PS205 Week 4 Lecture Notes- Prof. Skalnes
PS205 Week 4 Lecture Notes- Prof. Skalnes PS205, CRN 26418
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This 9 page Class Notes was uploaded by Kathryn Sternberger on Friday January 30, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PS205, CRN 26418 at University of Oregon taught by Lars Skalnes in Winter2015. Since its upload, it has received 118 views. For similar materials see Inro. to International Relations in Political Science at University of Oregon.
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Date Created: 01/30/15
PS205 Week 4 Lecture Notes Game Theory Assumptions Relies on assumptions for the theory to work 0 Actors are rational and selfinterested 0 Actors have preferences over outcomes 0 The two players have knowledge of the choices or strategies available to both parties and they know each other s preferences 0 The two players move simultaneously So with game theory we are in a world of strategic interaction When I want to decide what to do I have to take in to account what the other actor is likely to do BOTH players here are trying to do as well as possible given the other players best response So game theory 0 Any outcome is determined by the choices of BOTH parties 0 Describes a world of strategic interaction strategies are usually cooperate or cheat 0 Choice of strategy depends on your own preferences and what the other player is likely to do 0 You want to do as well as possible given the other player s best response 0 We decide the strategy we utilize but we do not choose the outcome The prisoners dilemma 0 Two criminals caught with drugs If both remain silent both get 1 year in prison if only one remains silent he gets 25 years in prison whereas the other goes free if both squeal bot get 10 years in jail o The outcome in this game when it is played only once is it is rational to squeal The reason they can t trust each other 0 It s rational to squeal even though it prevents the best possible outcome 0 There are four possible strategies 1 DefectCooperate 025 2 CooperateCooperate 11 3 DefectDefect 10 10 4 CooperateDefect 25 0 0 We need to be able to read the prisoner s dilemma There is always at least one equilibrium in these games o Equilibrium a combination of strategies in which neither player has an incentive to unilaterally cooperate meaning to switch strategies on their own neither one wants to change their strategy given the strategy of the other 0 What is the equilibrium outcome in this game and how do we know I We are assuming self interested actors here I Since the other player is a selfinterested individual we have to assume they will talk so that you have an incentive to talk I CooperateCooperate option why is that NOT equilibrium in the game They both have an incentive to defect 0 years in prison is better than one If state A is O 2 P8205 Week 4 going to cooperate then what is state B going to do Defect At least one state has an incentive to switch strategies I What about State A cooperates State B defects NOT an equilibrium State B is going to defect So state A has an incentive to switch strategies So they will defect too I They both defect this is the equilibrium neither state has an incentive to change strategies I When the game is played only once which is important they both go in to defect I The game is SO interesting because the game contains a suboptimal outcome through cooperation however the option is not chosen Liberalism and the Dilemma 0 Believe that PD prisoner s dilemma models much of IR I Why I IR arena is anarchic I Cooperation winwin scenario exists I Liberals would argue that international organizations help reach suboptimal outcomes through cooperation I Institutions help states get to the cooperatecooperate option 0 Existence of a common interest in cooperation common goal 0 If the game is iterated cooperation may emerge 339 Axelrod s computer tournament tit for tat Strategy where you open with cooperation If other player responds by defecting you defect If other player cooperates you keep cooperating This is a superior strategy is the best in particular simulation If people can cooperate like this if cooperation is possible by iteration then we may not need institutions 0 Nice guys can nish rst I If the game is iterated 9 Advice from the teacher if you think you understand this you are probably wrong Most people don t understand this at rst Take a few looks at it and ask questions Distributional Con icts 0 Liberals focus on absolute gains in which both can gain absolutely common interests a loft of IR we can model as PD in which we want to cooperate but we have trouble doing so PD is not zero sum game 0 Liberals ignore the question of who gains more states pursue absolute gains 0 Realists focus attention on who gains more relative gains states pursue relative gains real question from this perspective is who gains more Distributional con icts Power con ict is a zero sum game Con icts over relative gains are zerosum Terrorist con ict are zerosum 0 Game modeling distributional game the battle of the sexes PS205 Week 4 Lecture Notes 0 Choosing between football and opera 00 00000 O 1 Strategy 1 football 2 Strategy 2 opera They would both prefer the outcome where they go together He wants to go to the football game she wants to go to the opera pretty sexist game developed in the 50 s Football football best for him second best for Operaopera second best for him best for her He goes to footballshe goes to opera third best option She goes to football game he goes to the opera worst scenario Footballfootball is an equilibrium in the game because neither of them have an incentive to switch operaopera is also an equilibrium Two equilibriums in this game all it can tell us is that they are both going to go TOGETHER but we don t know where they will go the game is indeterminate The game is designed to model this situation that realists say is VERY important in IR of distributional con icts obvious example is territorial division The role of power 0 O O O 0 How do we choose between the two equilibriums The simple game theory is not going to help us with that We have to look deeper at the role of power That s why Skalnes said in the 1950 s they would end up going to the football game assuming a certain power dynamic Also a situation in which the player who moves rst is able to determine the outcome the ability to move first could also be a function of power Having attractive outside options matter in this situation this can force the other party to choose the way you want 9 Trade negotiations I UK and US are the most powerful large domestic markets