Chapter 10 and 11
Chapter 10 and 11 CPO 2002
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This 6 page Class Notes was uploaded by Sabrina Notetaker on Sunday November 1, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to CPO 2002 at Florida State University taught by Quintin Beazer in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 92 views. For similar materials see INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS in Political Science at Florida State University.
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Date Created: 11/01/15
1020 Chapter 10 Types of dictatorships A monarchy relies on kin and family network to come power and stay in power 0 Royal family determines succession Military dictatorships are often ruled by committee of Junta o the size of the junta vanes depending on ruler o guardians of the national interest 0 biggest threat to stability is more military coups civilian dictatorship relies on regime parties or personality cults to stay in power 0 ex china and north Korea A dominant party dictatorship is where one party dominates office and control over policy 0 communist party PRI in Mexico A personalistic dictator is where the leader controls all policy decisions and selection of regime 0 weaken others to present challenges 0 weak parties military press 0 strong secret police 0 cult of personality Personality cults help leaders hold on to power by citizen s beliefs electoral authoritarianism is where leaders hold elections and tolerate variation in elections in dictatorships 0 competition 0 suffrage o competitiveness o electoral system Selectorate Theory 0 Assumes that political leaders are motivated by the desire to gain and maintain office even if they have other goals political competition forces them to pursue and maintain of ce 0 whether we observe that competition or not and someone always wants leader39s position 0 office seeking explains much of leaders behavior leaders choose different kinds of outcome 0 economic performance 0 provision of public goods 0 corruption 0 war and con ict good economic performance does not necessarily result in longevity in power What explains performance 0 some environments encourage leaders to behave in way that benefits society This theory characterizes governments by 0 size of the electorate 0 size of their winning coalition The selectorate s is the set of people who can play a role in selecting leaders Winning coalition co includes those people whose support is necessary for the leader to stay in power In order to stay in power leaders have to keep winning coalition 0 they can achieve this by public goods or private goods public consumed by everyone private consumed only by winning coalition Public Vs Private in selectorate theory 0 whether leaders distributes public or private goods depend on sre of WC leaders prefer to buy WC with private goods 0 better at maintaining loyalty c not always possible 0 As sre of WC increases the share of private goods decline 0 if W gets big enough the share of private gets really small in this case members prefer public goods O O O 0 when W is small leaders Will want to provide private goods instead When W is large leaders Will want to provide public goods rather than preserve in addition to goods provision leader must pick a tax rate Determines how much money the leader has to pay for the provision of public and private At the same time challenges propose a bundle of publicprivate goods 0 Loyalty Norm O 0 individuals in W Who are disgruntled and must weigh the cost and benefits of defecting individuals Who de ect the risk that a member races When thinking about defecting is a ration of WS Ws represents the probability that a member of the selectorate Will be in WC As a result it indicates the probability that someone Who defects Will be in the next leaders WC systems Wa small Ws are rigged election dictatorships systems Wa large Ws are democracies monarchies and military juntas the loyalty norm affects the performance of leaders if there is a strong loyalty norm small Ws then leaders don39t need to pay members of W to keep loyal as a result leaders can engage in kleptocracy and corruption these leaders have little incentive to produce good public policy it doesn39t help them stay in power When Ws is large members of the WC Will be less loyal thus leaders can39t hoard all the resources for themselves and need to demonstrate competence performance should be better in large Ws systems than small Ws systems 0 Bottom Line 0 O 0 good things happen When W is large and Ws is small midline W is small and Ws is large Bad W is small and Ws is small 1022 leaders like to set up political system with small W and small ws members of WC like small W are large Ws members of selectorate large W and large Ws Chapter 11 Preferences of committee members 0 A Condorcet winner is the option that beats all other options in pair wise comparisons Condorcet s Paradox A set of individuals rational preferences aggregate to a rational preference ordering via majority rule An agenda setter decides the order of the voting by deciding which options are compared first Council members should think about the strategic implications of first round votes If the agenda is o quotI v D then winner is pitted against Cquot Then quotthinking strategicallyquot means thinking 0 quotIf I in first round what happens in second roundquot 0 quotIf D wins in the first round what happens in the second roundquot Policy may be more stable than we would expect because some actors have the ability set the agenda If this is true then stability has been achieved at the sacrifice of fairness the agenda setter is effectively a dictator Allows voters to list a complete preference ordering and then assigns a value to each item in the individual39s preference ordering that re ects their preferences The alternative with the most quotpointsquot wins No pair wise comparison so no cycling Institutions Affect Outcomes They change the rules for how a group decides O voting methods Identify agenda setters 0 They change the options available to people 0 Sometimes e g the Borda Count just the introduction of an alternative nobody wants can change the outcome 0 But in doing so they also bring stable outcomes Stability through restriction on preferences 0 We characterize each person39s preferences according to their a numerical scaling in which higher number stand for higher positions in an individual39s preference ordering Median Voter Theorem 0 If in a contest between two alternatives there are an odd number of votes who all vote sincerely with singlepeaked preferences on a onedimensional policy space 0 Then the proposal matching the ideal point of the median voter will defeat all other alternatives Stability through restriction on preferences 0 The median s ideal point beats all other proposals in a pair wise comparison Their most preferred option is the Condorcet winner Two Dimensional Voting 0 Representatives of three societal groups Capital Labor and Agriculture vote on how to divide a pot of subsidies 0 Assume that each group cares only about maximizing subsidies to their constituency o The chaos theorem states that if there are two or more issue dimensions and three or more voters then except for the case of a rare distribution of preferences no Condorcet winner will exist The Chaos Theorem 0 Chaos theorem if there are two or more issue dimensions and three or more voters with preferences in the issue space who all vote sincerely there will be no Condorcet winner Except in the case of a rare distribution of ideal points Problems of Majority Rule 0 O O Majority rule might not produce a stable outcome In order to reach clear outcomes we often must do something quotundemocraticquot But maybe this is just a residual effect of these weird voting rules and assumptions Arrow s Theorem 0 0 Non dictatorship D there must be no individual who fully determines the outcome of the group decision making process Universal admissibility members can adopt any rational preference ordering over the available alternatives Unanimity or Pareto optimality if all individuals in a group prefer X to y then the group preference must re ect a preference of X to y Independence from irrelevant alternative the group choice should be unperturbed by changes in the ranking of irrelevant alternatives The minimal standards are Arrow proved that it is impossible to meet all 4 of these fairness conditions while simultaneously guaranteeing that the group be able to avoid the instability caused by group intransitivity
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