Thinking Friendship, from Plato to Derrida
Thinking Friendship, from Plato to Derrida
Popular in Course
Popular in Department
This 105 page Reader was uploaded by Allegra Print & Imaging on Friday January 3, 2014. The Reader belongs to a course at Brown University taught by a professor in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 635 views.
Reviews for Thinking Friendship, from Plato to Derrida
Report this Material
What is Karma?
Karma is the currency of StudySoup.
You can buy or earn more Karma at anytime and redeem it for class notes, study guides, flashcards, and more!
Date Created: 01/03/14
rown Spring 2014 Thinking Friendship from Plato to Derrida German Studies 1200B amp COLT 18138 Course packet sales are nonrefundable All sales final Thinking Friendship from Plato to Derrida German Studies 1200B amp Comparative Literature 1813S Spring Term 2014 Professor Gerhard Richter Wed 300 520 pm i TA Michael Powers CRN 24500 Office 190 Hope St Rm 104 How have the concept and experience of friendship been construed in the Western intellectual traditions What are the implications of dividing one s personal cultural and political World into friends and enemies What is the relation between friendship and questions of community hospitality war and the work of mourning To what extent are our so called social networking services the end of friendship We will gain a grounding in the history and theory of friendship through close and caring readings of writers such as Plato Aristotle Cicero Montaigne Kant Emerson Nietzsche Freud Heidegger Schmitt Blanchot Nancy and Derrida Taught in English Required Texts available at the Brown University Bookstore Michael Pakaluk ed Other Selves Philosophers on Frterzdship Indianapolis Hackett ISBN 0872201 139 Sigmund Freud Totem and Taboo New York Norton ISBN 0393001431 Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political Chicago University of Chicago Press Jacques Derrida The Work of Mourning Chicago University of Chicago Press There also is a required course reader available at Allegra Print on Waterman Street Expectations Unfailing attendance diligent preparation and thoughtful participation Weekly one page response papers returned to student with feedback Inclass midterm examination Term paper Grade Composition Unfailing Attendance amp Preparation incl response papers 25 Inclass Midterm S 30 Term Paper 45 II III IV VI VII VIII IX XI XII XIII Weekly Plan Introduction Friedrich Nietzsche selections on friends and enemies from Human All Too Human and The Gay Science Plato Lysis Aristotle Nichomachearz Ethics Book VIII Cicero quotTreatise on Friendshipquot Michel de Montaigne quotOf Friendshipquot Immanuel Kant Lecture on Friendship Kant The Doctrine of Virtue Ralph Waldo Emerson Friendship Sigmund Freud Mourning and Melancholia Freud T oiem and Taboo Heidegger Being and Time paragraphs 27 34 35 38 Maurice Blanchot Friendship Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political In class midterm J ean Luc Nancy Shattered Love i p Nancy Ronell and Schirmacher Love and Community A Roundtable Discussion Jacques Derrida Politics of Friendship Derrida The Work of Mourning selected essays Derrida The Work of Mourning selected essays OF FREENDSHIP Ph csophic Selections 3 on a Perennial Concern Edited by Marshell Carl Bradley and Philip Blosser Longwood Academic Wolfeboro New Hampshire Friedrich Nietzsche HUMAN ALL TOOHUMAN 39 AND p THE JOYFUL WISDOM Friedrich Nietzsche 18441900 is perhaps the most controversial gure in the history of modern philosophy Few thinkers have been so often quoted and misquoted and misunderstood Nietzsche39s postulations of the 0vennan and the quotEternal Returnquot have made him the subject of not only philosophers in particular but political thinkers and theologians as well Many of Nietzsche39s critics and there are many accuse him of fostering protoNazism by way of his distinction between a quotmaster morality and a slave morality while other critics accuse him of being the atheist par excellence who would too hastily reevalu ate all values Many however are also defenders of Nietzsche defenders who say simply that 939 one looks at all of Nietzscheis writings and overlooks his aphoristic style which by its very nature is intended to shock the reader then one finds a Nietzsche who is anything but a protoNazi or a super cial atheist On the surface Nietzsche would seem to care little for morality or for humanity for that matter However as he once wrote his was an ethic which contained a more severe morality than was to be found anywhere else in any other philosopher or in any religion This seeming contradiction quotstems from the fact that Nietzsche had lost all patience with those political institutions and religious institutions of his time which would claim to be moral through and through namely democracy and socialism wherein everyone was wn j FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 327 to be seen as equal and in Christianity which preached a rather pathetic form of sympathy for sufferers In contradistinction from these moralizersquot who would level all of humanity into an unfree joyless mass Nietzsche expounded the notion of master moralityquot to be taken up by the individual in order that one live a life by the highest of standards Though born in Germany Nietzsche disliked much of German culture Even the philosophy he said had too much beer in itquot Nietzsche spent the greater part of his adult life outside of Germany At an early age he became professor of classical philology at the University of Basel Only a few years thereafter due to bad health which had plagued him even in his childhood Nietzsche retired to Italy where he spent his most productive years His death in 1900 seems almost symbolic as both his critics and admirers alike agree that he seems to have been something of a prophet of the ills of the twentieth century in particular HUMAN ALLTOOHUMAN1 46 SYMPATIIY STRONGER THAN SUFFERING There are cases when sympathy is stronger than actual suffering For instance we are more pained when one of our friends is guilty of something shameful than when we do it ourselves For one thing we have more faith in the purity of his character thanhe has himself then our love for him probably on account of this very faith is stronger than his love for himself And even if his egoism suffers more thereby than our egoism inasmuch as it has to bear more of the bad consequences of his fault the unegoistic in us this word is not to be taken too seriously but only as a modi cation of the expression is more deeply wounded by his guilt than is the un egoistic in him 1 Friedrich Nietzsche The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche ed Oscar Levy New York Russell amp Russell Inc 190911 Vol 6 Human AllTooHuman Part One tr Helen Zimmem Vol 7 Human All TooHuman Part Two tr Paul V Cohen Adapted by the editors 3 28 OF FRIENDSHIP 49 GO0DWHL Amongst the small but countlessly frequent and therefore very effective things to which science should pay more attention than to the goat rare things is to be reckoned goodwill i mean that exhibition of a riendly disposition in intercourse that smiling eye that clasp of the hand that cheerfulness with which almost all human actions are usually accompanied Every teacher every official adds this to whatever is his duty it is the perpetual occupation of humanity and at the same time the waves of its light in which everything grows in the narrowest circle namely within the family life blooms and ourishes only through that goodwill Kindliness iendliness the courtesy of the heart are everflowing sueams of unegoistic impulses and have given far more powerful assistance to culture than even those much more famous demonstrations which are called pity mercy and selfsacrifice But they are thought little of and as a matter of fact there is not much that is unegoistic in them The sum of these small doses is nevertheless mighty their united force is amongst the strongest forces Thus one nds much more happiness in the worldthan sad eyes see if one only reckons rightly and does not forget all those moments of comfort in which every day is rich even in the most harried of human lives 5 l HOW APPEARANCE BECOMES ACTUALITY The actor nally reaches such a mint that even in the deepest sorrow he cannot cease from thinking about the impression made by his own person and the general scenic effect for instance even at the funeral of his child he will weep over his own sorrow and its expression like one of his own audience The hypocrite who always plays one and the same part ceases at last to be a hypocrite for instance priests who as young men are generallypconscious or unconscious hypocrites become at last natural and are then really without any affectation just priests or if the father does not succeed so far perhaps the son does who makes use of his father s progress and inherits his habits if any one long and obstinately desires to appear something he finds it difficult at last to be anything else The profession of almost every individual even of the artist begins with hypocrisy with an FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 32939 imitating orn without with a copying of the effective He who always wears the mask of a friendly expression must eventually obtain a power over well meaning dispositions without which the expression of friendliness is not to be compelled and nally these again obtain a power over him he is wellmeaning 58 WHAT ONE MAY PROMISEOne may promise actions but no sentiments for these are involuntary Whoever promises to love or hate a person or be faithful to him for ever promises something which is not within his power he can certainly promise such actions as are usually the results of love hate or delity but which may also spring from other motives for many ways and motives lead to one and the same action The promise to love some one for ever is therefore really So long as I love you I will act towards you in a loving way if I cease to love you you will still receive the same treatment horn me although inspired by other motives so that our fellow men will still be deluded into the belief that our love is unchanged and ever the same One promises therefore the continua tion of the semblance of love when without selfdeception one speaks vows of eternal love i S9 WTELLECT AND MORALITY 0ne must have a goo memory to be able to keep a given promise One must have a strong power of imagination to be able to feel pity So closely is morality bound to the goodness of the intellect 368 THE TALENT FOR FRIENDSHIP Two types are distinguished amongst people who have a special faculty for friendship The one is ever on the ascent and for every phase of his development he nds a hiend exactly suited to him The series of friends which he thus acquires is seldom a consistent one and is sometimes at variance and in contradiction entirely in accordance with the fact that the later phases of his development neutralise or prejudice the earlier phases Such a man may jestingly be called a ladder The other type is represented by him who exercises an 3 3 0 OF FRIENDSHIP attrmtive in uence on very different characters and endowments so that he wins a whole circle of iends these however are thereby brought voluntarily into friendly relations with one another in spite of all differences Such a man may be called a circle for this homogeneousness of such different temperaments and natures must somehow M typi ed in him Furthermore the faculty for having good hiends is greater in many people than the faculty for being a good iend 376 OF FRIENDSJust consider with thyself how different are the feelings how divided are the opinions of even the nearest acquaintances how even the same opinions in thy 39iend s mind have quite a different aspect and strength horn what they have in thine own and how manifold are the occasions which arise for misunder standing and hostile severance After all this thou wilt say to thyself How insecure is the ground upon which all our alliances and friendships rest how liable to cold downponrs and bad weather how lonely is every creature When a person recognises this fact and in addition that all opinions and the nature and strength of them in his fellowmen are just as necessary and irresponsible as their actions when his eye learns to see this internal necessity of opinions owing to the indissoluble interweaving of character occupation talent and environment he will perhaps get rid of the bittemess and sharpness of the feeling with which the sage exclaimed Friends there are no friends Much rather will he make the confession to himself Yes there are friends but they were drawn towards thee by error and deception concerning thy character and they must have learnt to be silent in order to remain thy friends for such human relationships almost always rest on the fact that some few things are never said are never indeed alluded to but if these pebbles are set rolling friendship follows afterwards and is broken Arethere any who would not be mortally injured if they were to learn what their most intimate friends really knew about them By getting a knowledge of ourselves and by looking upon our namre as a changing sphere of opinions and moods and thereby learning to despise ourselves a little we recover once more our equilibrium with the rest of mankind it is true that we have good urIsLu FRIEDRICH NIETZS CHE 331 39 reason to despise each of our acquaintances even the greatest of them but just as good reason to turn this feeling against ourselves And so we will bear with each other since we bear with ourselves and perhaps there will come to each a happier hour when he will exclaim Friends there are really no friends thus cried th expiring old sophist Foes there is really no foe thus shout I the incarnate fool 241 GOOD FRIENDSH1P A good iendship arises when the one man deeply respects the other more even than himself loves him also though not so much as himself and finally to facilitate intercourse knows how toadd the delicate bloom and veneer of intimacy but at the same time wisely refrains from a true real intimacy rom the confounding of meant and mum 242 FRENDS AS GHOSTS If we change ourselves vitally our hiends who have not changed become ghosts of our own past their voice sounds shadowy and dreadful to us as if we heard our own voice speaking but younger harder less mellow 260 MAKDJG FRIENDS ONLY WITH THE HlDUSTRIOUS 39I39he man of leisure is dangerous to his friends for having nothing to do he talks of what his friends are doing or not doing interferes and finally makes himself a nuisance The clever man will only make friends with the indusuious 263 DEMONSTRATING 0NE S VANITY TO FRIEND AND FOE Many a man horn vanity maltreats even his friends when in the presence of witnesses to whom he wishes to make his own preponderance clear Others exaggerate the merits of their enemies 3 3 2 OF FRIENDSHIP in order to point proudly to the fact that they are worthy of such foes 333 EITERCOURSE AS AN ENJOYMENT lf a man renounces the world and intentionally lives in solitude he may come to regard intercoluse with others which he enjoys but seldom as a special delicacy run Jovrut WrsnoM2 279 Stellar Friendship We were friends and have become strangers to each other But this is as it ought to he and we do not want either to conceal or obscure the fact as if we had to be ashamed of it We are two ships each of which has its goal and its course we may to be sure cross one another in our paths and celebrate a feast together as we did before and then the gallant ships lay quietly in one harbour and in one sunshine so that it might have been thought they were already at their goal and that they had had one goal But then the almighty suength of our tasks forced us apart once more into different seas and into different zones and perhaps we shall never see one another again or perhaps we may see one another but not know one another again the different seas and sums have altered us That we had to become suangers to one another is the law to which we are subject just by that shall we become more sacred to one another lust by that shall the thought of our former friendship become holierl There is probably some immense invisible curve and stellar orbit in which our courses and goals so widely di erent may be comprehended as small stages of the way let us raise ourselves to this thought But our life is too short and our power of vision too limited for us to be more than friends in the sense of that sublime possibility And so we will believe in our 2 Friedrich Nietzsche The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche ed Oscar Levy New York Russell amp Russell Inc 1909ll Vol 10 The Joyful Wisdom tr Thomas Common with Poetry rendered by Paul V Cohen and Mande D Petre Adapted by the editors FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 333 stellar friendship though we should have to be terrestrial enemies to one another 329 Leisure and Idleness 39l here is an Indian savagery a savagery peculiar to the Indian blood in the manner in which the Americans suive after gold and the breathless hurry of their work the characteristic vice of the New World already begins to infect old Eurow and makes it savage also spreading over it a strange lack of intellectuality One is now ashamed of repose even long re ection almost causes remorse of conscience Thinking is done with a stop watch as dining is done with the eyes xed on the financial newspaper we live like men who are continually afraid of letting opportunities slip Better do anythingwhatever than nothing this principle also is a noose with which all culture and all higher taste may be strangled And just as all form obviously disappears in this hurry of workers so theusense for form itself the ear and the eye for the melody of movement also disappear The proof of this is the clumsy perspicuity which is now everywhere demanded in all positions where a person would like to be sincere with his fellows in intercourse with friends women relatives children teachers pupils leaders and princesone has no longer either time or energy for ceremonies for roundabout courtesies for any esprit in conversation or for any otium3 whatever For life in the hunt for gain continually compels a person to consume his intellect even to exhaustion in constant dissimulation overreaching or forestallingz the real virtue nowadays is to do something in a shorter time than another person And so there are only rare hours of sincere intercourse permitted in them however people are tired and would not only like to let themselves go but to stretch their legs out wide in awkward style The way people write their letters nowadays is quite in keeping with the age their style and spirit will always be the true sign of the times If there be still enjoyment in society and in art it is enjoyment such as over worked slaves provide for themselves Oh this moderation in joy of our cultured and 3 Free time leisure ease Eds 39 334 or FRIENDSHIP uncultured classes Oh this increasing suspiciousness of all enjoyment Work is winning over more and more the good conscience to its side the desire for enjoyment already calls itself need of recreation and even begins to be ashamed of itself One owes it to one s health people say when they are caught at a picnic Indeed it might soon go so far that one could not yield to the desire of the vita contemplativa that is to say excursions with thoughts and friends without se1f contempt and a bad conscience Welll Formerly it was the very reverse it was action that suffered horn a bad conscience A man of good family concealed his work when need compelled him to labour The slave laboured under the weight of the feeling that he did something conternptible the doing itself was something conternptible Only in otium and bellumdt is there nobility and honour so rang the voice of ancient prejudice FOR FURTHER READING Primary Sources 02 the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for L39y39e Translated with an Introduction by Peter Preuss lndianamlis Hackett 1980 Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks Translated with an introduction by Marianne Cowan Chicago Henry Regnery Co 1962 The Will to Power Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R J Hollingdalei Edited with Commentary by Walter Kaufmann New York Random House Vintage 1968 Discussion and Commentary Brinton Crane Nietzsche Cambridge Harvard University Press 1941 New York Harper amp Row 1965 v Copleston F C Frederick Nietzsche Philosopher of Culture New York Harms amp Brothers 1942 2nd edition 1975 4 War Eds FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 335 9 Danto Ar iur C Nietzsche as Philosopher New York Macmillan 1965 Figgis J N The Will to Freedom New York Charles Scribner s Sons 1917 Heidegger Martin Nietzsche 4 Volumes Translated by David Farrell Krell et al San Francisco Harper amp Row I979 I988 llollingdale R 3 Nietzsche The Man amp His Philosophy Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press 1965 Jaspers Karl Nietzsche Translated by Charles F Wallcraft amp Frederick J Schmitz South Bend RegneryGateway 1979 Kauftnann Walter Nietzsche Philosopher Psychologist Antichrist Princeton Princeton University Press 1950 Morgan George A Jr What Nietzsche Means Cambridge Harvard University Press 1941 reprint New York Harper amp Row 196539 Salter W M Nietzsche as Philosopher New York Henry Holt 1917 Wilcox J T Truth and Value in Nietzsche Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press 1974 2 5 0 OF FRIENDSHIP Discussion and Commentary Broad C D Five Types of Ethical Theory New York Harcourt Brace 1928 Chapter 4 Broiles R D The Moral Philosophy of David Hume The Hague Martinus Nijhoff 1964 MacNabb D G C David Hume His Theory of Knowledge and Morality New York Hutchinsotfs University Library 1951 Mossner Ernest C The Life of David Hume Aus n University of Texas Press 1954 second edition 1979 Smith Norman Kemp The Philosophy of David Hume London MacMi1lan C0 1941 Steward J B The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume New York Columbia University Press 1963 Stroud Barry Hume London Routledge amp Kegan Paul 1977 E7 Emmanuel Kant THE DOCTRENE OF WRTUE Immanuel Kant 1 7241804 was one of the most importantand in uential philosophers of modern times Born and raised in East Prussia he never setfoot outside of his native province and lived a singularly uneventful professorial life Although he enjoyed the company of friends he never married but remained a classic desk scholar a man of such regular habits that the fabled housewives of Konigsberg contemporary Kaliningrad are said to have set their clocks by his punctual daily walks Raised in a devoutly religious environment he rejected orthodox Christianity but retained entirely the pathos of his childhood Pietism in his emphasis on moral earnestness and the strength and purity of an indomitable good will Despite his geographical provincialism and academic detachment e Kant was well versed in the geography and culture of distant places and followed with interest the French Revolution and other political and social events of hisday His interest ranged with amazing breadth taking in everything from lunar volcanoes to theology but he always remained concerned preeminently with the critical metaphysical and epistemological questions of foundation underlying those other interests Like Aristotle and Aquinas Kant was a great builder of a philosophical system Those who know him only from his great and imposing Critiques and their formidable language and page long sentences often are surprised to find The Doctrine of Virtue so readable and entertaining Here they nd to their delight the Kant ofHerder39s recollections from his days as a student under Kant Speech the richest in thought flowed from his lips 2 5 2 OF FRIENDSHIP Play tlness wit and humor were at his command His lectures were the most entertaining talks Those used to thinking of Kant s ethics as a system of abstract formalism are often surprised to nd in his The Doctrine of Virtue a detailed treatment of a great diversity of Speci c 5343 0f often very interesting behavior Far from being concerned with only the empty form of morality Kant is here seen to be concerned with showing what specific kinds of actions may be regarded as morally good and hence as one s duties The Doctrine of Virtue is divided into two major parts the first entitled quotDuties to Oneself the second entitled Duties of Virtue to Other Men In the first part Kant ofers an analysis of duties involved in the moral penquotection of ourselves distinguishing between duties to oneself as a rationalmoral being and as a natural animal being The former require exercising rational freedom and avoiding the vices of lying avarice and servility the latter involve the duty of selfpreservation and the avoidance of suicide sexual perversion and gluttony 39 In the second part Kant offers an analysis of duties relating to the happiness of others distinguishing between our duties as they involve love and respect of others The former include the duties of bene cence gratitude and sympathy and the avoidance of their corresponding vices envy ingratitude and malicious joy the 3039quot include the duty of moderation in one39s demands and avoiding the vices of pride calumny and mockery Love and respect are viewed by K ant as coinciding in friendship Our selection Duties of Virtue to Other Men is zakenfrom the second part of The Doctrine of Virtue IMMANUEL KANT 253 THE nocrnma or vmrrtal On Duties of Virtue to Others CHAPTER I ON DUTIES 3390 OTIIERS BERELY AS BEN SECTION I ON DUTES OF LOVE TO OTHER BEN Division 23 The first division of duties of virtue to others can be the division into duties by fulflling which we also obligate the other and duties whose observance does not result in obligation on the other s part To fulfill the first is meritorious in rela on to the other person but to fulfill the second is to render the other only what is due to him Love and respect are the feelings that accompany the practice of these duties They can be considered separately each by itself and can also exist separately we can love our neighbour though he might deserve but little respect and we can show him the respect necessary for every man though we might not think him very lovable But in their ground in the law love and respect are always joined together in a duty only in such a way that now one duty and new the other is the subject s principle with the other joined to it as an accessory 39l39hus we shall recognize an obligation to help a poor man but since our favour humbles him by making his welfare dependent on our generosity it is our duty to behave as if our help is either what is 4481 merely due to him or but a slight service of iove and so to spare him humiliation and maintain his selfrespect it 1 Immanuel Kant The Doctrine of Virtue tr by Mary I Gregor Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press 1964 English translation copyright 1964 by Mary I Gregor Foreword Copyright 1964 by H J Paton Excerpts reprinted by permission of Harper amp Row Publishers Inc 2 5 4 OF FREENDSHIP 25 In this context however love is not to be taken as a feeling aestheuc love tie a pleasure in the wrfection of other men it does not mean emotional love for others cannot oblige us to have feelings It must rather be taken as a maxim of benevolence practical love which has bene cence as its consequence The same holds true of the respect to be shown to others it is not to be taken merely as the feeling that comes from comparing one s own worth with another s such as mere habit causes a child to feel toward his parents a pupil toward his teacher a subordinate in general toward his superior Respect is rather to be taken in a practical sense observantio aliis praeszanda as a maxim of limiting our selfesteem by the dignity of humanity in another person i 28 Now the benevolence present in the love of all men as such is indeed the geatest in its extent but the smallest in its degree and 39 when I say I take an interest in this man s welfare only in keeping with my universal love for man the interest I take in him is as slight as an interest can be I am only not indifferent with regard to him Yet one man is closer to me than another and in benevolence I am the closest to myself Now how does this fit in with the precept love your neighbour your fellowman as yourself When in the duty of benevolence one man is closer to me than another I am obligated to greater benevolence to him than to the other but I am admittedly closer to myself even according to duty than any other So it would seem that I cannot without contradicting myself say that I ought to love every man as myself for the standard of self love would allow of no difference in degree But it is quite obvious 451 that what is meant in this case is not a mere benevolence in wishes which is really only a satisfaction in the wellbeing of all others and does not even require me to contribute to their well being every man for himself God for us all It refers rather to active practical benevolence beneficence which consists in making another s wellbeing and happiness my end For in wishing I can be equally benevolent to everyone whereas in acting I EMMANUEL KANT 255 can without violating the universality of my maxim vary the degee geatly according to the different objects of my love one of whom concerns me more closely than the other Division of Duties of Love They are duties of a bene cence b gratitude and c sympathy A On the Duty of Bene cence 30 It is every man s duty to be bene cent that is to promote according to his means the happiness of others who are in need and this without hope of gaining anything by it I For every man who finds himself in need wishes to be helped by other men But if he lets his maxim of not willing to help others in turn when they are in need become public ie makes this a universal permissive law then everyone would likewise deny him assistance when he needs it or at least would be entitled to Hence the maxim of selfinterest contradicts itself when it is made universal law that is it is contrary to duty Consequently the maxim of common interest of beneficence toward the needyis a universal duty of men and indeed for this reason that men are to be considered fellowmen that is rational beings with needs united by nature in one dwelling place for the purpose of helping one another i Casuisticul Questions How far should we expend our means in practicing bene cence Surely not to the extent that we ourselves would nally come to need the charity of others How much worth has bene cence extended with a cold hand by a will to be put into effect at one s death What of the man who deprives another of his freedom but in exercising over him the supreme authority permitted by the law of the land does so according to his own idea of how to make that person happy of how to do good to his bondsrnan Can this man 2 5 6 OF FRIENDSHIP ponsider himself bene cent for taking paternal care of his bondsman In keeping with his own concept of happiness Or is not the injustice of depriving someone of his freedom a thing so opposed to juridical duty as such that the man who freely consents to submit to this condition counting on his mastefs heneficence commits the supreme rejection of his own humanity and the master s utmost concern for this man would not really be bene cence at all Or could the service which the master renders him be so great as to outweigh rnan s right I cannot do good to anyone according to my concept of happiness except to young children and the insane but only according to that of the one lintend to benefit and I am not really being kind to someone if I force a gift on him The ability to practice beneficence which depends on promrty follows largely horn the injustice of the government which favours certam men and so introduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need help This being the case does the rich man s help to the needy on which he so readily prides himself as something ll39l6I39ltOI l0l1S really deserve to be called beneficence at all B On The Duty of Gratitude 32 Gratitude is a duty It is not a mere prudential maxim of encouraging another to show me further bene cence by attesting my indebtedness to him for a past kindness grariarum acrio est ad plus dandum invitatio for in such a maxim I use him merely as a means to my further purposes Gratitude is rather immediate necessitation by the moral law ie duty C S ympatltezic Feelings is or Duty to General 39 35 But whileit is not in itself a duty to experience sadness and so I also joy in sympathy with others it is a duty to participate actively in the fate of others Hencewe have an indirect duty to cultivate the sympathetic natural aesthetic feelings in us and to use them as so many means to participating from moral principles and from the feeling appropriate to these principles lhus it is our duty not to RHMANUEL KANT 257 avoid places where we shall nd the poor who lack the most basic essentials but rather to seek them out not to shun sickrooms or debtors prisons in order to avoid the painful sympathetic feelings that we cannot guard against For this is still one of the impulses which nature has implanted in us so that we may do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish 457 On the Vices of Hatred of Man Which are Directly Opposed contrarie to Love ofMan 36 They comprise the abominable family of envy ingratitude and malicious joy in auother s misfortune In these vices however the haued is not open and violent but secret and veiled and this adds baseness to the failure in duty to oue s neighbour so that one also violates duty to oneself SECTION E ON DUTIES OF VIRTUE TO OTHER NEN WHlCH ARISE FROM THE RESPECT DUE TO quotITEM 37 Moderation in one s demands general1y that is the willing limitation of one man s self love by the selflove of othersis wlled modesty Want of such moderation lack of modesty in one s claims to beloved by others is called egotism philauzia But lack of modesty in one s claims to respect from others is selfconceit arrogantia The respect that I bear for others or that another can claim from me observantio aliis praestarzda is therefore the recognition of a dignity dignitos in other men ie of a worth that has no price or no equivalent for which the object of esteem mestimii could be exchanged The assessment of anything as worthless is contempt 38 Every man has a rightful claim to respect from his fellowmen and is reciprocally obligated to show respect for every other man Humanity itself is a dignity for man cannot be used merely as a means by any man either by others or even by himself but must 25 8 OF FRIENDSHIP always be ueated at the same time as an end And it is just this that comprises his dignity personality by virtue of which he assumes Superiority over all the other beings in the world which are not men and can he used hence over all things 41 To neglect mere duties of love is lack of virtue fpeccatum But to neglect duty that proceeds from the respect due to every man as such is vice vitium For no one is wronged when we neglect duties of love but if we fail in a duty of respect then a man is deprived of his lawful claim The first transgression is opposed to duty as a contrary comrarie oppositum virtutis But violation of a duty of respect is not only a want of moral embellishment it even removes the value of the respect that would otherwise stand the subject in good stead and is therefore vice On the Vices Which Violate Duties of Respect for Other Men These vices are a pride b calumny and C mockery A Pride 42 Pride superbia and as this word expresses it the desire to be always on top is a kind of ambition dmbitio in which we demand that others think little of themselves in comparison with us It is therefore a vice opposed to the respect which every man can righdully claim It is distinguished from proper pride animus eidtus which is love of honour ie anxiety to yield nothing of one s human dignity in comparison with others B Calamity 43 By cafumny obtrectatio or backbiting I do not mean slander contumelia false defamation to be taken to Law l mean merely the EMMANUEL KANT 259 immediate inclination with no particular end in view to bring into the open something prejudicial to respect for others This is conuary to the respect due to humanity as such for the scandal so given weakens this respect on which the impulse to the morally good rests and so faras possible makes people sceptical about it C Mockery 44 Woman censure and a mania for ridicule the propensity to expose others to laughter so as to make their faults the immediate object of our amusement are a form of malice CHAPTER H ON ETHICAL DUTIES OF LEN TO ONE ANOTEER WITH REGARD TO THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES 39 45 How should one behave for example to men who are morally pure or depraved to the cultivated or the crude to the 468 learned or the ignorant and among the learned to those who handle their science in a sociable polished way or in a specialized pedantic way to those who aim at practical goals or rather at wit and taste How should men be treated by virtue of their differences in rank age sex health prosperity or poverty and so forth These questions do not yield so many different kinds of ethical obligation for there is only one lltind that of virtue as such but only so many different ways of applying the one principle of virtue corollaries CONCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ELEBENTS On the Intimate Union of Love and Respect in Friendship 46 Friendship considered in its perfection is the union of two persons through equal and mutual love and respect It is easy to see that perfect friendship is an ideal of the emotional and practical concern which each of the friends united through a morally good will takes in the other s welfare and even if friendship does not produce 2 6 6 OF FREENBSHEP the complete happiness of life the adoption of this ideal in men s attitude to one another contains their worthiness to be happy Hence men have a duty of friendship The striving for mrfect friendship as the maximum good in the anitude of friends to each other is a duty imposed by reasou not indeed an ordinary duty but a duty of honour Yet it is easy to see that perfect friendship is a mere ldea although a practically necessary one which cannot be achieved in practice For in his relations with his neighbour how can a man ascertain whether one of the attitudes essential to this duty eg mutual benevolence is equal on the part of both iends Or still more important how can he be sure what relation exists in the same person between the feeling connected with the one duty and that connected with the other eg between the feeling connected with benevolence and that connected with respect And how can he be sure that if one of the friends 469 is more ardent in his love he may not just because of this forfeit something of the other s respect Does not all this mean that love and respect on the part of both friends can hardly be brought subjectively into that balanced proportion which is yet necessary for friendship For we can regard love as attraction and respect as repulsion and if the principle of love commands friends to come together the principle of respect requires them to keep each other at a proper distance This limita tion upon intimacy which is expressed in the rule that even the best of friends should not make themselves too familiar with each other contains a maxim which holds not only for the superior in relation to the inferior but also viceversa For if the superior suddenly feels his pride wounded he may want the inferior s respect to be put aside for the moment but not abolished But once respect is violated its presence within is irrevocably lost even though the outward marks of it manners are brought back to their former course Friendship conceived as attainable in its purity or completeness between Orestes and Pylades Theseus and Pirithous is the hobby horse of writers of romance On the other hand Aristotle says My dear friends there is no such thing as a friend The following remarks may mint up the difficulties in perfect hiendship From a moral point of view it is of course a duty for one of the friends to point out the other s faults to him this is in the other s best interests and is therefore a duty of love But his alter ego sees EMMANUEL KANT 261 in this a lack of the respect which he expected om his friend and thinks either that he has already lost something of his fri39endquots respect or that since he is observed and secretly criticized he is in constant danger of losing it and even the fact that his friend observes him and finds fault with him will seem in itself an insult How we wish for a friend in need one who is of course an acdve iend ready to help us at his own expense But still it is also a heavy burden to feel chained to another s fate and encumbered with his needs Hence iendship cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage the union must rather be a pure moral one and the help that each of the two may count on om the other in case of need must not be regarded as the end and motive of friendship for in that case he would lose the other s respect but only as the 470 outward manifestation of an inner heartfelt benevolence which should not be put to the test since this is always dangerous Each iend is generously concerned with sparing the other his burden and bea ng it all by himself even concealing it altogether from his friend while yet he can always atter himself that in case of need he could con dently count on the other s help But if one of them accepts a favour from the other then he may well be able to count on equality in love but not in respect for he sees himself obviously a step lower in so far as he is under obligation without being able reciprocally to impose obligation It is sweet to feel a mutual possession that approximates to a fusion into one person Yet friendship is something so delicate teneritas amicitiae that it is never for a moment safe from interruptions if it is allowed to rest on feelings and if this mutual sympathy and selfsurrender are not subjected to principles or rules preventing excessive familiarity and limiting mutual love by the requirements of respect Such interruptions are common among uncultivated people although they I do not always result in a split for the rabble ght and make up These people cannot part with each other and yet they cannot come to terms with each other since they need quarrels in order to savour the sweetness of being united in reconciliation But in any case the love in friendship cannot be an agitation Affekt for this is blind in its choice and after a while it goes up in smoke 2 6 2 OF FRIENDSHIP 47 Moral iendship as distinguished from emotional friendship is the complete con dence of two persons in revealing their secret thoughts and feelings to each other in so far as such disclosures are consistent with mutual respect for each other Man is a being meant for society though he is also an unsociable one and in cultivating social intercourse he feels suongly the need to reveal himself to others even with no ulterior purpose But on the other hand hemmed in and cautioned by fear of the misuse others may make of this disclosure of his thoughts he finds himself constrained 471 to lock up in himself a good part of hrs opinions especially those about other people He would like to discuss with someone his opinions about his associates the government religion and so forth but he cannot risk it partly because the other person while prudently keeping back his own opinions might use this to harm him and partly because if he revealed his failings while the other person concealed his own he would lose something of the other s respect by presenting himself quite candidly to him If he finds someone understanding so1neone who moreover shares his general outlook on things with whom he need not be anxious about this danger but can reveal himself with complete con dence he can then air his views He is not completely alone with his thoughts as in a prison but enjoys a freedom denied to him with the rank and file with whom he must shut himself up in himself Every man has his secrets and dare not con de blindly in others partly because most men have a base disposition to use these secrets to his prejudice and partly because many people are indiscreet or incapable of judging and distinguishing what may or may not be repeated The necessary combination of qualities is seldom found in one person ram avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno especially since the closest friendship requires that this understanding and uusted friend he also bound not to share the secrets entrusted to him with anyone else no matter how reliable he thinks him without explicit permission to do so EEMANUEL KANT 263 Appendix 43 On the Virtues of Social Intercourse virtutes hornileticae lt is a duty both to ourselves and to others not to isolate otuselves separatistam agere but to bring our moral perfection into social intercourse o icium commercii sociabilitas while we should make ourselves a xed center of our principles we should regard the circle thus drawn around us as one that also forms a part of the allinclusive circle of