NEW HAMPSHIRE is where the first primaries are held each year caucus chooses candidates 3 Convention the first convention was for ANDREW JACKSON 1828 4 Campaign Proportional Representation maximizing reputation of voters no electoral college makes it more democratic Ifyou say you have 40 of the vote in the party you get 4 votes Party Percent of Vote Number of Seats A 40 4 B 30 3 C 20 2 D 10 1 100 10 Presidential Elections are steadily increasing in cost year by year This increasing cost has candidates relying more on soft non regulated money along with personal contributions For example the 2004 election cost 4 billion It takes at least 5 million to run a successful Senate campaign and a seat in the House of Rep can cost 2 million Abraham Lincoln spent 100000 to run in 1860 In 1988 George Bush and Michael Dukakis spent 922 million In 1996 the over all Presidential election cost between 600 million and 1 billion Cost of Presidential elections 2004 4 billion 2000 3 billion 1966 22 billion 1962 18 billion 1971 Congress passed Federal Election Campaign Act created the Federal Election Commission provided public financing for presidential primariesgeneral


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"Knowing I can count on the Elite Notetaker in my class allows me to focus on what the professor is saying instead of just scribbling notes the whole time and falling behind."

Anthony Lee UC Santa Barbara

"I bought an awesome study guide, which helped me get an A in my Math 34B class this quarter!"

Bentley McCaw University of Florida

"I was shooting for a perfect 4.0 GPA this semester. Having StudySoup as a study aid was critical to helping me achieve my goal...and I nailed it!"


"Their 'Elite Notetakers' are making over $1,200/month in sales by creating high quality content that helps their classmates in a time of need."

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