Intro to Info Security
Intro to Info Security CS 4235
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This 0 page Class Notes was uploaded by Alayna Veum on Monday November 2, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to CS 4235 at Georgia Institute of Technology - Main Campus taught by Staff in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 8 views. For similar materials see /class/234156/cs-4235-georgia-institute-of-technology-main-campus in ComputerScienence at Georgia Institute of Technology - Main Campus.
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Date Created: 11/02/15
Static and Dynamic Analysis Tools for Improving Software Security Presented by Kyle Forkner cs423sA Fan 2004 Paul WleerOWSkl College of Computing Heena Macwan Georgia Institute of Technology Overview I Introduction I Static Code Analysis CI Definition CI Design Goals CI Three Example Research Projects I Other Forms of Software Security Analysis CI Static Binary Analysis through Disassemblers CI Dynamic Binary Analysis through Debuggers CI Dynamic Binary Analysis through Simulators ancl Emulators I Security in Development Process I Conclusion I References I Questions Introduction I Software flaws form the base of security vulnerabilities CI Design flaws El Implementation flaws I Coding errors are easy to discover and correct if found before release CI Example Buffer over ow exploits and string format bugs I Unfortunately many organizations leave security as an afterthought placing functionality project deadlines and production costs ahead of it Static Code Analysis I Static Code Analyzers Programs that review source code to discover potential security flaws and either CI Prevent and correct CI Alert the programmer common approach I Many research projects and products in this field I No real consensus on types of analysis approaches Static Code Analyzer Design Goals I All static code analyzers have certain goals in mind CI CI CI CI Coverage of Security Flaws Compatibility of Environments and Languages Minimal Execution Overhead If Corrective Action is Taken Minimal Manual Effort I Reality No project can completely fulfill these goals I Compromises and tradeoffs must be made Three Example Research Projects I Example projects that show a range of relevant techniques and ISSUES CI Detecting Invalid Pointer Dereferences in C CI MOPS an Infrastructure for Examining Security Properties of Software CI CSSV A Tool to Uncover String Manipulation Errors I Discuss tradeoffs to show the limits of effectiveness in software development Detecting Invalid Pointer Dereferences in C I Focus Improper C pointer dereferencing is a source of many security flaws specially buffer overflows I Analysis Method CI Tracks pointer dereferences and memory locations in programs CI Checks are inserted into the program CI If unsafe dereference occurs violation is reported and program halts Detecting Invalid Pointer Dereferences in C cont I Tradeoffs and Limits in Design CI CI Coverage Prevents flaws like buffer over ows Compatibility Limited to C and does not automatically cover library functions Overhead Little execution overhead since only checks and stops program Manual Effort Depends on support with library functions MOPS an Infrastructure for Examining Security Properties of Software 39 MOdeIchecking Programs for Security properties 39 Security Property Secure programming practices 39 Model Finite State Automata represent security properties Vulnerable CO Q Q other Example of Security Property Finite State Automata MOPS an Infrastructure for Examining Security Properties of Software cont Focus Identifying safe programming rules and checking for violations in program Analysis Method CI Security Properties defined in a database Create an automata model representing the program Check the program s model with Security Properties Alert the programmer of possible violations EDD MOPS an Infrastructure for Examining Security Properties of Software cont I Tradeoffs and Limits in Design CI Coverage Theoretically could eventually check all types of security flaws CI Compatibility Security Properties heavily dependent on OS environment CI Manual Effort Programmer must look over program with analysis results CSSV A Tool to Uncover String Manipulation Errors I C String Static Verifier I Focus Use a contract system to discover flaws with C string manipulation I Analysis Method CI Each procedure has a contract that defines preconditions post conditions and sideeffects CI CSSV then analyzes each procedure to see if contract is broken CI If a contract is