I Other countries wants access to these markets giving these two states an advantage They are less dependent on foreign markets I During these negations the UK and the US have attractive options no agreement at all would be better for you than it would be for other state eX Switzerland you would be able to force the other country in to an agreement I ALL countries benefit from international trade however they don t all benefit the same amount Democracy and war Authoritarian sates absolute rulers can easily commit their states to war Immanuel Kant In a democracy the people can vote against war Democracies should therefore be peaceful because in a democracy the opinion of the people matters because people can vote against war The problem is that Democratic electorates have often voted for war 0 O O I Ancient Greece Perciles roused the people of Athens for war 4 P8205 Week 4 I 1898 the US electorate dragged a reluctant McKinley in the Spanish American War I 1991 opinion polls and a congressional vote supported Bush in Iraq War could argue the same for the second one Democratic Peace 0 Democracies are not anymore peaceful than nondemocracies 0 Instead they are unwilling to ght democratic countries 0 As close as anything we have to an empirical law in IR right about 80 of the time which is very strong for a social science law 0 Based on an empirical observation How do we de ne democracies o A system in which most citizens can vote 0 Elections are free faire and contested 0 Presidential or parliamentary 0 Separation of powers is not a determining factor US would then likely be the only democracy in the world Correlation and Causation 0 Correlation between two variables type of political system and war I Correlation is strong but do we have cause and effect I Problem can we figure out a causation Random Chance 0 It is not surprising that there are few wars among democracies o Wars are so rare that it could be random chance 0 Think of wars between states beginning with the letter K So few it could be random 0 Why would a realist say there is no democratic peace I Most realism particularly the facets we have touched on ignore internal characteristics of actors I This argument focuses on the nature of the DOMESTIC system but realists focus on the INTERNATIONAL system I Only exception is defensive realists they are willing to open up the black box if they need to for explanation The importance of the theory 0 To increase con dence of causation I Need to develop a theory for what it is that makes democracies not fight other democracies why are they different I Identify a causal mechanism that would explain the absence of war among democracies 0 Without a theory and a causal mechanism we will be less inclined to believe in domestic peace Institutional Constraints 0 People who are going to fight have a say in whether or not the war is needed public opinion 0 Leaders are held accountable if public support is not there less likely to start the war PS205 Week 4 Lecture Notes 0 Checks and balances obvious in the US democracies are slow to use force very dif cult to pass legislation it is designed to be dif cult to do anything Why don t restraints apply to dictatorships as well According to this explanation we would assume democracies to be more peaceful in relations with all states this is not the case 0 This is the problem with this theory these constraints should apply across the board Should be dif cult for democracies to ght wars in general 0 It is NOT the case that democracies are more peaceful than all countries Norms and Shared Culture 0 Shared commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes 0 Democratic states share norms and culture I Tradition of compromise and peaceful resolution of con icts within democracies also apply to con icts between democracies I Democracies tryst each other to refrain from using force I Committed to using the system to solve con ict 0 This is a constructivist explanation in the sense that it emphasizes shared norms and ideas So how would a liberal come to grips with this argument 0 Could agree with constructivist o A variance of interdependences argument democracies trade more with each other than with other countries 00 1282015 Liberal Explanation 1 Democracies trade more with each other than with no democracies economic interdependence A variant of the interdependence argument war and the consequent disruption of trade is costly when interdependence is high For the purposes of this class institutions are de ned as the rules of the game Last time we were talking about democratic peace theory 9 The argument was that institutional constraints lead us to expect that democracies will be more peaceful overall as authoritarian regimes I This isn t the case I They are just more peaceful toward other democracies I What is the problem with the institutional explanation of democratic peace It really doesn t explain democratic peace theory That explanation leads you to believe democracies to be more peaceful overall and they are not 9 Cultural norms argument works a little better main democratic peace theory explanation I Argues that democracies have a cultural norm of solving con ict peacefully 6 P8205 Week 4 I That shared set of norms keeps democracies from going to war with one another I There is also an argument that says you need BOTH cultural norms AND institutions for democratic peace theory to come through 9 Economic interdependence theory can be applied here as well I Democracies trade more with other democracies I So going to war with another democracy would likely be more expensive 9 Democracies belong to international institutions I Democracies follow rules and regulation I Have a routinized way of resolving con ict peacefully through negotiation 9 Could public view of other democracies vs authoritarian countries England vs Iraqi I When public perception saw England as a hierarchy they were willing to go to war with them I Public opinion changes as the British political system changes I As a country becomes more democratic it gets more difficult to fuel a war with that country I Seems clear that people in the US thought of England as a democracy I British opinion of the US changed dramatically after the Emancipation Proclamation 1862 by 1830 slavery was out The British saw slavery as an abomination Lincoln framed that war as a war to keep the union together but the emancipation changes all that After the proclamation England supported the north instead of south who they had strong trade relationships with They probably saw that as a move in more democratic direction I There are difficulties in this way of thinking 