those who in their attitude are citizens of the world The end in this duty is not to promote the highest good of the world but only the means that lead indirectly to this end means such as pleasantness in our relations with others good naturedness mutual love and respect affability and propriety humanitas aesthetica et decorum By this we associate virtue with the graces and to effect this is in itselfa duty of virure These are indeed only outworks or byproducts parerga which present a fair illusion of something like virtue an illusion which also deceives no one since everyone knows how to take it Ajfability sociability courtesy hospitality and gentleness in disageeing without quarreling are indeed only small change yet they promote the feeling for virtue itself by arousing a striving to bring this illusion as near as possible to the truth All of these 4731 like the mere manners of social intercourse manifest what is obligatory and also bind others to it and in so doing they work toward a virtuous attitude in so far as they at least make virtue fashionable But the ques on arises here whether we may also keep company with the vicious We cannot avoid meeting them unless we leave the world and besides our judgment about them is not competent B in if the vice is a scandalthat is a publicly given example of contempt for the strict laws of duty which therefore brings infamy widr it then even if the laws of the country do not punish the vice we must break off the existing association or avoid it as much as mssible For the further continuation of it does away with all the 2 6 4 OF FRIENDSHIP honour of virtue and puts it up for sale to anyone who is rich 311031311 to bribe parasites With the pleasures of luxury 474 FOR FURTHER READING Primary Sources Amh 0170108 om a Pragmatic Point of View Translated by James W Ellington Indianapolis Hackett 1974 Critique of Practical Reason Translated by Lewis White Beck 1Ild1anapolisBobbsMerrill 1956 Grounding of Metaphysics of Morals Translated by James W Ellington Indianapolis Hackett 1981 Lectures on Ethics Translated by Louis In eld Indianapolis gggke 1963 See esp his chapter on Friendship pp 200 Philosophy of Kant Immanuel Kanfs Moral and Political Writings Edited by Carl J Friedrich New York The Modern Library 1949 Discussion and Commentary Beck Lewis White Early German Philosophy Cambridge Harvard University Press 1969 Bmai C D Five Types of Ethical Theory New York Harcourt Brace 1928 Chapter 5 C3531 C1 E11131 K3939l39lt39s39 Life amp Thought Translated by Theodore M Greene amp Hoyt W Hudson New York Harper amp Row 1960 Korucr Stephen Kant New Haven Yale University Press 1982 Lindsay A D Kant London Oxford University Press 1934 Pat0DH T The Categorical Imperative A Study of Kanfs Moral Philosophy Chicago University of Chicago Press 1948 R083 W D Kant39s Ethical Theory Oxford Oxford University Press 1954 Schtlpp Paul Arthur Kant s PreCritical Ethics Evanston Northwestern University 1933 G W F Hegel EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITmGs George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel I770I831 considered by some to be the greatest philosopher of all time both because of his systematic rigor and encyclopaedic brilliance was born in Stuttgart After a studious childhood the young Hegel entered the famed theological seminary at the University of T bingen A roommate of the philosopher S chelling and the poet Holderlin Hegel39s astonishing brilliance did not become manifest in any universally recognized way until he had the opportunity to add the nishing touches to his dialectical system while professor at Heidelberg and later at Berlin In the years between his rather unspectacular daysas a student and his ascent to the pinnacle of the philosophic world on the Continent Hegel served as a private tutor and as both a journal and newspaper editor There was hardly an intellectual discipline which Hegel had not either nearly mastered or transformed by his philosophic insight ills major works The Phenomenology of Spirit The Science of Logic The Philosophy of Nature and the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Out line present the essentials of his dialectical system a system built on the principle that the world in its every manifestation be it in nature history revelation or reason is immanently knowable for according to Hegel the mind is not nite and merely grasping at everelusive scienti c or theological straws rather mind or spirit contains the iryinite within it such that the allegedly nite self must merely raise itself up to the infinite by the recognition primarily through the phenomenology of spirit that the Infinite quot3939quot quotL quot39quot quot1 ampi 339rquotquotquotquot 39 39 SIGMUND FREUD WITH A GROUP OF HIS CLOSEST SUPPORTERS Rank Abraham Eitingon Jones Freud Ferenczi Sachs 1920 amr395quot3939 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF 0 G b UND FREU K Translated am the German tinder the General E iitarship qf JAMES STRACHEY In Collaboratz39orzwitIz ANNA FREUD Assisted zgy 39 T Aux STRACHEY and ALAN TYSON 4 VOLUME XIV 19141916 On the History of the Pszch0Analytic Movement 39 Papers on Metapsychology 39 W A Other Works LONDON THE HOGARTH PRESS AND THE ms39r1TUTE or PSYGHOANALYSIS 56 rra3939 39n PX p MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA DREKMS having served us as the prototype in normal life of nar cissis c mental disorders we will now try to throw some light on the nature of rnelancholia by comparing it with the normal a ect of mourning This time however we must begin by ma ng an admission as a warning against any overestimation of the value of our conclusions Melancholia whose de nition uctuates even in descriptive psychiatry takes on various clini cal forms the grouping together of which into a single unity does not seem to be established with certainty and some of these forms suggest somatic rather than psychogenic affections Our material apart from such impressions as are open to every observer is limited to a small number of cases whose psycho genic nature was indisputable We shall therefore 39om the outset drop all claim to general validity for our conclusions and we shall console ourselves by re ecting that with the means of investigation at our disposal toclay we could hardly discover anything that was not typical if not of a whole class of disorders at least of a small group of them The correlation of melancholia and mourning seems justi ed by the general picture of the two conditions Moreover the exciting causes due to environmental in uences are so far as we can discern them at all the same for both conditions Mourn 39 ing is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person or to l the loss of some abstraction which has taken the placeof one such as one s country liberty an ideal and so on In some people the same in uences produce melaneholia instead of mourning and we consequently suspect them of a pathological disposition it is also well worth notice that although mourning involves grave departures from the normal attitude to life it never occurs to us to regard it as a pathological condition and to 1 The German Trauer like the English mourning can mean both the a ect of grief and its outward manifestation Throughout the present paper the word has been rendered mourning 3Abraha139n 1912 to whom we owe the most important of the few analy c studies on this subject also took P comparison as his starting point Freud himself had alreadyniade the comparison in 1910 and even earlier See Editor s Note p 240 above 39 e 243 24439 MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA 39 refer it to medical treament We rely on its being overcome after a certain lapse of time and we look upon any interference withit as useless or even hasm ll The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a pro foundly painful dCCClZ10I1 cessauon of interest in the outside world loss of the capacity to love inhibition of all activity and a lowenng of the selfregarding feelings to a degree that nds utterance 1n selfreproaches and selfrevilings and culminates in a deluslonal expeptation of punishment This picture becomes a little more mtelhgible when we consider that with one excep g sl he Sametra1ts aregmet within mourning The disturbance 0 se Iregard IS absent 111 mourmng but otherwise the features are t e same Profound mourmng the reaction to the legs of someone who 1s loved contains the same painful frame of mind the same loss of interest in the outside world in so far as it does not recall him the same loss of capacity to adopt any new 01 ect of love which would mean replacing him and the same tllm1113 away from any actlvlty that is not connected with thoughts of him It is easy to see that this inhibition and circun1 scnptlon of the ego is the expression of an exclusive devotion to Iquot 110Ilrnm 39 g leaves nothing over for other pu139poses or other 111t31quot Sl5S C IS I39t al1y only because WC know so well how to explain it that this atutude does not seem to us pathological We should regard it as an appropriate comparison too to call the mood of mourning a painful one We shall probably a characterization of the economics of pain Ipniwhat now does the work which mourning performs een SIS do not q there is anything farfetched in presenting It 111 thefollowing way Realitytesting has shown that the loved see the jusd cation for thiswhen we are in aposition to give 39 n0 101136 XiStS and it proceeds to demand that all hbl 3910 511311 bf Wilhdrawn from its attachments to that object T515 pl 3I 0 15 33 3mdC1 St3ndableoppositionit is a matter of general observat1on that people never willingly abandon a A llibllcllnal P05111011 not even indeed when a substitute is already cc onmg to them This oppos1t1on can be so intense that a turning away from reality takes place and a clingin to th Object throughthe medium of a hallucinatory wishful psgchosisj NQ139flally respect for reality gains the day Nevertheless its See footnote p 147 above G the preceding paper 13 230 MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA 245 orders cannot be obeyed at once They are carried out bit by bit at great expense of time and cathectic energy and in the meantime the e stence of the lost object is psychically pro longed Each single one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is brought up and hyper cathected and detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect of it Why this compromise by which the command of reality is carried out piecemeal should be so extraordinarily painful is not at alleasy to explain in terms of economics It is remarkable that this painful unpleasure is taken as a matter of course by us The fact is however that when the work of mourmg is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again Let us now apply to melancholia what we have learnt about mourning In one set of cases it is evident that Inelancholia too may be the reaction to the loss of a loved object Where the exciting causes are different one can recognize that there is a loss of a more ideal kind The object has not perhaps actually 39 died but has been lost as an object of love eg in the case of a betrothed girl who has been jilted In yet other cases one feels justi ed in mainta1n1n39 39 g the belief that a loss of this ikinii has occurred but one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost and it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost either This in deed rnightbe so even if the patient is aware of the loss which 39 has given rise to his melancholia but only in the sense that he knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him This would suggest that melancholia is in some way related to an objectloss which is withdrawn oin consciousness in contradis tincuon to mourning in which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious H In mourning we found that the inhibition and loss39ofinterest are fully accounted for by the worli of mourning in which thequot ego is absorbed In melancholia the unknown loss will result 39 ina similar internal work and will therefore be responsible for the melancholic inhibition The difference is that the inhibition 1 This idea seems to be expressed already in Studzks on I1DJsten39a l895d a process similar to this one will be found described near the beginning of Freud s Discussion of the case history of Fraulein Elisabeth von R Standard Eal 2 152 9 A discussion of the economics of this process will be found below on p 255 39 quotevery living thing to cling to life 246 Mounixuno AND MELANClHOLIA Of lhe111 laJ1Ch0lilt seems puzzling to nsbecause we cannot see what it IS that IS absorbing him so entirely The melancholic displays something else besides which is lac ng in mourning an extraordinary diminution in his selfregard an impoverish ment of his ego on a grand scale In mourning it is the world which has becprne poor and empty in melancholia it is the ego itself The patient represents his ego to us as worthless incap ahle of any achievement and morally despicable he reproaches himself vili es himself and expects to be cast out and punished He ahases himselfihefore everyone and commiseiates with his own relatives for heing connected with anyone so unworthy He IS not of the opinion that a change has taken place in him but extends his selfcriticism back over the past he declares that he was never any better This picnire of a delusion of mainly moral inferiority is completed by sleeplessness and re fusal to take nourishmenta11d39 what is psychologically very lfemarlrable by an overcoming of the instinct which compels it would be equally fruitlessfrom a scienti c and a therapeu lZ1C39p0111t of view to contradict a pa ent who brings these accu sanons against his ego He must surely be right in some way and be describing something that is as it seems to him to be Indeed we must at once con rm some of his stateinenn without reserva tion He really is as laclting in interest and as incapable of love and achievement as he says But that as we know is secfondary it is the e ect of the internal work which is consuming his ego work which is unhown to us but which is comparable to the work of mourning He also seems to us justi ed in certain other sellaccusations it is merely that he has a keener eye for the 0DI than other people who are not melancholic When in his heightened sellcriucism he describes himself as petty egoistic dlshollest lacklng snindependence one whose sole aim has been to hide the wealmessm of his own nature it may be so far as W6 know that he has come pretty near to understanding him self we only wonder why a man has to be ill before he can he accessible to a mith of this kind For there can be no doubt that if anyone holds and expresses to others an opinion of him self such as this an opinion which Hamlet held both of himself and of everyone else he is ill whether he is spea ng the 39 I1 Use every man after desert and Wh0 shall scape whipping Act II Scene 2quot II 393939393939 amp MOURNING AND MELANGIIOLIA 47 truth or whether he is being more or less unfair to himself Nor is it difficult to see that there is no correspondence so far as we can judge between the degree of selfabasement and its real justi cation A good capable conscientious woman will speak no hotter of herself after she develops melancholia than one who is in fact worthless indeed the former is perhaps more likely to quot 39 fall ill of the disease than the latter of whom we too should have agency which is here split o 39 om the ego might also show its 1 independence in other circumstances p be con rmed by every nothing good to say Finally it must strike us that after all the melancholic does not behave in quite the same way as a person who is crushed by remorse and selfreproach in a normal fashion Feelings of shame in ont of other people which would more than anything characterize this latter condition are lack ing in the melancholic or at least they are not prominent in him One might emphasize the presence in him of an almost opposite unit of insistent communicativeness which nds satis faction in selfexposure 39 The essential thing therefore is not whether the melan cholic s distressing selildenigration is correct in the sense that his selfcriticism agrees with the opinion of other people39The point must rather be that he quotis giving a correct description of his psychological situation He has lost his selfrespect and he must have good reason for this It is true that we are then faced with a contradiction that presents a problem which is hard to solve The analogy with mourning led us 16 conclude that he had su ered a loss in regard to an object what he tells us points to a loss in regard to his ego e Before going into this contradiction let us dwell for a moment on the view which the melancholic s disorder a ords of the consntution of the human ego W eisee how in him one part of the ego sets itself over against the other judges it critically and as it were takes it as its obj ectOur suspicion that the critical irtlier observation We shall really nd grounds for distin guishing this agency from the rest of the ego What we are here becoming acquainted with is the agency commonly called con science we shall count it along with the censorship of con scioumess and realitytesting among the major institutions of the mo and we shall come upon evidence to show that it can become diseased on its own account In the clinicalquot picture of 1 See above p 233 4 4 248 MOURNING AND MELANcrioLiA nielaiicholia dissatisfaction with the ego on moral grounds is the most outstanding feature The patient s selfevaluation con cerns itself much less nquently with bodily in rmity ugliness or weakness or with social inferiority of this category it is only his fears and asseverations of becoming poor that occupy a prominent position There is one observation not at all di icult to make which leads to the explanation of the contradiction mentioned above at the end of the last paragraph but one lfone listens patiently to a nielancholic s many and various selfaccusations one can not in the end avoid the impression that often the most violent of them are hardly at all applicable to the patient himself but that with insigni cant modi cations they do t someone else someone whom the patient loves or has loved or should love Every time one examines the facts this conjecture is con rmed So we find the key to the clinical picture we perceive that the selfreproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away rmm it on to the patient s own ego The woman who loudly pities her husband for being tied to such an incapable wife as herself is really accusing her husband of being incapable in whatever sense she may mean this There is no need to be greatly surprised that a 39 few genuine self reproaches are scattered among those that have been trans posed back These are allowed to ohtrude themselves since they help to mask the others and make recognition of the true state of a hirs impossible Moreover they derive om the pros and cans of the conflict of love that has led to the loss of love The behaviour of the patients too now becomes much more intelli gible Their complaints are really plaints in the old sense of the word They are not ashamed and do not hide themselves since everything derogatory that they say about themselves is at bottom said about someone else Moreover they are far horn evincingtowards those around them the at tude of humility 39 and submissiveness that would alone be t such worthless people On the contrary they make the greatest nuisance of themselves and always seem as though they felt slighted and had been treated with great injustice All this is possible only because the 39 reactions expressed in their behaviour still proceed from a men tal constellation of revolt which has then by a certain process passed over into the crushed state of melancholia There is no difficulty in reconstructing this process An object MOURNING AND MEiANcnoiiA 249 choice an attachment of the libido to a particular person had at one time existed then owing to a real slight or disappoint ment coming iorn this loved person the ob ectrelationship was shattered The result was not the normal one of a with drawal of the libido from tl1IS object and a displacement of it on to a new one but something diiferent for whose coming in quot about various conditions seem to be necessary The object cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and was brought to an end But the free libido was not displaced on to another object it was withdrawn into the ego There however it was not employed in any unspeci ed way but served to establish an identi cation of the ego with the abandoned object Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency as though it were an object the forsaken object In this way an objectloss was transformed into an ego loss and the coii ict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical ae vity of the ego and the ego as altered by identi cation One or two things may be directly inferred with regard to the precondi ons and e ects of a process such as On the one hand a strong xation to the loved object must have been present on the other hand in contradiction to this the object cathexis must have had little powerof 1 S1St I1C AS 0110 R3Bk has aptly remarked this connadiction seems to imply that the obj ectchoice has been effected on a narcissistic basis Sp that the objectcathexis when obstacles come in its way can regress to narcissism The narcissistic identi cation with the object then becomes a substitute for thewerotic catheins the result of which is that in spite of the con ict with the loved person the loverelation need not be given up This substitiition of identi 39 39 canion for objectlove is an important mechanism in the nar eissis c a bctions Karl Landauer 1914 has lately been able to point to it in the process of recovery in a case 0fCh5Z Pl31393n5a It represents of course a regression from one type of object 39 choice to original narcissism We have elsewhere shown that identi cation is 3 preliminary stage oiiobjectchoice that it is the rstwaymand one that is expressed in an ambivalent fashion in which the ego picks out an object The ego wants to incor porate this object into itself and in accordance with the o1a1 or cannibalistic phase of 39 libidinal development in which it is 3 In the first 1917 edition only this word does not occur sr XIV R 439 39quot 39 39 39 39 V 5 quot 7 39 quot quot39 I7 quotr 39 39quot39vr r1 250 39 MOURNING AND M 39 L it wants to do so by devouring it iH IaI1I39IA 39 MOUhNING AND MELANCHOLIA 251 right in attributing to this con ec on the re llssalurgfoubtediy O aonships to wake itselfeffecttve and come into the Open Where mam met with in severe forms of melancholia 2 nouns there 15 a disposition to obsessional neurosis the con ict due to The conclusion which our theory would m39 Hire 81 ambivalence gives a pathological cast to mourning and forces that the disposition to fall ill of melancholia 31 m ham Y 0 111 to express itself z the fonn of selfreproaches to the effect that disposition lies in the predominance of the 11350 3 Part Of that the mourner hunself 1s to hlame for the loss of the loved of objectchoice has unfortunately not at been trctssistlc tyge object 1e that he has willed 11 These obsessional states of pbsemation In the Opening remarks of ltlhis a e 0I1firInI d ed Y depression following upon the death of a loved Pelstfn show us that the empirical material upon which this sptug quot3 fa ncztlitted what the con ict due to amblvalence can achieve by rtselfwhen insu viciem for Our needs Ifwe mum assume an Y 136 31111 eci is there 15 no regresnve dt39aW1I1g111 of libido as well In melan tween the results of Observation and What We havigringmerg e cholla the OCCZISIOIIS which give 1136 to the rllness extendfor the should not hesitate to include this regression o rreb we ghost PR1theYondthe clear case of a loss bY death and 1nclude tcathexis to the Still narcissistic oral phase of the lib 9 J Ct all those situations of being shghted neglected or disappointed Chamcte za on of melancho at Iden ca ons withrtho nrbour which can 1mPtrt oPPosed feelings of low and hate into the are by no means rare in the transference neumse t 0 J 3Ct relationship 0139 reinforce an ahead existing ambivalence This deed they are a w mhown nfmchanism Ofsym tom g 333 111 con rct due to ambivalence which sometimes 0 more from gspecia y in hysteria The di erence however PbetWee1I13U0Il real experiences sometimes more from constitutional factors slstic and hysterical identi cation 1n21Ybe selm in thisI39r i1l1mS 39 mus not be Overlooked anmug the Pramndl om of melanl whemas in the fennel the 0bjectCathexiS is aband d at choha Ifthe love for the obect a love which cannot be given latter it persists and manifests its in uence thou h title In the Ufp fthoughthe ob ect 1tself1s given39up takes refuge in narcis Con ned to Certain isolated actions and ainne 3 tic 1313 tI1sua11Y S1St1C1de 1 CaPOD then the hate comes into opera h on this Case in the transference neurbses too identi cation t aI1Y substnrunve obge abus11g 1396 debasi g it makillg it suffer and pression ofthere being something in Cognmon which ma F 93quot denving sadisnc satlsfactlon frorn its su ermg Tfhe selftorment p 10ve Narcissistic id n ca on is the 01derOf the mgr Slgglfy snggn melancholia which 15 vsfllll lut doubt 6219313513 Slg i fisa Paves thg way to an understanding of hysterical identi 31139 it Just like the corre5P011 g39Phenomenon 11 obsesstonal neurosis 39 whichha5 been 1633 thoroughly studied 3 E31011 a satisfaction of trends of sadlsm and hate whlch relate to an Melancho a therefore borrows sortie of its features object and which have been turned round upon the 1l3j ecw mo ning and the others from the Process quotof regression hem own self In the 1Ways Wdc have been discussing n both disorders ngamlssis c obj ecbchoice to narcissism It is on the one h ordn the panents usual1Y sn1l s11CCeedbY the circuitous path of self llke mourning a reaction to the real loss of a loved Ob Fa Pllnlshment In taking revenge on the on ad obqect andgm over and above this it is marked by a determinant 3 hilt tonmentrng their loved one thfqugh their hav1I1gresortet1 absent i normal mouming or which i t is resent c is to it In order to avoid the need to xpress their host1l1ty to Fm Iatta into Pathalogical mourning The 85 of aaltfa ov gljms openly After all the person who Uq occasioned the patient s 5 an excellent Oppommiw for the ambivalence in 100 Jt emononal d1S01 d1393Ild on whomhis 1llI1eSS is Qehtrcda Is usu211Y See above P 13839 Ci also Editofs N t 2 339 339 to be found B 1mmed1ate environment The melanchollcfs 39 2 Abraham apparm y mtdmw Frcudat 11o 4t1 3 erotic In regard toh1s obj et hag hus undergone a letter written bemgen Febmmy and April 1915 S62 If quotl1aP1391Vatc double v1c1ss1tude part of 11 has regressed to idenu canon 1g5EI 68 I 39 n 5 5 S aPhY i but the other part under the in uence of the conflict due to e w 39 39 lBChaPmr 1 Ill1EsctGro gdggtgit gonigrzafc d1 ctssdldlger lbs forgn di thiI111S3gf what follows is elaborated in Chapter of 3917 E30 and ere 393 39 UP Dfftiismarilegfldgaicgfgg rgfgfti1c cat1Qn In The Imerpretd a 3 For the distinction between the two see my paper on Instincts and 39 their Vicissitudes pp 1389 above 252 MOURNING AND MELANCIIOILIA ambivalence has been carried back to the stage of sadism which is nearer to that con ict It is this sadism alone that solvm the riddle of the tendency to suicide which makes melancholia so interesting and so dangerous So immense is the ego s selflove which we have come to recognize as the primal state from which instinctual life proceeds and so vast is the amount of narcissistic libido which we see liberated in the fear that emerges at a threat to life that we cannot conceive how that ego can consent to its own destruction We have long lmown it is true that no neuro tic harbours thoughts of suicide which he has not turned back upon himself from murderous impulses against others but we have never been able to explain what interplay of forces can carry such a purpose through to execution The analysis of melancholia now shows that the ego can kill itself only if owing to the return of the objectcathexis it can neat itself as an object if it is able to direct against itself the hostility which relates to an object and which represents the ego s original 39 reaction to objects in the external world Thus in regression from narcissistic objectchoice the object has it is true been got rid of but it has nevertheless proved more power il than the ego itself In the two opposed situa ons of being most in tensely in love and of suicide the ego is overwhelmed by the object though intotally different ways As regards one particular striking feature of melancholia that we have mentioned 39p 248 the prominence of the fear of 39 becoming poor it seems plausible to suppose that it is derivd from anal erotism which has been torn out of its context and altered in a regressive sense Melancholia con onts us with yet other problems the answer to which in part eludes us The fact that it passes o after a certain me has elapsed without leaving traces of any gross changes is a feature it shares with mourmg We found by way of 39 explanation pp 2445 that in mourning time is needed for the command of realitytesting to he carried out in detail and that 0 when this work has been accomplished the ego will have suc ceeded in freeing its libido om the lost object We may imagine 1 Instincts39and their Vicissitudes p 136 above 39 3 Later discussions of suicide will be found in Chapter V of 3917 Ego and the Id 19236 and in the lastpages of The Economic Problem of Masochism I9245 39 39 39 39393939L39j MOURNING AND MELAN CHOLIA 253 that the ego is occupied with analogous work during the Course of a melancholia inI1either case have we aIlY m51ghl39 mt the economicsof the course of events The sleeplessness 1n melan cholia testifies to the rigidity of the condition the iII1p0SS1b111tY of e bcting the general drawingin of cathexcs I1 C3553139Y for sleep The complex of melanchoha behaves hke an open wound A quot drawing to itself cathectic energies which in the transference neuroses we have called anticathexes 39om all diroC1ii0I1S afld emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished It can easily prove resistant to the ego s wish to sleep What is probably a somatic factor and one which cannot be explained psychogenically makes itselfvisible 111 the regular ameliora on in the condition that takes place towards evening These consideratiom bring up the question whether a1oss In tho ego quotisrespectively of the object a purely I1aI C1SS1S l1C blow to the ego 1nay not su ce to produce the picture of melanchoha and whether an impoverishment of egolibido di1 Ct1Y due to toxins may not be able to produce certain forms of the disease The most remarkable characteristic of melancholia and the one in most need of explanation is 1ts tendency to change round into mania a state which 1s the opposlte of 1t Its symptoms As we know does not happen to CVCTY me Em cholia Some cases run their course in periodic relapses during the intervals between which signs of mania may be eptirely 39 39 absent or only very slight Others show the regular alternation of melancholic and manic phases which has led to the hypo thesis of a circular p One would be tempted to regard these cases as nonpsychogenic if it were not for the fact that the psychoanalytic method has succeeded in 23911 I iVi11g at 3 5 1 1quot tion and e ecting a therapeutic improvement pU several cases p precisely of this nd It is not merely pernnss1ble therefore but incumbent upon us to extend an analytic explanat1onl Of melancholia to mania as well i cannot promise that this attempt W411 P3quot0V3 11m3931 5at15 factory It hardly carries us much beyond the posS1b1l1tY Of tahng one s initial bearings We have two things to go upon am f th 1 ears already illustrated by twin K iirgzythce mtheilhglilstivuiglgeciiiiilii VI of Freud s early Ilotc 011 melancholia Freud 1950a Draft G probably written 111 January i895 See Editor s Note p 229 39 experience e 254 Mouamno AND MELANGHOLIA the rst 1sa psychoanalytic impression and the second what g I P rhaps calla matter of general economic experience ha P1 15S10I1 which several psychoanalytic investigators 6 ea y put mto words IS that the content of mania is no dl er nt ft 0111 that Of IICaI1ChOlla that both disorders are Wres ins with the same complex but that probably in melan f3h 11a the C80 ua succumbed to the complex whereas in mania 1t mastered it or pushed 1t aside Our second pointer is afforded by the observation that all states such as joy exulta on 0139 m 1mPhs Whlch give us the normal model for mania depend on the same economic conditions What has happened here 1s that as a result of some in uence a large expenditure of psychical energy long maintained or habitually occurring has at last become unnecessary so that it is available for 11j1er ous quotapplications and possibilities of discharge when for in stanctzie some poor wretch by N a large sum of money 15 511 enly reheved om chrome worry about his daily bread or when a long and arduous struggle is nally crowned with success pr when a man nds Inmselfm a position to thmw g at 2 slug e blow some oppresslve compulsion some false posi on Whldl 116 has long had to keep up and so on All such situations 3 chalacherlzed bl high Spirits by the signs of discharge of joyful emotion and by mcreased readiness for all kinds of acdon I11 1115 the same way as in maniaand in complete contrast to 39 the depression and inhibition of melancholia We may venture to assert that mania is nothing other than a niumph gf this 3930 0111 that here again what the ego has surmounted and what it is triumphing over remain hidden from it Alcoholic T mtoxlcatlmls Which belongs to the same class of states may in so far as it is an elated one be explained in the same way here there is probably a suspension produced by toxins oi expendltures of energy in repression The popular View likes to assllillc that a person in a manic state of this nd nds such 39 delight in movement and action because he is so cheer il This Else connection must of course be put right The fact is that e economlc COI139l1tl0I1 111 the subject s mind referred to above has been ll lled and this is the reason why he is in such high spirits on the one hand and so uninhibited in actionon the other Ifwe put these two indications together what we nd is 1i5 1 T113 P5YGh 39311 1YtiC impression and the general economic n I MOURNING AND MELANGHOLIA I 255 In mania the ego must have got over the loss of the object or its mourning over the loss or perhaps the object itself and thereupon the whole quota of anticathexis which the painful suffering of melancholia had drawn to itself from the ego and bound will have become available p 253 Moreover the manic subject plainly demonstrates his liberation from the object which was the cause of his su ering by seeking like a ravenously hungry man for new obj ectcathexes This explanation certainly sounds plausible but in the rst place it is too inde niteand secondly it gives rise to more new problems and doubts than we can answer We will not evade a discussion of them even though we cannot expect it to lead us to a clear understanding In the rst place normal mourning too overcomes the loss of the object and it too while it lasts absorbs all the energies of the ego Why then after it has run its course is there no hint in its case of the economic condition for a phase of triumph l nd it impossible to answer this objection straight away It also draws our attention to the fact that we do not even know the economic means by which mourning carries out its task p 245 Possibly however a conjecture help us herequot Each single one of the memories and situations of expectancy which demonstrate the libido s attachment to the lost obj ect is met by the verdict of reality that the obj ct no longer exists and the ego confronted as it were with the question whether 39 39 it shall share this fate is persuaded by the sum of the narcissistic satisfactions it derives from being alive to sever its attachment to the object that has been abolished We may perhaps suppose thatthis work of severance is so slow and gradual that by the time it has been nished the eapenditure39 of energy necessary for it is also dissipated 39 It is tempting to go on om this conjecture about the work of mourning and n7 to give an account of the work of melan cholia Here we are met at the outset by an uncertainty Soquot far we have hardly considered melancholia om the topo graphical point of view nor asked ourselves in and between what psychical systems the work of melancholia goes on What 1 The economic standpoint has hitherto received little attention in psychoanalytic writings I would mention as an exception 21 paper by Victor Tausk 1913 on motives for repression devalued by recom penses 39 39 256 s MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA part of the mental processes of the disease still takes place in 39 connection with the unconscious objectquotcathexes that have been given up and what part in connection with their substitute by iden cation in the ego 39 The quick and easy answer is that the unconscious thing presentationl of the object has been abandoned by the libido In reality however this presentation is made up of innumer able single impressions or unconscious traces of them and this quotwithdrawal of libido is not a process that can be accomplished in a moment but must certainly as in mourning be one in which progress is longdrawnout and gradual Whether it be gins simultaneously at several points or follows some sort of fixed sequence is not easy to decide in analyses it often be comesevident that first one and then another memory is acti vated and that the laments which always sound the same and are wearisome in their monotony nevertheless take their rise each time in some different unconscious source If the object does not possess this great signi cance for the egoa signi cance reinforced by a thousand links then too its loss will not be ofa kind to cause either mourning or melancholia This characteristic of detaching the libido bit by bit is therefore to be ascribed alike to mourning and to melancholia it is probably supported by the same economic situation and serves the same purposes in both As we have seen however p 250 ii melancholia contains something more than normal mourning In inelancholia the relation to the object is no simple one it is complicated by the conflict due to ambivalence The ambivalence is either consti tutional ie is an element of every loverelation formed by this particular ego or else it proceeds precisely from those experi ences that involved the threat of losing the object For this reason the exciting causes of melancholia have a much wider l range z those of mourning which is for the most part occa sioned only by a real loss of the object by its death In melan cholia accordingly countless separate struggles are carried on s overihe object inwhich hate and love contend with each other i the one seeks to detach the libido from the object the other to maintain this position of the libido against the assault The location of these separate struggles cannot be assigned to any system but the 3763 the region of the memorynaces of things 1 D2391zgverstellung See above p 20171 r39ILC39 L ZZ39393E39 x39 V 39 39 Iquot quot 39 39 o II MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA 257 as contrasted with wordcathexes Inmournmg t00 the Cff01 f5 to detach the libido are made in this samesySI m but 111 It nothing hinders these processes oin proceeding along the nor mal path through the P65 to consciousness This path 1S blocked for the work of inelancholia owing perhaps to a number of causes or a combination of them Constitutional amblvalence belongs by its nature to the repressed traumatic eigperiences in connection with the object may have activated Other 1393Pr355ed material Thus everything to do with these struggles due to ambivalence remains withdrawn oin consciousness jlntll th outcome characteristic of melancholla has Set 111 jllll 5 33 WC how consists in the threatened libidinal cathexis at length abandoning the object only however to draw baCl 110 I13 Place in the ego om which it had proceeded So by taking flight into the ego love escapes extinction After this regression of the libido the process can become conscious and it is represented to con sciousness as a con ict between one part of the ego and the critical agency What consciousness is aware of in work of melanchoha is thus not the essential part of it nor is it even the part which we may credit with an in uence in bringingtlle a1lII1 I1t 330 311 end We see that the ego debases itself and 3335 38313 1quotSelf and we understand as little as the patient what 9 can lea to and how it can change We can more readily attribute suc afunction to the unconscious part of the work because it is not di cult to perceive an essential analogy between 916 W01 k Of melancholia and of mourning Just as mourning impels the ego to give up the object by declaring the object to be dead and o bring the ego the39induce1nent39 of continuing to live p 39255 i so does each single struggle of amb1quotva1ence l00Sen the 5335103 of the libido to the objeot bYtllSP31 3gi11git denigiating aid even as it were killing it It is possible for the process In 6 Ucs to come to an end cltllel ller the ll has Silent self r after the object has been abandoned as valueless We eannot 39 tell which of these two possibilinies is the regular or more usual one in bringing inelancholia to an end not what in uence this terminationquot has on the future course of the case The ego may enjoy in this the satisfaction of knowing itself as 116 bi U361 Of the two as superior to the object Even if we accept this view of the work of melancholia it still does not supply an explanationof the one point on Which quot 258 MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA we were seeking light It was our expecta on that the economic condition for the emergence of mania after the melancholia quothas run its course is to be found in the ambivalence which dominates the latter a ection and in this we found support om analogies in various other elds But there is one act before which that expectation must bow Of the three precon ditions of 1neIanchoia loss of the object ambivalence and regression of libido into the ego the rst two are also found in the obsessional selfreproaches arising after a death has occurred In those cases it is unquestionably the ambivalence which is the motive force of the coniiict and observation shows that after the conflict has come to an end there is nothing left over in the 39 nature of the triumph of a manic state of mind We are thus led to the third factor as the only one responsible for the result The accumulation of cathexis which is at rst bound and then after the work of inelancholia is nished becomes free and makes mania possible must be linked with regression of the libido I0 narcissism The con ict the ego which melan cholia substitutes for the struggle over the object must act like a painful wound which calls for an extraordinarily high anti 5catheXis But here once again it will be well to call a halt and to postpone any further explanation of mania until we have gained some insight into the economic nature rst of physical pain and then of the mental pain which is analogous to it p we already know the interdependence of the complicated problems of the mind forces us to break o 39 every enquiry before it is coinp1eted till theoutcome of some other enquirjr39 can come to its assistance 1 See footnote 1 p 147 above 2 Footnote added 1925 Cf a continua on of this discussion of mania in Gmzzjb Psychology and the Azzagysis Qf the Ego l92 la Standard Ed 18 1303 nnLn 5 1 3 m 3 39 22 39 V 39 39 ax r 39 3 39393939 j BEENG ANDTIME MARTIN HE IDE GGER Translated by john Macquarric amp Edward Robinson 39 Foreword gy Taylor Carman HARPERPERENNIAL c MODERNTHOUGHT 2 NEW YORK B LONDON 43 T0RONTO 0 SYDNEY 0 NEW DELHI 0 AUCKLAND 3915 BEING AND TIME S kov ycip dig pefs p v 1af5ra 113 wore ozileode ovypaivetv ticrrcirav 3v 0quot 6 39yy39qcr9e rra39lcu yzyvaioxere cities 3 rrpci rot p v q tiLc30 v v 3 r1rop1 g39 gap l For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you gse the expression being We however who used to think we under quot stood it have now become perplexed Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word being 1 Not at all So it is tting that we should raise anew the question cgquot the mecmingz of Being But are we nowadays even P perplexed at our inability to understand the expression Being Not at all So rst of all we must reawalten an understanding for the meaning of this question Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question i of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely Our provisional aim is the Interpretations of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being But the reasons for making this our aim the investigations which such a purpose requires and the path to its achievement call for some intro W ductory remarlts 39 39 1 seiend Heidegger translates Plato39s present participle 6 by