broken a list of potential errors is generated for the programmer CSSV A Tool to Uncover String Manipulation Errors cont I Tradeoffs and Limits in Design CI Coverage Only focuses on strings but still covers a respectable amount of aws CI Compatibility Only supports C language CI Manual Effort Programmer has to make manual corrections Other Forms of Software Security Analysis I Source code not always available El Virus or Worm Programs CI Microsoft I Binary analysis provides static executable and dynamic program execution tests Static Binary Analysis through Disassemblers I Disassembly The reverse assembly process I Two Approaches El Linear Sweeping CI Recursive Traversal I Problems CI Dynamic Instructions CI Data and Instruction Mix Dynamic Binary Analysis through Debuggers I Context information available I Catch interrupts to stop execution I Users control execution of each instruction I Example GDB Dynamic Binary Analysis through Simulators and Emulators I Develop Software Environment to Mimic System Features I Sandbox type area I Execution Speed Often a Problem I SimOS I ISS Gateway Box that Creates a Virtual Environment Integrating Software Security Tools into the Development Process Assign Security External Static Expert Review Source PENEtratlon Code Testing Analysis Security R39Sk Riskbased Binary Security Requirements Analys39s Security Tests Analysis Review I V l V I l I V I V V I I I I I I I I 3 4 5 6 Testing 7 Inception Requirements Des39gn TeSt Plan c dm9 Delivery amp Gathering and Feedback Analysis Software Security throughout the Software Development Life Cycle Conclusion I Throughout the software development process creators must keep software security in mind I Security Audits Security must be given as much importance as product features or overall quality I Static and Dynamic Analysis techniques can help build more secure code efficiently References I Chen H and D Wagner MOPS an Infrastructure for Examining Security Properties of Software Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security November 1822 2002 Washington DC USA New York NY ACM Press 2002 235244 I Chen Hao and David Wagner MOPS University of California at Berkeley 1 Nov 2004 lthttpwwwcsberkeleyedudawmopsgt I Dor N Rodeh M and M Sa iv CSSV Towards a Realistic Tool for Statically Detecting All Buffer Over ows in C Proceedings of the ACM SI PLAN 2003 Conference on Proqrammind Language Design and Implementation June 911 2003 San Diego California USA New York NY ACM Press 2003 155167 I Horwitz S and SH Yong Protecting C Pro rams from Attacks via Invalid Pointer Dereferences Proceedings of the 9th Eurooean Software Engineering Con erence Held Jointlv with 10th ACM SIGSOl l39 International Svmbosium 38 Fo3ur61dations of Software Engineering September 15 2003 Helsinki Finland New York NY ACM Press 2003 7 1 Li Shengying A Survev of Tools for Binarv Code Analvsis Stoney Brook University 24 August 2004 lthttpwwwecslcssunysbedutrBinaryAnalysisdocgt I McGraw Gary 461 Ex loiting Embedded Software Session 46 of the 4lst Annual Design Automation Conference June 7 20 4 lthttpvideosdaccom4lstslides462pptgt I Pietrek Matt Peering Inside the PE A Tour of the Win32 Portable Executable File Format MSDN March 1994 November 1 2004 lthttpmsdnmicrosoftcomlibrarydefaultaspurllibraryen usdndebughtmlmsdnpeeringpeaspgt Legal and Ethical Issues Matt Greenberg Sarah Kanel Felipe Nascimento Ryan Ricks Our project 0 What legal and ethical computing issues affect Georgia Tech students downloading MP3s adhering to Tech s policy maintaining information availability and integrity 0 What medium will be most accessible The OneStop Information Security Resource for Georgia Tech Students httpwwwccgatecheduclassesAY2004cs4235afallpaperslegalethicalsite Legal and Ethical Issues Copyright law Ryan Ricks DMCA Fair use File sharing Policy Felipe Nascirnento US Patriot Act GT Computer and Network Usage Policy Protecting your computer Matt Greenberg Privacy Trojans spyware etc Copyright Law Ryan Ricks Why important P2P implications Liability for end users Liability for developers Exclusive rights in copyrighted works Applies to everything CDs MP3 5 RAM Protected from inception 7 0 yrs after author dies Only copyright owner may reproduce distribute publicly perform Digital Millennium Copyright Act Implements WIPO treaties into US law civil and criminal penalties circumvent technological copyright protection tamper with copyright management information DMCA Allows for exemption for reverse engineering encryption research personal privacy security testing Fair use limits