GLOBAL ISSUES PSCI 4783
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This 31 page Class Notes was uploaded by Modesto Renner on Thursday October 29, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PSCI 4783 at University of Colorado at Boulder taught by Joseph Jupille in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 20 views. For similar materials see /class/231923/psci-4783-university-of-colorado-at-boulder in Political Science at University of Colorado at Boulder.
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Date Created: 10/29/15
Clare Skinner Article examines the I new orders in East As the current new ord39 Looks far aarRecurrent patterns SiCommen elements SEGenerall tendencies Influence Air interregnumt cunr wReasons for inte JEB rImplosion of Sovne sy EBPresence of communism EiNo perceived new threat EERegion s powers unwillingness to take the Head Growing Power to Sh a W We are witnessing a distribution of power Emergence of Asian Nationalism remains the most powerwa poiitical emotion in the imdem worldquot East Asia39s Fragiie Foundations If a new order is to be stable and endwlring it must re ect the dismbmtion of power in the regionquot Energy Concerns W China s oii import req 60 000 bariels iay to m elmpomance of the US eminence links dominan m economic power and could rav quote strong stabilizing force in regionquot Recurrent Trends in the Rate ef Japan in New Oers No single person not even the prime minister has the autharity in make a decisien Ques Wiili East Asia turn ta meet their increasing wiili the US react t0 relatianship 4mg Asian nations industrialize and naticnnlism increases do you think it will increase tension among other natiens in the region Wiii it create antiWestern sentiments The Basic Political Economy of Trade Key Concepts Classical 0 Absolute Advantage country A is more efficient at producing all of the relevant goods than is country B 0 Comparative Advantage specialization on the basis of comparative opportunity costs Source Adam Smith he Invisible Hand The individual intends only his own security and by directing his industry in such a manner as its produce may be of greatest value he intends only his own gain and he is in this as in many other cases led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it Adam Smith The Wealth of Nations Vork Modern Library 1937 1776 p 423 Ricardo s Theory of Comparative Advantage Portugal England Wine 80 120 Cloth 90 100 These are the labor costs of production Note that Portugal has an absolute advantage in the production of both goods Yet it still makes sense for Portugal and England to specialize and exchange Let s look at a more contemporary example Com parative Advantage TABLE 91 Cornparanve Advantage and he Gains from Free Trade mLm Pmriucrivily reffan Sp cirzliznn39nn Spmriall39zarion paquot you Specialization i 0 Trade Wm Trade Country Camera Colnpurer Camera Colnpurer Camera Computer Camera Computer npan 9 3 900 300 990 270 910 300 Unilcd Suirgt 4 2 400 200 320 40 400 210 Japan has an absolute advantage in the production of both goods But through specialization and exchange both countries can generate a surplus in the good that they produce relatively efficiently or relatively less inefficiently all while enjoying the same amount of the good that they produce relatively inefficiently Each countn is better off and the world is better off Such a process thus satisfies the condition of Pareto f iciency Source Kegiey and thkopf Comparative Advantage Worker Productivity an US World Cameras per hour Computers per hour 3 2 Domestic Out ut 100 er Countr er Cameras 900 400 1300 Computers 300 200 500 Out utAfter S eCialiZation move 10 of Workforce Cameras 990 320 Computers 27D 240 Available After Exchange Cameras 910 400 1310 Computers 300 21D 51D a an has an absolute advantage in the production of both goods But through specialization and exchange both countries can generate a surplus in the good that they produce relatively efficiently or relatively less inefficiently all while enjoying the ame amount of the good that they produce relatively inefficiently Each country is better off and the world is better off Such a process thus satisfies the condition of Pareto efficiency Source Derived from Kegley andenkopr table 91 Key Concepts Neoclassical HeckscherOlin Theorem country will have CA in producing those goods the production of which employs abundant factors StolperSamuelson Theorem under specialization returns to relatively abundant factors will increase and those to relatively scarce factors will decrease