this present participle of the verb sein to be We accordingly translate sciend here and in a number of 0 lata passages by the present participle being where such a translation is inconvenient we shall resort to other constructions usually subjoining the German word in brackets or in a footnote The participle seiencl must be distinguished from the in nitive sein which we shall usually translate either by the in nitive to be or by the gerund being It must also be distinguished from the important substantive Sein always capitalized which we shall translate as Being capitalized and from the equally important sub stantive Seiendes which is directlyderived from seiend and which we shall usually translate as entity or entities See our note I H 3 below 2 Sim In view of the importance of the distinction between Sinn and Bcdeutung 39 inocrman writers as diverse as Dilthcy Husserl Frcge and Schlick we shall translate Sinn by meaning or sense depending on the context and keep signi cation and signify for Bedcutung and bedcuten The verb mean will occasionally be used quotto translate such verbs as besagen sagen heissen and meincn but the noun meaning will be reserved for Sinn On Sinn see H 151 324 on Bedeutung etc see H 87 and our note 3 p 120 below 3 Heidegger uses two words which might well be translated as interpretation Aus legung and Interpretation Though in many cases these may be regarded as synonyms their connotations are not quite the same Auslegung seems to be used in a broad sense to cover any activity in which we interpret something as something whereas Inter pretation seems to apply to interpretations which are more theoretical or systematic as in the exegesis ofa text See especially H 148 ii and 199 ii We shall preserve this distinc tion by writing interpretation for Auslcgung but Interpretation for Hcidegger s Interpretation following similar conventions for the verbs auslegen and interpretieren 4 als des m iglichen IIorizontes cines jeden Seinsverstiindnisses berhaupt Throughout this work the word horizon is used with a connotation somewhat di brent from that to which the Englishspeaking reader is likely to be accustomed We tend to think of a horizon as something which we may widen or extend or go beyond Heidegger however seems to think of it rather as something which we can neither widen nor go beyond but which provides the limits for certain intellectual activities performed within it 127 quot774 39 2 3939s39 L I 64 Being and Time L catch up in relationship to them or whether one s Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed The can about this distance between them is disturbing to B lllgVVitll0116a110ther though this disturbance is one that is hidden nrn it If we may expes this existentially such Beingwithoneanother has the character gf distantialigy Abs indigkeit The more inconspicuous this kind of Being is to everyday Dasein itself all the more stubbornly and primordially does it work itself out But this distantiality which belongs to Beingwith is such that Dasein as everyday Beingwithoneanother stands in subjection Botmdssigkeit to Others It itself is not1 its Being has been taken away by the Others Daseirfs everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please These Others moreover are not definite Others On the contrary any Other can represent them What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being with One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power The Others whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one s belonging to them essentially oneself are those who proximally and for the most part are there in everyday Beingwith oneanother The who is not this one not that one not oneself man selbst not some people einige and not the sum of them all The who is the neuter the tfzgr dds Man39 39 We have shown earlier how in the environment which lies closest to us the public environment already is ready tohand and is also a matter of concern mitbesorgt In utilizing public means of transport and p in making use of informa on services such as the newspaper every Other is like the next This Beingwithoneanother dissolves one s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of the Others in such a way indeed that the Others as distinguishable and explicit vanish more and more In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability the real dictatorship of the they is unfolded We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they man take pleasure we read see and judge about literature and art as they see and judge likewise we shrink back from the great mass as they shrink back we nd shocking what they nd shocking The they which is nothing de nite and which all are though not as the sum prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness 39 The they has its own ways in which to be That tendency of Being with which we have called distantiality is grounded in the fact that Beingwithoneanother concerns itself as such with averzzgezzess which is an existential characteristic of the they The they in its Being 1 Nicht es selbst in p Being and Time I65 l fa Thus the they maintains itself factio es eS1ditl1at Vlfhich belongs to it of that which it regards P the Zvehraf high it does not and of that to which it grants success A an th hiit denies it In tliis averageness with which it Premribes L ithat to Tdm be ventured it keeps watch over evc thing exceptional can at itse llto the fora Every kind of priority gets noiselessly sup kth E ht everything that is primordial gets glossed over as lt vermg dissed that has long been well knowm Eve 8 gamed by 339 Struggle inethmg t omcthing to be manipulated Every secret loses its force glrcomes Jus S f Dasein eals In turn an essential tendency 0 g care of averageness rev cc 1Hg d E zebmmg of all possibilities of Being We thvdeness nvlnleielling d0WI1 33 Walls Of Bcing for the 4 p nstilfute what we know as publicness die O quotentlichkeitquotl f 57 3 co B Controls every Way in which the world and Dasein bhcneSS pty1m1ad it is always right not because there is some distinc hquotquot TC 3 3 giftlrlted ip rim relationshipofBeing in which it 1s related to Things hie an P alayils 39tself of some transparency on the part of Dasein which r becauSe1i1t391av 1o riated but because it is insensitive to every differ Bg has exp 61 y app P 3 and thus never gets to the Lheart pf ch I quotquot quotm3quotquot 9 39 rythillg 3 D 0 II1atter icauf dlc Sachem By Pubhcnesfileviiiquot as somefliiig f ar nd has thus been covered u gets P3533 0 lcgisibrliht fVrYtg alongside everywhere ist iiberall dabei but in 39 Y ay whenever Dasein presses t t 391 has alwa s stolen aw iv ch a maImer ha I 11 resents every judgment and decl 39for a decision Yet because the CY P f b1tY The 39 ts answera 1 1 39 51011 as its ow It d P1quot1V 55 the Particular quot5c1n0 1 Vokjno it 1 th6Y can as it Were manage to have thembconmali lfl 1 Deorie 39 i1 e t 13 no S0111 11 can 06 answerable 3 3 hmg R30 fag Y 66 i ho did it 4 who needs to vouch for anything It was alw3Y3 t 3 t BY W 0 yet it can be said that it has f hi h C L quotf th a8encY through Which n0St thmss Come 3b t 15 e W W A cstheylis ItE11ly that by thus disburdening it of its Being the they 39 if D 39n accommodates D3S61 k m 3 39 39 dem dDase1 gaIir Andaslcie has a11Y tendency to take thmgs 63515 an ma D quot b dig r 39 the they constantly accommodates the particular asem Y ruff t of its Being the they retains and enhances its stubborn p ur enmg 1 5 0 dominion Everyone is the other and no one is himse 4 1 39 1 Das Man kann es slch glemhsam lezst na 51355 ma 5 f The they which supplies ch stiindig auf es beruft been no one In Dasein S V31 Yd3Yn 355 I28 I29 39 39JI3939r 39 155 i Being and Time the answer to the question of the wire of everyday Dasein 71050 i3 to Wh m BVCFY Dquot1S iI1 has already surrendered itself ix 13S the amongone other fUntereinandersein I13 In these characters of Being which we have exhibited eVeryd3 B 3m ng39011e39an0th 1quot distantiality averageness levelling down Y less the disburdcning Of 0ne s Being and accommodation liiis he constancy of Dasein which is closest to us This constancy pertajnsthat to the enduring Beingpresent athand of something but rather to D 11 kind of Being as Beingwith Neither the Self of ond s own Dasein nasem 3 Self of the Other has as yet found itself or lost itself as long as it is of the in the modes we have mentioned In these modes one s wa of geiendil that of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one s Self 3912 be ienmfhfs yyay sigrif es no lessening of Dasein s facticity just as the they as ll o B i Z Y t as ea rer 1a a Being that has the Character oft q Y Reality we understand asem m 39 s16 ti1hehes is as little presentathand as Dasein itself The is but She 133 i it 3 behaves the harier1t1s to grasp and the slier it all m rtfudic d Ojlhlng at all If we see it onticoontologically with ness in eve ifeyte 1t reveals itself as the Realest subject of everydayquot this 39iS not in th 11 18 I otaccessible like a stone that is presentathand decree rematuii leasth ec1f51ve aS Rial S land of Being one may neither P 5 Y at t S they is really nothing nor profess the plpnnon that one can Interpret this phenomenon ontologically by some l 39 39 39 ow exp ammg it as what results from taking the Be1ngpresentathand together of several S11lICCtS and then tting them together On the contrary 39 kin 39 39 39 HLWO1quot 8 out C I1 3CPt3 Of Being one must direct one s course by these 13 enomena which cannot be pushed aside F h I I 3 0 lurt more tife may 15 110tS0II1eth1ng hke a universal subjectfwlnch 3 P urahty of subjects have hovering above them One can come to take t this r quot g 39 CharaC331n Yt1fa hehBemS Of Such subjects 1s understood as having a er 1 t at 0fDa Se1n and If these are regarded as cases of a genus of occurrents cases which are factually prescn1a1hand with this approach the only possibility ontologically is that everything which is t 391 63 if gfgim sort1 is to be understood 111 the sense of genus and species can We lxymg no t e genus to which the individual Dasein belongs nor even the tradficrosf Iii in such CI1t1lI1CS as an abiding characteristic That is n t 6 On 031C f391l1S11 When confronted with these phenomena 0 surprising if we bear 111 mind that it has its foundation in an 1 ManistindcrW d U U1id 2 sEi as i Ess mk1t on Sesgki 1 Being and Tree 167 r1 gy of the presentathand an ontology which moreover is still a one So no matter in how many ways this logic may be improved 5 iexpanded it cannot in principle be made any more exible Such 4 5 s of logic oriented towards the quothumane sciences only increase the logical confusion f zey is on existentiale ondos o primordial phenomenon it belongs to 7f3 positive constitution It itself has in turn various possibilities of concrete as something characteristic of Dasein seiner daseins gen Konkretion The extent to which its dominion becomes com and explicit may change in the course of history quotjfeSelf of everyday Dasein is the theyse f3 which we distinguish from g uthentic Se f that is from the Self which has been taken hold of in quotS own way eigcns ergriffenen As theyself the particular Dasein has sen dispersed into the they and must rst nd itself This dispersal gracterizes the subject of that kind of Being which we know as con Z absorption in the world we encounter as closest to us If Dasein familiar with itself as theyself this means at the same time that the licy itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Beingin eaworld which lies closest Dasein is for the sake of the they in an igeryday manner and the they itself Articulates the referential context E signmcance2When entities are encountered Dasein sworld frees them for 39 ii5iotahty of involvements with which the they is familiar and within the lvirnits which have been established with the they s averageness Proxi mall factical Dasein is in the withworld which is discovered in an average C P39osimofifiv it is not I in the sense of my own Self that am but igatlier the Others whoseway is that of the they 3 In terms of the they the they I am given proximally to myself selbst ggroximaliy Dascin is they and for the most part it remains so If 39Dasein discovers the world in its own way eigens and brings it close if it hnd this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing away of concealments and obscurities as a breaking up of the disguises pnU with which Dasein bars its own way With this Interpretation of Being with and Beingone s Self in the P 1 das lvianselbst This expression is also to be distinguished from das Man iSe1bst the they itself which appears elsewhere in this paragraph In the first of these b expressions selbst appears as a substantive in the second as a mere intensive I 2 Das Man selbst worumwillen das Dasein alltaglich ist artikuiiert den Verweisungsw quot39 Zusammenlaang dcr Bedeutsamlccit It is also possible to construe alltaglich as a pre quot diftate adjective after ist in that case we should read Dasein is everyday for the sake p 0 the the 3 Z2 namp c1lsi bin nicht ich im Sinne des eigenen Seibst sondern die Anderen in der pp Weisc des Man In the earlier editions there are commas after ich and Anderen p Which would suggest a somewhat different interpretation discloses to itselfits own authentic Being then this discovery of the world 130 168 they the question of the who of the everydayness of Being withone another is answered These considerations have at the same time brought us a concrete understanding of the basic constitution of Dasein Beingin Being and Time L 4 theworld in its everydayness and its averageness has become visible From the kind of Being which belongs to the they the kind which is closest everyday Dasein draws its preontological way of interpre ng its Being In the first instance ontological Interpretation follows the tendency to interpret it this way it understands Dasein in terms of the world and comes across it as an entity withintheworld But that is not all even that meaning of Being on the basis of which these subject entities diese seienden Subjekte get understood is one which that ontology of Dasein which is closest to us lets itself present in terms of the world But because the phenomenon of the world itself gets passed over in this absorption in the world its place gets taken tritt an seine Stelle by what is presentathand withintheworld namely Things The Being of those entities which are time with us gets conceived as presenceathand Thus by exhibiting the positive phenomenon of the closest everyday Beingin theworld we have made it possible to get an insight into the reason why an ontological Interpretation of this state of Being has been c This very state qfBeing1 in it everyday kind try Being is what proximally misses itself and covers itrelyf up a If the Being of everyday Beingwithoneanother is already di erent in principle from pure presenceathand in spite of the fact that it is seemingly close to it ontologicallystill less can the Being of the authentic Self be conceived as presence athand Authentic Beingone Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject a condition that has been detached from the they 52 is rather an existerztiell modi cation of the tfzey qftfze they as an essential existential e But in that case there is ontologically a gap separating the selfsameness of the authentically existing Self from the identity of that I which maintains itself throughout its manifold Experiences 1 We interpret Heidegger s pronoun Sic as referring to Seinsverfassung state Of Being but there are other words in the previons sentence to which it might refer with just as much grammatical plausibility particularly Interpretation W Aw 39 V BEINGIN AS SUCH 39 39 Analysis qfBeing23911 Q5 Task qfa Tlwmatzc f 39 l of Dasem we have or Pi the pre aratorjf Sl E Of hi itI1a1leaiiir1intheWorld Our rst leading lieme thlljs fn tiomenany the unitary primordial structure of l3quot 39 39 C to bring to re e P d h a s for it to be f which its possibilities an t e W Y 39 34531 5 Being tenns 0 alcharacterization t 39 Up U11 now Our Ph nomm 1 th orld as a structural r iquotBeiI1g 1nthe worl has been directed towar s e W quot the y ttem ted to provide an answer to 39 quot iitem ofBe1ng1n the world and has a P But even m 39 t 39 ts eve dagDCS5 irestion about the Wh 3 Of thls en 1W In 1 ry a1 fDasein 5quot t 39 arlcin out the tasks f 3 Preparatory fundamental an 130 i 395 m al g d ovided 39 advance orientation as to Beuzg315 as Mk ehave reaY Pr P i quot quot ld 15 e 39 d of knowing the wor ajrlfti have illustrated 1ft ID the oI1crpo e item which carries so much 39The fact that we oresaw S quot131 h t le items frornt eou f t the analysis of sing 3 quot ghquot F056 lm our aiIcdY 1 se11 m139naW View Of the 5quotquot quot Whole glzlwlfchm it ramfjonst any disruP39 0371 or aglnenta on of the unitary 1 0 3 mg 3393 39 d th concrete 39 39 t h s beenachieve 111 C Bhen0II1eponNoWkeep1ng 1n 3 a eamust mm our Interpretation analysis of the world and tfhg s 1 3B considering more pen nat back to the phenomenon 0 C 39 1 Cal c d surer phenomeno og1 39 ll not only get a ne an mgly however we Sha 1dbth11a1sopavc view of the structural totality Of B31113 In t Wor u S a B f again itself naInely care the way to grasping the pI 1I110I d1a1 31113 0 theW0r1d beyond the it But what more is there 120 Point out in Being In Bein th p gW1 Z essential relations of Being alc1pgs 1d0tle Etificd C13 erg S l1 remains 0 solicitude and Be1ng one sSe Vvh 31 Sis b amcterizing com the possibility of broadening out t e d3 l1t ircuIsPi ti0n of Solicitude paratively the Variations Of Concern ail 1 S 39 also the P ssibilitl Of and the considerateness which goes with 11 there1s t th t of Dasein by 39ji 39 39 39 h character is no 3 contrasting Dasein with ent111c1S1VB gig of all possible entities Wthmthe S a more precise explC3 i011 0 131 I60 202 Being and Time I 5 true of course that Aristotle did not pursue the analytical question as far as problem of which phenomenon within the structure of the A6yo is the onedz hat permits and indeed obliges us to characterize every statement as synth sis and diaeresis Along L the formal structures of binding and separating 0 more precisely along with the unity of these we should meet the phgn menon of the lsometl ng as something and we should meet this as a phenomenon Inhgccordance with this structure something is understood with regard to so apthingz it is taken together with it yet in such a way that this con onta en which understands will at the same time take apart what has been taken together and will do so by Articulating it interpretq tioehz If the phenomenhp of the as remains covered up and above all if its existential source e hermeneutical as is veiled then Arist0tle s phenomenological approac UI to the analysis of the Adyos collapses to a super cial theory of judgmeht in which judgment becomes the binding or separating of represenmtio s and concepts 7 Binding and separating may hp formalized still further to a relating The judgment gets dissolved logistipally into a system in which things are coordinated with one another it becomes the object of a calculus but it does not become a theme for lcazntological Interpretation The pos sibility and impossibility of getting an dnalytical understanding of O Iiv9eO39t3 and 8a 39peltns of the relation in judginent generally is tightly linked up with whatever the current status of thehpntological problematic and its principles may be P64 How far this problematic has worked its viiay into the Interpretation of the A yos and how far on the other hand th gconcept of judgment has by a remarkable counter thrust worked its way into the ontological problematic is shown by the phenomenon of the Etgpula When we consider this bond it becomes clear that proximally thh synthesisstructure is regarded as selfevident and that it has also retiiined the function of serving as a standard for Interpretation But if the fdiunal characteristics of relating and binding can contribute nothing pheiiomenally towards the structural analysis of the A6920 as subjectmatter g in the long run the phenomenon to which we allude by the term copul a has nothing to do with a bond or binding The Interpretation of the is lgrhether it be expressed in its own right in the language or indicated iriikthe verbal ending leads us therefore into the context of problems belonging to the existential analytic if assertion andquot the understanding of ing are existential possibilities for the Being of Dasein itself When we 2 me to work out the question of Being cf Part I Division 31 we sh Kfhus 1 This Division has never appeared 203 y dernonstratinggthat assertion is derived om interpretation and iierstanding we halite made it plain that the logic of the A yos is quotted in the existential of Dasein and provisionally this has 39 K 0 en su cient At the same t irne by knowing that the A6320 has been irpreted in a way which is ontillogica y inadequate we have gained a er insight into the fact that the Iriethodological basis on which ancient ptqlogy arose was not a primordial onquoteI he Acfyos gets experienced as 739 39 ething presentathand and Interpreteiigas such while at the same e the entities which it points out have thlngneaning of presenceat This meaning of Being is left undifferentiaged and uncontrasted other possibilities of Being so that Being in dig Sense 0f c1 f0fI11a1 il ingsomething becomes fused with it simultaneously d we are unable P to obtain a clearcut division between these two r L54 te L 13939 V Beingthere and Discourse Language I the fundaxnental existentialio which constitute the Being of the there 7e disclosedness of Beingin theworld are statesofmind and under In understanding there lurks the possibility of interpretation gs that is of appropriating what is understood In so far as a stateofmind 4 P equiprimordial with an act of understanding it maintains itself p a R understanding Thus there corresponds to it a certain capacity or getting interpreted We have seen that assertion is derived from 39 terpretation and is an extreme case of it In clarifying the third signi ca ion of assertion as communication speaking forth we were led to the oncepts of saying and speaking to which we had purposely given Ioattention up to that point The fact that language now becomes our heme for the rrt time will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Daseizfs disclosedness The existential ntological rundation of language is discourse or talk This phenomenon 1s fine of which we have been making constant use already in our foregoing quotInterpretation of stateo mind understanding interpretation and asser 7 tion but we have as it were kept it suppressed in our thematic analysis Discourse is existenzfial y equiprimordial with stateofmimi and understanding 39The intelligibility of something has always been articulated even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it Discourse is the Articulation 1 Bede As we have pointedout earlier see our note 3 p 47 H 25 above we have Translated this word either as discourse or talk as the context seems to demand so1ne atitnes compromising with the hendiadys discourse or talk But in some contexts dis course is too formal while talk is too colloquial the reader must remember that there IS 39 I10 good English equivalent for Rede For a previous discussion see Section 7 B above 3234 I5I I62 204 of intelligibility Therefore it underlies both interpretation and asger tion That which can be Articulated in interpretation and thus even more primordially in discourse is what we have called meaning That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation we call the totality ofsigni cations Bedeutungsganze This can be dissolved or broken up into significations Signi cations as What has been Articulated from that which39 can be Articulated always carry meaning sind sinrihaft If discourse as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the there is a primordial exisfezztiale of disclosedness and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by Beingintheworld then discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is speci cally worlally The intelligibility of Beingin theworld an intelligibility which goes with a stateofmind expresses itself as cfiscourse The totalityofsigni cations of intelligibility is put into words To signi cations words accrue But wordThings do not get supplied with signi cations The way in which discourse gets expressed is language Language is a totality of words a totality in which discourse has a worldly Being of its own and as an entity withintheworld this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as readytohand Language can be broken up into wordThings which are present athand Discourse is existentially language because that entity whose disclosedness it Articu lates according to signi cations has as its kind of Being Being inthe world a Being which has been thrown and submitted to the world As an existential state in which Dasein is disclosed discourse is con stitutive for Dasein s existence Hearing and keeping silent Sofzweigen are possibilities belonging to discursive speech In these phenomena the con stitutive function of discourse for the existentiality of existence becomes Being and Time 1 5 entirely plain for the rst time But in the rst instance the issue is one of working out the structure of discourse as such Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate signi cantly the intelligibility of Beingintheworld Beingwith belongs to Being inthe world which in every case maintains itself in some de nite way of concernful Beingwith oneanother Such Beingwithoneanother is discursive as assenting or refusing as demanding or warning as pro nouncing consulting or interceding as making assertions and as talking in the way of giving a talk Talking is talk about something That which the discourse is about das IVorziber der Rede does not neces sarily or even for the most part serve as the theme for an assertion in 1 Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache 2 Dieses ist redend als 211 und ahsagen au brdern warnen als Aussprache Ruck sprache Fiirsprache ferner als Aussagen machen und als reden in der Weise 163 Redenha1tens imgr 5 Being and Time 205 which one gives something a de nite character Even a command is given agjbout something a wish is about something And so is intercession What the discourse is about is a structural item that it necessarily possesses i for discourse helps to constitute the disclosedness of Beingintheworld F in its own structure it is modelled upon this basic state of Dasein what is talked about das Beredete in ta1kis always talked to an 39geedet in a de nite regard and within certain limits In any talk or idiscourse there is something saidinthetall as such ein Geredetes as oIchessomething said as such das Gesagte als solches whenever t wishes asks or expresses oneself about something In this something lgajd discourse communicates p As we have already indicated in our analysis of assertion the phenome siion of communication must be understood in a sense which is ontologically road Communication in which one makes assertions giving informa on for instance is a special case of that communication which is grasped in principle existentially In this more general kind of cour r w constituted Through it a costate ofmind Mitbe ndlichkeit gets 39i sliared and so does the understanding of Being With Communication as never anything like a conveying of experiences such as opinions or l 39 ishes from the interior of one subject into the interior of another aseinwith is already essentially manifest in a costateofmind and a foounderstanding In discourse Beingwith becomes explicitly shared gihat is to say it is already but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and apprOpri3tCd2 Q W39henever something is communicated in what is said inthe ta1k all about anything has at the same time the character of expressing itself quotSichtzusprecken5 In talking Dasein expresses itself spricht sich ems not39because it has in the first instance been encapsulated as something internal over against something outside but because as Beinginthequot ivorld it is already outside when it understands What is expressed is precisely this Being outside that is to say the way in which one currently has a stateofmind mood which we have shown to pertain to the full disclosednessof Beingin Beingin and its state of mind are made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation modulation the t mpo of talk the way of speaking In poetical discourse the com munication of the existential possibilities of one s stateofmind can be 0yQ Come an aim in itself and this amounts to a disclosing of existence F 1 Reading bci der Analyse der Aussage with the older editions The words MN der Aussage have been omitted in the newer editions 392 Bas Iv tsein wird in der Redo ausdri391cklich geteilt das heisst es in schon nur C B llngetezlt als nicht ergri ienes und zugeeignetes iinunica on the Articulation of Being with one another understandingly 205 Being and Time I 5 in discourse the intelligibility of Being in theworld an39 intelligibility which goes with a stateofmind is articulated according to signi cations and discourse is this articulation The items constitutive for discourse are what the discourse is about what is talked about what is saidin thetalk as such the communication and the makingknown These are not properties which can just be raked up empirically from language They are existential characteristics rooted in the state of Dasein s Being and it is they that rst make anything like language ontologically possible In the tactical linguistic form of any de nite case of discourse some of these items may be lacking or may remain unnoticed The fact that they often do not receive verbal expression is merely an index of some de nite kind of discourse which in so far as it is discourse must in every case lie within the totality of the structures we have mentioned Attempts to grasp the essence of language have always taken their orientation from one or another of these items and the clues to their conceptions of language have been the ideas of expression of symbolic form of communication as assertion 1 of the making known of experi ences of the patterning of life Even if one were to put these various agmentary de nitions together in syncretistic fashion nothing would be achieved in the way of a fully adequate de nition of language We would still have to do what is decisive here to work out in advance the ontologicoexistential whole of the structure of discourse on the basis of the analytic of Dasein 39 a We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself hearing If we have not heard aright it is not by accident that we say we have not understood Hearing is constitutive for discourse And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse so is acoustic perception on hearing Listening to is Dasein s existential way of Beingopen as Beingwith for Others Indeed hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality forBeing as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it Dasein hears because it understands As a Being intheworld with Others a Being which understands Dasein is in thrall to Daseinwith and to itself and in this thraldom it belongs to these Beingwith develops in listening to one another Aufeinanderhoren which can be done in several possible ways following going along with 1 der hditteilung als Aussage The quotation marks around Aussage appear only in the newer editions 39 9 Als verstehcndes In der Weltsein mit den Anderen ist es dem lIitdasein und ihm selbst h 39gtn39g und in dieser Hfirigkeit zugehorig In this sentence Heidegger uses some cognates of horen hearing whose interrelations disappear in our version 3 des Folgens In the earlier editions there are quotation marks around F oigens I 5 Being and Time and the privative modes of not hearing resisting defying and turning away It is on the basis of this potentiality for hearing which is existentially 207 Primary that anything like kearkming Horchen becomes possible Hear F lcening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is de ned in the first instance as hearing in psychologythe sensing of tones and the perception of sounds Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands What we first hear is never noises or complexes of sounds but the creaking waggon the motorcycle We hear the column on the march the north wind the woodpecker tapping the re crackling pA6 it requires a very arti cial and complicated frame of mind to hear a pure noise The fact that motorcycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein as Beinginthe world already dwells alongside what is readytohand withintheworld it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside se11sati0ns nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations 39 l arrives at a world Dasein as essentially understanding is proximally alongside what isunderstood Likewise when we are explicitly hearing the discourse of another we proximally understand what is said or to put it more exactly we are already with him in advance alongside the entity which the discourse is about On the other hand what we proximally hear is not what is ex quot pressed in the utterance Even in cases where the speech is indistinct or in 39a foreign language what we proximally hear is unintelligible words and not a multiplicity of tonedata1 p Iquot Admittedly when what the discourse is about is heard naturally we c Can at the same time hear the diction the way in which it is said die r ffgweise des Gesagtseins but only if there is some counderstanding before 39 hand of what is saidinthetalk for only so is there a possibility of 39j j3estimating whether the way in which it is said is appropriate to what the Tdiscourse is about thematically L In the same way any answering counterdiscourse arises proximally and directly from understanding what the discourse is about which is already shared in Beingwith Only where talking and hearing are existentially possible can anyone h arken The person who cannot hear and must feel may perhaps be quotOne who is able to hearken very well and precisely because of this just 39 39 1 Here we follow the reading of the newer editions nicht cine Mannigfal gkeit V011 Tondaten The older edztrons have reme instead of cine The author is here alluding to the German proverb Wer nicht hfiren kann muss ii393 39i 3h1 n Le he who cannot heed must suffer toprovide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and nally 208 hearing something all around Das N urherumhoren is a privation of the hearing which understands Both talking and hearing are based upon understanding And understanding arises neither through talking at length vieles Reden nor through busily hearing something all around Only he who already understands can listen zuhoren Keeping silent is another essential possibility of discourse and it has the same existential foundation In talking with one another the person who keeps silent can make one understand that is he can develop an understanding and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short of words Speaking at length Vielsprechen about something does not offer the slightest guarantee that thereby under standing is advanced On the contrary talking extensively about some thing covers it up and brings what is understood to a sham clarity the unintelligibility of the trivial But to keep silent does not mean to be dumb On the contrary if a man is dumb he still has a tendency to speak Such a person has not proved that he can keep silence indeed he entirely lacks the possibility of proving anything of the sort And the person who is accustomed by Nature to speak little is no better able to show that he is keeping silent or that he is the sort of person who can do so He who never says anything cannot keep silent at any given moment Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing To be able to keep silent Dasein must have something to say that is it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself In that case one s reticence Verschwiegenheit makes something manifest and does away with idle talk Gerede As a mode of discoursing reticence Articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a potentialityforhearing which is genuine and to a Being withoneanother which is transparent Because discourse is constititutive for the Being of the there that is for statesofmind and understanding while Dasein means Beingin theworld Dasein as discursive Beingin has already expressed itself Dasein has language Among the Greeks their everyday existing was largely diverted into talking with one another but at the same time they had eyes to see Is it an accident that in both their prephilosophical and their philosophical ways of interpreting Dasein they de ned the essence of man as 6501 A yov xov The later way of interpreting this de nition of man in the sense of the animal rationale something living which has reason is not indeed false but it covers up the phenomenal basis for this de nition of Dasein Man shows himselfas the entity which talks This does not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to him but rather that he is the entity which is such as to discover the world and Being and Yime I 5 5 Being and Time 209 Ejjasein itself The Greeks had no word for language they understood this phenomenon in the rst instance as discourse But because the A yog came into their philosophical ken primarily as assertion this was the nd of logo which they took as their clue for working out the basic structures of the forms of discourse and its components Grammar sought 5 its foundations in the logic of this logos But this logic was based upon the ontology of the present athand The basic stock of categories of signi cation which passed over into the subsequent science of language and which in principle is still accepted as the standard today is oriented towards discourse as assertion But if on the contrary we take this phe nomenon to have in principle the primordiality and breadth of an axistentiale then there emerges the necessity of reestablishing the science of language on foundations which are ontologically more primordial The task of liberating grammar from logic requires bgiirelzand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in generalas an xisterztiale It is not a task that can be carried through later on by im mind we must inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything understandable and to do so in accordance with signi cations and this articulation must not be con ned to entities withintheworld which we cognize by considering them theoretically and which we express in sentences A doctrine of signi cation will not emerge automatically even if we make a comprehensive comparison of as many languages as possible and those which are most exotic To accept let us say the philosophical horizon within which W von Humboldt made language a problem would be no less inadequate The doctrine of signi cation is rooted in the ontology of Dasein Vfhether it prospers or i iidecays depends on the fate of this ontology 397 39 In the last resort philosophical research must resolve to ask what kind ilof Being goes with language in general Is it a kind of equipment ready tohand withintheworld or has it Dasein s kind of Being or is it neither quotquot72 0f these What kind of Being does language have if there can be such a as a dead language What do the rise and decline of a I language mean ontologically We possess a science of language and the Being of the entities which it has for its theme is obscure Even the horizon 39f for any investigative question about it is veiled Is it an accident that quotquotPI 0ximally and for the most part signi cations are worldly sketched out beforehand by the signi cance of the world that they are indeed often Predominantly spatial P Or does this fact have existentialontological gl cessity and if it is necessary why should it be so Philosophical research p have to dispense with the philosophy of language if it is to inquire proving and rounding out what has been handed down Bearing this in I66 I67 210 Being and d I 5 into the things themselves and attain the status of a problematic which has been cleared up conceptually Our Interpretation of language has been designed merely to point out the ontological locus of this phenomenon in Daseinfs state of Being and especially to prepare the way for the following analysis in which taking as our clue a fundamental kind of Being belonging to discourse in connection with other phenomena we shall try to bring Daseirfs everydayness into view in a manner which is ontologically more primordial B The Everyday Being qf the Rae and the Falling of Dasein In going back to the existential structures of the disclosedness of Being intheworld our Interpretation has in a way lost sight of Dasein s everydayness In our analysis we must now regain this phenomenal horizon which was our thematical startingpointThe question now arises what are the existential characteristics of the disclosedness of Being inthe world so far as the latter as something which is everyday maintains itselfin the kind of Being of the they Does the they have a state oilmind which is speci c to it a special way of understanding talking and interpreting It becomes all the more urgent to answer these ques tions when we remember that proximally and for the most part Dasein is absorbed inthe they and is mastered by it Is not Dasein as thrown Beingintheworld thrown proximally right into the publicness of the they 3 And What does this publicness mean other than the speci c disclosedness of the they 2 If understanding must be conceived primarily as Dasein s potentiality forBeing then it is om an analysis of the way of understanding and interpreting which belongs to the fthey that we must gather which possibilities of its Being have been disclosed and appropriated by Dasein as they In that case however these 39 possibilities themselves make manifest an essential tendency of Being one which belongs to everyday ness And nally when this tendency has been explicated in an ontologic ally adequate manner it must unveil a primordial kind of Being of Dasein in such a way indeed that from this kind of Being1 the phenomenon of thrownness to which we have called attention can be exhibited in its existential concreteness In the first instance what is required is that the disclosedness of the thcy that is the everyday kind of Being of discourse sight and interpretation should be made visible in certain de nite phenomena In 1 Reading Von ihr aus The earliest editions omit aus correction is made in a 11st of errata Being and Time 211 jfgglation to these phenomena it may not be super uous to remark that our own Interpretation is purely ontological in its aims and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein and from the aspirations gfa philosophy of culture pv0 35 Idle Talk The expression idle talk Geredequot is not to be used here in a dis p39araging 1 signi cation Terrninologically it signi es a positive pheno menon which constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Daseirfs under standing and interpreting For the most part discourse is expressed by being spoken out andihas always been so expressed it is language2 But b0 0 that case understanding and interpretation already lie in what has thus been expressed In language as a way things have been expressed or N 3 standing of Dasein has been interpreted This way of interpreting it is no itself of the character of Dasein Proximally and with certain limits asein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness which controls distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the state ngofmind belonging to it The way things have been expressed or spoken 39 out is such that in the totality of contexts of signi cation into which it has been articulated it preserves an understanding of the disclosed world and therewith equiprimordially an understanding of the Daseinwith of thers and of one s own Beingin The understanding which has thus I 39 P already been deposited in the way things have been expressed pertains just as much to any traditional discoveredness of entities which may have 3 l3een reached as it does to one s current understanding of Being and to E jwhatever possibilities and horizons for fresh interpretation and conceptual quot f irticulation may be available But now we must go beyond a bare allusion quotifO the Fact of this interpretedness of Dasein and must inquire about the 39 f ii existential kind of Being of that discourse which is expressed and which quot lipresses itself If this cannot be conceived as something present at hand What is its Being and what does this tell us in principle about Dasein s ev ryday kind of Being Discourse which expresses itself is communication Its tendency of A 1 These quotation marks are supplied only in the older editions It is not easy to trans h Iat Gerede in a way which does not carry disparaging connotations Fortunately eldcgger makes his meaning quite clear j i 2 Die Rede spricht sich zumeist aus und hat sich schonjmmer ausgcsprochen Sic ist quotSP139aEhe As we have pointed out earlier see our note I p 190 H 149 above it is often quotf3uf Ctent to translate