copyright criticism comment news reporting teaching scholarship research Determining Fair Use Purpose and nature of use Nature of the copyrighted work Amount of work used Effect on market value of work P2P and copyright law Clearly implicates copyright law Files copyrighted Transmission reproduction distribution and public performance Endusers direct infringement Infringement End Users Direct infringement P2P Developers Contributory infringement Vicarious infringement Contributory Infringement Direct infringement Knowledge of infringement Induced caused or materially contributed to infringement Vicarious Infringement Direct Infringement Right and means to control infringement Direct nancial bene t Guidelines for P2P developers ways to avoid copyright infringement Make and store no copies Total control or no control at all Stand alone software not services Avoid customer support Market to noninfringing uses More Guidelines Do not promote infringing uses Disaggregate functions Don t make money from infringement Give up enduser license agreements No auto updates Be open source Policy Felipe Nascimento USA PATRIOT Act Passed on October 11 2001 Amendments to federal surveillance laws Pen registers and trap and trace devices Stored email Electronic surveillance Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Gather source and addressee information for computer conversations and telephone calls Change court jurisdiction Stored Email Before the act a search warrant issued by a federal court was needed Act allows federal court to issue order applicable anywhere Adds clause to treat voicemail like email Electronic Surveillance Adds cyber crime to Title 111 s predicate offense list Government may monitor intruded in a protected system Georgia Tech Computer and Network Usage Policy Designed to allow for proper use of Tech s computing and network facilities Lists users and Tech s privileges and responsibilities Individual Privileges and Responsibilities Right to privacy Right not to be harassed Responsible for available resources Responsible for security and integrity of systems No sharing of copyrighted materials Political campaigns and personal enterprises Georgia Tech Privileges and Responsibilities Right to impose sanctions and punishments Right to control access of information stored on its systems Individuals computing resources not entirely private GT Computer Network Usage Policy Overview Do Don t Install security patches Install packet sniffers Install antivirus software Harass ie spam people Respect other s right to privacy Copy and distribute copyrighted L 39 1 Perform regular computer backups Conduct political campaigns Conduct private business Share user account and passwords Protecting Your Computer Matt Greenberg Why Students at Tech MUST have computers They use them for all of their school work Reliability Speed Privacy Lack of knowledge makes you vulnerable Trojans Knowledge that such a thing exists Where they might be found What they can contain Adware Spyware Cookies Software Protection Spybot Adaware Pop up blockers Encryption Virus Scanner Personal Firewall Training Don t talk to strangers What is a secret Why is it a secret Information Theft Identity Theft Fraud Sparn Conclusion Copyright law The Patriot Act and the GT CNUP Protecting your computer The OneStop Information Security Resource httpwwwccgatecheduclassesAY2004cs423 5afa11paperslegalethicalsite ilill Efficiency of RBAC Database Security Group Sandhya Balakrishnan Joshua Chini Daniel Combiths Jamie Hobbs Introduction DB Access Control MAC and DAC RBAC overview Economic and Policy aspects of RBAC Comparison of Current RBAC Database implementations Conclusion Database AC vs Operating System AC Databases separated logically by user privileges Many different modes of access Records fields and elements of DB are related Number of elements in the DB is greater Tnhlp Column 1 Column 2 Row 1 Row 2 Row 3 Mandatory Access Control MAC A number of increasing security levels developed Each object is assigned a security level Access granted to users containing the minimum security clearance Information never ows from high to low Military Security Levels Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified Dynamic Access Control DAC Objects are assigned an owner Owner delegates access rights I Role Based Access Control Why do we need it Scenario 1 5 users What is RBAC Roles Description of the types of job functions within a group of users Permissions The amount of data a user is allowed to access Users People who access information from a database