0 Public opinion matters because leaders want to be reelected o Argument is that leaders wont wage an unpopular war Realist Explanation 9 They basically say most of the observations that we have come from the Cold War Theory Democracies formed alliances to meet the Soviet threat As alliance partners they did not fight each other The proposal causal link between the type of political system and war is spurious This democratic peace relationship is pretty well supported despite this argument Democratic Transitions New democracies often let people vote but do not have a free press checks on executive power and regular elections 0 The theorized relation is between liberal democracies not all democracies Countries in transition to democracy may be more unstable and prone to external aggression than authoritarian regimes are PS205 Week 4 Lecture Notes 0 The diversionary war argument the war is designed to have this rally around the ag effect External threat brings internal unity Transitional democracies are less stable than established democracies and therefore are more likely to engage in external conflict even more so than authoritarian countries In unestablished system leaders feel insecure about keeping their positions domestically unstable states are more likely to engage in external aggression to divert attention away from domestic issues 0 Example Germany in the years before WWI Diverted attention to external issues It has a rallying of nationalism effect This argument can be used to explain Russia s attack on the Ukrain It is difficult to know whether or not this was the motivation It is consistent with this logic Empirical Problems Social science arguments don t work 100 of the times a list of exceptions The War of 1812 0 Was Britain a Democracy 0 The proportion of the population eligible to vote in GB was almost certainly less than 10 o Perceptions of democracy matter US did not think of GB as an example Germany before WWI authoritarian regime with democratic elements 0 Doyle Wilhelmine Germany was a bifurcated democracy I Democratic in regard to domestic issues I The executivechancellors were not responsible to the Reichstag they couldn t be voted out of office 0 Pre 1914 Germany was democratic with respect to domestic politics but not in the realm of foreign policy 0 The executive was not responsible to the Reichstag the foreign policy making process remained autocratic 0 Germany did not differ appreciably from Britain and France in this respect 9 The problem is if Germany was a bifurcated democracy then so was Britain 0 If we call Wilhelmine Germany a democracy then we have an issue 0 Classification is very important US interventions during the Cold War not talking about war here but we help kick democratic leaders out of office 0 Iran 1953 Guatemala 1954 Chile 1973 Nicaragua 1984 0 Were these countries fully democratic I Not fully but in most cases they were far more democratic before the intervention than after I What the US is trying to do with these places seems inconsistent with democratic peace theory Constructivism on Structure All structure and no agency now wiggle room fire in a theater all run for the exit In IR we rarely are in this situation where it is all structure no agency 8 P5205 Week 4 Usually we aren t left with only one course of action available We could imagine such a situation This is a realist example but constructivist don t agree with this They say even the re example leaves room for choice Constructivists still indeterminate o Whose going to go rst through the exit I Say it is the most powerful The men go rst women and children go last I But in the titanic the weak did not suffer what they must like realists argue with states The boats were lled with women and children 0 The distribution of power is NOT enough I Why do the women and children end up in the lifeboats I Meaning there is agency I Everyone is running toward the exit but who goes through first is indeterminate just by structure or power dynamic I How do we make that determination Could be based on power but that s not what happened on the Titanic so how do they do it in a t of panic no one is thinking and they fall back on other things internalized norms 9 act in accordance with norms without thought There is a westemized norm that women and children go rst I Realists tend to think norms don t matter power does 0 We also need to know about cultural norms rules procedures ect Anarchy The core idea in IR certainly in realism o No one knows where anarchy comes from background condition Anarchy is what states make of it Mendz o Selfhelp and power politics do not necessarily follow anarchy contra realism o Selfhelp only follows from anarchy if a certain understanding of anarchy prevails Anarchy and the distribution of power do not predict whether two states are friends or foes will recognize each others sovereignty will have dynastic tires will be revisionist of status quo powers an so on o Anarchy is a constant 0 Certain distribution of power 0 States adopt different strategies issues is how do we explain why states have di erent strategies o Is there a realist way to gure out two drastically different strategies I Could adopt Mearsheimer O ensive Realist approach explains revisionist Germany Japan states will always seek survival and to be the most powerful state possible They don t recognize the distinction between status quo and revisionist states I Defensive realists predict that too much power would back re on you They would say we need to look at domestic politics to nd PS205 Week 4 Lecture Notes the explanation exists Irrational for the country but rational for a group within the country Essentially an interest group explanation 39 Constructivist Constructivists The role of lntemational norms Norms are a set of ideas about our standards of appropriate behavior 0 Standards by which actors expect or agree to be judged 0 Liberals and realists would say norms don t matter cost bene t analysis Standards of appropriateness norms will shape 0 State identity how states conceive of themselves 0 Norms work because of conceptions of who we are certain kinds of people just do or do not do certain things De nition of state interests norms may constrain or permit certain actions and shape how we conceive our interests Realists Liberalists make analytical assumptions Constructivists say that we should look at what states want and the norms that cause them to have those interests It is not the case that states ALWAYS act in selfinterest Rationalists liberalsrealist cost bene t analysis is right up their ally
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