aussprechen as express In the present passage however the con 3939 i f t 39i t10n of speaking out or uttering seems especially important we shall occasionaliy f 39 make it explicit in our translation by hendiadys or other devices poken out Ausgesprochenheit there is hidden a way in which the under more just presentathand than language is on the contrary its Being is e 168 212 39 Being and Time I 5 Being is aimed at the hearer to participate in disclosed Being towards what is talked about in the discourse In the language which is spoken when one expresses oneself there lies an average intelligibility and in accordance with this intelligibility the dis course which is communicated can be understood to a considerable extent even if the hearer does not bring himself into such a kind of Being towards what the discourse is about as to have a primordial understanding of it We do not so much understand the entities which are talked about we already are listening only to what is saidinthetalk as such lVhat is saidinthe talk gets understood but what the talk is about is understood only approxi mately and super cially We have the same thing in view because it is in the some averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said Hearing and understanding have attached themselves beforehand to what is saidiI1thetalkas such The primary relationshipofBeing towards the entity talked about is not imparted by communicationgl but Being withoneanother takes place in talking with one another and in concern with what is said inthetalk To this Beingwithoneanother the fact that talking is going on is a matter of consequences The Beingsaid the dictum the pronouncement Ausspruch all these now stand surety for the genuineness of the discourse and of the understanding which belongs to it and for its appropriateness to the facts And because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship ofBeing towards the entity talked about or else has never achieved such a relationship it does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner but communicates rather by following the route of gossiping and passing the word aZo22g3 What is saidinthe tak as such spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character Things are so because one says so Idle talk is constituted by just such gossiping and passing the word along a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on Bodenstandig keit becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness Bodenlosigkeit And indeed this idle talk is not con ned to vocal gossip but even spreads to what we write where it takes the form of scribbling das Gesch reibe In this latter case the gossip is not based so much upon hearsay It feeds upon super cial reading dem Angelesenen The average under standing of the reader will never be able to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle and how much is just gossip Th8 average understanding moreover will not want any such distinction and does not need it because of course it understands everything 1 Die Nlitteilung teilt nicht den primiiren Scinsbezug zum beredeten Seienden 2 Bun liegt daran dass geredet wird We have interpreted Ihm as referring to F133 Mitpinandersein but other interpretations are grammatically possible 3 0 B sondern auf dem Wege des Weiter und Nachredens Being and Time 213 W 55 something which anyone can rake up it not only releases one from the task of genuinelyunderstanding but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility for which nothing is closed off anylonger 9 39 Discourse which belongs to the essential state of Dasein s Being and has a ghare in constituting Dasein s disclosedness has the possibility of becoming idle talk And when it does so it serves not so much to keep Beinginthe world open for us in an articulated understanding as rather to close it eff and cover up the entities withintheworld To do this one need not aim to deceive Idle talk does not have the kind of Being which belongs to rsbzsciously passing qf something as something else The fact that something has been said groundlessly and then gets passed along in further retelling amounts to perverting the act of disclosing Erschliessen into an act of a closing off Verschliessen For what is said is always understood prodm ally as sa 39 g sornething that is an uncovering something T hus by its very nature idle talk is a closingoff since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something which it leaves undone 0 This closingoff is aggravated afresh by the fact that an understanding of what is talked about is supposedly reached in idle talk Because of this idle talk discourages any new inquiry and any disputation and in a peculiar way suppresses them and holds them back 57 This way in which things have been interpreted in idle talk has already established itself in Dasein There are many things with which we first become acquainted in this way and there is not a little which never gets beyond such an average understanding This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the instance with never a possibility of extrication In it out of it and 39 against it all genuine understanding interpreting and communicating quottall rediscovering and appropriating anew are performed In no case is a f untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been 39 fj lIiterpreted set before the open country of a worldinitself so that itjust gsilaeholds what it encounters The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a moodmthat is for the basic way in which Dasein Eiets the world matter to it1 The they prescribes one s stateofmind and determines what and how one sees quot 1 fiber die Moglichkeiten des Gestimmtseins entschieden das heisst ber die llllflart in der sich das Dasein von der Welt angehen lasst The second ber is found 5 P131 In the later editions 39 170 174 2 I 8 Being and 39 Time hay for if anyone is genuinely on the scent of anything he does ngt I5 P bout it and this is the most entangling way in which ambiguity presen possibilities so that they will already be sti ed in their power some day P 1 ctually translated into deeds ambiguity has already taken care that inter inwhat has been Realised will promptly die away Indeed this interest perss in a kind of curiosity and idle talk only so long as has been surmised gets rried out For in such a case Dasein is in every case forced back on dle talk and curiosity lose their power and are already exacting their PC ty2 When confronted with the Carrying through of what they ha surmised together idle talk readily estab lishes that they could ha done that too for they have indeed idle talk is even indignant that what it surmised it together In the en 1 and curiosity take care in their ambiguity to ensure that what is gen t ely and newly created is out of date as soon as it emerges before the p11 b Such a new creation In the ambiguity of the way things have been interpreted talking about things ahead of the game and making s Iquot es about them and carrying something through get stamped as somethin sequent and unimportant Thus Dasein s understanding in th possibilities of Being Dasein is always arnbiguously there that say in that Public disclosedness of Beirlgwithoneanother where the lo est 1 ist die verfanglichste Weise in der die Zweideutigkeit M iglichkeiten des t S vorgibt urn sic auch schon in ihrer Kraft zu ersticken Notice that ihrer may refer to Zweideutigkeit or to Mtiglichleiten 3 Und sie riichen sich auch schon Being and Time 219 2 13 talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep things moving where in c eryday manner everything and at bottom nothing is happening 1Thjssan1big11ity is always tossing to curiosity that which it seeks and 39gives i e talk the semblance of having everything decided in it But quot kind of Being of the disclosedness of Beinginthe world iaqminates o Beingwithoneanother as such The Other is proximally i there in term f what they have heard about him what they say 3139 their talk abo him and what they know about him Into prim dial e another idle talk rst slips itself in between B T f on the Other first and next watching how he will Zfcomport himself and at he will say in reply Beingwithoneanother the they is by no cans an indifferent side by sideness in which ve rything has been settledbut rather an intent ambiguous watching of hue another a secret and r ciprocal listeningin Under the mask of 5 In this connection we must no 39ce that ambiguity does not rst arise which the individual Dasein rs conjures up It is already implied quotin Being with one another as thrown Be withoneanother in a world Publicly however it is quite hidden and stlrqy will always defend them seives against this Interpretation of the kind Being which belongs to the way things have been interpreted by the quot y lest it should prove incorrect It would be a misunderstanding if we re to seek to have the explication of these phenomena con rmed by pD to the they for agreement The phenomena of idle talk curiosity and ambig forth in such a manner as to indicate thatthey are already in their Being We must now grasp in an existentialontolo 0 manner the kind of Being which belongs to this interconnection The kind i p 39of Being which belongs to everydayness is to be understood wi quottn the 397horizon of those structures of Dasein s Being which have been hitherto obtained have been set P 11 38 Falling and 77zrownm3ss quotW e idle talk curiosity and ambiguity characterize the way in which in an everyday manner Dasein is its there the disclosedness of Beingin theworld As de nite existential characteristics these are not presentat 39 hand in Dasein but help to make up its Being In these and in the way 7 they are interconnected in their Being there is revealed a basic kind of H which belongs to everydayness we call this the quot zling 1 of Dasein 1 Verfallen See our note 2 p 42 H 2 above and note i p 172 H 134 above om aiming explicitly at disguise ordstortion and that it is not some 175 176 2530 Being and Time I 5 This term does not express any negative evaluation but is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the world of its concern This absorption in 39 Aufgehen bei has mostly the character of Beinglost in the publicness of the they Dasein has in the first instance fallen away abgefallen from itself as an authentic pot entiality for Being its Self and has fallen into the world 1 Fallenness into the world means an absorption in Beingwithoneanother in so far asthe latter is guided by idle talk curiosity and ambiguity Through the Interpretation of falling what we have called the inauthenticity of Daseinx i may now be de ned more precisely On no account however do the terms inauthentic and nonauthentic signify really not 2 as if in this mode of Being Dasein were altogether to lose its Being In authenticity does not mean anything like Beingno longerin theworld but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of Beingintheworld the kind which is completely fascinated by the world and by the Dasein with of Others in the they Not Being itsself Das Nichtesselbstsein functions as a positive possibility of that entity which in its essential con cern is absorbed in a world This kind of not Bez39ng has to be conceived as that kind of Being which is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein main tains itself for the most part So neither must we take the fallenness of Dasein as a fall from a purer and higher primal status Not only do we lack any experience of this ontically but ontologically we lack any possibilities or clues for Inter preting it In falling Dasein itself as factical Beinginthe world is something from which it has already fallen away And it has not fallen into some entity which it comes upon for the rst time in the course of its Being or even one which it has not come upon at all it has fallen into the world which itself belongs to its Being Falling is a de nite existential characteristic of Dasein itself It makes no assertion about Dasein as something present at hand or about presentathand relations to entities from which Dasein is descended or with which Dasein has subsequently wound up in some sort of commzrcium We would also misunderstand the ontologicoexistential structure of falling3 if we were to ascribe to it the sense of a bad and deplorable ontical property of which perhaps more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves 1 and an die Welt verfallen While we shall follow English idioms by translating an die Welt as into the world in contexts such as this the preposition into 15 hardly the correct one The idea is rather that of falling at the world or collapsing against lt 2 Un und nichteigentlich bedeutet aber keineswegs eigentlich nicht 3 3 Die ontologischexistenziale Struktur des Verfallens The words des Verfallens do not appear in the earlier editions 0 p not something present athand for itself within the world as a product t4 39quot39 p 39 Lquot p 1p F0 Being With one another itself it does not first arise through certain 39 Being and Time 221 Neither in our first allusion to Beingintheworld as Dasein s basic v3t3te nor in our characterization of its constitutive structural items did we go beyond an analysis of the constitution of this kind of Being and take note of its character as a phenomenon We have indeed described concern and solicitude as the possible basic kinds of Beingin But we did not discuss the question of the everyday kind of Being of these ways in which ne may be We also showed that Beingin is something quite different from a mere confrontation whether by way of observation or by way of faactiong that is it is not the Being present athand together of a subject and an Object Nevertheless it must still have seemed that Beingin the world has the function of a rigid framework within which Dasein s possible ways of comporting itself towards its world run their course without touching the framework itself as regards its Being But this supposed framework itself helps make up the kind of Being which is S An existential mode of Beingintheworld is documented in the phenomenon of falling 3939 39 Idle talk discloses to Dasein a Being towards its world towards Others and towards itself a Being in which these are understood but in a mode 39o fgroundless oating Curiosity discloses everything and anything yet in such a way that Beingin is everywhere and nowhere Ambiguity hides nothing om Dasein s understanding but only in order that Beingin 39t39heworld should be suppressed in this uprooted everywhere and 5nowhere P By elucidating ontologically the kind of Being belonging to everyday 39Being intheworld as it shows through in these phenomena we first hrrive at an existentially adequate determination of Daseirfs basic state QA is the structure that shows us the movement of falling iiquot Idle talk and the way things have been publicly interpreted Which idle I talk includes constitute themselves in Beingwithoneanother Idle talk 2 detached from Beingwith one another And it is just as far from letting Iitself be volatilized to something universal which because it belongs f ssentially to nobody is really nothing and occurs as Real only in the iI391dividual Dasein which speaks Idle talk is the kind of Being that belongs I ircumstances which have eiiects upon Dasein from outside But if Dasein itself in idle talk and in the way things have been publicly inter TPreted presents to itself the possibility of losing itselfin the they and into groundlessness this tells us that Dasein prepares for itself a ltf0nstant temptation towards falling Beingin theworld is in itself l npting oer5ucker sok I177 I80 224 39 Being and Time s I 5 that Dasein s Being is in the state of Bez39ng in the world as we have already pointed out then it becomes manifest that falling as a kind qf Being Qf this Beingin affords us rather the most elemental evideneejbr Daseirfs eXiSte11 tiality In falling nothing other than our potentialityforBeingin world is the issue even if in the mode of inauthenticity Dasein can fall 3 only because Beingintheworld understandingly with a stateofmind is an issue for it On the other hand authentic existenceis not something which oats above falling everydayness existentially it is only a modi ed way in which such everydayness is seized upon The phenomenon of falling does not give us something like a night view of Dasein a property which occurs ontically and may serve to round out the innocuous aspects of this entity Falling reveals an essential ontological structure of Dasein itself Far from determining its nocturnal side it constitutes all Daseirfs days in their everydayness It follows that our existentialontological Interpretation makes no ontical assertion about the corruption of human Nature not because the necessary evidence is lacking but because the problematic of this Inter pretation is prior to any assertion about corruption or incorruption Falling is conceived ontologically as a kind of motion Ontically we have not decided whether man is drunk with sin and in the status carruptionis whether he walks in the status integritatis or whether he nds himself in an intermediate stage the status gmtiae But in so far as any faith or world view makes any such assertions and if it asserts anything about Dasein as Being ir1 theworld it must come back to the existential structures which we have set forth provided that its assertions are to make a claim to conceptual understanding The leading question of this chapter has been about the Being of the there Our theme has been the ontological Constitution of the disclosed ness which essentially belongs to Dasein The Being of that disclosed ness is constituted by statesofquotmind understanding and discourse Its everyday kind of Being is characterized by idle talk curiosity and ambiguity These show us the movement of falling with temptation tranquillizing alienation and entanglement as its essential characteristics But with this analysis the whole existential constitution of Dasein has been laid bare in its principal features and we have obtained the phe nomenal ground for a comprehensive Interpretation of Dasein s39 Being as care VI CARE AS THE BEING or DASEIN Question qf the Primordial Tetaligfy cy Dasein s Structural P zole 2 EEmsI TI IEWORLD is a structure which is primordially and con tantly who R In the preceding chapters Division One Chapters 25 7 P th39is39structure as been elucidated phenomenally as a whole and also in its gfciw lost the ernptrnxess of our rst general sketch of it To be sure the onstitution of the structural whole and its everyday kind of Being is phenomenally so mam ld that it can easily obstruct our looking at the Whole as such phenomenplogically in a way which is uni ed But we may ok at it more nely andloxur uni ed view of it may be held in readiness more securely if we now raise the question towards which we have been orking in our preparatory S damental analysis of Dasein in general howis the totality cyquot that structurdlwhole which we have pointed out to he de ned an existentialontological marmer Dasein exists factically We s Kinquire whether existentiality and cticity have an ontological unity or whether facticity belongs essentially ocxistentiality Because Dasein essentially has a stateofmind belonging quotfG it Dasein has a kind of Being in whic it is brought before itself and ecomes disclosed to itselfin its thrownness But thrownness as a kind of eing belongs to an entity which in each c 5 is its possibilities and is hem in such a way that itunderstands itselfi these possibilities and in rms of them projecting itself upon them Being ongside the ready to d belongs just as primordially to Being intheiiv orld as does Being Others and Beinginthe world is in each casexfor the sake of 39391tS6l The Self however is proximally and for the most art inauthentic pf theyself Beingintheworld is always fallen Accor 39 ly Dasez39n s quot7 W quot139crge eeerydqyness can be de ned as Beingintheworld to 39 h is falling ampfdd closed thrown andprqfecting cmdfbr which itsownnzostpoufentiali rBeing g an issue both in its Being alongside the world and in its Beingwith Others I81 SEEN UN ZEET VON MARTIN HEIDEGGER Neunzehnte Au age MAX NIEMEYER VERLAG TUBINGEN 2006 39 lov y xg Eng peig piw ta ta 113 3110138 Bo kao e cmpou39vew zrrs couv lt w cp yyno e yucilam yuy39vdcmate ueig e 598 101quot pm dg pe a v v 5 nog xapev 39 39 39 gtgtDerm offenbar seid ihr doch schon lange mit dem vertraut was ihr eigentlich meint Wenn ibr den A11339 druck seiend gebraucht Wir jedoch glaubten es einst zwar zu verstehen jetzt abet sind Wir in Verlegenheit gekommened Haben Wir heute eine Antwort auf die Frage nach den was Wir mit dem Won gtgtseie11dltlt eigentlich meinen Keineswegs Und so gilt es denn die Fmge mzda dem Siam van Sein erneut zu stellen Sind Wir denn heute auch nur in der Verlegenheit den Ausdruck Seinltlt nicht zu verstehen Keineswegs Und so gilt es denn vordem allererst Wieder ein Verstindnis f r den Sinn dieser Frage zu weaken Die konkrete Ausarbeitung der Frage nach dem Sinn von S39ein ist die Absicht der folgenden Abhandlung Die Interpre tation der Zeit als des m iglichen Horizontes eines jeden Seins verst indnisses iiberhaupt ist ihr vorl lufiges Ziel Das Absehen auf ein solches Ziel die in solchem Vorhaben be schlossenen und V011 ihm geforderten Untersuchungen und der Weg zu diesem Zielbediirfe11 einer einleitenden Erl luterung 1 Plato Sophistes 2442 539 27 Das allt iglidae Selbstsein mad dds Mam Das omtologiscfa relevante Ergebnis der vorstehenden Analyse des Mitseins liegt in der Einsicht da der Subjektcharakterltlt des eige nen Daseins und der Anderen sic existenzial bestimmt das hei t aus gewissen Weisen zu sein Im u1nWe1t1ich39Besorgten begegnen die An deren als das was sie sind sie sind das was sie betreiben Im Besorgen dessen was man mit f r und gegen die Anderen er griffen hat ruh139st5ndig die Sorge um einen Unterschied gegen die Anderen sei es auch nur um den Unterschied gegen sie auszugleichen sei es da das eigene Dasein gegen die Anderen zuriickbleibend im Verhiltnis zu ihnen aufholen Will sei es da das Dasein im Vor rang iiber die Anderen darauf aus ist sie niederzuhalten Das Mit einandersein ist ihm selbst verborgen V011 der Serge um diesen Abstand beunruhjgt Existenzial ausgedriickt es hat den Charakter der Abstiindigleeit e unauffilliger diese Seinsart dem a tiglichen Dasein selbst ist um so hartn ickiger und urspriinglicher wirkt sie sich aus V In dieser zum Mitsein geh jrigen Abstiindigkeit Hegt aber das Da 39sein steht als alltigliches Miteinandersein in der Botmd igkeit der Ande139e11 Nicht es selbst ist die Anderen haben ihm das Sein abge nommen Das Belieben der Anderen verf gt ber die allt iglichen Seinsm glichkeiten des Daseins Diese Anderen sind dabei nicht be szimmte Andere Im Gegenteil jeder Anders kann sie vertreten Ent scheidend ist nur die unauff llige vom Dasein als Mitsein unver sehens schon iibemommene Herrschaft der Anderen Man selbst ge h irt zu den Anderen urid verfestigt ihre Macht gtgtDie Anderenltlt die man so nennt um die eigene Wesenhafte Zugeh irigkeit zu ihnen 211 verdecken sind die die im a tiiglichen Lditeinandersein zurfaichst und kzumeist da si22d Das War ist nicht dieser und jcht jener nicht kgman selbst und nicht einige und nicht die Surnme Aller Des gtgtWer iiss s 1 Teut1um D445 Mm z D quotFriiher wjurde 0 z Wie je schon in der n chsten Umwelt die Bffentliche gtgtUmWe1t zuhanden und Initbesorgt ist In der Benut zung ffentlicher Verkehrsmittel in der Verwendung des NachrichteI1 iwesens Zeitur1g ist jeder Andere Wie der Andere Dieses Miteinan igdersein 16st das eigene Dasein v llig in die Seir1sart3939 der Anderemc auf so rwar da AnderenTiIkJj11terschiedlichkeit und Aus 1gqglp1ehr versehwinden II139dieser Uriauff lligkeit und Nichtfeststellbarkeit lentgfaltefquot Di seine eigentliche Diktatur W31 genie en end verg11jig 111z1s wie mm genie t Wir lesen sehe1 I26 j 4 4 313 T L und urteilen ber D Lizeramr upd K171A715I391 W543 7 7 7quot iquothF 1nd U1quotei1t5 gihs s ab rauch fT9me sr9 en Haufens i391 k W sich zuriT1c5zie 1 wir fmden emPorend was mam emporend n ef Das Man das kein best1mIntes 1st und das Alle obzrwar nicht 3 3 Summe sind schreibt die Seinsart der Alltiglichkeit vor Das Man hat selbst eigene Weisen zu sein Die genarmte 39Ie11denz des Mitseins die Wir die Abst adigkeit nannten griindet darm de das Miteinandersein als solches die Durckscbnittlichkeit besorgt S16 ist ein existenzialer Charakter des Man Dem Man geht 63 111 Sel em 39 Sein wesentlich um sie Deshalb hilt es sich faktisch in der Durch schnittlichkeit dessen was sich geh rt wasman gelten 132313 und Was nicht dern man Erfolg zubilligt dem man 11111 versagt D1ese Dutch schnittlichkeit in der Vorzeichmmg dessen was gewagt Werden kann fund daffy Wacht ber jade sich vordrangende Ausnahme Jeder Vor rang Wird ger iuschlos niedergehalten Alles Igrspr ng ehe ist diibir Nacht als 1 z39u1gst bekannt geglhttet Alles Erkampfte W11d han L Jedes Geheimrlis verliert seine Kraft Die Serge der Durchschmtt lichkeit enthiillt Wieder eine wesenhafte Tendenz des Daseins die Wir die Einebmmg aller Seinsrn glichkeiten nermen Abstiindigkeit Durchschnittliehkeit Einebnung konstimieren als Seinsweisen des Man das was wir als die fHendichkeitltlt kennen Sie regelt zunichst alle We1t und Daseinsauslegung end behalf 111 allem Recht Und das nicht auf Grand emes ausgeze1chneten und prirn ren Seinsverhiltnisses zu der1 gtgtIir1CeLltlt nicht Vjfeil sie 11ber eine ausdriicklich zugeeignete Durchs1cht1gke1t des Dasems verrugt son dern auf Grund des Nichteingehens auf he Sachenltlta W311 313 UP emp fldlich ist aess111U 1EE1 9 3islt1 es Nivc usi nu ltis1 Eca139sh Die Offentlichkeit verdunkefr alles und glbt das S0 Verd fi 3 5 Bekannte und edem Zugiinghche aus Das Man ist iiberall dabei doch so da es sich auch sphcgn imII1 r 1 fg399iJ3L gg g 11 1JgA g1 11gr A W0dais Disei ms 39E139h cELeic1139mg dringt 7e11 das Man jedoch alles Urtellen und Entsc he1den VOI39g1btgt nmt 33 F jeweiligen Dasein die Verantwcgtrt11cIse1139 ab Das Man km es s1c gleichsam leisten da gtgt1nan s1ch39stanchg auf es beruft Es V arm 0B leichtesten alles veranwvorten well kelfler 68 131 C131 1911 W33 61151 Zustehen braucht Das Man Warltlt es 1II11 I1 139 1111d do 3h kaml 33533 wgrdeg gtkeifc I ist 53 gCWCS I13 der A t glichkeit des Daseins wird das meiste durch das V011 dem wir sagen Iniissf Do 11511131 W35 35 Das Man entlczstet so das jeweilige Dasein in seiner Alltiglichkeit Nicht nur das mit dieser Seinsentlastung kommt das Man dem Da I27 sein entgegen sofern in diesem die Tendenz znm Leichtnehmen und Leichtrnachen Iiegt Und weil das Man mit der Seinsentlastung dem jeweiligen Dasein stiindig entgegenkomrnt behilt es und verfestiot es seine hartnickige Herrschaft 39 b 3 Jeder ist der Andere und Keiner er selbst Das Mam mit dem sich T die Frage nach dem Wr des a tiiglichen Daseins beantwortet is C135 Nfemd d dem alles Dasein iin Untereinandersein sich je schon ausgehefert hat einiidjfgiierifsgfeitgiltigi S BScl1arLaltEr 5 aI1 gHquoth Pnter Iichkeita Seinsentlastung ut ti 11 Sc mhchkem E1nebnuI1g Offenp tandiok d 1 ntgegenkornmen Izegt dle nachgte H D e1t es Dasems D1ese Standlgkert betnfft mcht das fort Wahrende Vorhandenseill V011 W33 sondern die Seinsart des Daseins Verloren Man ist in der Y dem slch nofh ch gefunden bzW39 W Hes Daseins so Wenig Wie das Man 2113 das Eenrn1 in eT1 st Im Gegemeila in diesel Seinsart ist das Dasein ein ens realissif mum falls ReaIit itltlt alsdaseinsmi iges Sein verstanden Wird ha E IId1nge of 139std1sli1 an sohWn139g vorhanden wie das Dasein iiber ens1c t c er 31 as Man veb rdet um so unfafg und Versteckter ist es um so Weniger ist et aber auch nichts De Cher m un vore enornm 39 d mg enen ontlsch ontologlschen Sehen enthu t es slch 315 as 1ealste Subekt der A tag chkeit Und Warm es nicht zug Iich ist wie e39 39 39 agg 111 V rha11 31e T Stein dann entsche1det das mcht 1m mmdgeten uber sieme Semsart Man darf Weder vorschnell dekretie ren Ieses Man let e1gen111ch mchts noch der Meinung huldicren das Phancmen se1 ontelogisch interpretiert Wenn man es etw D I a a Ilachtraghch zusammengeschlossenes Resultat des Zusammenvorhanf densems mehrerer Subjekte gtgterkl irtltlt Vielrnehr rnu sich umg 1 hr die Ausarbetun 39 6 C 1 2 def Selnsbegr e nach d1esen unabwembaren Phi nomenen rzchten D 18 Man 131 auch nxcht so etwas me em mllgememes gubjekm das uber mehreren schwebt Z11 dieser Auffassung kann es nur k H om dasalseln 61er fgt5ubekteltlt mcht ndasernsmai lg verstanden Gamm 3110353 5 Iati3ChI1ch Vnrhandene Falle e1ner vorkommenden die Magli S tZ Wer en Be1 d1esemAnsatz besteht ontologisch 11133 g C en es was mcht Fall 1st 1m Smne der Art und Gat tung zu Verstehen Das Man ist nicht die Gattung des eweiligen Da I28 seins und es li t sich auch nicht als bleibende Beschaffenheit an die sern Seienden Vorfinden Da auch die traditionelle Logik angesichts dieser Ph inomene versagt kann nicht vervvundern Wenn bedacht wird da sie ihr Fundament in einer fiberdies noch rohen Ontologie des Vorhandenen hat Daher ist sie durch noch so viele Verbesserun gen und Erweiterungen grundsitzlich nicht geschmeidjger zu machen Diese geistesvvissenschaftiChltlt orientierten Reforrnen der Logik stei gern nu die ontologische Verwirrung Das Man ist ein Exzistenzzlel zmd geb rt als urqprzinglicbes Phine men 224739 positiven Verfczsmng des Dczseins Es hat selbst Wieder ver schiedene Miigliehkeiten seiner daseinsmifiigen Konkretion Ein dringlichkeit und Ausdr ck chkeit seiner IIerrscha kiinnen geschicht Iich Wechseln Das Selbst des allt iglichen Daseins ist das Momselbst das Wir V011 dern eigentlidaen das hei t eigens ergriffenen Selbst unterscheiden A15 Man se1Bst ist das eweilige Dasein in das Man zerstrem und mu sich erst fineien Diese Zerstreuung charakterisiert das gtgtSubjekt der 39 Seinsart die wir als das besorgende Aufgehen in der niiehst begeg nenden Welt kennen Wenn das Dasein ihm selbst als Man se1bst ver traut ist damn besagt das zugleich da das Man die niichste Ansle gung der Welt und des InderWeltseins vorzeichnet Das Man se1bst worurn Willen das Dasein alltiglieh ist artikuliert den VerWeisungs zusarnmenhang der Bedeutsamkeit Die Welt des Daseins gibt das be gegnende Seiende auf cine Bewandtnisganzheit frei die dem Man vertraut ist und in den Grenzen die mit der Durcbschnittlichkeit des Man festgelegt sind Zzmiicbst ist das faktische Dasein in der dutch schnittlich entdeckten Mitwelt Zzm icbst gtgtbin nicht gtgtichltlt im Sinne des eigenen Selbst sondern die Anderen in der Weise des Man Ans diesem her und als dieses Werde ich rnir gtgtse1bstltlt zun ichst gegebenltlt Zunichst ist das Dasein Man und zumeist bleibt es so Wenn das Da sein die Welt eigens entdeckt und sich nahebringt wenn es ihm selbst sein eigentliches Sein erschlief t damn vollzieht sich dieses Entdecken Von gtgtWe1tltlt und Erschlie en Von Dasein immer als Wegriumen der Verdeckungen und Verdunkelungen als Zerbrechen der Verstellungen 0IA mit denen sich das Dasein gegen es selbst abriegelt Mit der Interpretation des Mitseins und des Selbstseins im Man ist die Frage nach dem Wet der Allt iglichkeit des Miteinanderseins beantwortet Diese Betrachtungen haben zugleich ein konkretes Ver st ndnis der Gnmdverfassung des Daseins erbracht Da I 1c1 1We1t se1z1W13 Cleiuseie9r 1l1ti1i bJ eitee 112ezssl 9 9itt1ichkei sichLbar 129 Das allt igliche Dasein sch pft die vorentologische Auslegung seines Sems aus der niichsten Seinsart des Man Die ontologische Imerpre talflon 91375 Z1113915C1 1S1 clieser Auslegungstendetlz sie versteht das Da sem aus der Welt her und findet es als innerweltlich Seiendes vor N1Cl1c nur das auch den Sinn des Seins claraufhjn diese gggenden SubJekte Verstanden Wefde l i t sich die gtgtn chsteltlt Ontologie des D33 1I15 3113 C161 gtgtW ltltlt vorgeben Weil abet in diesem Aufgehen in d61 Vl7elt das Weltphiinpmen selbst iibersprungen wircl trim an seine Stelle das 111ne139VVf1F1iC13E V9rh3I 1d Eidi Dinge Das Sein des Seien den das mzt dzzst Wird als Vorhandenheit begriffen So erm glicht 1V31391A11 fWFV iS des peasitiven Pl nomens des n lchstallt iglichen Incler 1elt se1ns die En1s1cht 111 die Wmzel der Verfehlung der ontolbgil icben InerP139 et3T1011 d1eSc139 Semsverfassung Sie selbst in ibrer allt g zc en Seznsart zsr es dze sack zmziicbst 39ae7fe7Zt and verdeckt Wfenn schon des Sein cles allt iglichen Miteinanderseins das sich schembar ontologisch der puren Vorhandenheit n hert von diesel grundsitzlich verschieden ist dann wird das Sein des eigentlichen Selbst noch weniger als Vorhandenheit begriffen Werden kfinnen Das eigemtlicbe Selbstsein beruht nicht auf einern Vom Man abgelfisten Plusnahmezustand des Subyekts sondem ist eine existenzielle M odi fzecztzon ales Man 41539 emes wesenlmften Existerzzizzls Die elbigkeit des eigentlich existierenclen Selbst ist aber clann Omologlsch dufch fine Kluft getrennt Von der Identit it des in der Erlebmsrnamz gfaltigkeit sich durchhaltenden Ich Fiinftes Kapitel Das InSein 31339 solches ll 23 Die Azafge ze einer tbenmtisclaen Analyse ales I72Seins S 316 exlstenziale Analytlk des Daseins hat in ihrem Vorbereitenden ta Iurn d1e Grundverfassung theses Sexenclen das Inder Weltsein Zuni lenenclen Theme N n chstes Ziel ist die phinomenale Hebung er einheitlichen nrspnmglichen Struktur des Seins des Daseins dar ans S1Cl l seine Moghchkeiten und Weisen zu seinltlt ontologisch be Stlmmen B1sher war die ph nomenale Charakteristik des InderWelt seins auf das Strukturmoment der Welt und die BeantwcJrtung der Frage nach dem Wer clieses Seienden in seiner All iglichkeit gexich T tet Aber schon bei der ersten Kennzeichnung der Aufgaben einer vor I30 3939 4 0 39 1 n C 132 734 l r F 1 739quot 39 23939quot 39 quotquot39u 33 39 4 5 9539 39 3952 39 7 3939a1n bereitenden Fundamentalanalyse des Daseins Wurde eine Orientierung ber das I n Sez39n als solclaes vorausgeschicktl und an dem konkreten Modus des Welterkennens demonstriertz Die Vorwegnahme dieses tragenden Strukturmomentes entsprang der Absicht V011 Anfang an die Analyse der einzelnen Momente in einem sich durchhaltenden Vorblick auf das Strukturganze einzukrei sen und jede Sprengung und Aufsplitterung des einheitlichen Phine mens zu verhiiten jetzt gilt es die Interpretation unter Bewabrung des in der konkreten Analyse VOI1 Welt und Wer Gewonnenen zurn Phiinomen cles InSeins zuriickzulenken Die eindringlichere Bet1ach tung desselben soll aber nicht nur emeut und sicherer die Struktur ganzheit des InderWelt seins vor den ph inomenologischen Blick zwingen sondern auch den Weg bahnen zur Erfassung des ursprIing D lichen Seins des Daseins selbst der Sorge Was kann aber noch Weiter aufgezeigt Werden am InderW39elt sein ber die wesenhaften Bezfige des Seins bei der Welt Besorgen des Mitseins Fiirsorge uncl des Selbstseins Wer hinaus Es bleibt allen 39 falls noch die M igliehkeit die Analyse dutch vergleichencle Charak teristil der Abwandlungen des Besorgens und seiner Umsicht der Fiirsorge und ihrer Riicksicht in die Breite auszubauen und durch die verschirfte Explikation des Seins alles m glichen innerweltlichen Seienden das Dasein gegen nicht daseinsmi iges Seiendes abzuheben Ohne Frage liegen nach dieser Richtung unerledigte Aufgaben Das bislang Herausgestellte ist vielfiiltig erg inzungsbediirftig im Hin blick auf eine geschlossene Ausarbeitung des existenzialen Apriori der philosophischen Anthropologie Darauf zielt aber die vorliegende Untersuchung nicht Hare Absidyt ist eine fundamenmlontologiscbe W39enn Wir sonach dem InSein thematisch naclafragen clann k nnen wir zwar nicht die Urspriinglichkeit des Ph inomens durch Ableitung aus anderen d h durch eine unangemessene Analyse im Sinne einer AuE Iciisung vernichten Wollen Die Unableitbarkeit eines Ursprfmglichen sclnlieSt aber eine Mannigfaltigkeit der dafiir konstitutiven Seinscha39 raktere nicht aus Zeigen sich solche dam sind sie existenzial gleichs ursprfmglich Das Phiinomen der Gleicbwspriinglicbkeit der konstitu tiven Momente ist in der Ontologie oft mi achtet Worden zufolge einer methodisch ungeziigelten Tendenz zur Herkunftsnachweisung 2 Von allem und jeclezn ans einem einfachen gtgtUrgrundltlt I Vgt M2 5 52 ff 2 Vgl ms 5 5963 I31 als selbstversr indlieh an as at 39d interpretatorische Funkticgm eauchw ehalliii l f 1Vn111eaa jebelde al I e 01quot n gclfti zur sfrajtiVn S Be ung und Vrbmdu39Pg Phanomenal dann hat am Endegd m d analyse deg quot 9 bemfeuem kamena nichts mi B d mitt em39T1te1 C Pu1a g lelnte Phinomen an und Verbxndung zu tun Das ist und seine In prfltanon mag es sprachlich eigens ausgedriickt oder in der Ver gi me lt be em Wm w den Problemzusammenhanemsmgghchlfelten deg DaemS selbst shad in um def S fr pG er ex1stenz1alen Analyuk Die Augalbe d g ems age verglelche I Ted 3 Abschnitt Wird denn auch 1658 quot 39 In elgemlllllllchen Semsphanomen mnerhalb des l yog wieder begegnen Saojcfgiu g 311 es nur mit dem Nachvafeis der Abk nftigkeit der Aug de M 0 11113 und Yerstehen denthch zu maehen da die Logi1 s W 0 r t 0Nr p verschiirfr zuglelch diegginsiflitzliejii 61136 II1terIreta39uOn39deS W09 thodischen Baszs auf d di 39 e 1C mr pmnghchkelt der me L 539YO Wird als V h d er D 6 make O 1395 10g1e erwachsen 131 Der Chen hat das Seidn CE 63 erfalfbn als Solcpgs interpretiem imglei Digger silm Von Sam ableibteief11StZ11g iti Ed n Smn VOI1 Vorhandenheit dere Seinsm iglichkeiten so dag FL at unabgenoben gegen an Simle deg formalen Em S s1c rrnt 111m zuglezch das Sem im as ems Versch3111313 Ohne def auch Ilur eine a reme regzonale Scheidung beider gewonnen warden kgnnte 5 34 DdSein and Rede Die Spmdae schljcfsefnlE1IJ1entifri Existenzia eno die das Sch des D3 die Er ez und Verstehen i ersteher sh S39em konsntmer ID Sifid Befmdhchkeit d A en 1rg1 1n s1ch d1e Moghchkezt der Auslegung 3393 mt def Zuelgnung 155 Verstandenen Sofern die Befindli hk 39 393 Verstehen gleichursprijngljch is halt Sie sigh in ei 4 Eltvmnz stand 39 Ihr 39 Hem gevnssen 61quot Die I mng der dritte 2361 envat def Auslegung S1d1rba39r gemacht n e eutung V011 Aussage ale Mnzteilung Hep b h bli un eac tet eb und zwar rmt Abszcht Da jetzt ers Sprache Thema Wird 3011 anzei en da di quot fassuncr der Ersfhl nh 39 6368 PhanOmen m der 6 ED313133 V31 053 Cit 155 Djasems seme Wurzeb hat Dds exi stenzzkzlontologiscEve Finzdament der Spmcfae 3952 d I ze 160 Rede Von die 25 T 397 39L39 V 39i 13919 Z 394 23 quot39 Q 391 r 39quot 3 quot L 39 39p39 33 39 J 1 r 39T39 1 quot 4 seem Phiinomen haben wir in der bisherigen Interpretation der Be findlichkeit des Verstehens der Auslegung und der Aussage stindig schon Gebrauch gernacht es in der thematischen Analyse aber gleich sam unterschlagen Die Rede is mit Be ndlicbkeit zmd Verstefzren exisrenzial glez39da wsprrlinglicb Verst ndlichkeit ist auch schon vor der zueignenden Auslegung immer schon gegliedert Rede ist die Artikulation der Ver stialndlichkeit Sie Iiegt daher der Auslegung und Aussage schon zu grunde Das in der Auslegung urspr nglicher mithin schon in der Rede Artikulierbare nannten Wir den Sinn Des in der redenden Ar tikulation Gegliederte als solches nennen Wir das Bedeutungsganze Dieses kann in Bedeutungen aufgel st Werden Bedeutungen sind als das Artikulierte des Artiln ierbaren immer sinnhaft Wenn die Rede die Artikulation der Verstindliehkeit des Da urspriingliches Existen zial der Erschlossenheit ist diese aber prirniir konstituiert Wird dutch das 111der Weltsein Inu auch die Rede Wesenhaft eine spezi sch weltliclae Seinsart haben Die befindliche Verstindliclrkeit des I11 der Weltsems spriclot sida als Rede ems Das Bedeutungsganze der Ver 39 stindlichkeit kommr zu Wort Den Bedeutungen wachsen Worte zu Nicht aber werden W nerdinge mit Bedeutungen versehen Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache Diese Wort ganzheit ale in welcher die Rede ein eigenes We1t1ichesltlt Sein hat Wird so als innerweltlich Seiendes wie ein Zuhandenes vor ndlich Die Sprache kann zerschlagen Warden in vorhandene W nerdinge Die Rede ist existenzial Sprache Weil das Seiende dessen Erschlos senheit sie bedeutungsm iiiig artikuliert die Seinsart des geworfenen auf die gtgtWelt angewiesenen Inder V7e1tseins hat Als existenziale Verfassung der Erschlossenheit des Daseins ist die Rede konstitutiv ir dessen Existenz Zum redenden Sprechen ge h ren 213 M glichkeiten H ren und Sciaweigerz An diesen Ph inon1e nen Wird die konstitutive Funktion der Rede r die Existenzialit it der Existenz erst v6ligdeut1ich Zuniichst geht es um die Heraus arbeitung der Struktur der Rede als solcher Reden ist das gtgtbedeutendeltlt Gliedern der Verst ndlichkeit des In derW e1t seins dem das Mitsein zugehiirt und das sich je in einer bestimrnten Weise des besorgenden l iteinanderseins h lt Dieses ist redend als zu und absagen auffordern Wamen als Aussprache R cksprache F rsprache ferner als Aussage11 machenltlt und als reden in der Weise des Redenhal1ensltlt Reden ist Rede berDas Woriiber der Rede hat nicht notwendig zumeist sogar nicht den Cha 61 F9 rakter des Themas einer bestimmenden Auseage Auch ein Befehl ist ergangen ber der Wunsch hat sein Wor ber Der F rsprache fehlt nicht ihr Wor ber Die Rede hat notwendig dieses Strukturmotnent Weil sie die Erschlossenheit des Inder Weltseins mitkonstituiert in ihrer eigenen Struktur durch diese Grundverfassung des Daseins vor geb1Idet ist Das Beredete der Rede ist immer in bestimmter Hinsicht und in gewissen Grenzen gtangeredetltlt In jeder Rede liegt ein Ge redetes ale solches das im eweiligen W mchen Fragen Sichaus sprechen uber Gesagte als solches In diesem teilt sich die Rede mit Das Phinomen der Mitteilzmg nm Wie schon bei der Analyse an gezeigt wurde CH einem ontologisch Weiten Sinne verstanden warden Aussagende M1ttezIung die Benachrichtigung zum Beispiel ist ein Sonderfall der existenzial grundsitzlich gefa ten Mitteilung In dieser konstituiert sich die Artikulation des vetstehenden Miteinanderseins Sie vollzieht die Teilungltlt der Mitbefindlichkeit und des Verst nd nissesdes Mitseins Mitteilung ist nie so etwas wie ein Transport Von Erlebnissen zum Beispiel Meinungen und W nschen aus dem Inne ren des einen Subjekts in das Innere des anderen Mitdasein is we senhaft schon offenbar in der Mitbefindlichkeit und im Mitverste hen Das Nlitsein wild in der Rede ausdriickich gereilr das hei t es 251 schon nur ungeteilt als mcht ergriffenes und zugeeignetes Alle Rede iiber 3 die in ihrern Geredeten mitteilt hat zugleich den Charakter des Szcfmusspredaens Redend spricht sich Dasein ems nicht Weil es zuniichst als Inneresltlt gegen ein Drau en abgekapselt 31 sondern weil es als In der WeIt sein verstehend schon drauI3enltlt 131 9 Ausgesprochene ist gerade das Drau ensein das hei t die je weilige Weise der Befindlichkeit der Stimmung V011 der gezeigt wurde da sie die voile Erschlossenheit des InSeins betrifft Der sprachiiche Index der zur Rede geh renden Bekundung des befind lichen InSeins liegt im Tonfall der Modulation irn Tempo der Rede in der Art des Sprechensltlt Die Mitteilung der existenzialen M6g lichkeiten der Befindlichkeit das hei t das Erschlie en V011 Existenz kann eigenes Ziel der gtgtdichtenden Rede WefdeQ Die Rede ist die bedeutungsm i ige Gliederung der befindlichen Verstiindlichkeit des Inden VVeIt seins Als konstitutive Mcitnente ge hiiren ihr zu dag Wor ber der Rede das Beredete das Geredete als solches die Mitteilung und die Bekundung Leas sind keine Eigen schaften die sich nur empirisch an der Sprache aufraffen iassen son dern in der Seinsverfassung des Daseins verwurzelte existenziale I62 7 n J 39 r 4 Io 4quot 4 9 L 34 2 h quot T Z7 riffquot 1 3 5 1quot L Qau 2of 2 39 394quotI 393939 39 39 t Q 39 i 39 r Link quot5 39 quotIr 139 tr 31 4 39 hi Mquot I1 r q Ki a z I 1 a Charaktere die so etwas Wie Sprache ontologisch erst ermiiglichen 39 In der faktischen Sprachgestalt einer bestimmten Rede k innen ein zelne dieser Mornente fehlen bzw unbemerkt bleiben Da sie oft gtgtWjrtliche nick zum Ausdruck konnnen ist nur der Index einer be stimmten Art der Rede die sofern sie ist je in der Ganzheit der ge nannten Strukturen sein mu Die Versuche das gtgtWesen der Sprache zu fassen haben denn im mer auch die Orientienmg an einem einzelnen dieser Momente ge nomznen und die Sprache begriffen am Leitfaden der Idee des Aus drucksltlt der symboIischen F01n1 der Mitteilung als A11ssage der gtgtKundgabeltlt Von Erlebnissen oder der gtgtGes1altungltlt des Lebens Fiir eine voll zureichende De nition der Sprache Wire abet auch nichts gewonnen Woilte man diese verschiedenen Bestiinmungsstiicke syn kretistisch zusammenschieben Das Entscheidende bleibt zuvor das ontoiogischexistenziale Ganze der Strtlktur der Rede auf dem Grunde der Analytik des Daseins herauszuarbeiten quotDer Zuszimmenhang der Rede Init Verstehen und Verstindlichkeit Wird deutlich aus einegzum Reden selbst gehiirenden existenzialen M glichkeit aus demf fH6ren39 Wk sagen nicht zufiillig Wenn Wir nicht rechtltlt geh irt haben L haben nicht 39verstanden Das H6 ren ist fiir das Reden konstitutiv Und Wie die sprachliche Ver1au1 barung in der Rede griindet so das akustische Vernehmen im Hiiren Das Hfiren auf ist das existenziale Offensein des Daseins als Mit sein ir den Anderen pas hIi i n i cft1stituiert sogatv die prim lre nnd eigentliche Offenheit Dciseins fiir einquot 4Ii39gei1sLtk9squot39Seiiil39Eiannf3n39 als FI5re i derL Wdes freundes den jedes Dasein bei sich trigt Das H39j einquoti5rt Weil es versteht