Role Based Access Control Users Roles Role 1 Role 2 Role3 Databases i E E Why lS RBAC Useful Principle role of RBAC is to simplify administration and reduce cost Roles remain constant but the users role can change Reduces the likely hood of errors for the DBA Three major DBA functions 1 Assigning Users to Roles 2 Assigning Permissions to Roles 3 Assigning Roles to Roles to generate a role hierarchy Scope of RBAC Reference Model 1 Core RBAC 2 Hierarchical RBAC 3 Static Separation of Duty Relations 4 Dynamic Separation of Duty Relations Administrative Duties 1 Administrative Operations 2 Administrative Reviews 3 System Level Functionality I g Core RBAC RII Rolc Hierarchy UA PA User Am39gn Permission men Assignment USED Sexsion sessiorUalex Role Hierarchy Depanm Manager Depa m anager Team Leader Team Leader Team Leader Team Leader Higher order roles inherit roles of lower order roles Lower order roles obtain permissions from higher order roles I RBAC Policy Dynamic Structure Ease oflntegration Low Maintenance lIlII Government Contributions NIST 55 million in RampD 2 patents granted 2 pending Acceleration in commercial diffusion Economics of RBAC Expected industry benefits 376 million by 2004 NIST claim Actual industry bene ts 671 million by 2003 RTI impact study 4357 per employee benefit by 2006 NIST case study RBAC Features Supported in Commercial RDBMS Oracle 9i Enterprise Edition release 2 Sybase Adaptive Server Enterprise release 115 IBM Informix Dynamic Server version 94 lIII Oracle 9i Enterprise Edition Multiple roles per user Default roles Role hierarchy Password protection for roles Privileges System Level Object Level Sybase Adaptive Server Enterprise Multiple roles per user Default roles Role hierarchy Password protection for roles Mutual exclusivity of roles Membership Level Activation level Privileges Object Creation Object Access Mill il IBM Informix Dynamic Server Multiple roles per user Role hierarchy Privileges Table Level EXECUTE Summary RBAC Feamre Oracle Sybase Iuiormix Mulu39ple roles I or user Yes Yes Yes Mulu39ple roles enabled at a Lime Yes Yes No Default roles at logiu me Yes Yes No Role hierarchy Yes Yes Yes Password prolecu39on ior roles Yes Yes No Mutual exclusion oiroles No Yes No Conclusion Users Roles Permissions RBAC in the Business World Chevron Blue CrossBlue Shield State Farm Insurance Drawbacks of RBAC New Technology Network Security Part II Jeff King July 3 2007 Network Security Part Cryptography o Encryption of data as it passes over the network Can provide confidentiality encryption and integrity keyed hash Can provide authenticity PKI o Encryption can happen at different network layers 0 Some application protocols are tied to encryption SSH Network Security Part Network Security Part User SSH TCP Ethernet Giverne a secure ogH1sesyon Giverne a data strearn Send packets to des na on Send39 ames across LAN Cryptographic Tunnels I 0 Some protocols provide an encrypted tunnel at the transport layer 0 Secure Socket Layer SSL Transport Layer Security TLS o HTTPS SMTPPOPIMAP STARTTLS etc 0 Pro bolts onto existing protocols 0 Pro authentication information is closely associated with session 0 Con two versions of each protocol 0 Con assumes TCPbased protocol Network Security Part Network Security Part User HTTP SSL TCP Ethernet Give me httpsexampecom Give me an encrypted data stream Give me a data stream Send packets to destination Send frames across LAN Cryptographic Tunnels Take 239 0 Q What happens when we move the tunnel down a layer 0 A Virtual Private Networks VPNs Network Security Part Network Security Part IP Internet Ethernet Give me httpexamplecom Give me a data stream Send packets to destination Send frames across virtual LAN Send packets to VPN endpoint Send frames across LAN 0 Build encryption into the network layer 0 Extension to IPv4 mandatory in IPv6 0 Transport Mode Payload is encrypted headers are not 0 Tunnel Mode Pointtopoint communications lP encapsulated inside lP Entire packet is encrypted Network Security Part Public Key Infrastructure PKII 0 Now that we have all this encryption a how do we know we re talking to the right endpoint Network Security Part What is PKI o Fundamentally a binding of identity to some bits 0 What is an identity Person Business Role It depends on policy and goals 0 What is a binding Connects two or more things lmplies some authority that is hard to forge 0 Why do we want it Make sure we encrypt to the right entity Correctly verify signatures from other entities Concepts used everywhere tunneling protocols secure email web ecommerce etc