Protectionism Quota quantitative restriction Tariff tax on imports Nontariff barriers NTBs Voluntary export restraints VERs Content regulations Use American Procurement policies Buy American Regulatory standards Technical standards 06 The Governance Problem Generic Outline Preliminaries Lisa Martin s Article Exercise Common Dilemmas and Functional Solutions Implications for Trade Governance H Martin Interests Power amp Multilateralism Key Claim Institutional governance choices can be well understood as responses to the dilemmas that actors face Many different dilemmas can arise in international relations and they demand different institutional solutions A wide variety of institutional forms populate the international system Harmony Player 2 A B A 3 2 5 E m 2 3 1 1 B No governance required self regulating self enforcing Coordination Game P1 2 L ayer L 00 Player 1 00 R The game has two equilibria that are equally satisfacton to the players Reaching agreements may be hard Governance through information provision facilitation of preference revelation etc that can help identify focal point solutions Agreements once reached are self enforcing Battle of the Sexes Chris B 00 Pat 00 The game has twoquilibria but actgtrs disagree at out which is prefereable Reaching agreements may be hard both because of the need to coordinate and because of 39 over 39 39 39 Governance institutions can help in identifying coordinated equilibria and in facilitating repeat play which in turn can promote strategies of reciprocity r Krasner 1991 power may also figure centrally in determining which equilibrium prevails Agreements once reached are selfenforcing Prisoner s Dilemma Pla er2 C y C 3 3 14 41 D The DD equilibrium is suboptimal both players prefer CC Reaching agreements is easy enforcing them is difficult Functional governance institutions will thus facilitate monitoring and enforcement Player 1 IV Implications Since global trade rarely involves games of Harmony dilemmas arise that can be addressed through institutional governance solutions Different sorts of dilemmas demand different sorts of institutional solutions We see a wide variety of governance arrangements in the area of global trade 05 The Governance Problem Specmc Outline I Preliminaries II The Modern International System A States B Anarchy C StatesinAnarchy III Governance wo Government A The Governance Problem B Hegemonic Stability Theory HST C International Institutions IV Implications Modern Int l System A States Sovereignty right of final decision in a given territory Key but not only Actors B Anarchy Absence of rule Insecurity C StatesinAnarchy Quest for Security Promote Economic Growth Defend Autonomy Focus on Relative Gains C4 Absolute vs Relative Gains l US ChMa Refuse 4 Trade Deal Accept Trade Deal 5 15 The above are payoffs say in additional GDP growth over time for a hypothetical trade deal between the US and the People s Republic of China Would you accept the deal C4 Absolute vs Relative Gains ll US Canada Refuse Trade Deal 2 4 Accept Trade Deal 5 15 Now would you accept the deal A Governance Problem A 9159 In the SmithRicardo liberal world of trade order emerges spontaneously and governance is either unnecessary or easily supplied In the real world thou h overnance may be bene cial the lnvisib e and may not operate effectively Stolper Samuelson domestic distributional consequences may induce relative closure informational problems may plague international Interact ons Under anarchy monitoring and enforcement may be weak States may be unwilling or unable to risk dependence on others Etc IIIC International Institutions Institutions frameworks of rules May have organizations underpinning them Institutions as solutions to dilemmasproblems Institutions as instruments of hegemonic management Institutions in the absence of hegemony may arise among or led by small groups of states 6 Institutions may come to exert independent effects socialization 99quot U stickiness B Hegemonic Stability 1 Grieco amp Ikenberry the openness and stability of the world economy depends on the presence of a hegemonic power that acting in its own enlightened selfinterest plays the role of organizer and supervisor of the world economy p 1 1 1 Questionable assumption hegemons prefer openness Key claim hegemony allows the Collective Action Problem to be overcome 1 IV Implications Same themes that have arisen throughout this part of the class Economy Politics Political Economy Governance Demand Supply Next Time Governance as Institutional Choice
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