A1sii39ref t Hend39e quot InderWeltsein mit den Anderen ist es dem Mitdasein und ihm selbst gtgth5rigltlt und in die ser H irigkeit zngehfirig Das Aufeinanderh ren in dem sich das Mitsein hausbildet hat die m glichen Weisen des Folgens Mitgehens die privativen Modi des Nicht Hltquotgtrens des Widerseaens des Trot zens der Abkehr Auf dem Grunde dieses existenzial prirniren II renkfinnens ist so etwas m glich wie Hordoen das selbst ph noinenal noch urspriing licher ist als dasgiwas man in der Psychologie gtgtzun chstltlt als H ren bestimmt das Empfinden Von T nen und das Vemehmen Von Lau ren Auch das IIorchen hat die Seinsart des verstehenden H rens Zi1n5ichstltlt h iren wir nie und nimrner Geriusche und Lziutkoznplexe sondern den knarrenden Wagen das Motorrad Man h rt die Ko lonne auf dem Marsch den Nordwind den klopfenden Specht das knisterzide Feuer I63 Es bedarf schon einer sehr kfinstlichen und komplizierten Einstei lung urn ein reines Ger i1sch zu gtgth6ren Da Wir aber zuniichst Motorriider und Wagen horen ist der ph inomenale Beleg da ir da das Dasein als In derWeltsein je schon beim innerweltlich Zuhan denen sich aufhilt und zun ichst gar nicht bei EInp ndungenltlt de ren Gew h zuerst geformt werden mii te um das Sprungbrett ab zugeben von dem das Subjekt abspringt um schlie lich zu einer WeItltlt zu gelangen Das Dasein ist als Wesenhaft Verstehendes zu n ichst beim Verstandenen Auch irn ausdr cklichen IIoren der Rede des Anderen verstehen Wir zun ichst das Gesagte genauer Wir sind im Vorhinein schon mit dem Anderen bei dem Seienden Woriiber die Rede ist Niclar dage gen horen Wir zunichst das Ausgesprochene der Verlautbamng So gar dort W0 das Sprechen undeiitlich oder gar die Sprache fremd ist h iren Wir zuniichst unverst indlicae Worte und nicht eine Mannig faltigkeit V011 Tondaten Im nat139irlichenltlt Hfiren des Wor ber der Rede konnen Wir aller dings zugleich auf die Weise des Gesagtseins die Diktionltlt hiiren aber auch das nur in einem vorgiingigen Mitverstehen des Geredeten denn nur so besteht die M iglichkeit das Wie des Gesagtseins abzu sch itzen in seiner Angernessenheit an das thematische Wor ber der Rede Imgleichen erfolgt die Gegenrede als Antwort zun ichst direkt aus dem Verstehen des im Mitsein schon gtgtgeteiltenltlt Wor ber der Rede Nur W0 die existenziale Miiglichkeit V011 Reden und Horen gege ben ist kann jemand horchen Wer nich1 horen kannltlt und ihlen 1nui3ltlt der vermag vielleicht sehr Wohl und gerade deshalb zu hor chen Das Nurherum h6ren ist eine Privation des hiirenden Verste hens Reden und Horen griinden im Verstehen Dieses entsteht Weder durch vieles Reden noch durch geschifdges Heruxnh iren Nur Wer schon versteht kann zuhoren Dasselbe existenziale Fundament hat eine andere Wesenhafte Mog lichkeit des Redens das Sdaweigen Weiquot im l iteinanderreden schweigt kann eigentlicher gtgtzu verstehen gebenltlt das hei t das Verst indnis ausbilden als der dem das Won nicht ausgeht Mit dem Vie1 spre Chen fiber etwas ist nicht im mindesten gewiihrleistet da dadurch das Verst lndnis Weiter gebracht Wird I111 Gegenteil das Weitl lu ge Bereden verdeckt und bring das Verstandene in die Scheinklarheit das hei t Unverst indlichkeit der Trivialit it Schweigen hei t aber nicht strumrn sein Der Sttimrne hat umgekehrt die Tendenz zum Sprechenltlt Bin Stuminer hat nicht nur nicht bewiesen da er schWei 164 Aa 39 gen kann es fehlt ihrn sogar ede Moglichkeit dergleichen zu beWei sen Und so Wenig wie der Sturnme zeigt einer der V011 Natur gewohnt ist wenig zu sprechen da er schweigt und schweigen kann Wer nie etwas sagt vermag im gegebenen Augenblick auch nicht zu schwei gen Nur im echren Reden ist eigentliches Schweigen mfiglich Um schweigen zu k innen mu das Dasein etwas zu sagen haben das hei t ber eine eigentliche und reiche Erschlossenheit seiner selbst vexf gen Dann mach Verschwiegenheit offenbar und schl igt das gtgtGerede nieder Verschwiegenheit artikuliert als Modus des Redens die Verstindlichkeit des Daseins so ursprfingiich da ihr das echte Horenk nnen und durchsichtige Miteinandersein entstammt Wail ir das Sein des Da das hei t Befindlichkeit und Verstehen die Rede konstitutiv ist Dasein aber besagt Inder Weltsein hat 39das Dasein als redendes InSein sich schon ausgesprochen Das Da sein hat Sprache Ist es Zufall da die Griechen deren alltiigliches Existieren sich vorwiegend in das Miteinanderreden Verlegt hatte N und die zugleich 2gtAugen hattenltlt zu sehen in der Vorphilosophi schen sowohl wie in der philosophischen Daseinsauslegung das Wesen des Menschen bestimmten als c39o39v l yov E3501P Die spatere Auslegung dieser De nition des Menschen im Sinne VOI1 animal rationale ver niinftiges Lebewesemz ist zwar nicht fa1sch aber sie verdeckt den ph lnomenalen Boden dem diese De nition des Daseins entnommen is1iDer Mensch zeigt sich als Seiendes das redet Das bedeutet nicht da ihm die M iglichkeit der stimnllichen Verlautbarung eignet son dern da dieses Seiende ist in der Weise des Entdeckens der Welt und des Daseins selbst Die Griechen haben kein Won f r Sprache sie Verstanden dieses Ph inomen zun39aEchs1 als Rede Wei jedoch ir die philosophische Besinnung der loyog vorwiegend als Aussage in den Blick kam vollzog sich die Ausarbeitung der Grundstrukturen der Forrnen und Bestandstiicke der Rede am Leitfaden dieses Logos Die Grarnmatik suchte ihr Fundament in der Logikltlt dieses Logos Diese aber griindet in der Ontologie des Vorhandenen Der in die nach kormnende Sprachvvissenschaft iibergegangene und grundsitzlich heute noch ma gebende Grundbestand der gtgtBedeutungskategorien ist an der Rede als Aussage orientiert Nimnit man dagegen dieses Ph no men in der grunds itzlichen Urspriinglichkeit und Weite eines Exi Tbtenzials dann ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit einer Umlegung der Sprachwissenschaft auf ontologisch urspriinglichere Fundamente Die Aufgabe einer Befreizmg der Grammatik Von der Logik bedarf vor g ingjig eines positiven Verst indnisses der apriorischen Grundstruk tur V011 Rede iiberhaupt als Existenzial und kann nicht nachti glich I65 durch Verbesserungen und Erginzungen des Uber eferten durchge fiihrt Werden Mit Riicksicht darauf ist zu fragen nach den Grund formen einer moglichen bedeutungsmi igen Gliederung des Verstehw baren iiberhaupt nicht nur des in theoretischer Betrachtung erkann ten und in Siitzen ausgedr ckten innerweltlichen Seienden Die Be deutungslehre ergibt sich nicht V011 selbst dutch umfassendes Ver gleichen njfoglichst vieler und entlegener Sprachen Ebensowenig ge niigt die Ubernahme etwa des philosophischen Horizonts innerhalb dessen W 139 H umlaoldt die Sprache zum Problem machte Die Be deutungslehre ist in der Ontologie des Daseins verwurzelt Ihr Ge deihen und Verderben hiingt am Schicksal dieserl Am Ende mu sich die pbilosophische Forschung einmal entschlie Ben zu fragen Welche Seinsart der Sprache iiberhaupt znlkornmt Ist sie ein innerweltlich zuhandenes Zeug oder hat sie die Seinsart des Daseins oder keines VOI1 beiden Welcher Art ist das Sein der Sprache da sie gtgtt0tltlt sein kann Was besagt ontologisch eine Sprache wichst und zerfillt Wk besitzen eine Sprachwissenschaft und das Sein des Seienden das sie zum Thema hat ist dunkelg sogar der Horizont ist verhiillt ir die untersuchende Frage darnach Ist es Zufall da die Bedeutungen zunichst und zumeist gtgtWeItIicheltlt sind dutch die Be deutsamkeit der Welt vorgezeichnete ja sogar oft vorwiegend r iu1n 1icheltlt oder ist diese gtgtTatsacheltlt existenzialontologisch notwendig und Warum Die philosophische Forschung Wird auf gtgtSprachphilo sophieltlt Verzichten m ssen um den gtgtSachen se1bst nachzufragen und sich in den Stand einer begrif ich gekl rten Problematik bringen mussen Die vorliegende Interpretation der Sprache sollte lediglich den on tologischen Ort fiir dieses Ph inomen innerhalb der Sei11sVerfas sung des Daseins aufzeigen und vor allem die folgende Analyse vor bereiten die am Leitfaden einer fundarnentalen Seinsart der Rede im Zusarnmenhang mit anderen Phinoxnenen die Alltiglichkeit des Da seins ontologisch urspriiuglicher in den Blick zu bringen versucht B D415 allt iglicfoe S ein des Dd zmd das Verfozllen des Daseins Im Riickgang auf die existenzialen Strukturen der Erschlossenheit des In derWeltseins Iiat die Interpretation in gewisser Weise die Alt gichkeit des Daseins aus dem Ange verloren Die Analyse mu 1 Vgl zur Bedeutungslehre E Husseri Log Unters Bd 11 1 und 4 6 Untersuchung Fernerl die radikalere Fassung der Problematik Ideen I a a O 123 ff 3255 H I66 D t 39A 1 I 394 2 4 1 ielg2F39v 4 4 Pa 1 P Y gt P A t J i I 3939 k 39 Q diesen thematisch angesetzten phinomenalen Horizont Wieder zu riiekgewinnen Die Frage erhebt sich jetzt welehes sind die existen zialen Charaktere der Erschlossenheit des In der VVe1tseins sofem dieses sich als allt gliches in der Seinsart des Man hilt Eignet die sem eine spezi sche Befindlichkeit ein besonderes Verstehen Reden 39 und Auslegen Die Beantwortung dieser Fragen Wird um so drii1g licher Wenn wir damn erinnern da das Dasein zun ichst und zu meist im Man aufgeht und Von ihm gemeistert wird Ist das Dasein als geworfenes In derWeltsein nicht gerade zun chst in die ffent lichkeit des Man geworfen Und was bedeutet diese O ent chkeit anderes als die spezi sche Erschlossenheit des Man Wenn das Verstehen primiir als das Seinkonnen des Daseins be griffen T Warden mu dasm wird einer Analyse des dem Man zuge h irigen Verstehens und Auslegens zu entnehmen sein welche Mog lichkeiten seines Seins das Dasein als Man erschlossen und sich zu geeignet hat Diese Moglichkeiten selbst offenbaren dann aber cine Wesenhafte Seinstendenz der Alltiglichkeit Und diese mu schlie D lich ontologisch zureichend expliziert eine urspriingliche Seinsart des Daseins enthiillen so zwar da VOI1 ihr aus das angezeigte Ph ino rnen der Geworfenheit in seiner existenzialen Konkretion auEWeis bar Wird Zuniichst ist gefordert die Erschlossenheit des Man das hei t die allt igliche Seinsart V011 Rede Sicht und Auslegung an bestimmten Phiinomenen sichtbar zu machen Mit Bezug auf diese mag die Be merkung nicht ber iissig sein da die Interpretation eine rein onto Iogische Absicht hat und Von einer mozalisierenden Kritik des al1t g Hchen Daseins und Von kulturphil0sophischenltlt Aspirationen weit entfernt ist 35 D45 Gerede Der Ausdruck Geredeltlt soll hier nicht in einer herabziehenden Bedeutung gebraucht Werden Er bedeutet tenninoiogisch ein positi ves Ph nomen das die Seinsart des Verstehens und Auslegens des all t iglichen Daseins konstituiert Die Rede spricht sich zumeist aus und hat sich schon immer ausgesprochen Sie ist Sprache Im Ausgespro chenen liegen abet dann je schon Verst indnis und Auslegung Die prache als die Ausgesprochenheit birgt eine Ansgelegtheit des Da seinsverst lndnisses in sich Diese Ausgelegtheit ist so Wenig wie die Sprache nu noeh vorhanden sondern ihr Sein ist selbst daseinsm3i Biges Ihr ist das Dasein zun ichst und in gewissen Grenzen st indig berantwortet sie regelt und verteilt die Miiglichkeiten des durch I67 schnittlichen Verstehens und der zugehorigen Befindlichkeit Die Aus gesprochenheit verwahrt im Ganzen ihrer gegliederten Bedeumngsw zusammenh inge ein Verstehen der erschlossenen Welt und gIeichur spriinglich damit ein Verstehen des Mitdaseins Anderer und des je eigenen In Seins Das so in der Ausgesprochenheit schon hinterlegte Verstindnis betrifft sowohl die jeweils erreichte and berkommene Entdecktheit des Seienden als auch das jeweilige Verst indl s Von Sein und die ver igbaren Moglicbkeiten und Horizonte fiir neuansetzende Auslegtmg und begri liche Arttikulation Uber einen blo en Hin we1s auf das Faktum dieser Ausgelegtheit des Daseins hinaus mu nun aber nach der existenzialen Seinsart der ausgesprochenen und s1ch aussprechenden Rede gefragt Werden Wenn sie nicht als Vor hnndenes begriffen Werden kann Welches ist ihr Sein und was sagt cheses grundsitzlich fiber die allt igliche Seinsart des Daseins S1chausspre39chende Rede ist Mitteilung Deren Seinstendenz zielt daraufa den Hiirenden in die Teilnabme am erschlossenen Sein zum Beredeten der Rede zu bringen Gemi der durchschnittlichen Verst indlichkeit die in der beim Snzhaussprechen gesprochenen Sprache schon liegt kann die mitge tellte Iede Weitgehend verstanden Werden ohne da sich der H6 rende 1n e1n urspriinglich verstehendes Sein zum Wor ber der Rede brmgt Man versteht nicht so sehr das beredete Seiende sondern man hort schon nur auf das Geredete als solches Dieses Wird verstanden das Wor ber nur nngefihr obenhin man Ineint dasselbe Wei man das Gesagte gemeinsam in dersellven Durchschnittlichkeit versteht Das H iren und Verstehen hat sich vorg ingig an das Geedete 315 solches geklarnrnert Die I itteilung gtgtteiIt nicht den prim ren Seins bezug zumberedeten Seienden sondern das Miteinandersein bewegt s1ch 1n1 Mlteinanderreden und Besorgen des Geredeten Ihm Hegt daran da geredet wird Das Gesagtsein das Diktum der Ausspruch stehen jetzt ein fi391r die Echtheit und Sachgemi heit der Rede und Ihres Verst indnisses Und Weil das Reden den primiren Seinsbezug 39 zum beredeten Seienden verloren bzw nie gewonnen hat teilt es sich mcht mi in der Weise der urspr nglichen Zueignung dieses Seienden sondern auf dem Wege des Weiter 39 und Nacbredens Das Geredete als solches zieht Weitere Kreise 11nd iibernimmt autoritativen Cha rakfter Die Sache ist so Weil man es sagt In solchem Nach und VWe1te39rreden dadurch sith das schon anf ingliche Fehlen der Boden standlgkext zur v illigen Bodenlosigkeit steigert konstituiert sich das Cerede Und zwar bleibt dieses nicht eingeschrinkt auf das 1aut hche Nachreden sondern breitet sich aus izn Geschriebenen als das I68 3913939 g39 IaH quotJ 39 394 3939Ql 0 1 E39 rquot s 71 3973933 W r 39 r4 39393935 39 I 39 39 39 39 gt 1 H gtgtGeschreibeltlt Das Nachreden griindet hier nicht so sehr in einem H rensagen Es speist sich aus dem Angelesenen Das durchschni1t liche Verstindnis des Lesers Wird nie entscheiden k mnen was ur spriinglich geschopft und errungen und was nachgeredet ist Noch xnehr durchschnittliches Verstindnis Wird ein solches Unterscheiden gar nicht Wollen seiner nicht bediirfen Weil es ja alles versteht Die Bodenlosigkeit des Geredes versperrt ihm nicht den Eingang in die C ent chkeit sondern begiinstigt ihn Das Gerede ist die Mog ljchkeit alles zu verstehen ohne Vorg ngige Zueignung der Sache Das Gerede behiitet schon vor der Gefahr bei einer solchen Zueig nung zu scheitern Das Gerede das jeder aufraffen kann entbindet nicht nur Von der Aufgabe echten Verstehens sondern bildet eine in differente Verstiindlichkeit aus der nichts mehr verschlossen ist Die Rede die zur Wesenhaften Seinsverfassung des Daseins geh39o39rt und dessen Erscblossenheit rnit ausmacht hat die Moglichkeit zum Gerede zu werden und 2115 dieses das InderW7e1t sein nicht so sehr in einem gegliederten Verstindnis offenzuhalten sondem zu versch1ie 39 Ben und das innerweltlich Seiende zu verdecken Hierzu bedarf es nicht einer Absieht auf Tiiuschung Das Gerede hat nicht die Seins art des bewu ten Ausgebem VOI1 etwas als etwas Das bodenlose Ge sagtseiI1 und Weitergesagtwerden reicht hin da sich das Erschlie en 39 verkehrt zu einem Verschliefsen Denn Gesagces wird zunichst immer Verstanden als sagendesltlt das ist entdeckendes Das Gerede ist so E nach Von Hause ans ge1n S der ihm eigenen Unterlassung des Rikk gangs auf den Boden des Beredeten ein Verschlie en Diesesi Wird erneut dadurch gesteigert da das Gerede darin ver meintlich das Verstiindnis des Beredeten erreicht ist auf Grand die ser Verzneintlichkeit edes neue Fragen und alle Auseinandersetzung hintanhilt und in eigentiimlicher Weise niederh ilt und retardiert Im Dasein hat sich je schon diese Ausgelegtheit des Geredes fest gesetzt Vieles lernen wir zun ichst in dieser Weise kennen nicht We niges kommt ber ein solches durchschnittliches Verstindnis nie hin aus Dieser alltiglichen Ausgelegtheit in die das Dasein zuniichst hin einw ichst Vermag es sich nie zu entziehen In ihr und aus ihr und gegen sie vollzieht sich alles echte Verstehen Auslegen und Mitteilen iederentdecken and neu Zuefgnen Es ist nicht so da je ein Dasein unberiihrt und unver ihrt durch diese Ausgelegtheit voz das freie Land einer gtgtWeltltlt an sich gestellt Wiirde um nu zu schauen was ihm begegnet Die Herrscha der offentlichen Ausgelegtheit hat so gar schon fiber die Moglichkeiten des Gestizmntseins entschieden das I69 hei t fiber die Grundart in der sich das Dasein V011 der Welt angehen lii t Das Man zeichnet die Befindlichkeit vor es bestixnmt was man und Wie man siehtltlt Das Gerede das in der gekennzeichneten Weise verschlie t ist die Seinsart des enrvvurzelten Dasehzsverstindnisses Es kommt jedoch nicht als vorhandener Zustand an einem Verhandenen vor sondern existenzial entwurzelt ist es selbst in der Weise der stiindigen Ent Wurzelung Das besagt ontologisch Das im Gerede sich haltende Da sein ist als InderWeltsem von den prixniren und urspr ng1ich echten Seinsbeziigen zur Welt zum Mitdasein rum InSein selbst ab geschnitten Es hilt sich in einer Schwebe und ist in dieser Weise doch immer bei der gtgtW39e1t mit den Anderen und zu ihm selbst Nur Sei endes dessen Erschlossenheit durch die be ndlichverstehende Rede konstituiert ist das hei t in dieser ontologischen Verfassung sein Da das gtgtInder VVeltltlt ist hat die Seinsm glichkeit solcher Entwurzelung die so Wenig ein Nichtsein des Daseins ausmacht als vielmehr seine alltiglichste und hartniickigste Realititltlt In der Selbstverstiind chkeit und Selbstsicherheit der durchschnitt lichen Ausgelegtheit jedoch Iiegt es dafi unter ihirem Schutz dem je Weiligen Dasein selbst die Unheirnlichkeit der Schwebe in der es einer Wachsenden Bodenlosigkeit zutreiben kann verborgen bleibt 36 Die Neugier Bei der Analyse des Verstehens und der Erschlossenheit des Da iiberhaupt Wurde auf das lumen naturale hingewiesen und die Er schlossenheit des InSeins die Lidatzmg des Daseins genannt in der erst so etwas wie Sicht miiglich Wird Sicht Wurde im Hinblick auf die Grundart alles daseinsmi igen Erschlie ens das Verstehen int Sinne der genuinen Zueignung Von Seiendem begriffen zu dem sich Dasein gemi seiner Wesenhaften Seinsmfjglichkeiten verhalten kann Die Grundverfassung der Sicht zeigt sich an einer eigentiimlichen Seinstendenz der Allt iglichkeit zum Sehenltlt Wit bezeichnen sie Init dem Terminus N eugier der charakteristischerweise nicht auf das Sehen eingeschriinkt ist und die Tendenz zu einem eigent139in1lichen39verneh xnenden Begegnenlassen der Welt ausdriickt Wir interpretieren dieses Ph inomen in grundsitzlicher existenzialontologischer Absicht nicht in der verengten Orientierungo am Erkennen das schon friih und in der griechischen Philosophie nicht zufiillig aus der gtgtLust zu se henltlt begriffen Wird Die Abhandlung die in der Sarnmlung der Ab handlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie an erster Stelle steht I70 beginnt mit dem Satze stcfwteg fiv gwstot I013 SE55zvott c gtQ yov1aL p139J0eL Im Sein des Menschen liegt Wesenhaft die Sarge des Sehens Damit wird eine Untersuchung eingeleitet die den Ursprung der wissen schaftlichen Erforschung des Seienden und seines Seins aus der ge nannten Seinsart des Daseins aufzudecken sucht Diese griechische Interpretation der existenzialen Genesis der Wissenschaft ist nicht zu fillig In ihr kommt zum expliziten Verstiindnis Was im Satz des Parmemldes vorgezeichnet ist ti 7amp9 mm voeiv otiv 12 nod sivut Sein ist was irn reinen anschauenden Vernehmen sich zeigt und nur dieses Sehen entdeekt das Sein Urspriingliche and echte Wahrheit liegt in der reinen Anschauung Diese These bleibt fortan das Fun dament der abendl indischen Philosophie In ihr hat die Hegelsche Dialektik das Motiv und nur auf ihrem Grunde ist sie nl glich Den merkwiirdigen Vorrang des Sehens hat V01 allem Augusta mts bemerkt im Zusammenhang der Interpretation der concupiscen tiaz Ad oculos enim videre proprie pertinet das Sehen gehiirt eigent Iich den Augen zu Utimur autem hoe verbo etiam in ceteris sensibus curn eos ad cognoscendum intendimus Wir gebrauchen aber dieses Wort gtgtsehenltlt auch f r die anderen Sinne wenn Wir uns in sie legen uxn zu erkennen Neque enim dicirnns audi quid rutilet aut olefac quatn niteat aut gusta quam splendeatg ant palpa quanta fulgeat videri enizn dicuntur haec omnia Wu sagen n mlich nicht h re wie das schinnnert oder rieche wie das gl inzt oder schmecke Wie das Ieuchtet Oder fiihle wie das strahltg sondern Wir sagen bei all dem sieia wir sagen da all das gesehen wird Dicimus autern non solurn vide quid luceat quod soli oculi sentire possunt wir sagen aber auch nicht alleinz sieh wie das leuchtet was die Augen allein ver nehmen k innen sed etiam vide quid sonet vide quid oleat vide quid sapiat vide quanzi durum sit Wu sagen auch sieh Wie das klingt sieh wie es duftet sieh wie das schmeckt sieh wie hart das ist Ideoque generalist experientia sensuum concupiscentia sicut dic tum est oculorum vocatur quia videndi officium in quo pritnatum oculit tenent etiam ceteri senses sibi de similitudine usurpant cum aliquid cognitionis explorant Daher wird die Erfahrung der Sinne iiberhaupt als gtgtAugenlustltlt bezeichnet WCII such die anderen Sinne aus einer gewissen Ahnlichkeit her sich die Leistung des Sehens aneig nen Wenn es um ein Erkennen geht in Weleher Leistung die Augen den Vorrang haben I 1 Metaphysik A 1 980 a 21 3 Confessiones lib X cap 35 I71 Sache abstirbt Dieses Interesse besteht ja nur in der Weise der Neugier und des Geredes solange als die M iglichkeit des unverbind lichen Nurmitalmens gegeben ist Das Mitdabei sein Wenn man und solange man auf der Spur ist versagt die Gefolgschaft wenn die Durchfiihrung des Geahnten einsetzt Denn mit dieser wird das Dasein je auf sich selbst zur ckgezwungen Gerede und Neugier Ver lieren ihre Macht Und sie r ichen sich auch schon Angesichts der Durch 391hrung dessen Was man mit ahnte ist das Gerede leicht bei der Hand mit der Feststellung das h itte man auch machen kiinnen denn man hat es ja doch mitgeahnt Das Gerede ist am Ende sogar ungehalten da das VOD ihrn Geahnte und standig Geforderte nun wirelida geschieht Ist ihm ja doch damit die Gelegenheit entrissen Weiter zu ahnen Sofern nun aber die Zeit des sich einsetzenden Daseins in der Ver schwiegenheit der Durch ihrung and des echten Scheitems eine an dere ist iiffentlich gesehen eine Wesentlich langsarnere als die des Geredes das schneler 1ebt ist dies Gerede liingst bei einem ande ren dern jeweilig Neuesten angekommen Das 39 friiher Geahnte und einmal Durchgefiihrte kam im Hinblick auf das Neueste zu spat Gerede und Neugier sorgen in ihrer Zweideutigkeit dafiir da das echt und neu Geschaffene bei seinem Hervortreten ir die Cffent lichkeit veraltet ist Es vermag erst dam in seinen positiven M6g lichkeiten frei zu werden Wenn das verdeckende Gerede unwirksam D geworden und das gtgtgemei11eltlt Interesse erstorben ist Die Zweideutigkeit der ffentlichen Ausgelegtheit gibt das Vor Wegbereden und neugierige Ahnen fiir das eigentliche Geschehen aus und stempelt Durch ihren und Handeln 211 einem Nachtraglichen und Belauglosen Das Verstehen des Daseins im Man versieizrt sich da her in seinen Entwiirfen st lndig hinsichtlich der echten Seins1n6glich keiten Zweideutig ist das Dasein immer daltlt das hei t in der Eif fentlichen Erschlossenheit des Miteinanderseins W0 das lauteste Ge rede und die findigste Neugier den gtgtBetriebltlt im Gang halten da W0 39 alltiiglich alles und irn Grunde nichts geschieht Diese Zweideutigkeit spielt der Neugier immer das zu was sie sucht und gibt dem Gerede den Schein als wiirde in ihm alles ent schieden Diese Seinsart der Erschlosisenheit des Inder We1t seins durab herrscht aber auch das 391Iiteinandersein als solches Der Andere ist zunachst daltlt aus dem her was man VOI1 ihrn geh rt hat Was man ber redet undi Wei Zwischen das urspriingliche Miteinander sein schiebt sich zun ichste das Gerede Jeder pa t zuerst und zunichst I74 E A p I 5 4 j 39 I 5 45 r 1 J kg 39 39 3945wA39 39 H u H 1 G 39 39 v 39 39 e amp I an V G r 39 39 I F quot I T auf den Andern auf Wie er sich verhalten was er dazu sagen wird Das Miteinandersein im Man ist ganz und gar nicht ein abgeschlos senes gleichgiiltiges Nebeneinander sondern ein gespanntes zWei deutiges Aufeinanderaufpassen ein heimliches Sich gegenseitigabh6 ren Unter der Maske des F reinander spielt ein Gegeneinander Dabei ist zu beachten da die Zweideutigkeit gar nicht erst einer ausdr cklichen Absicht auf Verstellung and Verdrehung entspringt da sie nicht VOIII einzelnen Dasein erst hervorgerufen wird Sie liegt schon im Miteinandersein als dem gewmffenen Miteinandersein in einer Welt Aber Fjffentlich ist sie gerade verborgenund mam wird sich ixmner dagegen Wehren da diese Interpretation der Seinsart der Ausgelegtheit des Man zutrifft Es wire ein Mi verstindnis wollte die Explikation dieser Phfinomene durch die Zustimmung des Man sich bewahren Die Phinomene des Geredes der Neugier und der Zweideutigkeit Wurden in der Weise herausgeste t da sich unter ihnen selbst schon ein Seinszusammenhang anzeigt Die Seinsart dieses Zusa1mnenhan gee gilt es jetzt existenzialontologisch zu fassen Die Grundart des Seins der Allt lglichkeit 3011 im Horizont der bisher gewonnenen Seinsstrukturen des Daseins Verstanden werden 39 38 Dds Vef zllen and die Geworfenbeit Gerede Neugier und Zweideutigkeit charakterisieren die Weise in F der das Dasein allt iglich sein Daltlt die Erschlossenheit des Inder We1t seins ist Diese Charaktere sind als existenziale Bestimmtheiten am Dasein nicht vorhanden sie rnachen dessen Sein mit aus In ihnen und in ihrem seinsmii igen Zusammenhang enth llt sich eine Grund art des Seins der Alltiiglichkeit die Wir das Ve7fzllen des Daseins nennen Der Titel deri keine negative Bewertung ausdriickt 5011 bedeuten das Dasein ist zunachst und zumeist bei der besorgten gtgtWe1tltlt Dieses Aufgehen bei hat meist den Charakter des Verlorenseins in die C ent chkeit des Man Das Dasein ist VOII ihm selbst als eigent vliehem Selbstseink nnen zun ichst imrner schon abgefallen und an die VgtgtWe1tltlt verfallen Die Verfallenheit an die gtgtWeltltlt meint das Auf gehen im Miteinandersein sofern dieses durch Gerede Neugier und 39 Zweideutigkeit ge ihrt Wird Was wir die Uneigentlichkeit des Da seins nannteif erfahrt jetzt durch die Interpretation des Verfallens I Vgi 9 S 42 ff E75 eine schiirfere Bestimrnung Un und nicbteigentlich bedeutet aber keineswegs gtgteigentlich nicht als ginge das Dasein mit diesem Seins rnodus iiberhaupt seines Seins verlustig Uneigentlichkeit meint so Wenig dergleichen Wie NichtmehrinderWeltsein 213 sie gerade ein f ausgezeichnetes In derWeltsein ausrnacht das V011 der Welt und idem Mitdasein Andereg iggl benornrnenh PK Das Nioht esselbstsein fungiert ials posiiiiioi i Nii gliichkeiiiidesigeienden das we senhaft besorgend in einer Welt aufgeht Dieses Nicksein rnu3 als die n icbste Seinsart des Daseins begriffen Werden in der es sich zu meist h ilt Die Verfallenheit des Daseins darf daher auch nicht als Fa1Iltlt aus einem reineren und hoheren gtgtUrstandltlt aufgefa t Werden Davon haben wir ontisch nicht nur keine Erfahrung sondern auch ontolo gisch keine Miiglichkeiten und Leitf iden der Interpretation D Von ihm sel rst als faktischem In der We1tsein ist das Dasein als verfallendes schon abgefallen und verfallen ist es nicht an etwas Seiendes darauf es erst irn Fortgang seines Seins st t oder auch nicht sondern an die Welt die selbst zu seinem Sein gehort Das Verfalien ist eine existenziale Bestimmung des Daseins selbst und sag nichts aus fiber dieses als Vorhandenes fiber vorhandene Beziehungen zu Seien dem von dem es abstammtltlt oder zu Seiendern mit dem es nach tr glich in ein commercium geraten ist Die ontologischexistenziale Struktur des Verfallens Wire auch mili Verstanden Wollte man ibr den Sinn einer schlechten und beklagens Wertell ontischen Eigenschaft beilegen die vielleicht in fortgeschri1te nen Stadien der Menschheitskultur beseitigt Werden konnte Bei dem ersten Hinweis auf das Inder WeIt seir1 als Grundver fassung des Daseins ebenso bei der Charakteristik seiner konstitu tiven Strukturmomente blieb ber der Analyse der Seinsoerfasmng die Seinsart dieser phinomenal unbeachtet Zwar wurden die infig lichen Grundarten des In Seins das Besorgen und die Fiirsorge be schrieben Die Frage each der allt iglichen Seinsart dieser Weisen zu sein blieb uneriirtert Auch zeigte sich da das InSein alles andere ist als ein nu betrachtendes oder handelndes Gegeniiberstehen des hei t Zusammenvorhandensein eines Subjekts und eines Obj ekts Trotzdem rnu te der Schein bleiben das Inder Weltsein fungiere als staxres Geriist innerhalb dessen die m glichen Verhaltungen des Daseins zu seiner Weltablaufen ohne das Geriis1ltlt selbst seinsmiiiig zu beriibren Dieses Vennutliche Geriistltlt aber macht selbst die Sei11s art des Daseins rnit aus Ein existenziozler Modm des Inder We1t seins dokumentiert sich im Phiinomen des Verfallens I76 4 2 1 u 393939u 2 2 3 4r2t quot p p Das Gerede erschlie t dern Dasein das verstehende Sein zu seiner Welt zu Anderen und zu ihm selbst doch so da disses Sein zu den Modus eines bodenlosen Schwebens hat Die Neugier erschlie t alles und jedes so jedoch dad des InSein iiberall und nirgends ist Die Zweideutigkeit verbirgt dem Daseirisverstindr s nichts aber nur um des In der Welt sein in dem entwurzelten Uberallundnirgends niederzuhalten Mit der ontologischen Verdeutlichung der in diesen Phzinomenen durchblickenden Seinsart des allt alglichen InderK7e1t seins gewinnen Wir erst die existenzial zureichende Bestirnxnung der Grundverfas sung des Daseins Welche Struktur zeigt die gtgtBeWegtheit des Ver fallens Das Gerede und quotdie in ihm beschlossene ffentliche Ausgelegtbeit konsrituien sich im Miteinandersein Es ist nicht als ein abgel astes Produkt aus diesem und ir sich innerhalb der Welt vorhanden Ebensowenig 139a33t es sich zu einem gtgtAl1gemeinen ver chtigen das weil es Wesenhaft dern Niemand zugeh irt eigen11ich nichts ist und rea1ltlt nur im sprechenden einzelnen Dasein vorkommt Das Gerede ist die Seinsart des Miteirzanderseins selbst und entsteht nicht erst durch gewisse Umst inde die auf das Dasein von au en einWir I ken Wenn aber des Dasein selbst irn Gerede und der Esffentlichen Ausgelegtheit ihm selbst die Miiglichkeit vorgibt sich im Man zu ver Iieren der Bodenlosigkeit zu verfallen dann sagt das das Dasein bereitet ihm selbst die stindige Versucbung zum Verfallen Das In der Weltsein ist an ihm selbst versuckeriscia In dieser Weiss sich selbst schon zur Versuchung geworden hiilt die iffentliche Ausgelegtheit das Dasein in seiner Verfallenheit fest Ge rede und Zweideutigkeit das Allesgesehen und AJles vers1anden haben bilden die Vermeintiicbkeit ans die so verfiigbare und herr schende Erschlossenheit des Daseins vermiichte ihm die Sicherheit Echzheit und Fiille aller Moglichkeiten seines Seins zu verbiirgen Die Selbstgewi heit und Emzschiedenheit des Man verbreitet cine WaCh sende Unbediirftigkeit hinsichtlich des eigentlichen be nd chen Ver stehens Die Vermeintlichkeit des Man das Voile und echte Lebenltlt zu niihren und zu ibren bringt eine Bembigmzg in das Dasein ffir die alles i11 bester Ordnungltlt ist und der alle T ren offenstehen Das verfallende h derWeltsein ist sich selbst versuchend zugleich be rubigend Diese Beruhigung im uneigentlichen Sein verf brt jedoch nicht zu Stillstand und Tatenlosigkeit sondern treibt in die Hemmungs1osig keit des Be1riebsltlt Das Verfallensein an die WeIt kornmt jetzt I77 3 nicht etwa zur Ruhe Die versucherische Beruhigung steigerr das Ver fallen In der besonderen R cksicht auf die Daseinsauslegung kann 7 jetzt die Meinung au gommen das Verstehen der fremdesten K121 tllreil und die gtgtSyI1these dieser mit der eigenen ihre zur restlosen und erst echten Aufkl rung des Daseins ber sich selbst Vielgewandte Neugier und ruheloses Alleskennen t iuschen ein universales Daseins veret ndnis V01 1111 Grunde bleibt aber unbestimint und ungefragt was denn eigentlich zu verstehen sci es bleibt unverstanden da Veistehen selbst e111 Seink innen ist das einzig im eigensten Dasein frei Werden mu In diesem beruhigten alles gtgtverstehendenltlt Sic vergleichen mit allem treibt das Dasein eine Entfremdung zu in der sich ihm das eigenste Seink innen verbirgt Das verfallende In der Welt sein ist als Versuchend beruhigendes zugleich enrg emdend Diese Entfremdung Wiederum kann aber nicht besagen das Dasein werde ihm selbst faktisch entrissen im Gegenteil sie treibt das Da sem in eine Seinsart der an der iibertriebensten Selbstzerg1iederung iiegt die sich in allen Deutungsm glichkeiten versucht so da die V011 Ihr gezeigten Charakterologienltlt und Typo10gienltlt selbst schon un iibersehbar Werden Diese Entfremdung die dam Dasein seine Eigent hchkeit und M6g1ichkei1 Wenn auch nur als solche eines echten Schei terns versdalie t liefert es jedoch nicht an Seiendes aus das es nicht selbst ist sondern dr ingt es in seine Uneigentlichkeit in eine m gliche Seinsart seiner selbsr Die versuchendberuhigende Entfremdung des Verfallens fiihrt in ihrer eigenen Bewegtheit dazu da sich das Da sein in ihm selbst verf ngt Die aufgezeigten Ph lnomene der Versuchung Beruhigung der Ent fremdung und des Sichverfangens das Vex f ingnis charakterisieren die spezifische Seinsart des Verfallens Wir nennen diese BeWegtheit des Daseins in seinen1 eigenen Sein den Abstmrz Das Dasein stiirzt aus ihm selbst in es selbst in die Bodenlosigkeitund Nichzigkeit der uneigentlichen Allt iglichkeit Dieser Sturz aber bleibt ihm durch die fiffentliche Ausgelegtheit verborgen so zwar da er ausgelegt Wird als Aufstiegltlt und kon1sretes Leben Die Bewegungsan des Absturzes in die und in def Bodenlosigkeit des uneigentlichen Seins im Man rei t das Verstehen st indig 103 vom Entwerfen eigentlicher M glichkeiten und rei t es hinein in die be ruhigte Vermeintlichkeit alles zu besitzen bzw zu efreichen Dieses st indige Losrei en Von der Eigentlichkeit und dpch irnmer Vermin schen derselben in eins mit dem Hineinrei en in das Man charakteri siert die Bewegtheit des Verfallens als Wirbel I78 Das Verfallen bestimmt nicht nur existenzial das In der Weltsein Der Wirbel offenbart zugleich den Wurf und Bewegtheitscharakter der Geworfenheit die in der Befindlichkeit des Daseins ihm selbst sich aufdr ingen kann Die Geworfenheit ist nicht nur nicht eine fer tige 39I39a39csacheltlt sondern auch nicht ein abgeschlossenes Faktum Zu dessen Faktizitiit geh irt da das Dasein solmzge es ist was es ist im Wurf bleibt und in die Uneigentlichkeit des Man hineingewirbelt wird Die Geworfenheit darin sich die Faktizitiit phiinomenal sehen li st gehfjrt zum Dasein dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht Dasein existiert faktisch Aber ist mit diesem Aufweis des Verfallens nicht ein Phhomen herausgestellt das direkt gegen die Bestimmung spricht mit der die formale Idee V011 Existenz angezeigt Wurde Kann das Dasein als Seiendes begriffen Werden in dessen Sein es um das Seinkifannen geht Wenn dieses Seiende gerade in seiner Allt lglichkeit sick verloren bat und im Verfallen van sick wag gtgt1ebtltlt Das Verfallen an die Welt ist aber nur dann ein phinomenaler gtgtBeweis gegen die Existenzialit lt des Daseins wenn dieses als isoliertes IchSubjekt angesetzt wird als ein Selbstpunkt V011 dem es sich Wegbewegt Dann ist die Welt ein Objekt Das Verfallen an sie wird dann ontologisch umintezpretiert zum Vorhandensein in der Weise eines innerweltlichen Seienden Wenn Wir jedoch das Sein des Daseins in der aufgezeigten Verfas sung des I72dewWelt 5eins festhalten dann Wird offenbar da das Verfallen als Seinszzrt dieses I nSeirzs vielmehr den elementarsten Be Weis fair die Existenzialit it des Daseins darstellt Im Verfallen geht es um nichts anderes als um das In derWeltsein k6nnen Wenngleich im Modus der Uneigentlichkeit Das Dasein lamm nur verfallen wail es ihm um das Verstehendbefindliche Inder VVe1t sein geht Urnge lgehrt ist die eigentlidae Existenz nichts was ber der verfallenden Alltiiglichkeit sclmiebt sondern existenzial nur ein modi ziertes Er greifen dieser A Das Phiinornen des Verfallens gibt aueh nicht so etwas Wie eine Nachtansicht des Daseins eine ontisch vorkommende Eigenschaft die zur Erg inzung des harmlosen Aspekts dieses Seienden dienen mag Das Verfallen enthiillt eine wesenmfteonto1og 1sche Struktur des Daseins selbst die so wenig die Naehtseite bestimmt als sie a e seine Tage in ihrer Alltiglichkeit konstituiert Die existenzialmntologische Interpretation rnacht daher auch keine ontische Aussage ber die Verderbnis der rnenschlichen Naturltlt nicht Weil die nfjtigen Beweismittel fehlen sondern Weil ihre Problematik 179 war jederAussage ber Verderbnis und Unverdorbenheit liegt Das Verfallen 1st ein ontologischer Bewegungsbegriff Ontisch wird night entstghiedexl ob der Mensch in der Siinde ersoffen im status cor 13911P310I113 15 Ob er im status integriratis wandelt oder sich in einem quotzwischenstadium dem status gratiae befindet Glaube und gtgtWeIt anschauung warden aber sofern sie so oder so aussagen und Wenn sie ber Dasein als In derV7611sein aussagen auf die her2usges1e1 ten exzstenzialen Strukturen zur ckkommen miissen vorausgesetzz da ihre Aussagen zugleich auf ivegrzfflicfaes Verst indnis einen An spruch erheben Die leitende Frage dieses Kapitels ging nach dem Sein des Da 39i hema Wurde die ontologische Konstitution der zum Dasein Wesent Iich gehiirenden Erschlossenheit Ihr Sein konstituiert sich in Be nd I1Chk39 1t Yerstehen und Rede Die allt igliche Seinsart der Erschlos senheit owxrd charakterisiert durch Gerede Neugier und Zweideu g keit Drese selbst zeigen die Bewegtheit des Verfallens mit den we senhaften Charakteren der Versuchung Beruhigung Entfrezndung und des Verf ingnisses Mir dieser Analyse ist aber das Gauze der existenzialen Verfas Sung des Daseins in den 39IIauptziigen freigelegt und der ph inome nale Boden gewonnen f r die gtgtzusarnmenfassende Intepretatign des Seins des Daseins als Serge Sechstes Kapitel Die Sorge als Sein des Daseins 939 39 Die Fmge mack der umprrlinglicfaeyz Gmzziaeit des Stmkturganzen des Daseins Das Inder Weltsein ist eine urspr nglich und stindig gcmze Struk tnr In den voranstehenden Kapiteln L Abschnitt Kap 25 Wurde s1e als Ganzes und nnrner auf diesem Grunde in ihren konstitutiven Mornenten ph nomenal Verdeutlicht Der zu Anfangi gegebene Vor bhck anf das Gauze des Ph inomens hat etzt die Leere der ersten allgemeinen Vorzeichnung verloren Allerdings kann nun die phiino menale Viel ltigkeit der Verfassung des Srrukturganzen und seine alltaghchen Seinsart den eizebeitlidaen phinomenologischen Blick auf das Ganze als solches leicht verstellen Dieser mu aber urn so freier bleiben und um so sicherer bereitgehalten Werden als Wir jetzt die 1vg1 12 s 52 ffquot I80 Frage stellen der die vorbereitende Fundaxnentalanalyse des Deseins berhaupt zustrebt wie is exzlstenzzlzbontologiscb die Ganzlaeit des aucfgezeigren Srmkmrgcmzen zu bestimmen Das Dasein e stiert faktisch Gefragt Wird nach der ontologischen Einheit Von Existenzialitiit und Faktizit it bzw der wesenhaften Zu gehorigkeit dieser zu jener Des Dasein hat ausf Grund seiner ihm wesenhaft zugeh renden Befindlichkeit eine Seinsart in der es vor es selbst gebracht und ihm in seiner Geworfenheit erschlossen wird Die Geworfenheit aber ist die Seinsart eines Seienden das je seine Mog lichkeiten selbst ist so zwar da es sic in und aus ihnen ver steht auf sie sich entwirft Das Inder 39We1tsein zu dern ebenso urspriinglich das Sein bei Zuhandenezn geh rt wie das Mitsein rnit Anderen ist je umwillen seiner selbst Das Selbst aber ist zun ichst und zumeist uneigentiich das Man seIbst Das In derWeltsein ist innmer schon verfallen Die durclascbnittlicbe Alltiigliciakeir des Da seins kann dernnach bestimmt Werden als dds ve1fzllend ersc19lo55ene gewo7fen emrwerfende In derWeltsez39n dem es in seinem Sein bei der Welt and im Mitsein mi Amleren arm des eigenste Seinle amen selbst gebt T D Kenn es gelingen dieses Strukturganze der Alltiglichkeit des Da seins in seiner Ganzheit zu fassen L i t sich das Sein des Daseins einheitlich so herausheben da aus ihm die Wesenhafte G1eichur spriinglichkeit der aufgezeigten Strukruren verst indlich Wird in eins mit den zugeh irigen existenzialen Modi kationsm glichkeiten Gibt es einen Weg dieses Sein ph inornenal auf dem Boden des jetzigen Ansatzes der emstenzialen Analytik zu gewinnen Negativ steht au er Frage Die Ganzheit des Strukturganzen ist ph inomenal nicht zu erreichen durch ein Zusammenbauen der Ele mente Dieses bediirfte eines Bauplans Zuginglich wird uns das Sein des Daseins das ontologisch das Strukturganze als solches tr igt in einem vollen Durchblick dmrcfa dieses Ganze d tf ein urspriinglich einheitliches Ph lnomen das im Ganzen schon liegt so da es jedes Strukturrnomem in seiner strukturalen M glichkeit ontologisch funv diert Die gtgtzusammenfassendeltlt Interpretation kann daher kein auf samrnelndes Zusarnrnennehmen des bisher Gewonnenen sein Die Frage nach dem existenzialen Grurldcharakter des Daseins ist Wesenhaft ver schieden Von der Frage nach dem Sein eines Vorhandenen Des all t gliche umweltliche Erfahren das ontisch und ontologisch auf das innerweltliche Seiende gerichtet bleibt vermag Dasein nicht ontisch urspriinglich vorzugeben fiir die ontologische Analyse Imgleichen inangelt der immanenten Wahmehmung Von Erlebnissen ein onto 181 FRIENDSHIP Maurice Blcmckot Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg Stanford Uniyerxziy Pres Sran 9rd Cab arm 1997 39 Wf I 29 Friendship How could one agree to speale oftbisfriend Neitber in praise nor in tbe interest of some trutb Tbe traits of bis cbaracter tbe forms of bis existence tloe episodes ofbis life even in leeeping wit7 tbe searcb n wbicb befelt bimself responsible to tbe point of irresponsibility belong to no one TJere are no witnesses Tbose wbo were closest say only wbat was close to tlaem not tbe distance tbat affirmed itself in tbis proximity and distance ceases as soon as presence ceases Vainly do we try to maintain witb our words wit7 our writings wbat is absent vainly do we o er it tbe appeal of our memories and a sort of gare tloejoy of remaining witb tbe day li e prolonged by a trttto tl appearance We are only looleing to ll a void we cannot bear tbe pain tbe a irmation of tbis void Wbo could agree to receive its inszgm cance an insigni cance so enormous tbat we do not bave a memory capable of co ntaining it and suck tbat we ottrselves must already slip into oblivion in order to sustain it tbe time of tbis slippage tbe my enigma tbis insign z cance represents Eveiytbing we say tends to veil tbe one a irmation tbat I everytbing must zde and tbat we can remain loyal only so long as we 39watcb over tbis fading movement to wbicb sometbing in its toat rejectsquot all memory already belongs quotquotJ I lenow tbere are tbe booles Tbe booles remain temporarily even 4 tloeir reading must open as to tbe necessity oftbis disappearance into 289 4 a w Y r 2 9 0 Friendship which th jl withdraw themselves The hooks themselves refer to an existence This existence hecause it is no longer a presence hegins to he deployed in history and in the worst of histories literary history Literary history inquisitive painstaking in search of documents takes hold of a deceased will and transforms into knowledge its own purchase on what has illen to posterity This is the moment of complete works One wants to puhlish everything quot one wants to say everything as r one were anxious ahout only one thing that everything he said as the everything is said quot would nally allow us to stop a dead voice to stop the piti il silence that arises from it and to contain rmly within a well circumscrihed horizon what the equivocal posthumous anticipa tion still mixes in illusorily with the words of the living As long as the one who is close to us exists and with him the thought in which he a irms himsehf his thought opens itself to us hut p reserved in this very relation and what preserves it is not only the mohility of life this would he very little hut the unpredictahility introduced into this thought hy the strangeness of the end And this movement unpredict ahle and always hidden in its in nite imminence that of dying perhaps arises not hecause its term could not he given in advance hut hecause it never constitutes an event that takes place even when it occurs never a reality that can he grasped ungraspahle and henceforth entirely in the ungraspahle is the one destined to this movement It is this unpredictahle that speaks when he speaks it is this which in his lifetime conceals and reserves his thought separates and frees it from all seizure that of the outside as well as that of the inside I also know that in his hooks Georges Bataille seems to speak o himself with a freedom without restraint that should ee us from all discretion hut that does not give us the right to put ourselves in his place nor does it give us the power to speak in his ahsence And is it certain that he speaks of himself The quotIquot whose presence his search seems still to make manifest when it expresses itself toward whom does it direct us Certainly toward an I very di ierent om the ego that those who knew him in the happy and unhappy particularity ofli i would like to evoke in the light of a memory Everything leads one to think that the personless presence at stake in such a movement