Network Security Part 1 0 What do we want out of a good PKII 0 Secure hard to forge binding 0 Flexible can specify many aspects of identity 0 Efficient online vs offline verification o Adaptable changes over time o Scalable handles many users 0 Easy to use lock icon in browser Network Security Part 11 How do we do PKI a Local caching ssh o Outof band methods ssh PGP DomainKeys o Hierarchical X509 DNSSEC a Web of trust PGP Network Security Part 12 Local caching ssh examplecom The authenticity of host examplecom 10001 can t be established DSA key fingerprint iS 5fszz23OdzbedeC23382zl3za6z62z9fz659dCC Are you sure you want to continue connecting yesno o Warn the user during the first session 0 Aggressively cache read never delete public keys 0 Check cached keys and abort if mismatch 0 Secure Flexible Efficient Scalable Adaptable Easy to use 13 Network Security Part Outofband Methods I o ssh verify key fingerprint by emailphone o ssh seed public keys from disk 0 PGP key signing parties check government id 0 DomainKeys DNS hierarchy of keys 0 Secure Flexible Efficient Scalable Adaptable Easy to use Network Security Part 14 Hierarchical Methods microsoft has key 1234 message signed by 5678 signed by 1234 verisign has key 3456 thawte has key 5678 signed by 3456 yahoo has key 7890 another message signed by 5678 signed by 7890 o Vocabulary word certificate a signature that binds an identity and some authorization to a public key 0 Chain of trust going to root 0 Standards of practice for certificate authorities CAS 0 Why do we trust the root 0 Secure Flexible Efficient Scalable Adaptable Easy to use Network Security Part Web of Trust 0 Imagine a hierarchy tree without a root 0 Alice knows Bob and Bob knows Carol so Bob introduces Alice to Carol cryptographically 0 Bob tells Alice how well he knows Carol Alice decides how much to trust the introduction a Introductions are transitive but weaken with distance 0 Secure Flexible Efficient Scalable Adaptable Easy to use Network Security Part 1 6 Why is PKI hard 0 Trust enforcement is suspect Verification procedures are not standardized Hello this is Microsoft we need some new certificates 0 Trust isn t infinitely transitive Complex policy rules for who can sign whom 0 Weak links in trust chains single point of failure Breaksteal root key break them all Trust Verisign s handling Network Security Part 17 Why is PKI hard o Identities names Names aren t always unique Jeff King the baseball player TV producer and lditarod champion Entities use many names which are legitimate bankofamericacom bankofamericacomhk bankofamericacx Unambiguous names don t always last forever yearly domain registrations Network Security Part 1 8 Why is PKI hard o Revocation Sign revocation with cert key or pre sign with private key Revocation lists must be checked online Require negative response from list replay issues Scalability issues Network Security Part 19 Why is PKI hard 0 User issues Trust decisions are hard to make Key storage recovery issues 0 Political issues Export regulations Crypto usage regulations in some countries Carnivore wiretapping Has the US government given up on crypto restrictions Network Security Part 20 o Fundamentally Keep bad packets out let good ones in o How can we tell them apart Source Destination address ports Headerfields Application layer reassemny o How do we create rules By hand Rudimentary learning Network 59mm Parrl Why are firewalls good I 0 Remember that networks are automated they usually try hard to move data around 0 Firewalls allow us to change the defaultpass behavior 0 Why notjust turn off listening services Centralize policy in one place for ease of management Protect poorlymaintained systems Firewalled systems are not necessarily under the same administrative control Network Security Part 22 What is Intrusion Detection o Intrusion a set of actions aimed to compromise security goals 0 Intrusion detection the process of identifying and responding to intrusion activities Network Security Part 23 Why do we need intrusion detection I o Layered security 0 In practice firewalls will not block all malicious traffic 0 There is value in knowing about malicious traffic on network Network Security Part II 24 How does intrusion detection work 0 Assume system activities are observable 0 Assume normal and intrusive events have distinct evidence Audit Data Models Detection Engine 39Alarms ActionReport Decision Policy Engine Network Security Part How does intrusion detection work o Misuse detection signature based Handcode model of bad behavior Can t detect new attacks 0 