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Week 3 Lecture Notes- Intro to IR

by: Kathryn Sternberger

Week 3 Lecture Notes- Intro to IR PS205, CRN 26418

Marketplace > University of Oregon > Political Science > PS205, CRN 26418 > Week 3 Lecture Notes Intro to IR
Kathryn Sternberger
GPA 3.5
Inro. to International Relations
Lars Skalnes

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About this Document

Complete lecture notes from week 3. Professor Skalnes covered threat theory and the concepts of balancing and buck-passing. He also covered Offensive vs. Defensive Realism and Liberalism. He also b...
Inro. to International Relations
Lars Skalnes
One Day of Notes
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This 4 page One Day of Notes was uploaded by Kathryn Sternberger on Friday January 23, 2015. The One Day of Notes belongs to PS205, CRN 26418 at University of Oregon taught by Lars Skalnes in Winter2015. Since its upload, it has received 140 views. For similar materials see Inro. to International Relations in Political Science at University of Oregon.

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Date Created: 01/23/15
Balance of threat theory The more power somebody has the more of a threat they appear to be However power and threat are not identical Threat is a function of offensive capability States that are closest to you are most threatening Threat is a function of aggressive intentions States have to weigh the intentions not only the capabilities when deciding whether or not to balance Balancing power theory is that you balance against the strong With that what should we see happen with Europe after 1945 They band together against the US But the US formed a military alliance NATO If you look at aggregate power the US is by far the most powerful but if you look at location the US is very far away Russia is close to Western Europe making it appear more threatening Russia has offensive capability on the continent The US would have to bring offensive weapons to the continent So what it came down to was weighing intentions They decided Russia was more threatening based on intentions The US showed that it did not have the aggressive intentions by pulling troops out of Europe NATO was constructed by the Europeans and begged the US to stay involved Sates have power what you have to decipher is what will they do with that power Offensive Realism Structural realism split up in to two groups offensive and defensive realists With offensive realism the assuptions are 0 Great powers have offensive military capability if you don t you aren t a great power 0 States can never be certain about other states intentions future intentions Survival is the primary goal of great powers independence 0 Great powers are rational actors take the means available to them and apply them in the most ef cient way possible to survive as an independent state Mearsheimer to survive states maximize power not security there are differences 0 Anarchy and the international system provide strong incentives for expansion security in a sense is scarce 0 There are no status quo powers unless you completely dominate the system have never really existed 339 Status quo power actor trying to preserve the current system Happy with the system the way it is 339 Revisionist power actor that wants to change the current system They are unhappy with the way things are currently and their position in the system 339 Will China be a status quo power or a revisionist power Hot topic in IR of great concern to the US O Little can be done to ameliorate the security dilemma as long as states operate in anarchy can t really be improved upon or avoided Mearsheimer says all powers are revisionist powers because there are strong incentives to increase their power position in the system Defensive Realism There are incentives for expansion but not always Believe the security dilemma can be avoided States maximize security not power 0 If you try to maximize power you are only going to provoke a counter balancing coalition Hitler behaved how Mearshiemer expects and what happened He provoked an alliance against him and was defeated 0 Security should be attained for survival only enough to protect yourself Concerned with preserving relative power of the existing balance of power maintain position in the systemmakes them status quo states Cooperation may be risky but so is competition pursuit of hegemony 0 So how do we explain the existence of powers that try to this 0 Hitler Napoleon Imperialist Japan 0 If pursuing hegemony is so risky how do we explain revisionist states Why do people do it How do they do it 0 Not all states are rational States that behave irrationally are going to fall behind fail eventually By doing this they are ultimately going to fail 339 They open up the black box of state and find various groups for whom expansion is rational interest groups They become powerful enough by joining together to impose their preferences upon the state as the whole To explain the existence of revisionist states or behavior they have to look at domestic level characteristics this means it is not a totally systemic analysis The focus is on how the security dilemma can be made less severe o If defense dominates offense states are more likely to adopt less aggressive strategies 0 Offensedominance is rare almost always easier to defend than attack 0 If we can distinguish offensive from defensive weapons and postures status quo states can lessen the severity of the security dilemma 0 Geographic isolation and weak neighbors allow states to focus on less aggressive strategies Japan amp Great BritainNavy the US big oceans on both sides and weak neighbors Conquest does not pay cf nationalism o Tied in with the rise of nationalism that arises sometime after the French Revolution a very powerful force today 0 Nationalism makes it very difficult to conquer states 0 People didn t think of themselves as belonging to a certain nation you could conquer people almost at will Offensive Realist Response to this Balancing is inefficient buckpassing so cant rely on it 1930 s Great Britain the US Austria Soviets should have banded together right away against Hitler but they didn t Offense dominance is not rare 0 History says offense often pays 0 Side who starts the war wins more often than not Conquest sometimes pays Liberalism Focus on the expansion of economic interdependence democracy and international situations Point to the emergence of an increasingly complex global society NATO WTO The industrial revolution was a breakthrough o Caused the proliferation of trade agreements governmental and nongovernmental organizations and domestic actors with an interest in international affairs 0 lntemational affairs used to be the game of monarchs domestic actors begin to emerge and in uence policy to a greater extent Types of Liberalism 0 Commercial liberalism 0 Institutional liberalism 0 Democratic liberalism The economic interdependence argument 0 Wars are more costly when economic interdependence is high because trade will be affected this is only true if you cannot nd the goods from somewhere else 0 Belligerents will be deterred from launching a war only if there are no close substitutes for a country s good What do realists say about interdependence o Interdependence means mutual dependence and vulnerability o Might lead states to initiate war to ensure continues access to goods ect o Asymetric interdependence is important who is more dependent o The state that has the upper hand they don t have the same amount of incentive to maintain peace They can also use their asymmetric advantage as leverage 0 We can imagine situations where it is mutual interdependence o The main counter is empirical the situation before WWl the economy was highly interdependent People are moving across borders with almost no restrictions What do we expect to see if the interdependence argument works It should have been peaceful they went to war Expectations about future levels of interdependence o Copeland argument if you expect trade to continue in to the future then interdependence fosters peace 0 If you do not expect that to continue then the argument doesn t hold it will lead to war 0 The most highly dependent states will be most likely to start the war 0 Fear of losing the economic wealth that supports their longterm security Expectation and the world wars 0 Wars are to ensure access to markets and raw materials 0 Explanation of WWI despite high trade levels in 191314 declining expectations for the future trade pushed German leaders attack wasn t actions done but fear of future behavior Explanation of WWII high barriers to trade and increasing regionalization in the 1930 s led to low expectations for future trade and ultimately power you couldn t be taken seriously as a great power if you didn t have colonies this is a completely different argument that is a status argument for this Institutions and cooperation O O 0 Provide information that makes it easier to detect cheating Provide standards of behavior against which performance can be measured Free trade organization if they all cooperate they are all better off Reduce transaction costs 0 O 0 Costs associated with negotiating monitoring and enforcing agreements Institutions specify what cheating is WTO has an enforcement mechanism can take the dispute to a dispute settlement body by the way WTO is mostly about law and very little about economics


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