introduces an enigmatic relation into the existence of him who indeed decided to Friendship I 2 9 I speak of it hut not to claim it as his own still less to make of it an event of his hiography rather a gap in which the hiography disappears And when we ask ourselves the question Who was the suhject of this experience this question is perhaps already an answer even to him who led it the experience asserted itself in this interrogative form hy suhstituting the openness of a Who without answer ir the closed and singular 397 not that this means that he had simply to ask himself What is this I that I am hut much more radically to recover himself without reprieve no longer as I hut as a Who the unknown fld slippery heing of an inde nite Who WE must give up trying to know those to whom we are linked hy something essential hy this I mean we must greet them in the relation with the unknown in which they greet us as well in our estrangement Friendship this relation without dependence without episode yetinto which all of the simplicity oflzfe enters passes hy way of the recognition of the common strangeness that does not allow us to speak of our friends hut only to speak to them not to make of them a topic ofconversatzons or essays hut the movement of understanding in which speaking to us they reserve even on the most imiliar terms an in nite distance the fundamental separation on the hasis of which what separates hecomes relation Here discretion lies not in the simple re isalto put forward con dences how vulgar this would he even to think ofi hm it is the interval the pure interval that from me to this other who is a iend measures all that is hetween us the interruption of heing that never authorizes me to use him or my knowledge ofhim were it to praise him and that zr from preventing all communication hrzngs us together in the di rence and sometimes the silence of speech It is true that at a certain moment this discretion hecomes the ssure of death I could imagine that in one sense nothing has changed in the secret hetween us that was capahle of taking place in the continuity of discourse without interrupting it there was already om the time in which we were in the presence of one another this imminent presence though tacit of the final discretion and it is on the haszs of this discretion that the precaution of friendly words calmly a rmed 1135 2 9 2 Friendship Wordr om one shore to the other shore speech responding to someone who speaks from the other shore and where even in our lz the measurelessness of the movement of dying would like to complete itself And yet when the event itself comes it brings this change not the deepening of the separation but its erasure not the widening of the caesura but its leveling out and the dissipation of the void between us where formerly there developed the anleness of a relation without history In such a way that at present what was close to us not only has ceased to app roach but has lost even the truth of extreme distance Thus death has the false virtue of appearing to return to intimacy those who have been divided by grave disagreements This is because with death all that separates disappears What separates what puts authentically in relation the very abyss of relations in which lies with simplicity the agreement of iendly a irmation that is always maintained 1 should not by means of artifice pretend to carry on a dialogue What has turned away om us also turns us away om that part which was our presence and we must learn that when speech subsides a speech that for years gave itseh to an quotexzgency without regard it is not only this exigent speech that has ceased it is the silence that it made possible and om which it returned along an insensible slope toward the anxiety of time Undoubtedly we will still be able to follow the same paths we can let images come we can appeal to an absence that we will imagine by deceptive consolation to be our own We can in a word remember But thought knows that one does not remember without memory without thought it already struggles in the invisible where everything sinks back to ind erence This is thought profound grief It i must accompany iendshzp into oblivion leanLuc Nancy Edited by Peter Connor Translated by Peter Connor Lisa Garbus Michael Holland and Simona Sawhney Foreword by Christopher Fynsk Theory and History of Literature Volume 76 University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis and Oxford Chapter 4 Shattered Love Thinking of Love I love you more than at that has been thought and can be thought I give my saw to you llenriette Vogel to Heinrich von Kleist The thinking of love so ancient so abundant and diverse in its forms and in its modulations asks for an extreme reticence as soon as it is solicited It is a question of modesty perhaps but it is also a question of exhaustion has not everything been said on the subject of love Every excess and every exactitude Has not the impossibility of speaking about love been as vio lently recognized as has been the experience of love itself as the truesource of the possibility of speaking in general We know the words of loveto be inexhaustible but as to speaking about love could we perhaps be exhausted m It might well be appropriate that a discourse on love supposing that it still has something to say be at the same time a communication of love a letter a missive since love sends itself as much as it enunciates itself But the words of love as is well known sparsely miserably repeat their one declarationwhich is always the same always already suspected of lacking love because it declares it Or else this declaration always carries 82 SlIATTERED LOVE L 83 the promise of revealing itself as the unique incarnation the unique and certain if derisory manifestation of the love that it declares The discourse might well have nothing more to say or to describe than this communal indigence these dispersed and tarnished flashes of an al1 too familiar love This is why at our slightest attempt to solicit the thinking of love we are invited to an extreme reticence Should this thinking be solicited I will not discuss this As it happens it is As it happens indeed this solid tation regularly returns throughout our history to formulate its demands One asks what has become of love but one does not forget to return to it after a certain period When for example as is the case today love is no longer the dominant theme of poetry when it seems to be essentially rele gated to dime store novels instead it is then that we inquire and question ourselves about love about the possibility of thinking love As though this possibility were always recurringly indispensable to the possibility of think ing in general that is to say to the possibility of the life of a community of a time and a space of humanitysomething that would not be the case for other objects such as God for example or history or literature or even philosophy This reticence of thinking that beckons to us does not imply that it would be indiscreet to deflower love Love deflowers and is itself deflowered by its very essence and its unrestrained and brazen exploitation in all the genres of speech or of art is perhaps an integral part of this essencea part at once secret and boisterous miserable and sumptuous But this reticence might signify that all of love is possible and necessary that all the loves possible are in fact the possibilities of love its voices or its characteristics which are impossible to confuse and yet ineluctably entan gled charity and pleasure emotion and pornography the neighbor and the infant the love of lovers and the love of God fraternal love and the love of art the kiss passion friendship To think love would thus demand a boundless generosity toward all these possibilities and it is this generosity that would command reticence the generosity not to choose between loves not to privilege not to hierarchize not to exclude Because love is not their substance or their common concept is not something one can extricate and contemplate at a distance Love in its singularity when it is grasped abso lutely is itself perhaps nothing but the indefinite abundance of all possible loves and an abandonment to their dissemination indeed to the disorder of these explosions The thinking of love should learn to yield to this abandon to receive the prodigality the collisions and the contradictions of love without submitting them to an order that they essentially defy But this generous reticence would be no different from the exercise of thought itself Thinking rejects abstraction and conceptualization as these are recognized by understanding Thinking does not produce the operators 84 U SHATTERED LOVE of a knowledge it undergoes an experience and lets the experience inscribe itself Thought therefore essentially takes place in the reticence that iets the singular moments of this experience offer and arrange themselves The thinking of love if it is necessary to solicit it or if it is necessary that it be proposed anew as a theme to be discussed or as a question to be posed does not therefore lay claim to a particular register of thinking it invites us to thinking as such Ipvemd9es not call for a certain kind of thinking or fora thinking of loveb11t for thinking in essencemand in its39 totality And this is because thinking most properly speaking is lovequot It is the love for that which reaches experience that is to say for that aspect of being that gives itself to be welcomed In the movement across discourse proof and concept nothing but this love is at stake for thought Without this love the exercise of the intellect or of reason would be utterly worthless This intimate connivance between love and thinking is present in our origins the word fphilosophyquotf betrays it Whatever its legendary inventor might have meant by it philosophy in spite of everything and perhaps in spite of all philosophies rneans this love of thinking since thinking is love Love of love love of the self in consequence Perhaps but we will have to return to this We cannot however dispense with asking what we must understand by this To say that thinking is love does not mean that love can be under stood as a response to the question of thinking and certainly not in the manner of a sentimental response in the direction of a unifying effusive or orgiastic doctrine of thinking Even though the paradox might appear simple it is necessary to say that thinking is love is a difficult severe thought that promises rigor rather than effusion Faced with this thought about thinking we can do nothing but begin the quest for an ignored essence of thinking for which we lack any evident access it might well be that nothing that has been designated celebrated or ineditated under the name of love is appropriate for this determination thinking is love It might also be that everything is appropriate that all loves are at stake in thinking and as thinking In fact to say thinking is love Ia pens e est amour is different from saying thinking is Love la perzs e est Pamour or Thinking is a certain species of love Neither genre nor species perhaps not any genre or perhaps all species However this may be love thus employed would be so to speak existential rather than categorial or again it would name the act of thinking as much as or more than it would its nature The model for this phrase is obviously the ancient God is love which entailed the same formal implications We know nothing more about what this means We only know by a sort of obscure certainty or premonition that it is necessary SHATTERED LOVE Cl 85 or that it will one day be necessary to attest this phrase Thinking is love Put philosophy has never explicitly attested this One single time however the first philosopher expressly authenticated an identity of love and of philosophy Plato s Symposium does not represent a particular treatise that this author set aside for love at the heart of his work as others would do later and often by relating to this same Plato Ficino among others or Leon the Hebrew as though Plato were the unique or at least necessary philosophical reference de amore always present beyond the epoch of treatises in Hegel or in Nietzsche philosophY in the manner of Plato is an erotic duel in Freud or in Lacan But the Symposium signifies first that for Plato the exposition of philosophy as such is not possible without the presentation of philosophic love The commentary on the text gives innumerable confirmations of this from the portrait of Eros to the role of Socrates and to the figure who appeared here once and for all on the philosophical scene of Diotima Although the Symposium speaks of love it also does more than that it opens thought to love as to its own essence This is why thisdialogue is more than any other the dialogue of Plato s generosity here he invites orators or thinkers and offers them a speech tempered altogether differently from the speech of the interlocutors of Socrates The scene itself the gaiety or the joy that traverses it attests to a consideration that is unique in Plato to such a degree at least consideration for others as well as for the object of discourse All the different kinds of loves are welcomed in the Symposium there is discussion but there is no exclusion And the love that is finally exhibited as true love philosophical Eros does not only present itself with the mastery of a triumphant doctrine it also appears in a state of deprivation and weakness which allows the experience 0i the limit where thought takes place to be recognized In the Symposium Plato broaches the limits and all his thinking displays a reticence or reserve not always present elsewhere it broaches its own limit that is to say its source it effaces itself before the love or in the love that it recognizes as its truth Thus it thinks its own birth and its own effacement but it thinks in such a way that it restores to love to the limit its very task and destination Philosophy is not occupied with gathering and interpreting the experiences of love here Instead in the final analysis it is love that receives and deploys the experience of thinking I But this hasbnly taken place once at the inauguration of philosophy and even that time it did not really take place since it did not reach its ends For all its generosity the Symposium also exercises a mastery over love At any rate we cannot fail to read or to deduce here in the order and the choices of philosophical knowledge a truth regarding love one that assigns its experience and hierarchizes its moments by substituting the 86 Cl SHATTERED LOVE impatience and conatus of desire for its joyous abandon Thus in Plato thinking will have said and will have failed to say that it is love or to explain what this means There is not one philosophy that has escaped this double constraint In each love occupies a place that is at once evident and dissimulated as in Descartes between the theory of union and that of admiration or embar rassed and decisive as in Kant in the theory of sublime reason or essential and subordinate as in Hegel in the theory of the State At the cost of these contradictions and evasions love consistently finds the place that it cannot not have but it only finds it at this cost What we would have to understand is why this place is essential for it and why it is essential to pay this price I Philosophy never arrives at this thinking that thinking is love even though it is inscribed at the head of its program or as the general epigraph to all its treatises One might say it reaches toward it it does not reach it But this does not mean that it does not have any thinking of love Quite the contrary Since the Symposium or if you prefer since before Plato in Heraclitus or Empedocles in Pythagoras or Parmenides the general schema of a philosophy of love is at work and it has not ceased to operate even now determining philosophy as it understands and construes itself as well as love as we understand it and as we make it If it were necessary to take the risk of grasping this schema in a formula one might try this love is the extreme movement beyond the self of a being reaching completion The first meaning of this formula and it delib erately has several meanings would be that philosophy always thinks love as an accomplishment arriving at a final and definitive completion The second meaning would be that philosophy thinks love as an access rather than an end the end is the completion of being even though this might also be conceived as love which would thus designate its own result The third meaning would be that philosophy thinks the being in love1 as incomplete and led by love toward a completion The fourth meaning that this completion surpasses what it completes and consequently fulfills it only by depriving it of itself which comes down to suppressing its tension thus love suppresses itself inasmuch as it reaches its end The fifth mean ing would be that philosophy thinks the suppression of self in love and the correlative suppression of the self of love as its ultimate truth and as its ultimate effectivity thus love infinitely restitutes itself beyond itself in the final analysis death and transfiguration and this is not by chance the title of a musical work since music accomplishes the philosophical erotic SIIATTERED LOVE U 87 The sixth meaning would be that this beyond the self in which in a very general manner love has taken place is necessarily the place of the other or of an alterity without which neither love nor completion would be possible But the seventh meaning would neverthelessbe that this beyond is the place of the same where love fulfills itself the place of the same in the other if love consists in IIegel s terms of having in an other the moment of one s subsistence According to this schema the nature of love is shown to be double and contradictory even though it also contains the infinite resolution of its own contradiction This nature is thus neither simple nor contradictory it is the contradiction of contradiction and of noncontradiction It operates in an identical manner between all the terms in play the access and the end the incomplete being and the completed being the self and the beyond of the self the one and the other the identical and the different The contradiction of the contradiction and of the noncontradiction organizes love infinitely and in each of its meanings It is this that definitively confers on love the universality and the totality to which according to philosophy it is destined by right and that have crystallized in the figure of Christian love where the love ofGod and the love of men form the poles of a new contradiction and of its resolution since each of them is carried out by the other and in the other Of course this kind of philosophical thinking is not confined only to philosophical discourse or to its theological avatar It is easy to see that it structures all occidental experience and expression of love it is not certain that the Occidentquot here might not include both Islam and Buddhism its poetics its drama its pathos its mystique from the Grand Rhetoricians to Baudelaire from the troubadours to Wagner or Strauss from Saint John of the Cross to Strindberg and moving through Racine or Kleist Marivaux or Maturin Monteverdi or Freud For all of them love is double con flictual or ambivalent necessary and impossible sweet and bitter free and chained spiritual and sensual enlivening and mortal lucid and blind altruistic and egoistic For all these oppositional couples constitute the very structure and life of love while at the same time love carries out the resolution of these very oppositions or surpasses them Or more often it simultaneously surpasses them and maintains them in the realization of love the subject of love is dead and alive free and imprisoned restored to the self and outside of the self One sentence by Rene Char best epitomizes this thinking and its entire tradition The poem is the fulfilled love of desire remaining desire This sentence in effect does not only speak the truth of the poem according to Char it speaks the truth of love More precisely it intends to speak the truth of the poem by grace of the truth of love thus confirming moreover that love holds the highest truth for 88 Cl SHATTERED LOVE us the contradiction desire opposed to the noncontradiction love and reconciled with it remaining desire But this thinking that so profoundly and so continually innervates so much of our thought received its name and its concept in philosophy it is the thinking of the dialectic One might say that love is the living hypothesis of a dialectic which formulates the law of its process by way of a return This law is not only the formal rule of the resolution of a contradiction that remains a contradiction it gives under this rule the law and the logic of being in general By being thought according to the dialectic and as the essence of the dialectic love is assigned to the heart of the very movement of being And it is not surprising that these two ideas have coexisted or have even intermixed that God is love and that God isthe Supreme Being Love is not only subject to the ontological dialectic it does not only form one case of its ontic application If one may say so and one may rightly in the most accurate or proper manner love is the heart of this dialectic The idea of love is in the dialectic and the idea of the dialectic is in love IIegel transcribing Christian theology into the ontology of the statement The Absolute wishes to be close to us says nothing other The Absolute loves us and the Absolute dialectizes itself Love is at the heart of being Again it is necessary that being have a heart or still more rigorously that being be a heart The heart of being means nothing but the being of being that by virtue of which it is being To suppose that the being of being or the essence of being is an expression endowed with mean ing it would be necessary to suppose that the essence of being is something like a heart that is to say that which alone is capable of love Now this is precisely what has never been attested by philosophy Perhaps being in its essence is affected by the dialectic that annihilates its simple position in order to reveal this contradiction in the becoming of reality or of reason of the Idea of history and in this sense one might say that being beats that it essentially is in the beating indeed in the e motion of its own heart beingnothingnessbecoming as an infinite pul sation And yet this heart of being is not a heart and it does not beat from the throbbing of love Philosophy never says this and above all never explains its implications as close as it might come to thinking it It is not that love is excluded from fundamental ontology on the contrary everything summons it thither as we have just shown Thus one must rather say that love is missing from the very place where it is prescribed Or better still love is missing from the very place where this dialectical law operates the law that we have had to recognize as the law of love And there is nothing dialectical about this loss or this lack it is not a contradiction it is not SHATTERED LOVE 1 89 made to be sublated or resorbed Love remains absent from the heart of being That love is missing from philosophical ontology does not mean that the dialectical law of being is inappropriate for love In one sense nothing is false in what we have just demonstrated regarding this law and the nature of love Nothing is false but love is missing because the heart of being which has shown itself to be commanded by the dialectic is not a heart That which has the power of the dialectic is not a heart but a subject Perhaps one could find a heart in the subject But this heart if there is one designates the place where the dialectical power is suspended or per haps shattered The heart does not sublate contradictions since in a general sense it does not live under the regime of contradiction contrary to what poetry or perhaps only its philosophical reading might allow us to believe The heart lives that is to say it beats under the regime of exposition If the dialectic is the process of that which must appropriate its own becoming in order to be exposition on the other hand is the condition I of that whose essence or destination consists in being presented given over offered to the outside to others and even to the self The two regimes do not exclude one another they do not form a contradiction but they are not of the same order The being that has become through a dialectical process 15 perhaps destined to be exposed one could show that this is what happens despite everything at the end of The Phenomenology of Spz39rz39t but the dialectic knows nothing of this it believes it has absorbed the entire destination in the becomingproper The exposed being is perhaps also the subject ofa dialectical process but what is exposed what makes it exposed 15 that it IS not completed by this process and it incompletes itself to the outside 1t 13 presented offered to something that is not it nor its proper becoming The heart exposes and it is exposed It loves it is loved it does not love It is not loved Affirmation and negation are present here as in the dialectic But in its modes of affirmation and negation the heart does not operate by reporting its own judgment to itself if it is a judgment It does not say I love which is the reflection or the speculation of an ego and which engages love neither more nor less than the cogito but it says I 1 YOU adeclaratton where I is posed only by being exposed to you That 18 to say that the heart is not a subject even if it is the heart of asubject The subject isone who reports to himself as his own his judgments and their contradiction in order to constitute therefrom his proper being for example that he is Descartes that he is not his immediate being Spinoza that he becomes what he is by traversing the other 1 1ege1 T1115 F 53mb1 S 10 in any case it calls to and even demands loveand yet this is not love The subject poses its own contradiction in order to 90 Cl SHATTERED LOVE report it to itself and to maintain it in itself as Hegel says Thus it surmounts it or infinitely sublates it By principle the moment of exposition is evaded even though it dimly emerges This is the moment when it is not a matter of posing or of opposing and then of resorbing the same and the other It is when the affirmation I love you is given over to that which is neither contradictory nor noncontradictory with it the risk that the other does not love me or the risk that I do not keep the promise of my love The being of philosophy is the subject The heart of the subject is again a subject it is the infinite rapport to the self That this rapport demands in turn an infinite migration through the other even the gift of the self does not in any way hinder the structure of the subject from thence deriving all its consistency Philosophy will not fail to retort what is at stake is nothing but a dialectic of the heart and the subject of love and the con science or the reason From Pascal to Hegel and beyond this dialectic is well attested But the response of philosophy is not admissible There is no dialectic of the heart and the reason not because they would be irrec oncilable the question of their rapport if it be a question cannot be posed in these terms the perhaps pseudoPascal of the Discourse on the Passions of Love writes They have inappropriately removed the name of reason from love and they have opposed them without a sound foundation since love and reason is but the same thing but because the heart is not able to enter into a dialectic it cannot be posed disposed and sublated in a superior moment The heart does not return to itself beyond itself and this is not as Hegel would have wished the spirit which is attendant to the power of the heart Or again there is no sublimation of the heart nor of love Love is what it is identical and plural in all its registers or in all its explosions and it does not sublimate itself even when it is sub lime It is always the beating of an exposed heart This argument carries a corollary because it is a stranger to the dialectic the heart does not maintain itself in opposition to the subject any more than love does to reason But they are one in the other and one to the other in a manner that is neither a mode of contradiction nor of identity nor of propriety This mode might declare itself thus The heart exposes the subject It does not deny it it does not surpass it it is not sublated or sublimated in it the heart exposes the subject to everything that is not its dialectic and its mastery as a subject Thus the heart can beat at the heart of the subject it can even beat in a movement similar to that of the dialectic but it does not confuse itself with that This is why love is always missed by philosophy which nevertheless does not cease to designate and assign it Perhaps it cannot help but be missed one would not know how to seize or catch up with that which exposes If SIIATTERED LOVE U 91 thinking is love that would mean insofar as thinking is confused with philosophy that thinking misses its own essence that it misses by essence its own essence In philosophy and in mysticism in poetics etc thinking would thus have said all that it could and all that it should have said about l0ve by l39139l1SSII1g it and by missing itself Loving and loving love it will have lost love It is thence that Saint Augustine s amare amabam draws its exemplary force of confession This does not at all mean that in all this tradition thinking has never occurred or that love has never occurred or that thinking about love has never occurred On the contrary But this does mean that love itself in that it IS missed by thinking and by the love of thinking gives itself again to thinking This is to say that in thinking it calls forth once again this love that it is Something revealed and reveiled with the Symposium like a missed rendezvous calls again for its repetition The Heart Broken Love is a series of scars No heart is as whole as a broken heart said the celebrated Rabbi Nazman of Bratzlav Elie Wiesel The Fifth Son One would want to be able to engage this repetition at least in part outside of the Occident that 18 to say apart from love as we have come to know it from our history and from our thinking That which is not the 39 Occident is in fact no stranger to any of the figures or forms we know as love sexuality erotism tenderness passion friendship fraternity or even fld ilty abandon union desire jealousy or what we represent quotas the emotion of love as the adoration or supplication of love or the gift of theself or deliverance by love etc But in all these figures which their occidental denominations here risk falsifying and which moreover are perhaps not figures but rather so many distinct essences or so many flashes whatis at issue outside of the Occident is not love absolutely Only the Occident designates within love absolute1y and in every sense or in the absolute of all its conjoined meanings which obstinately make up one sole meaning one sole essence an ordering or disordering prin ciple of the totality of being and of beings of nature of the city of knowledge and of God Only the Occident raises with this one name love such a claim to universality That this claim is continually disap pointed or ridiculed that it is continually found guilty of delirium of 92 C SHATTERED LOVE contradiction or of bad faith only confirms its imperious demanding insistent or insidious character When we name love we name sornethirig and without a doubt the only thing of this lltind that diffuses itself through all things that comes closer and closer to totality because this thing is the principle or the movement of proximity and of the neighbor because it is the evidence and the certainty of recognition and at the same time the power of fulfillment Diverse as the realities are that are designated by armor fan by the love of God by the love of Tristan by love in the afternoon love on the ground love in flight or by the sacred love of the fatherland the meaning remains the same unchangeable and infinite it is always the furthest movement of a completion If we take love within the Occident and the Occident in turn within love how then can we hope to repeat the rendezvous that seems to have been missed once and for all since it is the very nature of this love unique and universal plenary fulfilling that caused the rendezvous to be missed If such an undertaking will always be in vain it is nonetheless certain that love is not to be found elsewhere Elsewhere if such an elsewhere exists but this is not the question here one will find by definition only pleasure or desire vows sacrifice or ecstasy but love will not be found We will not be able to redirect love to the edges of the Occident if such edges exist in order to abandon it to voluptuous rituals innocent games or heroic communions as certain ethnological or archaeological fictions would like to do For there we would instantly lose what makes love its unique nomination and the intimate communication it establishes between caress and devotion between charity and nuptials we would in fact lose the very meaning of these words of all love s words Nothing leads us more surely back to ourselves to the Occident to philosophy to the dialectic to literature than love That is why one would want to separate oneself from love free oneself from it Instead of this law of the completion of being one would want to deal only with a moment of Contact between beings a light cutting and delicious moment of contact at once eternal and fleeting In its phil osophical assignation love seems to skirt this touch of the heart that would not complete anything that would go nowhere graceful and casual the joy of the soul and the pleasure of the skin simple luminous flashes of love freed from itself That is Don J uan s wish it is his fervor it is even his success but we can think Don Juan only condemned unless we represent his impunity as a diabolical or perverse challenge to the very law of love Thus there is no innocent or joyous Don Juan lVIozart s it is true continues up until the end merrily thwarting the condemnation And yet perhaps in spite of himself Mozart let him be condemned But even in hell the figure of Don Juan testifies with remarkable force and insistence that this SHATTERED LOVE U 93 style of love as heart s touch obstinately haunts the thinking of love as law of fulfillment Actually when we represent modes of existence and thinking foreign to the law of love we supplement this law in our representations by something else it is a sacred order a social tie or a natural attraction that plays in the final analysis the role of love and that gives tenderness erotisrn and fraternity their independence This means that we think love in the guise of a substitute or a transfiguration of these things that our imaginary figures as realities that we would have possessed thenlost religion community the immediate emotion of the other and of the divine But this substitute is not satisfied with coming to the place of what would have been lost or in the most Christian version it is not satisfied with transfiguring it Love conceals a fundamental ambivalence in which it at the same time challenges that which it must replace we represent love as hostile or as foreign to the city and to religion so that while affirming that they are founded within love or virtually fulfilled in it they multiply with respect to love the procedures of control or of conciliation But for itself in its living essence love is reputedto be rebellious fugitive errant unassignable and inassimilable Thus love is at once the promise of com pletion but a promise always disappearing and the threat of decompo sition always imminent An entire modern eroticism and an entire modern spirituality those of romantic love of savage love of transgressive love are determined according to this dialectic Love is thus not here and it is not elsewhere One can neither attain it nor free oneself from it and this is at bottom exactly what it is the excess or the lack of this completion which is represented as the truth of love In other words and as it has been extensively said extensively represented and extensively theorized for some two centuries the impossible H We will thus have to engage the repetition differently We will have to stop thinking in terms of possibility and impossibility We will have to maintain that love is always present and never recognized in anything that we name love We will have to admit that the rendezvous our rendezvous with love takes place not once but an indefinite number of times and that it is never love that is at the rendezvous or unique and universal love Catholic love or nomadic and multiple loves but another presence or another movement of love Or rather another love presence or another love movement that we in fact touch or that touches us but that is not the love we were expecting Classical figure of romantic comedy or drama it is another who is at the rendezvous but it is love itself that IS revealed 94 C3 SHATTERED LOVE thereby and betrayed Cosi fan rune Another love presence or another love movement that is what the repetition should let emerge This would not at all imply the invention of another love or of a beyond love it would imply letting love once again open up its paths within39thO1t rht letting it once again call thought toward it thought exposed to missing love as well as to being touched by it exposed to being betrayed as well as to taking account of its miserable means of loving We will set out again from the given that is perhaps the simplest and that is offered right in the middle of the tradition In this tradition love is defined above all as that which is not self love Any other determination ontological erotic political is excluded from the start and could only be recaptured if that is necessary starting from there It was within the spirituality of the mystic tradition that this formulation of love came to be privileged As an example some lines from F nelon The ownership condemned with such rigor by the mystics and often called impurity is only the search for one s own solace and one s own interest in the jouissance of the gifts of God at the expense of the jealousy of the pure love that wants everything for God and nothing for the creature The angel s sin was a sin of ownership sretit in se as Saint Augustine says Ownership of course is nothing but self love or pride which is the love of one s own excellence insofar as it is one s own and which instead of coming back completely and uniquely to God still to a small extent brings the gifts of God back to the self so that it can take pleasure in them What is expressed in these terms and under the rubric of a relation to God belongs in one way or another to all modes and all forms of the thinking of love that we have been able to know In one sense this does not say anything other than what the philosophical schema of love already contains and nonetheless it displaces its entire economy of a fulfillment proper It is simply a matter of letting oneself be carried by a tiny movement barely perceptible which would not reconstitute the dialectical logic but which would touch the heart of the schema the heart of love itself Love defines itself as the absolute opposite and as the destruction of selflove Selflove is not simply the love of the self it is as we have just read the love of one s own excellence insofar as it is one s own One can love oneself with a real love and it might even be that one must do so however it is not certain that these words the self oneself can let us discover without being themselves put into play precisely who is at issue in this love of selfquot that is a question that we will have to take up again later But selflove understood according to the signification the SiIATTERED LOVE Cl 95 spiritual authors gave to it and not as a term in psychology almost syn onymous with sensitivity is the love which from this moment on is no longer one of possession it is the love of the self as property Property is an ontological determination It does not designate the object possessed out the subject in the object Matter for itself is not proper to itself Hegel it can therefore become my possession But in this pos session it is I myself as subject that finds myself realized it is my subjectivity me as will need desire consciousness of me and in this respect possession properly becomes property Which is to say that property is the objectivized presence of subjectivity its realization in the outside world and thus the first existence of freedom Hegel Property is the attestation and the assurance of the self in the actuality of the world The self presents itself there outside itself but in this presentation it is itself that it posits Selflove is the desire and the affirmation of this autoposition outside itself in objectivity and in exteriority the subject has the moment 39 of its authenticity and the truth of its fulfillment Thus Selflove indeed has the structure of love here also it is a matter of having in another the moment of one s subsistence In one sense the formulas of love and of property respond to each other infinitely in the philosophical economy each one giving to the other its stability or its movement If love is the gift of the se1fit would thus also be dialectically the appropriation of the self Self love would therefore be at the heart of love it would be its heart the heart of love and this implacably reconstituted economy the dialectical economy of fulfillment the capitalist economy of an absolute surplus value of the self would prescribe love from the heart of love itself The tradition knows well this absence of love from love itself La Rochefoucauld in this respect sums it all up or there is Nietzsche s formula a refined parasitism and so on until L vinas for example who writes To love is also to love oneself within love and thus to return to the self Actually the problem had been posed since the Aristotelian discussion of philautia of the love of oneself and it has traversed and troubled all Christian thought since Saint Augustine The question that dominated all the debates of the Middle Ages about love was the question of knowing if man by nature is capable of loving God more than himself One could even explain by way of this absence the missed rendezvous between philosophy and love if the latter always frustrates love or diverts it to self love if love finally lies to itself and lacks itself how could one fail to forever lack it And how could one not substitute for it sometimes its dismembered parts the sexual organ sentiment some times its sublimations friendship charity 96 Cl SHATTERED LOVE HI But this knowledge is too Slight Love frustrates the simple opposition between economy and noneconomy Love is precisely when it is when it is the act of a singular being of a body of a heart of a thinking that which brings an end to the dichotomy between the love in which I lose myself without reserve and the love in which I recuperate myself to the opposition between gift and property Of course philosophy and theology have always surmounted and dialec ticized this opposition God s love for himself in his son brings itself about as a love for man on the part of this same Son given abandoned and retaken in glory with all of creation redeemed and brought into relation through the love thus received with its creator But the separation is thus surmounted only because it is annulled in its principle God gives only what he possesses infinitely in a sense he thus gives nothing and recip rocally he possesses only what he gives He is the proprietor par excellence he appears to himself in the totality of objectivity and that is what the idea of the creation in this respect signifies And if our time still had to be one of such a research it is in an entirely different direction that we would have to look for the mystery of the god of love Love brings an end to the opposition between gift and property without tsurmounting and without sublating it if I return to myself within love I do not return to myself from love the dialectic on the contrary feeds on the equivocation I do not return from it and consequently something of I is definitively lost or dissociated in its act of loving That is undoubtedly why I return if at least it is the image of a return that is appropriate here but I return broken I come back to myself or I come out of it broken The return does not annul the break it neither repairs it nor sublates it for the return in fact takes place only across the break itself keeping it open Love represents I to itself broken and this is not a representation It presents this to it he this subject was touched broken into in his subjectivity and he is from then on for the time of love opened by this slice broken or fractured even if only slightly He is which is to say that the break or the wound is not an accident and neither is it a property that the subject could relate to himself For the break is a break in his self possession as subject it is essentially an interruption of the process of relating oneself to oneself outside of oneself From then on I is constituted broken As soon as there is love the slightest act of love the