Anomaly detection statistical based Compare behavior to normal trained profile Higher false positive rate Network Security Part 26 Security Decision Making and Risk Management Jeff King May 22 2007 Security Decision Making and Risk Management I What is Security I a Classic definition A state of wellbeing of information and infrastructures in which the possibility of successful yet undetected theft tampering and disruption of information and services is kept low or tolerable a Not a binary state secure insecure o How low is low How tolerable is tolerable Security Decision Making and Risk Management I What is Security I a Security is a cylical process 1 Inspection evaluate the current status and appropriate levels of security ie risk analysis1 Protection proactive process of creating an environment that is as secure as possible Detection reactive process of determining inappropriate activities and alerting responsible individuals Reaction responding to a security incident minimizing the impact Reflection followup processes necessary to evaluate the quality of the security implementation and improve for the next iteration o How frequently should the cycle repeat 1Definitions from Pipkin Information Security Security Decision Making and Risk Management A Security Example I You re a Tech student living in an offcampus apartment with a roommate To make some extra money you set up a website where other students can meet and discuss class assignments You make money from ads displayed on the site The site runs on a server in your bedroom connected through your DSL line Security Decision Making and Risk Management Identify threats vulnerabilities assets Assign probabilities consequences and values Consider countermeasures or controls and their costs Calculate expectation of different actions 0 Example Your site brings in 300month One threat is an attacker breaking in to the webserver If this happens you expect the downtime to be a few days You estimate the probability at 1 per month You can get up to date security patches for your server software for 1month Is subscription worth it What other factors are there How do we include those factors in our analysis Analysis goes beyond what we normally consider security issues Security Decision Making and Risk Management 0 Implementation of controls and countermeasures 0 May be technological physical policy andor humanoriented 0 Some controls are specific to one threat eg encryption of logins prevents snooping on network 0 Some controls cover many threats eg keeping backups of important data 0 Example Realizing the value of the website s data you perform daily backups to DVD Technological DVD writer backup software Policy backups are scheduled daily human must insert new DVD Security Decision Making and Risk Management 0 Waiting for something bad to happen and then hopefully detecting when it does 0 Helped by systems implemented in the protection phase 0 Systems can have technological components Network intrusion detection systems Antivirus Firewall logs Heartbeat monitoring a Human Process components People monitoring intrusion systems firewal logs Gathering external information eg customer complaints 0 What controls should be used for our website example Security Decision Making and Risk Management a When bad things are detected what do you do 0 Develop a plan during inspectionprotection phases for dealing with some attacks 0 Technological components Adding firewall rules based on detected misuse Automatic failover of one site to another a Human Process components Manual shutdown of some affected systems Sysadmin restores from backup 0 Example After learning that you went on a date with his eXgirlfriend your roommate pours a bottle of Jolt Cola into your server How do you react Security Decision Making and Risk Management Reflection 0 Examination of what went wrong and right with a security incident 0 Blends naturally into next iterative phase of inspection 0 What are our reflections on the Jolt incident Security Decision Making and Risk Management lThings to RememberI 0 Security is never done it is a constant process 0 Attacks have cost So do controls There needs to be an analysis of which actions are worth it Principle of Adequate Protection 0 You must consider all attacks protection must be balanced across threats because attackers will always use the easiest route Principle of Easiest Penetration Principle of Weakest Link Security Decision Making and Risk Management 1 0 Risk Analysis 0 Absurdly idealized value of control cost of control probability that control works