Part 1 of "Why are there wars?"
Part 1 of "Why are there wars?" PSC 204- Dr. Chyzh
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This 3 page One Day of Notes was uploaded by Erica Kugler on Friday January 23, 2015. The One Day of Notes belongs to PSC 204- Dr. Chyzh at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa taught by Dr. Chyzh in Spring2015. Since its upload, it has received 429 views. For similar materials see International Relations in Political Science at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa.
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Date Created: 01/23/15
Why Are There Wars 0 Wars reasons are not the same as causes 0 Reasons for war goal or aim that a state wants to achieve 0 Causes of war actions involving achievement of said goal that leads to irreconcilable conflict 0 War is costly and there is always an outcomedeal that two states prefer to war 0 War is more of a rarity in terms of world history ie most countries aren t at war 0 States would rather get what they want wo going to war 0 Core of why wars 0 War occurs when bargaining parties fail to reach an agreement I Failure of crisis bargaining 0 Causes of war 0 Information gt lack of info or misunderstanding 0 Lack of commitment gt state can t guarantee it will follow through on bargain o indivisibility of contested good gt can said good be divided wo losing its value 0 Purpose of war 0 War event involving organized military force be at least two parties that satisfies a minimum threshold of severity I organized force I at least two parties I minimum threshold of severity ie of casualties length of conflict etc 0 Interstate war main parties involved are states 0 Civil war main parties involved are actors win states ex govt vs rebel group 0 What states fight over 0 Wars are fought over things of value 0 Purpose of war is to obtain not to fight 0 State s interests leading to conflict I Territory gt wealth strategic mil value ethnicrelHY ties I Policies gt stop what a country sees as bad govt ex US intervention in LAm I Regime type gt oust dangerous govts ex Vietnam to stop spread of comm o Bargaining and war 0 Crisis bargaining bargain under threat of war I Aka coercive diplomacy I Failure of crisis bargaining war 0 Likely outcomes and costs of war define the range of acceptable outcomes from cbarg I A state will accept a bargain if it gets at least as much as it would expect from war I Bargaining range range bwn which states prefer deals over war because both results in same outcomes 0 e range of status quos in which deals outweigh war 0 The status quo gained by deals is the same as the status quo gained by war to why go to war favorite outcome ideal outcome getting 100 of object in question x is portion of the object each side gets when no war is occurring p is status quo with war p c status quo moves in A s favor ie moves closer to A s fav Outcome state B is more inclined to war p c status quo moves in B s favor ie moves closer to B s fav Outcome state A is more inclined to war area bwn pc and pc bargaining range 0 Varieties of coercive bargaining 0 Where status quo is located compared to state s value of for war determines which state may have interest in war I State wstatus quo closest to its idealfavorite outcome is less likely to want war because war could disrupt is status quo and move it away from its ideal outcome I Compellence effort to change status quo via force 0 quotgive mestop doing X or else 0 Deterrence preserve status quo by threatening other side if other side takes an action to change the status quo 0 quotdon t do X or else 0 state with status quo closest to its idealfavorite outcome deterrant 0 state with status quo further from its idealfavorite outcome compellenet 3 factors preventing crisis bargaining Incomplete information gt poor info about willingness and ability of states to fight 0 States facing demands may yield too little nor no info States facing demands may yield too much info 2 classes of unknown info 0 Capabilities state s physical ability to bear costs of war 0 Resolve state s willingness to bear cost of fighting 0 Total war all resources are mobilized 0 Limited war not all resources are mobilized Riskreturn tradeoff tradeoff bwn getting good deal and preventing war Incentives to misrepresent info make your state seem more powerful or more prepared for war than it really is o Credibility believability that a threat will be carried out Brinksmanship o Coined by Thomas Schelling o Appear to be on brink of war 0 Take actoins that make you look like you re on slippery slope that has a risk of starting war 0 Resolute states those willing to take brink Risk 0 rresoute states those no willing to take brink Risk Typing hands 0 Send signs of willingness to fight by making threats in a way that it is hard to back down from 0 Audience costs neg repercussions when a leader backs down I Can be international or domestic audience 0 Resolute states willing to making tying statements 0 rresoute states unwilling to make typing statements
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