slightest spark there is this ontological fissure that cuts across and that disconnects the elements of the subject proper the fibers of its heart Onehour of love is enough one kiss alone provided that it is out of love and can there in truth be any other kind Can one do it without love without being broken into even if only slightly SHATTERED LOVE U 97 r The love break simply means this that I can no longer whatever presence to myself I may maintain or that sustains mequotpropose myself to myself nor im pose myself on another without remains without something of me remainiizg outside of me This signifies that the immanence of the subject to which the dialectic always returns to fulfill itself including in what we call intersubjectivity or even communication or commu nion is opened up broken into and this is what is called in all rigor a transcendence Love is the act of a transcendence of a transport of a transgression of a transparency also immanence is no longer opaque But this transcendence is not the one that passes into and through an exteriority or an alterity in order to reflect itself in it and to reconstitute in it the interior and the identical God the certainty of the cogito the evidence of a property It does not pass through the outside because it comes from it Transcendence is always thought as a selfsurpassing but here it is not at all a surpassing and even less self transcendence is the disirnplication of the immanence that can come to it only from the outside Love does not stop as long as love lasts coming from the outside It does not remain outside it is this outside itself the other each time singular a blade thrust in me and that I do not rejoin because it disjoins me it does not wound properly speaking it is something else foreign to a certain dramatics of love The movement of the transcendence of love does not go from the singular being toward the other toward the outside It is not the singular being that puts itself outside itself it is the other and in the other it is not the subject s identity that operates this movement or this touch But in the other it is this movement that makes it other and which is always other than itself in its identity that is what transcends in me This transcendence thus fulfills nothing it cuts it breaks and it exposes so that there is no domain or instance of being where love would fulfill itself This does not mean that this transcendence accomplishes only what we would call for example in the theory of the sublirne a negative presen tation Love certainly has the most intimate relations with the sublime and with this extreme mode of presentation that I have attempted to des ignate elsewhere as the sublime offering see chap 2 n 45 but with the offering it is already a question of what in fact exceeds the sublime itself and within love it is perhaps a question in the final analysis of that which exceeds love When the transcendence that touches me presents the unfulfillment of love which becomes neither substance nor subject it at the same time offers its actual advent love takes place it happens and quotit happens endlessly in the withdrawal of its own presentation It is an offer ing which is to say that love is always proposed addressed suspended in its arrival and not presented imposed already having reached its end 98 Cl SHATTERED LOVE Love arrives it comes or else it is not love But it is thus that it endlessly goes elsewhere than to me who would receive it its coming is only a departure for the other its departure only the coming of the other What is offered by transcendence or as transcendence is this arrival and this departure this incessant comingandgoing What is offered is the offered being itself exposed to arrival and to departure the singular being is traversed by the aiterity of the other which does not stop or fix itself anywhere neitherin him nor in me quotl because it is nothing other than the comingandgoing The other comes and cuts across me because it immediately leaves for the other it does not return to itself because it leaves only in order to come again This crossing breaks the heart this is not necessarily bloody or tragic it is beyond an opposition between the tragic and serenity or gaiety The break is nothing more than a touch but the touch is not less deep than a wound Transcendence will thus be better named the crossing of love What love cuts across and what it reveals by its crossing is what is exposed to the crossing to its comingandgoing and this is nothing other than finitude Because the singular being is finite the other cuts across it and never does the other penetrate the singularnbeing or unite itself with it or corn rnune Love unveils finitude Finitude is the being of that which is infi nitely inappropriable not having the consistency of its essence either in itself or in a dialectical sublation of the self Neither the other nor love nor I can appropriate itself nor be appropriated Infinity of one and of the other in the other and in the one al ry This is why desire is not love Desire lacks its object which is the subject and lacks it while appropriating it to itself or rather it appro priates it to itself while lacking it Desire l mean that which philosophy has thought as desire will appetite conatus libido is foreign to love because it sublates be it negatively the logic of fulfillment Desire is self extending toward its end but love does not extend nor does it extend itself toward an end If it is extended it is by an upheaval of the other in me Along with desire all the terms of this contemporary lexicon are foreign to love demand seduction dependence and so on and more generally an entire analyticsthat is not only of the psych variety of the amorous operation as calculation investment completion retribution and the like Desire is unhappiness without end it is the subjectivist reverse of the infinite exposition of finitude Desire is the negative appropriation that the dialectic tries inde nitely to convert into positivity It is infelicitous love and the exasperation of the desired happiness But in the broken heart desire itself is broken This heart is no more unhappy than itis happy It is offered at the limit between one and the other sentiment or one and SHATTERED LOVE Cl 99 the other state And this limit corresponds to that of its finitude the heart does not belong to itself not even in the mode of a desire and even less in the mode of happiness or unhappiness To love with all my heart puts a totality into play that of the crossing to which I cannot accede Cor mum nondam est totum tuum Baudoin du Devon The heart of the singular being is that which is not totally his but it is thus that it is his heart Actually the heart is not broken in the sense that it does not exist before the break But it is the break itself that makes the heart The heart is not an organ and neither is it a faculty It is that I is broken and traversed by the other where its presence is most intimate and its life most open The beating of the heart rhythm of the partition of being syncope of the sharing of singularitywcuts across presence life consciousness That is why thinking which is nothing other than the weighing or testing of the limits the ends of presence of life of consciousness thinking itself is love Love does not transfigure finitude and it does not carry out its trans substantiation in infinity The transsubstantiation is infinite withoutbeing the infinite Love cuts across finitude always from the other to the other which never returns to the sarnewand all loves so humbly alike are superbly singular Love offers finitude in its truth it is finitude s dazzling presen tation This could be said in English glamour this fascination this seduc ing splendor reserved today for the language of makeup and of the staging of faces Glamour love s preparations and promises Or perhaps love itself is eclipsed in this outburst at once because it does not stop coming and going never being simply present and because it is always put into play farther off than everything that would have to qualify it sublime love tender love foolish love implacable love pure love abandoned love Nietzsche s Zarathustra says Great loves do not want love they want more To Joy and Concern So I say it again and again pleasure is shared Lucretius In one senseand in a sense that will perhaps always conceal the totality of sense assignable as such love is the impossible and it does not arrive or it arrives only at the limit while crossing It is also for this reason that it is missed by philosophy and no less by poetry They do not miss love 100 C SHATTERED LOVE simply because they say it and because they say that it is fulfilled whether by a divine force or inthe splendor of words It is true that in saying I love you I suspend all recourse to gods as much as I put myself back in their power and that I unseat the power of words as much as I affirm that power at its peak But philosophy and poetry still feed themselves on these contradictions But there is more for in one sense nothing happens with I love you neither power nor effacernent I love you is not a perfor rnative neither is it a descriptive nor a prescriptive statement This sentence names nothing and does nothing Though spoken billions of times I loveyou is extralexicographical it is a figure whose definition cannot tran scend the heading It is the very quotsentence of indigence immediately destined to its own lie or to its own ignorance and immediately abandoned to the harassment of a reality that will never authenticate it without reserve In one sense love doesnot arrive and on the contrary it always arrives so that in one way or another the love boat has crashed against the everyday Mayakovsky But I love you which is the unique utterance of love and which is at bottom its name Iove s name is not lovequot which would be a substance or a faculty but it is this sentence the I love you just as one says the cogito the I love you is something else It is a promise The promise by constitution is an utterance that draws itself back before the law that it lets appear The promise neither describes nor prescribes nor performs It does nothing and thus is always vain But it lets a law appear the law of the given word that this must be I love you says nothing except a limit of speech but it allows to emerge the fact that love must arrive and that nothing absolutely nothing can relax divert or suspend the rigor of this law The promise does not anticipate or assure the future it is possible that one day I will no longer love you and this possibility cannot be taken away from love it belongs to it It is against this possibility but also with it that the promise is made the word given Love is its own promised eternity its own eternity unveiled as law Of course the promise must be kept But if it is not that does not mean that there was no love nor even that there was not love Love is faithful only to itself The promise must be kept and nonetheless love is not the promise plus the keeping of the promise It cannot be subjected in this way to verification to justification and to accumulation even if there are indisputably illusory or deceitful loves loves without faith and law that are no longer of love but these are counterfeits and even Don Juan is not one of them Love is the promise and its keeping the one independent of the other How could it be otherwise since one never knows what must be kept Perhaps unlike all other promises one must keep only the promise itself not its contents love but its utterance I love you That quot 39J39quotquot 3942 L SlIATTERED LOVE C3 101 is why love s ultimate paradox untenable and nonetheless inevitable is that its law lets itself be represented simultaneously by figures like Tristan and Isolde Don Juan or Baucis and Philemonwand that these figures are neither the types of a genre nor the metaphors of a unique reality but rather so many bursts of love which reflect love in its entirety each time without ever imprisoning it or holding it back When the promise is kept it is not the keeping but it is still the promise that makes love Love does not fulfill itself it always arrives in the promise and as the promise It is thus that it touches and that it traverses For one does not know what one says when one says I love you and one does not say anything but one knows that one says it and that it is law abso lutely instantly one is shared and traversed by that which does not fix itself in any subject or in any signification If one more proof or account were necessary the same holds true when one hears I love you said by an other whom one does not love and whose expectations will not be met Despite everything it cannot be that one is not traversed by something that while not love itself is nonetheless the way in which its promise touches us U Love arrives then in the promise In one sense in another sense always other always at the limit of sense it always arrives as soon as it is promised in words or in gestures That is why if we are exhausted or exasperated by the proliferating and contradictory multiplicity of represen tations and thoughts of 1ove which compose in effect the enclosure and the extenuation of a history of love this same multiplicity still offers however another thought love arrives in all the forms and in all the figures of love it is projected in all its shatters There are no parts moments types or stages of love There is only an infinity of shatters love is wholly complete in one sole embrace or in the history of a life in jealous passion or in tireless devotion It consists as much in taking as in giving as much in requiring as in renouncing as much in protecting as in exposing It is inquot the jolt and in appeasement in the fever and in serenity in the exception and in the rule It is sexual and it is not it cuts across the sexes with another difference Derrida in Ge schlechr initiated the analysis of this that does not abolish them but displaces their identities Whatever my love is it cuts across my identity my sexual property that objectification by which I am a masculine or feminine subject It is Uranian Aphrodite and Pandernian Aphrodite it is Eros Cupid Isis and Osiris Diane and Acteon Ariadne and Dionysus it l02 U SHATTERED LOVE is the princesse dc Cl ves or the enfarzt ole Boh me it is Death enlaced around a naked woman it is the letters of Hyperion of Kierkegaard or of Kafka It is perhaps thata hypothesis that I leave open here in love and in hate but according to a regime other than that of Freudian ambivalence there would not be a reversal from hate to love but in hate I would be traversed by the love of another whom I deny in his alterity Ultimately I would be traversed by this negation This would be the limit of love but still its black glimmer Peverse acts of violence or the cold rage to anni hilate are not hate From one burst to another never does love resemble itself It always makes itself recognized but it is always unrecognizable and moreover it is not in any one of its shatters or it is always on the way to not being there Its unity or its truth as love consists only in this proliferation in this indefinite luxuriance of its essence and this essence itself at once gives itself and flees itself in the crossing of this profusion Pure love refuses orgasm the seducer laughs at adoration blind to the fact that they each pass through the other even though neither stops in the other Plato had encountered the nature of Eros son of Poros and of Penia of resources and indigence love multiplies itself to infinity offering nothing other than its poverty of substance and of property But love is not polymorphous and it does not take on a series of disguises It does not withhold its identity behind its shatters it is itself the eruption of their multiplicity it is itself their multiplication in one single act of love it is the trembling of emotion in a brothel and the distress of a desire within fraternity Love does not simply cut across it cuts itself across itself it arrives and arrives at itself as that by which nothing arrives except that there is arriving arrival and departure of the other always of the other so much other that it is never made or done one malltes love be ca u 39e it ismneyeimadgj and so much other that it is never 22 love if I say to HE other rriyquotlove it is of the other precisely that I speak and nothing is mine There is no master figure there is no major representation of love nor is there any common assumption of its scattered and inextricable shatters That is why love is saturated exhausted with philosophy and poetry and threatened with falling into sexology marriage counseling newsstand novels and moral edification all at once as soon as it no longer supports its major figures sealed in the destiny of occidental love if we miss what love itself misses that it comes across and never simply comes to its place or to term that it comes across itself and overtakes itself being the finite touch of the infinite crossing of the other SHATTERED LOVE Cl 103 III What thus arrives in the crossing crosswise is not an accident of being nor an episode of existence It is an ontological determination of that existent that Heidegger names the Dasein which is to say the being in which Being is put into play The putting into play of Being in the Dasein and as the Dasein is indissociable from the following that the world of the Dasein is right away a world that I share with others or a world with Because Heidegger at the final frontier of philosophy is the first to have assigned the being with in Being itself we must consider him for a moment The world that is here in question is not an exteriority of objects nor an environment or neighborhood It designates the mode of the putting into play of Being through the Dasein Being is beingin theworld thrown abandoned offered and set free that is what in the world means If the world is Mitwelr shared world Being insofar as it is in the world is constitutively beingwith and beingaccordingtothesharing The orig inary sharing of the world is the sharing of Being and the Being of the Dasein is nothing other than the Being of this sharing One could transpose this approximately into a more classical language as follows that which confers Being on whatever it may be is that which puts in the world but the world is a with Being consists thus in being delivered to the with The Dasefrz is what it is in being originarily with others And if concern most properly creates the Being of the Daseirz concern that is to say the structure and the thrust of the existent that is offered to ahead of itself concern for the other is its constitutive determination Heidegger names it Fiirsorge concern for the other whose analysis shows that it is in its advancing as opposed to its domineering form the movement of touching the other in his own concern of restoring him to this concern or of liberating him for it instead of exempting him from it The concern for the other sends the other in sending me to himahead of him outside of him once more into the world The shared world as the world of concern for theother is a world of the crossing of singular beings by this sharing itself that constitutes them that makes them be by addressing them one to the other which is to say one by the other beyond the one and the other I am certainly betraying in part the Heideggerian description Concern or preoccupation for things and not for others that are in the world Besorgen plays a role in Heidegger parallel to the Fiirsorge and although the latter is in effect a fundamental ontological determination it does not exactly accede to the privileged position I have just given it The analytic of the beingwith remains a moment which is not returned to thematically E04 C SHATTERED LOVE in a general analytic where the Dasein appears first of all and most fre quently as in some way isolated even though Heidegger himself emphasizes that there is solitude only in and for a beingwith Moreover love is never named and consequently never furnishes as such an onto1ogico existential character although the description of Fzjlrsorge greatly resembles a certain classical description of the most demanding most noble and most spiritual love I will not undertake here the dense and meticulous explication that Heidegger s text would demand I will be content to propose dryly this double hypothesis in approaching more closely than we ever have the altered crossed by the other constitution of Being in its singularity Heidegger 1 determined the essence of the Daseirz outside of subjectivity and a fortiori outside of intersubjectivity in a beingexposed or in a beingoffered to others of which philosophy since Plato despite Plato has always been despite everything the denial and 2 kept despite himself the assignation of this Dasefn in the apparent form of a distinct individuality as much opposed as exposed to other individualities and thus irremediably kept in a sphere of autonomic if not subjective allure In accordance with these two gestures IIeidegger was prevented from summoning love to the ontological register On the one hand he could in effect only collide with the metaphysicaldialectical thinking of love which had redirected the Mir sein into the space of subjectivity On the other hand love insofar as it is traversed by Being exceeds the very movement of Fiirsorge which sur passes and liberates the other this movement is still thought starting from an I or from an identity that goes toward the other and it is not thought as what cuts across and alters I going to the other while the other comes to it It is not at all by chance that Heidegger is silent about love at least his references to Scheler his critique of the theory of empathy and at least one allusion made to love demonstrate that this silence was deliberate if it were not already obvious that it is deliberate with respect to the entire philosophical tradition Love forms the limit of a thinking that carries itself to the limit of philosophy Until thinking extricates itself it will not be able to reach love But what this thinking at its limit lets emerge could be this that one never reaches love even though love is always happening to us Or rather love is always offered to us Or yet again we are always in our Being and in us Being is exposed to love Note I will be even less explicit with L vinas than with Heidegger Every philosophical inquiry on love today Carries an obvious debt toward L vinas as well as points of proximity such as are easily detected here For Levinas cleared the path toward what one can call in the language of SIIATTERBD LOVE Cl 105 Totafiry and In nity a metaphysics of love to the point that this meta physics commands at bottom his entire oeuvre For this very reason a discussion of L vinas would have to be an enterprise distinct from this essay I should however indicate what its principle would be As a citation above recalled love remains equivocal for L vinas reducing itself to ego tisrn Its transcendence lifts the equivocation only by transcending itself into fecundity filiation and fraternity If I for my part do not thernatize such notions here it is because another work would be necessary to attempt to extract them from the oriented sequence that in L vinas in a rather classical manner hierarchizes them and prescribes them to a teleology This teleology proceeds from the first given of his thought the epiphany of the face love is the movement stressed by this epiphany a movement that transcends it in order to reach beyond the face beyond vision and the you the hidden never hidden enough absolutely ungraspable 5 From this vertigo that no signification any longer clarifies that of the Eros the fraternity of children lifting its equivocation can emerge the fraternity of children in which again the epiphany of the face is produced Love thus retains at least certain traits of a dialectical moment It retains them it seems to me due to the motif of the face The latter signifies the primordial relation as the expression of another and as signification Because this signification is given at the beginning it must disappear within love and be recaptured in its surpassing I can on the contrary grasp the relation with the face only as second and as constituted L vinas opposesquot it and preposes it to the unveiling of Being in general a Ileideggerian theme in which he sees the absolute indetermination of the there is of an existing without existentsincessant negation infinite limitation anarchic I can be in solidarity with Le39vinas s distaste for certain accents shall we say of dereliction in Heidegger s discourse But in the es gibr it gives itself of Being one can see everything except generality There is the each time anarchic in fact or even archiarchic as Derrida might say of an existing singular occurrence There is no existing without existents and there is no existing by itself no concept it does not give r39tself but there is always being precise and hard the theft of the generality Being is at stake there it is in shatters offered dazzling multiplied shrill and singular hard and cut across its being is there Beingwith is consti tutive of this stake and that is what L vinas before anyone understood But beingwith takes place only according to the occurrence of being or its posing into shatters And the crossing the comingandgoing the com ingsandgoings of loveis constitutive of the occurrence This takes place before the face and signification Or rather this takes place on another level at the heart of being I I06 Cl SHATTERED LOVE IV We are exposed by concern not that which we hold for the other but by this concern this solicitude this consideration and this renunciation for the other that cuts across us and does not come back to us that comes and goes incessantly as the beingother of the other inscribed in being itself at the heart of being or as the promise of being This concern exposes us to joying To joy is no more impossible as Lacan wanted it than possible as the sexologist would want it To joy is not an eventuality that one might expect that one might exclude or that one might provoke To joy is not a fulfillment and it is not even an event Nonetheless it happens it arrivesand it arrives as it departs it arrives inudeparting and it departs in the arrival in the same beat of the heart gr To joy is the crossing of the other The other cuts across me I cut across it Each one is the other for the other but also for the self In this sense one joys in the other for the self to be passed to the other This is the syncope of identity in singularity A syncope the step marked in a suspense from the other to me neither confusion nor fading clarity itself the beating ltLt39 the heart the cadence and the cut of another heart within it Everything has been said of joying as of love but this word resists It is the verb of love and this verb speaks the act of joy the for of courtly love Something resists through these two words that are only one the u overwhelming exhaustiveness of discourses on love It is not so much a result or discharge as Freud says and as it is said vulgarly as an acute insistence the very formation of a shatter one might say like Deleuze a hardening that is one with love It is not something unspeakable because it is spoken the joy is named but it is something with which discourses narratives and poems can never be even They have never said it enough having always discoursed it too much declared it too much Joy isthe trembling of a deliverance beyond all freedom it is to be cut across undone it is to bejoyed as much as to joy Love is joy accompanied by the idea of an exterior cause writes Spinoza and he specifies that with this joy it is not a matter of desire for this definition explains with enough clarity the essence of love Regarding that of the authors who define love as the will of he who loves to join himself to the loved object it does not express the essence of love but its property But we have to push the idea of an exterior cause to this to be joyed to face the extremity of being which is to say at once its completion and its limit beyond desire or short of it This is joy and this also reflects on the essence of chagrin and of pain For joy is not appeasement but a serenity without rest To joy is not to be satisfied it is to be filled overflowed It is to be cut across without even being able to hold onto what to joy makes happen SHATTERED LOVE Cl 107 To joy cannot contain itself Joy is not even to contain joy itself nor the pain that consequently accompanies it The joy of joying does not come back to anyone neither to me nor to you for in each it opens the other In the one and the other and in the one by the other joyquot offers being itself it makes being felt shared Joy knows concern and is known by it Joy makes felt and it lets go the very essence of the sharing that is being Although it means diverting the sentence from its proper context I will cite Michel Henry Far from coming after the arrival of being and mar veling before it joy is consubstantial with it founds it and constitutes it This puts one beside oneself this irritates and exasperates and the language for saying it is exasperated It would be better to let another speak and in a language that would remain somewhat on the side7 Laura the basilisk made entirely of asbestos walking to the fiery stake with a mouth full of gum Hunkydory is the word on her lips The heavy fluted lips on the sea shell Laura s lips the lips of lost Uranian love All floating shadowward through the slanting fog Last murmuring dregs of shelllike lips slipping off the Labrador coast oozing eastward with the mud tides easing starward in the iodine drift I kept it up like a Juggernaut Moloch fucking a piece of bornbazine Organza Friganza The bolero in straight jabs We embraced one another silently and then we slid into a long fuck Henry Miller But this is shared too much within the other It is not that identity in joying simply loses itself It is there at its peak There is in fact too much identity and joying opens the enigma of that which in the syncope of the subject in the crossing of the other affirms an absolute self To joy poses without reserve the question of the singular being which we are no doubt barely on the way to broaching It is the question of that which remains self when nothing returns to the self the very question of love if love is always proffered I love you and ifjoy coming from the other coming and going is however always mine It is the question of a presence to joy is an extremity of presence self exposed presence ofselfjoying outside itself in a presence that no present absorbs and that does not represent but that offers itself endlessly To try to enter into the question one could say at least this self that joys joys of its presence in the presence of the other He she is only the presence of the reception of the other presence and the latter cuts across The presence that cuts across is a burst To joy joy itself is to receive the burst of a singular being its more than manifest presence its seeming beyond all appearance ekphanestatoh Plato said But it is by oneself also that he she who joys is bedazzled It is in himself thus that he is delighted I03 Cl SHATTERED LOVE But he does not belong to himself and he does not come back to himself he is shared like the joy he shares What appears in this light at once excessive and impeccable what is offered like a belly like 1 kissed mouth is the singular being insofar as it is this self that is neither a subject nor an individual nor a communal being but that she or he which cuts across that which arrives and departs The singular being affirms even better its absolute singularity which it offers only in passing which it brings about immediately in the crossing What is offered through the singular being through you or me across this relation that is only cut across is the singularity of being which is to say this that being itself being taken absolutely is absolutely singular thus it would be that which remains self when nothing comes back to the self This constitution is buried at the heart of being but it emerges in outbursts of joy One could say being joys One would thus define an ontological necessity of love But love is neither unique nor necessary It comes it is offered it is not established as a structure of being or as its principle and even less as its subjectivity One would thus define a necessity without a law or a law without necessity thus the heart of being within love and love in surplus of being One could say at the limit the fun damental ontology and the caprices of love The correlation would neither be causal nor expressive nor essential nor existential nor of any other known genre Perhaps it would no longerbe necessary to speak of correlation But there is this brilliant shattering constitution of being Love does not define it but it names it and obliges us to think it Postscriptum You wrote It might well be appropriate that a discourse on love be at the same time a communication of love a letter a rnissive since love sends itself as much as it enunciates itself But you didn t send this text to anyone And you know very well that that doesn t mean that you sent it to everyone One can t love everyone But a letter a missive once published is no longer a missive It is a citation or a mimicking of one About how many poets do the biographers or the critics tell us that their poems are far from the reality of their loves And don39t you think that I love you by itself is already a citation Listen to Valery To say to anyone I love you is to recite a lesson It was never invented Recitation for citation you might have risked that You might have risked playing at losing the distance of discourse I didn t want to I was afraid if I played that game that it would be even more discourse and not necessarily more love SHATTERED LOVE Cl 109 And nonetheless aren t you ever touched by a poem by a letter by a dialogue of love And do you really believe that your love if you have one how could one know owes nothing to these public dispatches I know I know my debt and I know that I don t pay returns But you also read that I would want to be exempt from love to be even with it The splinters that cut across me coming from another from you perhaps or coming from me that is still something other than love other than this burden of the word and its declaration It is lighter more relaxed it is not subject to the grandiloquence of love There is then no excess no infinite transport in this raving it must be only this other Only him her to whom you send your love and if not there is no love But each time and even if you switched every day and even if you love several at a time love is addressed to one alone singularly and infinitely does not your lightness forget that No I haven t forgotten that But this infinity is minute and the words of love are too big for it Or rather they are really too small I don t know anymore I should perhaps give them all to you send them all to you all imprinted as one touches everywhere the minute infinity of skin with impatience with this boundless disorder that never finds an order or a measure except by being always shaken always broken rushed to rnul tiply itself a nervousness of fingers on masses on flanks and in secret foldswith nothing more that is secret in the end I should have sent everything a thousand pages of love and not one word on it to you alone All the words of love from everyone It would have flown into pieces barely thrown toward you as it always flies into pieces as soon as it is sent Yes it s made for that Translated by Lisa Garbus and Simona Sawhney FACULTY JEANLUC NANCY ARTICLES LOVE AND COMMUNiTY Biography j Bibliography Articles Lectures i Photoswmmmjuvideos 1 Quotes Links I LOVE AND COMMUNITY A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION WITH J EANLUC NANCY AVITAL RONELL AND WOLFGANG SCHIRMACHER AUGUST 2001 Schirmacher It s a rare opportunity to have one of the most important and most intriguing European philosophers among us He has agreed instead of giving a lecture to participate in an open round table which is intended for questions and answers and for open discussion We are asking him questions and he will tell us how wrong our questions are To the students in his class he said so much about the body that we are kind of fed up with it So the body will not be the main topic in the beginning at least He wants to be asked questions about politics art and community I don t know whether you want to start Avital or if we should see whether somebody already has a question for asking Ronell I would be happy to start unless someone wishes to have the floor as we say in English Only to break the ice in case there is some ice This a very simple question it39s not what you are used to as an intervention which would have involved a very elaborate recapitulation of some of your work I don t know if you recall one of the texts that you wrote that is the most startling and in a good sense destructive for people in other words it has a transformative quality and some people are blown away by it it s precisely the text called quotShattered Lovequot It has changed lives it has devastated it has created ecstatic recognitions and dis identifications breakups new fusions and so on multiplied the whole notion of a possible couple and given different modalities of loving and love Now I wanted to ask you about your love butl also read somewhere where you had something to say to displace the Lacanian insistence on lack and now you are teaching Christianity to us I wonder whether this created an interference with the kind of ecstatic love that seemed possible in quotShattered Lovequot This text is particularly powerful not only because it is an amazing text but also because I remember working on its translation It somehow inscribed itself inside me somewhere Nancy I can demonstrate that your question is false because it is not a question but a demand Of course as every demand is a demand of love everybody sees that everyday This text has something to do with what I am working now as you mentioned I am also working on what I have called a deconstruction of Christianity which asks what can we grasp from Christianity or what is it that remains after its sef deccnstruction I believe without a doubt that Christianity has already deconstructed itself that it has opened up a space to let us see something which was always present in it but unseen and unseeable until now Among those things that perhaps remain from Christianity belonging to it as a precondition that Christianity itself doesn t know but at the same time is recovered by the repressive power of religion is of course love This is the famous Christian love which is nothing but impossible love Because first and foremost Christian love is a command a command to love everybody which is obviously impossible I simply ask myself about that would not precisely the impossibility of this love be the very thing that produces the very concept content and reality of this love As every construction deconstructs itself in a certain way so the command of love as impossible is one of those things on which Western thinking as Christian is structured organized and derived from This is for me a refiection which started a long time ago when reading quotCivilization and its Discontentsquot There Freud writes about how civilization is sick and how to cure it because of course psychoanalysis can t be used to cure the collective In one place he writes that of course the anwer of Christian love seems to be the best answer but I m afraid he writes with irony that it is not practiceable I thought that precisely this is the point The fact that it is impossible is why it is the answer Now if you think about it this is precisely the definition of love that Lacan gives Lacan s definition is that love consists in giving what one does not have Of course this is a definition by impossibility because how can you give what you don39t have We don t need to be Christian or to have a Christian face to agree that Lacarrs definition is a Christian one To give what I don t have is precisely not to give something I would have so it must mean not to give anything of the order of anything that could be given No to give something that doesn39t belong to the realm of give able things neither that nor to give myself because one could be seduced by the idea quotyes this means to give myselfquot it myself is once again something I could give then this myself is only the myself which I have Then this definition means that love consists in giving something which is nothing Nothing has to do with what is not a thing not at all a thing then what is not a thing what is not an object If you want this is a subject But this doesn t really mean to give the subject as the subject would be once again some thing that I would be Love consists in my giving from me what is not mine in any sense of a possible possession of mine not even my person So to love means to give what is behind or beyond any subject any self It is precisely a giving of nothing a giving of the fact that I cannot possess myself This is to abandon because in that case I would say that to give is the same as to abandon In French I would say dormer is the same as abandonner Because to give in French is donner Schirmacher To give up Nancy Ah that is wonderful To give is to give up So yes perhaps that could be meaning of quotshatteredquot and thus of the title to this ancient text you refer to that is that tolove means in one way to give the self as possession the self as present to itself and in another way to give and to abandon to the other something that the other himself has to say that it is in the same way for himself because he is as well a self In other words love is to share the impossibility of being a self I think that in that way this is perhaps a means to understand Christian love with all its impossibility with all its absurdities contradictions and denials within the context of the church but outside of the church as well So with all that has been done against this idea of love this idea still did organize something in Western thinking and it is the point where we are today I think that we all share something of this idea even if we share nothing else with Christianity and then I could say that for me it gives two further possibilities One is to think of the community not as a totality in which the people would have to share a common being that is a common possession a common body if you want quotbodyquot taken in the sense of an organized whole organized entity We think the body of political thought not as an organicity but of community as the living to share precisely an impossibility of being in common I would say the community of love is a community living to share the absence of common being Not the absence of being in common but the absence of common being There is no common property and that is what we have to share That39s the first extension of this idea of love The second is that there is then a way from this idea to understand what Christianity meant by quotloving one39s neighborquot Ronellz quotLove our neighborquot it s a big problem Nancy You know the place in the gospel where the meaning of the neighbor is explained some Pharisian asks Jesus quotWho is my nearest or my neighborquot and Jesus answers with the parable of the good Samaritan A man was wounded and lying on the side of the road and a priest a Jewish priest of course passes and does nothing and there is no one finally comes a Samaritan who stops and heals the poor man39s wounds and pays for a place for him to stay Then Jesus asks quotwho was the neighbour of this poor manquot That is the core of the Christian story that the neighbour is everybody without any distinction That is something that is also at the core of the whole structure of Western thinking a thinking of equality and perhaps to a certain extent of the fraternity of all men Then what does that mean Precisely if you think about how difficult it is to love your neighbor I don t know in Manhattan perhaps but I think that the quotnearestquot is absolutely not the nearest in any sense of neighborhood nor the nearest by place nor the nearest by taste nor the nearest according to my desire etc The nearest is everybody to the extent that everybody shares with me the same impossibility of being or becoming the fixed enunciation of a certain position Of course everyone is different the woman the man the blond this one is brown is tail is small is I don39t know is French is American is intelligent is stupid is strong is weak etc However all those properties are precisely only properties and if love consists in giving what is not a property then it consists precisely in this common unproperty Which means then that this love doesn39t say anything against love in the ordinary sense but perhaps we should refer to ordinary love as predilection One could say that the ordinary love of lovers is a predilection a preference which is based on distinction This is this one I love and not the other one but then we could analyse how even in this predilection the love as impossible is present Or how predilection very quickly becomes a kind of possession For now I would say that it makes understandable how impossible