probability of incident cost of incident 0 How do we come up with those numbers Research analysis ideally Heuristics practically Intuition yikesl Security Decision Making and Risk Management Risk Analysis 0 Costs come from many sources Initial investment in technology Maintenance costs of systems Use costs during security incidents Use costs during nonsecurity incidents eg false alarms Direct impact on business Impact on public perception of business a Risks threats come from many sources Casual attackers collateral damage worms viruses Targeted malicious attackers financial gain Regulatory issues violating laws gets you sued Accidents Natural disaster earthquake in data center Security Decision Making and Risk Management 1 2 Cryptography PGP Christian Adam Alexander B39Lnk Steven Scott and Mark tham Agenda History Implementations Derro Algorithms Issuesand Future Hstow of Owtograplw Until 19708 Sr metric only o Writ O39yptography researched in early 19708 1976 Public Key prtography 1978 RSA published 1980s US Law is generally hostile to developmert of cryptography algorithms Lnbreakable by the US gwernment Idea for PGP 1991 Senate all 266 proposed indudes provision requiring any encryption algorithm to have a back door o F nil Zin39r rermarn was a software engineer and artinuclear activist Wanted a oryFIOSstem that would be Lnbreakabie by governmerts o Export Troubles o So ware expands rapidy to users all over the world o ln1998 Federal Gwernmert investigates Zir merr r39ann under export lavv o O39yptosyster r39s using nore than 40 bits were defined as nuntions Investigation later cropped in 1996 Export lavv liberalized a fewyears later lVbre legal troubles RSAdidrft like Zin39mermann using their gorithm o Zir merr r39ann clained it was upto each indvidLal user of PGPto lioense RSA Lawsuit oor r39plicated by dffering laws RSA was orly patented in United States Resut was breakLpof PGPinto US and international versions 0 Continued Development o In 1996Zinnerr r39ann nergesvvith Aao39ypt and forms POP Inc o PGPVS released in 1997 rst platform allowing operation within a GUI In 1997 Network Mates acquires POP Inc adds seeral newfeatures o In 2002 several eXPGP menters form POP Carp buy rigrts to POP from NAI Alternative Irrplementa ons PGPOorrpatible applications can be created royalty ee OpenPGP is an IEI39F standard RFC 1991 Described PGP 2 algorithms to enable compatible products Used patert encu39r39bered algorith Soon made obsolete by PGP 3 RFC 2440 Creation of OpenPGP Only required open algorith withou patents Irrplementations Veridis HLshmaiI GnuPG Dermnstra on PGP Key Elements Asymmetric Eruyption RSA 39 Srm39etric Encryption IDEA Hash Function MD6 RSA Key Creation Two large independert prime nm39bers a b Their product N Oorrthe a1b1 Q PiokanintegereWnere1lteltQandeis ooprir39reto Q Ooantedsuohtmtder1rmdQ Encryp 0nampDecryp on B39eakther39ressageupintoblodsofsize 2We2iltnand2i1gtnAnendealing withbinarydata ToEncwptqmermdn ToDectyptmqandn RSAin action a47b71N3 7 Q46703220 Chooseetobe79 d791rrod32201019 m6882826879666683 c15702756209122762423158 RSA Security Factoring Large Nun39bers RSA Fa orirg Challenge REA 576 has been factored RSA 640 has yet to be factored RSA mrmally uses a 1CQ4 bit or 204ampbit N TWI RL Hypo etical piece of rumare that could n39ake 324 bit RSA um RSA rowsuggests Lsing 2048bit masom m co ny I 8 I mox I 8205 5x 5 85 546 ltmn IDEA Round F K2 K3 0 K4 XOR ace EB EB EB Addition lag LPFi K6 rmd 2 3 6 times R r39 rmd lgt ltl 216 1 IDEASecurity AbakKeys Extreme rare B39ute Force 1038 enoryptions necessary to aadlt The IVD5 Hashing Algorithm 512bit blocks divided into 16 32bit blocks 4 32bit blocks are odputted and oorr39bined to formthe 128 bit hash value Fundions FXYZXandYormtQandY GgtltYZXandZ0rYandth HXYZ XxorYxorZ XYZYxorXornotZ FFabcdMst r39reans a ba Fbcd M t ltltlt s 06 uses Gbcc1 IH uses Hbcd and II uses bod IVD5 Security Increr39rertal Ir39rprovemert over MD4 Oollisiors Afew hourswork Can cause problems if a r rearingful collision was found Privan vs Security Issue Goverm erts needto beabIetoaooess information used b crim39rals terrorists and enem nations F vate indviduals need powerful em39yption to proted IP and lives ermerrmnn s Nngent for PGP o Prdection from other gwemments Letters from groups in Eastern Europe M39I39Izim emamoomEmalers ndemm o Prdection from our own goverrment o Eonom39c Reasons o More fromZir r39r rBrmam mpJMMNpHIzinmema39ncmvEM inmy memm The Government s Nngent o Case Italy 2008 Red Bn39gade terron39st QOUP Italian of cials seized PW using PGPvariant FBI called into help Ur able to bteak 1he emryption W rrsnpmmdoorrmemlar deQaid me COasp o Shh powerful em39yption leaves usall vulnerable to those using it for refarious purposes Does PGP have a backdoa Speculation Cases lilethose in Italy Show it probably doesn t have one Zrm39em39ann says absolutely not Ah39le he was involved Wrat about newversions The Future of PGP Qantum Ernwption QantumOor39rputing B39ealdng PGP Conclusion History Implementations Derro Algorithms Issuesand Future Malicious Code Patrick Carnahan Dustin Roberts Zach Shay Jeff Yeary Malicious Code Introduction Motivations Case Studies 0 Conclusion Questions Introduction Topic The various reasons behind writing a virus Explore some of the motivations Look at real world examples Is it possible to write a bene cial virus Intro Motivations Case Studies Conclusion Questions Motivations Education Politics Fame Protection Information Intro Motivations oEducation oPolitics oFame oProtection olnfonn ation Case Studies Conclusion Questions Education Intro Called Proof Of Concept E E d i mns oPoliics V1rus Famte oProtection Not released 1n W1ld 39Infom am Case Stud1es Introduced early in life cycle Conclusion 0 29a Labs i i Questions Politics 0 Political Messages 0 Denial Of Service Attacks Can hurt cause CRIMINAL u httpwwwpoliticalcartoonscom Intro Motivations oProtection olnform ation Case Studies Conclusion Questions Fame Writers advertise their work Compete With each other Harry McBungus Only minor reason Intro Motivations oEducation oPolitics oFame oProtection oInformation Case Studies Conclusion Questions Protection 0 Download Security Patches 0 Delete Other Viruses Search for criminal activity 0 Attack illegal sites quot Intro Motivations oEducation oPolitics oFame oProtection oInformation Case Studies Conclusion Questions Information Money Identity Thieves Governments Black Hatters Intro Motivations oEducation oPolitics oFame oProtection olnfonn ation Case Studies Conclusion Questions Case Studies Creeper and Reaper Viruses Welehia Worm Za Worm Lion Worm and Cheese Worm AIDS Information Diskette Trojan Intro Motivations Case Studies oCreeperReaper oWelchia Worm 0Zafi Worm oLionCheese OAIDS Info Disk Conclusion Questions The Creeper Virus Unleashed in 1972 by Beranek and Newman First real world example of distributed computer Distributed over ARPANET Inspired by a science ction novel Intro Motivations Case Studies oCreeperReaper oWelchia Worm 0Zafi Worm oLionCheese OAIDS Info Disk Conclusion Questions The Reaper Virus Unleashed soon after Creeper Funetioned to seek and destroy Creeper Distributed over ARPANET Author Intro Motivations Case Studies oCreeperReaper oWelchia Worm 0Zafi Worm oLionCheese OAIDS Info Disk Conclusion Questions CreeperReaper Implications Intro 0 Educational in nature Motivations 0 Generally thought of as the rst gase st ldies reeper eaper network V1ruses we1ch1aw0nn 0Zaf1 Worm oLionCheese o Innovatlons 1n cpu 1dle t1rne oAIDS Info Disk revolutionary for distributed Conclusion computing Questions Welchia Worm Intro 0 Protectwe Worm 2003 Motivations o 2 avors Case Studies oCreeperReaper Welch1aa combats MS Blaster 2272231733311 Welchiab combats MyDoom ii g g izsgisk 0 Still caused damage thru heavy Conclusion network traf c Questions AirCanada CSX Za Worm Political Worm 2004 Massmailing worrn to promote Hungarian nationalism Disables security software Za B can propagate Via P2P Intro Motivations Case Studies oCreeperReaper oWelchia Worm 0Zafi Worm oLionCheese OAIDS Info Disk Conclusion Questions Lion Worm Motivated by Fame 2001 cnhonker group claims worm is political Version 1amp2 used a centralized distribution Version 3 used the Rarnen worm s rnethod Intro Motivations Case Studies oCreeperReaper oWelchia Worm 0Zafi Worm oLionCheese OAIDS Info Disk Conclusion Questions Cheese Worm Intro 0 Protective Worm Motivations o In response to the Lion Worm Case Studies oCreeperReaper 0 Causes almost as much grief as it gi li m oLi nCh was des1gned to stop Afbsmefis isk Conclusion Questions AIDS Info Diskette Trojan Trojan EULA serves as spin After 90 reboots all les become encrypted and hidden Paying the 378 ransom you receive the encryption key Full extent of damage unkown Intro Motivations Case Studies oCreeperReaper oWelchia Worm 0Zafi Worm oLionCheese oAIDS Info Disk Conclusion Questions Conclusion 0 Evolution of computer viruses 0 Where will the future lead computer Viruses Other operating systems 0 Is there such thing as a good Virus Intro Motivations Case Studies Conclusion Questions
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