love consists in loving without any predilection and that explains how it can become the idea quotto love one s enemyquot which is the top of absurdity To love my enemy does not mean that I should have a predilection for my enemy as he is my enemy I hate him and I fight him instead i should think of the enemy as my enemy but also as a subject who has no more or less properties than me because he or she has no properties I would just perhaps add a footnote regarding Lacan Everywhere in Lacan s system you have this haunting nothingness which here gives perhaps a certain pessimistic or ironic sound to his de nition of love quotto give what you don t havequot but perhaps this is not the only side of Lacan s thinking here Although there is so much in Lacan about an originary lack and so on ljust want to insist that I would underline that the impossibility of love should not be interpreted as a lack as a originary lack because every iack is to be filled if possible Love means precisely to fill the emptiness with emptiness and thus to share it Schirmacher Thank you for your open lecture I knew I only had to make Avital ask a question to give us the lecture Let me just to make a small remark as you know this guy was not invited to tell you some truth He is here to introduce you to a certain way of approaching things As you see he gives with one hand and takes away with the other If you know Derrida you know then that one of his teachers made him do it But what he does better than Derrida is that something very uid very imperceptible appears in this discussion of the possibility of impossible love The possibility starts as an opening in which something appears which cannot be grasped but can only be lived in a certain way So he gives to us by taking away Forget Derrida he just gives more more than I can take OK so in this respect I invited him my idea was to get any political thinker nowadays who I could respect because normally I have total distaste for politics In this respect anything political as such relies on an outdated misused concept going back to Aristotle you should throw it away and never talk about it because they are using it to make you to do things to bring you together to fight or to kill whatev Az quot v39394 39 share because as a community it is impossible to do so This sounds very vague it sounds like nothing compared to all these big promises we have about what will happen if we have community but this vagueness is i think worthwhile to explore Audience But isn t Derrida39s idea of the gift what you are implying with the idea of giving what you don39t have Nancy Yes yes this is somewhere almost the same but I don39t think that he says this in relation to love What Derrida adds is around the same point his main thought is quotto givequot cannot succeed if the giver knows about his gift so quotto givequot needs to be imperceptible Now concerning the quotimperceptiblequot we can comment about how I can give myself my gift ifl return my gift to myself to say that psychologically when I think I make a gift I think that is very Christian you know This is also in the gospel that you are quite unsure not knowing what your left hand is doing In addition the task of love is demanded so strongly that I will answer its call even if I shall not receive any gratification in return from the love This we could say makes this love absolutely unpresentable and even in the feeling in which this love is not a feeling and nevertheless should be a way of feeling this is where we might feel the nothlngness of predilections I return intentionally to the quotnothlngnessquot to say to Wolfgang that with the nothing one has always to think that quotnothingquot is not nothing Nothing is something it is a something of no thing in English you can do that this is quotnothingquot in French I can do that with the word rien You know in French rien means nothing but what is very interesting is that rien comes from the accusative form rem from the word res which means thing Res comes reality reality is from res Now I don39t know the entire etymological derivation but rien became nothing by the way of meaning a thing a small thing a very small thing the smallest possible thing and then not even rien Audience Could you say that if you say that nothing is like not really nothing could you say that nothing is not neo nihilism Nancy Exactly thank you very much for introducing this very important word Precisely nothing is nothing nihilist All these questions are somehow about what we should do with nihilism That is sure that we are in the middle of nihilism That means we have no longer have a heaven of value or a tradition or a natureThis is precisely the 39 reason for what we have in so different a manner to do with the nothingness which precisely is not nihilistic if we go a step further with nothing we say that nothing is nothing What is no thing This is i would say is everything which is not a thing You and me for example Who here would accept to be a thing So perhaps this is a very very important point It is told that Archimedes said quotgive me the right point and i will move the worldquot that the mechanics of it if you have the right point you can move a very heavy mass with a short stick Now this is perhaps the academic point for us exactly the point where we can sublate the nihilismus and turn nihilismus is something This is very important because to the nihilismus as Nietzsche said there are only two issues One is to try to replace the nihil as the emptiness of heaven the absence of Gods of sense of value etc by taking all Gods all values all sense and again and again trying to fill the holes which is already done all day Perhaps I would say the whole story of the twentieth century will one day appear as a story of a civilization desperately seeking to fill the hole value value and something more this is what we were talking about in class speaking of what Bergson calls the supplementary soul Bergson says that this world needs a supplementary soul A soul however cannot be supplementary Then either there is a way which is desperate or of course there is the nihilistic way in which we destroy The people who call themselves destroyers were literally the nihilismus Lastly the third and quite different way is perhaps precisely to understand how nothing is not a thing Ronell This will allow us to talk about the difference in a certain way between community and politics if we briefly consider the so called quothippie movementquot in America which was at one point a movement under the signi er of love which we are talking about Nancy Yes precisely this is a way of speaking about community and politics Today I think there cannot be a politics of love because if love is what I tried to say it excludes a certain fulfillment that politics implies The space of politics shall be a fulfillment totally organized although this doesn39t mean totalitarianism It has to be the law and here we could say that the law is that what I call here fulfillment or a closed space Precisely with what I said about love can be said in another way by saying the quotlaw of lovequot This is a very Christian expression the law of love which is only a law to the extent that there is precisely no law or that there is no closure of the law or that in love we find the achievement of law Love is the achievement of law which means that love is beyond law or that the law of love is a law commanding and indicating something beyond law That is for me the reason to think that community is one thing and politics another Of course politics belongs to community but politics is not everything If politics is taken as equally co extensive and homogeneous to community we are very quickly in totalitarianism This is because we say everything is political and if everything is directly ontologically political that means very simply that everything belongs to law 80 I can make law about anything about food about art about love as predilection There is a very ancient and not by chance quasioriginary model for that in Plato You know it is often said that the politics of Plato is quite totalitarian because Plato says that the law can and must say which man has to be married to which women which child has to be saved how you have to educate etc Why Because the politics of Plato is a politics which conceives of thought as founded on something namely on ontology theology etc The politics of Aristotle is quite contrary For some reason it is only the way of Plato which determines a certain thinking of politics This is the way of thinking that Karl Schmidt named political theology i think when we are in a world where there is no meaning to provide this kind of foundation as a transcendent foundation when we are in the world without God precisely the world of nihilism it is absolutely normal and natural to succumb to the temptation to ontologize the community as such to proclaim that the totality of the community and of mankind should be the foundation of politics This is Rousseau To a certain extent this is a extraordinary ambiguity in Rousseau in the quotSocial Contractquot this book is at the same time a book not about foundation but about creation the selfcreation of mankind as such Man comes from the contract and not the reverse because if it was the reverse it would be quite different thing from the contract which was already by Hobbes or Spinoza for example After that when Rousseau tries to found a politics on this ontological selfproduction of mankind he describes his politics and then he writes quotBut such a constitution would be good only for a people of Godsquot So this is a reason for why there is such an ambiguity in Rousseau and for why some people still now explain how Rousseau is the roots of totalitarianism I think that for us now it is very important to learn about the distinction of acommunity as such for example to think of it as among other ways a way of love and to think of politics as a special order where of course the community has to establish a law to guarantee management as a management ofjustice equality the rule etc I was smiling when I say management because while I should be ashamed to speak of politics in terms of management I think this is precisely today a serious question to know in what extent there is not something I don t speak of the politics of the managers but in Europe today there is always always the leftist critique which goes quotThose socialists are only managers They do nothing but manage the capitalquot This is precisely a very important point of course there are different ways of managing but if such a sentence can be a total radical critique that presupposes rst that we know what other than the capital we could right now propose Secondly that implies that we have an idea of politics which immediately goes far beyond any management which is not only the law but the total being of community That is exactly what we have learned in about the middle of the twentieth century Schirmacher OK now I have to bring some order here because I see that Nancy You are the law the state everything you hate So now we can make a revolution Schirmacher Now I want to collect your questions and let JeanLuc answer them altogether Audience Your concept of community and of BeingV th reminded me very much about the way Wittgenstein talks about concepts He says that a type of bird isn t defined by a specific characteristic but by a group of characteristics that the birds say nightingales have They don t each have the same characteristic but instead each one has a characteristic in common with another one I also wondered although you can use your concept to define community how can you use it to de ne different communities Audience George Bataille say that we communicate across our common psychological lacerations cutsquot You describe it as touching can you elaborate on what the difference might be for example in either a restricted or a general economy Audience You ve stated that if communication communicates anything it39s intensities forces and effects and hardly concepts Why exclude concepts aren t they a valid way of sensing the world Can a concept or a general abstraction be something that is sensual Audience When you speak of love and sharing of nothingness how does that apply to the body Not explicitly in an erotic sense but in the body as a presence and how that also extends into community Audience I would like you to elaborate more on to what extent we can speak about politics as an aesthetic project We could speak about it in relation to the individual because in the social field it could be dangerous Audience in your concept of community does that necessitate enemies as well as friends Audience I would want to know about your conception of Christian love in relation to anarchism Ulmer The room here is full of critics learners beginning scholars people who have to face Wolfgang with their dissertation ideas I wonder if you could in your response provide some rnetacornmentary on your thinking process how you can start talking about the love the way you do it can seem perhaps magical or mysterious for those who aren39t intimately aware of the philosophical tradition Nancy Until Greg s question almost all the questions made it possible to give one answer to all of them There were many questions about a community as specific structure of being with And to say first regarding the Wittgensteinian nightingale I would say what interests me is that is the different are together The question is what is quotto be withquot which as you know is a question that Vwttgenstein did address Wittgenstein is aware of and very attentive to the singularity as such and to what makes it possible to share something singular First it is a question which comes to me through Heidegger because he is the first to introduce a very simple almost selfevident concept of BeingVl th There is however a very strange thing in quotSein und Zeitquot that besides so many precise long and complicated analyses he makes no analysis of the quotWithquot as such and that seems to be very important perhaps because the quotWithquot is a quasi empty category for all philosophy The whole scheme of our culture knows very well what is to be in or out to be and to identify with something or to be totally exterior to it to be homogeneous or heterogeneous But to Be With this is the same thing to say that the glass is with the pen on the table and quotbe onquot is a way to quotbe withquot or I am with Wolfgang and Avital on this side of the table you are each with the other What is that In a certain way this is nothing because quotI and Wolfgangquot to a certain extent are like quotthe glass and the penquot we have nothing to do with the other Then you39ve got a iot more to do First because he is the director I am the teacher etc and perhaps if we go a little further we find that we are two human beings so we share A r 14 in something biologically etc So the quotwithquot has very interesting property in that it shows a proximity it implies a proximity and so once again we have the quotnearestquot But it is proximity without recovering one through the other If the pen is hidden behind the glass you can t say that they are quotwithquot Or if I hide myself behind Wolfgang there is no longer Jean Luc with Wolfgang So quotWithquot implies proximity and distance precisely the distance of the impossibility to come together in a common being That is for me the core of the question of community community doesn39t have a common being a common substance but consists in beingin common from the starting point it s a sharing but sharing what Sharing nothing sharing the space between quotWithquot is in a certain way always between or implies an in between and so from there we can go to the question which Victor asks Yes I would say that what I take here from Bataille is of course this central meaning that communication implies a gap between the one and the other and that communication is not a continuous transmission because the continuous transmission is a transmission of a information Information is a concept What I don t share absolutely with Bataille is the way he goes from that gap to the cut and then slowly to the sacrifice which implies that there is still another realm a sacred realm to which I could transfer something In the end however Batallle did himself write quotwhat I call the sacred is nothing else than the communication of passionsquot and from there we could return to love etc regarding passion and once again for you the man with the concept in the communication it shall still be a communication of passion even if it is through or by the means of concept This is in a certain way like Kant who wrote 3939I cannot read Rousseau without being too much troubled and so I have to read Rousseau twice because the first time I could not sustain my emotionquot It is perhaps a very good example of communication between men of concepts I think that touching seems to me to indicate the same thing That is the distance in the approach but it avoids all questions of cutting sacri ce etc I disagree as well with Bataille who is always presenting the sex of the woman as a wound because it implies that there is some penetration into the flesh Sex doesn t cut the body any more than the mouth or the anus or any bodily ori ce cuts the body It is an opening which is something different This is why regarding eroticism I like to say there is no penetration that penetration in a certain way has no proper meaning To penetrate is to enter into the internal structure of the matter but in physical love as well as in spiritual it is the same there is no penetration info there is everywhere only a touching Schirmacher But excuse me are you saying that there is no penetration because I can still remember this act you know it was long time ago Nancy But penetration where Schirmacher The penis in the vagina Your parents haven t told you about that Ronell I remember that once you said that there is a prejudice an assumption that the vaginal structure is an interiority Nancy This is exactly what I mean It39s a topological issue for me the body is first a hole a tube if you want and around the tube is a skin The first character of this topoiogy is that it is a resounding thing The air can go through the tube and you have the skin over it and you produce music The body is first a certain sound and that sound is the voice And yes with a little more time I would claim that to make love is to produce a sound sometimes a real sound even with words but even in the silence there is a certain sound that is a certain resonance resounding or vibration The only place where the two lovers can really penetrate themselves into each other and become one thing is in the grave like it is in the story of Tristan and Isolde There is one flower the rose grows from the grave of Tristan and goes into that of Isolde I would argue that the community is always a community of BeingWith that the V th is characterised by the touch and that the touch is characterised both by proximity and by distance but by proximity as distance In the touch you still need to have both This is the impossibility of penetration The conclusion then is that a community is a community of bodies and nothing else This doesn t mean that it is a community like the glass and the pen It means that to be quotin commonquot we need the exteriority of the bodies contrary to the very old model where the community should become a pure community of spirits becoming One Spirit Now to return just for one moment to Christianity in this very point there is an enormous ambiguity within Christianity which gives the model of one body for all This model is called the mystical body of Christ Normally the mystical body of Christ was understood as a unique body of all men but a couple of theologians even understood it as a totality of the universe At the same time however in a way which for Christianity is quite contradictory the singularity of each man not only of each man but of each creature of God each being is impossible to suppress And that is the meaning of the resurrection The resurrection is a resurrection of the body The resurrected body is not precisely a spirit but a body to be touched or not touched You know the story about Jesus and Magdalene quotDon t touch meIquot All this means that a community as a community of bodies means a community of mutual presentation of the common absence of common substance Which is another way to say what Lacan says with the father as being quotbecause ofquot the mother as a common substance However to become an individual means precisely to go out of the common substance and then even the brother and the sister are separated from the substance The father then is a common law suppressed as death the father is a dead father as it is said by Lacan The only thing that I disagree with there is precisely that Lacan needs once again a figure of lack of castration and so the figure of the center of signification is an empty center a zero point I prefer to take that in the way of the nothing as I did before So then you are asking about the community s relation to its enemies What I said about love did already answer to the question of the enemy I answer that the meaning of quotto love even the enemyquot is the meaning of love understood as having nothing to do with predilection such as friendship or what is the contrary hostility Schirmacher The question was about the community and not about love There is still a difference between love and community Nancy Yes but rst I wanted to say that love gives the rule of community in general but now we should add that the predilection is not simply something other and that the difficulty of absolute love of impossible love is that it has to deal with possible love as predilection This is because possible love is not only the possible it is necessary It is necessary that there are certain links certain proximities between groups of people etc and the fact that there are friendships and hostilities has to be taken as such The question is only to know if a positive community or a community of predilection has to totally exclude the other communities or not Now without the general rule of the impossible love why would community not exclude the other that is to kill it Once again this is a question of substance identity and subjectivity and if the community of predilection thinks of itself as being natural as being a substance as a race given by nature such as Ayrian or Serbian or Croatian or Macedonian or the Hutu or the Tutsi this community has an absolute right in a certain way to kill all the others because it is the only community and has no ground for the existence of other communities Then the question is simply not only the structure of the community of predilection but to understand how the communities have to be related to each other Then we can begin to examine the relations between community art and politics So I agree with you but my answer would be that politics can be an aesthetic project only in relationship to the individual not as a social project This is what I formulate by saying politics is not everything and then I think it is better to think that politics doesn t39have to become an aesthetic project if politics is a general andclosed law The law has nothing to say about beauty And as it is known the Nazism can be interpreted as LacoueLabalthe did as a national aestheticism Schirmacher Ah bravol Nancy No I could not disagree but anyway there s no need to No no I did not answer to Greg his question is so different so original that I am a little paralysed by it but I understand very well why you pose it Do I have a method I don t know But simply I think I was educated and more than educated I was brainwashed and touched by a certain number of persons because it was the first time that I heard somebody teaching about Hegel in a certain way That touched me even ifl did not understand very much at the time I was also affected by all those people people like Ricoeur Derrida Canguilhem and other people who are not known and I would say came from outside This is perhaps now why I am always thinking by the outside Of course I speak of living people because when I am speaking of touching first I think through those who are living What I mean is that they all gave me a quantity of imposed ideas and then I tried to work with that This is why I don t think I have so much in proper philosophy with me and that is why I have difficulty answering when I am asked about my concept of something But I think that I have no one concept What is present in contemporary thinking is all of our common problem You are exposed to that you take one part another and so this is a little bricolage there But in accordance with LeviStrauss bricolage is as rational as the scientific method Schirmacher Thank you very much It is very hard for the artist to think about his own method because we do it for him and he doesn39t do it any more top American Imago Studies in Psychoanalysis and Culture ISSN 0065860X Volume 50 Number 3 September 1993 Copyright 1993 by The Johns Hopkins University Press All rights reserved No portion of this journal may be reproduced by any process or technique without the formal consent of The johns Hopkins University Press Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use or the internal or personal use of speci c clients is granted by The Johns Hopkins University Press for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center CCC Transactional Reporting Service provided that the base fee of 325 per article is paid directly to ICC 527 Congress Street Salem MA 01970 This consent does 19 extend to other kinds of copying such as copying for general distribution for advertising or promotional purposes for creating new collective works or for resale 0065BBOXIQ3 325 Frequency of publication quarterly March June September December Subscription price individuals 529 institutions 63 students 27 Subscribers in Canada and Mexico add 295 postage others outside the US add 540 Please direct all subscription inquiries and business communications to the publisher The Johns Hopkins University press journals Publishing Division 2715 North Charles Street Baltimore MD 212184319 Phone 410 5166987 FAX 410 5166968 TollFree 18005481784 Contributors See page iv Secondclass postage paid at Baltimore Maryland and additional mailing of ces Postmaster send address changes to American Imago The johns Hopkins University Press 2715 North Charles Street Baltimore MD 212184319 Typeset by Capitol Communications Crofton MD printed at The Sheridan Press Hanover PA This journal is printed on acidfree paper The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sci ences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials ANSI Z39481984 39I This journal is a member of E1 the Council of Editors of Learned journals American Imago is abstracted and indexed in Abstracts of English Studies Annual Bib liography afEng i5h Language and Literature Arts and Humanities Citation Index B og39rt1p By Inciwc Chemical Abstracts Current Contents Film Literature Index Index Medicus Magazine I Indezc Middle East Abstracts and Index MLA International Bibliography Psychological Abstmcts39Reader s Guide Recently Pmblzlshed Articles and Social Science Citation Index Back issues of Volumes 135 are available from KrausThomson Organization Ltd Route 100 Millwood NY 10456 Volumes from 36 on are available through The Johns Hopkins University Press 2715 North Charles Street Baltimore MD 21218 quot 4319 AMERICAN Studies in Psychoanalysis and Culture Volume 58 F311 1993 CONTENTS LOVE Thomas Keenan Special Editor THOMAS KLEENAN Editor39s Note LYNNE Truman Love Sentence ALEXANDER GARCIA IKJTTMANN What is called love in all the languages and SLl 11C S of the world Nietzsche Genealogy Contingtncr CLAIRE NOUVET On the Way Toward Love Jacques Dnnmoa Politics of Friendship No 3 253 255 277 325 353 Flquot 1 V 39tr 39 39 39 JACQUES DERRIDA Politics of Friendship O mes amis il n y nul amy O my friends there is no friendquot In addressing you in this way perhaps I have not yet said anything Perhaps I have not even addressed myself to you On the two sides of a comma or a pause the two parts of this sentence seem incompatible with each other destined to annihilate themselves in their contradiction And rst I have not yet said anything in my own name I have contented myself with quoting Spokesman for another I have reported his words which belong in the first place to a foreign or even rather archaic language I have then signed nothing put nothing on my own account O my friends there is no friend This is not merely a citation which I am reading at present it was already the quotation by another reader of the country I come from Montaigne it is a saying which he says Aristotle was used to repeatirigf In other words I have quoted the quotation of a saying attributed to Aristotle a saying whose origin seems to lose itself in the anonymity of time immemorial None theless it is not one of those proverbs without an assignable origin and whose aphoristic mode rarely takes the form of an apostrophe i This meditation on friendship should also involve at the very same time a study of quotation and of the quotation of an apostrophe What happens when one quotes an apos nophe Later on we will connect these themes to those of the friend s name and death of memoirs and of testaments In the Eudemian Ethics VII 4 1239 a 3540 Aristotle in scribes friendship knowledge and death within the same con guration in a constellation whose necessity gives much Translated by Gabriel Motzkin and Michael Syrotinski with Thomas Keenan Portions of this essay originally appeared in Thejomvzal ofPzilo5ophy Vol LXXXV No 11 November 1988 63244 Reprinted by permission of the author and The faumal of Philosophy American Imago V01 50 No 3 353391 is 1993 by Thejohns Hopkins University Press 353 354 Politics of Friendship to think about He begins by remarking that in friendship it is more appropriate to love than to be loved which somewhat complicates the mutualist and if I may say so the reciprocahst schema that he seems to privilege elsewhere He goes on to give a proof of this If a friend had to choose between knowing and being known he would choose knowing rather than being known To make this point clear Aristotle gives the example of what women do in Antiphotfs Andromache they put their children in the care of a nurse and love them without seeking to be loved in return They know themselves to loving they know that they love and whom they love while accepting that they are neither known nor loved in return To want to be known or loved Aristotle then says is an egoisttc feeling and he concludes It is for this reason that we praise those who continue to love their dead ones for they know but are not known Friendship for one who is dead thus carries this philia to the limit of its possibility is this asym metry consistent with the law of symmetry and with other Aristotelian axioms such as for example the one according to which the friend is another self who must have the feeling of his own existence or the one according to which friendship proceeds from selflove p On the subject of the death of friends of memory 7 of testaments let us recall to begin with that the chain of this citation of a citation O my friends there 15 no friend reaches like the heritage of a boundless rumor across the philosophical literature of the West from Aristotle to Kant to Blanchot from Montaigne to Nietzsche who reverses it this way in a passage from Human All Too Human Perhaps the hour of joy die freudigere Sttmde will also come on a day when each Wlll say too er sagt Freunde es gibt keme Freunde so nef tier sterbende Weiss Feinde es gibt keinen Feind mf ich der lebende Tim Friends there are no friends cried the dying W156 man Jacques Derrida 39 355 Enemies there are no enemiesquot cry I the living madman T Von den F reunden 376 1980 2263 N86 149 Numerous paths are opened up by a reading of this reversing apostrophe which converts the friend into an enemy and com plains in short about the enemy s disappearance in any case fears it recalls it announces or denounces it as a catastrophe Later on we will situate one of these paths the one we could more or less strictly call political It would lead back to a tradition that in a naturally differentiated and complicated manner goes back at least to Hegel and that will take a systematic form in Carl Schmitt In truth it is the political as such nothing more nor less that would no longer exist with out the gure and without the determined possibility of the enemy that is of an actual war In losing the enemy one would simply lose the political itse1f and this would be the horizon of the postworldwars In Der Begrz des Politischen 192 Schmitt whose relationships to Nazism on the one hand and to Heidegger on the other are of the greatest complexity one would also have to mention Leo Strauss at this point writes for example The speci c political dis tinction die spezzfische politische Unterscheidung to which po litical actions and motives can be reduced is the distinction between friend and enemy die Unterscheidung van F reund tmd Feind 1976 26 The distinction or the differential mark Unterscheidung of the political amounts to a discrimination Unterscheidung between friend and enemy This Unterschei dung is not only a difference it is a determined opposition Opposition itself Should this opposition be effaced and war with it the region named politics would lose its boundaries or its speci city Schmitt draws a great many consequences from this ax i0m and from these de nitions notably as to a certain de politicization as the essential risk of modern humanity and even of humanity period which as such knows nothing of the gure of the enemy Schmitt claims he is reviving a tradition which was beginning to weaken Whether one sanctions them 356 Politics of Friendship 2 The modern de nition of the enemy goes back to Hegel but modern philosophers already have a tendency to avoid it just as they avoid the political in fact insofar as it is linked to a certain concept and a certain practice of war or not certain of his remarks ought to interest us here I will underline two of them 1 Without proposing any equivalence or symmetry for the friend the opposing term of the Unterscheidung Schmitt considers that the enemy has always been taken to be public The concept of a private enemy would have no meaning One has a feeling that the very sphere of the public emerges with the gure of the enemy Hegel also offers the rst polemically political de ni tion of the bourgeois The bourgeois is an individual who does not want to leave the apolitical riskless pri jacques Derrida 357 One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals But rationally speaking it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend and enemy antithesis that the distinction still remains actual today and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general He is also not the private adversary whom one hates An enemy exists only when at least potentially one ghting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity The enemy is solely the public enemy because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men particularly to a whole nation becomes public by virtue of such a relationship The enemy is hostis not inimicus in the broader sense polemios and not ekhtkros As German and other languages do not distinguish between the private and political enemy many misconceptions and falsi cations are possible The often quoted Love your enemies Matt 54 l Luke 627 reads diligite inim icos vestros czgapate IOZLS ekhthrous and not diligite hostes vestros No mention is made of the political enemy Never in the thousandyear struggle between Chris tians and Muslims did it occur to a Christian to sur render rather than defend Europe out of love toward F the Saracens or Turks The enemy 1n the political sense need not be hated personally and in the private sphere only does it make sense to love one s enemy 1e one s adversary 1976 2829 vate sphere He rests in the possession of his private property and under the justification of his possessive T individualism he acts as an individual against the to tality He is a man who nds his compensation for his political nullity in the fruits of freedom and enrichment and above all in the total security of its use Conse quently he wants to be spared bravery and exempted from the danger of a violent deathquot Hegel has also advanced a de nition of the enemy which in general has been evaded by modern political philosophers it is ethical difference not in the sense of morality but within the perspective of absolute life in the eternal being of the people the foreigner negated in its living totality The question is how long the spirit of Hegel has actually resided in Berlin In any event the new political tendency which dominated Prussia after 1840 preferred to avail itself of a conservative philos ophy of state especially one furnished by Friedrich Julius Stahl whereas Hegel wandered to Moscow via Karl Marx and Lenin His dialectical method became established there and found its concrete expression in a new concreteenemy concept namely that of the in ternational class enemy and transformed itself the di alectical method and everything else legality and il legality the state even the compromise with the enemy into a weapon of this battle The actuality of Hegel is very much alive in Georg Lultacsfl 1976 5263 my emphasis When Nietzsche writes Enemies there are no enemies Cry I the living madman this reversing apostrophe this 358 Politics of Friendship cat apostrophe thus marks the n1odern and antimodern landscape included between Hegel and Schmitt understood and determined as such by Hegel and Schmitt Nietzsche or the living madman could mean among many other equally enigmatic things that there is no more politics no more great politics In order to complain about it rather than to rejoice in it But we have decided not to set out on this path for the moment We will encounter Schmitt again a little later in the vicinity of Heidegger the vicinity that is to say both prox imity and distance difference and affinity Let us for the moment turn rather to the side of the friend Schrnitt has indeed been reproached for having made the enemy and not the friend the properly positive conceptual criterion das eigentlicize positive Begn smerkmal in the de nition of the political In his preface to the 1963 edition Schmitt replies by invoking the privilege that negation must maintain in a dialectical determination of the life of law and of the theory of law He responds in short I insist on the enemy rather than on the friend because if I had to as you invite me begin with the friend it would require me to offer a preliminary de nition of it and that would not be possible except by reference to the opposing term the enemy We must begin from this oppositional negativity and hence from hostility to gain access to the political In a word hostility is required by de nition by the very de nition of de nition By the di alecticity or the diacriticity which thus do not go without the possibility of war So let us return to Nietzsche s eathpostrophe from another point of view 39 If something is converted or inverted in these two apos trophes it is perhaps not in the content of the utterances that is the reversal of friendship into enmity which perhaps leaves things intact but rather in the modalities of the ut terance Substituted for the quotation in the past so rief of an exclamation attributed to a dying wise man der sterbende Weise is the quotation or rather the performative utterance of a present exclamation reef ich for which a first person answers introducing himself precisely as a living madman ruf ich der lebende Tor Jacques Derrida 359 In what way does Nietzsche here reverse a Greek tra dition of philia In what way will he denounce in a context which will later be that of Zarathustra the Christian mutation which prefers the neighbor to the Greek friend Let us note at the start that the citational rumor appears not to have begun but to have found the simulacrum of its inauguration but what would be the origin of a rumor with Diogenes Laertius He does not quote Aristotle himself but rather cites the Memorabilia of Favorinus in the chapter on Aristotle in his Lives Teachings and Sayings of Famous Philosophers After having described the tenor of Aristotle s testa ment Diogenes Laertius tells of the beautiful sayings of the philosopher One of them answers the question What is a friend with A single soul and two bodies Further on instead of directly quoting the sentence written by Aristotle Diogenes Laertius prefers to quote Favorinus Memorabilia which itself quotes Aristotle s words In spite of their surface discontinuity certain series of sayings resemble chains of aph orisms drawn together by a secret logic An ethicopolitical thematics for example associates a certain egalitarianism the idea of distributive or proportional justice and a certain concept of the rights of man or of the human person with this ambiguous complaint 0 my friends there is no true friend For example People reproached him for having given alins to a scoundrel he answered for the fact is also reported in this way I did not give to the individual but to man This saying can be compared with the Nicizomachean Ethics 1161 b where Aristotle recalls the friendship due to 39 the slave as a man and not as a slave The Eudemitm Ethics 1236 a b indeed reserves the first and highest friendship for man as opposed to animals the friendship from which all others in a sense derive their name even if they are not simply hornonytns of it even if they are not types of friend ship and are not related to this rst meaning in an entirely equivocal or univocal manner This rst meaning of friend ship which is also the highest if not the universal meaning is that of friendship founded on virtue It is reserved for man because it implies that faculty of deliberation bouleusis which belongs neither to animals nor to God There is no 360 Politics of Friendship friendship at least in this first sense with or between animals with or between gods But one is not allowed to talk only of friendship in the rst sense without beingquot caught in several paradoxes For there is also friendship founded on utility and this is the case for concord as a political friendship cf Eud 1242 a b or on pleasure an unstable friendship found particularly among youngpeople These three friendships imply equality but a certain friendship can also imply superiority The friendship of a divine being for a man of a governor for the governed of a father for his son of a husband for his wife is another kind of friendship says Aristotle and they also differ among each other implying no absolute reciprocity It is during the passage devoted to this inequality that Aristotle evokes friend ship for the dead the friendship that knows without being known1239 a b What does the series of Aristoteliansayings reported by Diogenes Laertius signify For example People reproached him for having given alms to a scoundrelz he answered I did not give to the individual but to the man People asked him how one ought to conduct oneself with one s friends As we would like to see them conduct themselves towards us He de ned justice as a virtue of the soul which makes us give to each according to his own merit He af rrned that study is the greatest asset in reaching old age Favorinus says nally lllemoirs book H that he loved to exclaim O my friends there is no true friend And one can in fact nd this sentence in the seventh book of the Ethics Aristotle 1925 l462 5 The little word true there is no true friend obviously bears almost the whole enigma the other part coming back to the grammatical instability of the sentence which can al ways have the 0 of the apostrophe understood as a sort of dative the one for whom ther are friends many friends for that one there are no friends Very schematically we could say that the interpretation can appeal to two great logics The rst can make true friend jacques Derrida T 351 ship the first friendship pron philio in Iiudemia E hiC5 perfect or complete fI l I1ClSl11p teleza phzlza 111 the Nzch0nta chasm Ethics an make or a telos toward which one must strive even if one never attains it The inaccessibility in this case is merely a distancing within the immensity of a homogeneous space a path along which to go But one could also interpret this inaccessibility differently Dii erentlyi that is t0 say 111 if 1 m5 of a thinking of the alterity that makes true or perfect friend ship not only inaccessible as a conceivable telos but inaccessible because it is inconceivable in its very essence and thus In its telos On the one hand one would have a conceivable talus which one could not reach on the other the telos remains inaccessible because it is unreachable and inconceivable be cause it is contradictory in itself This inaccessibility would then take on a completely different meaning that of a pro hibitive bar within the very concept of fI 1f I1dSh1p As An benque says perfect friendship destroys itse It is contra dictory in its very essence On the one hand one must want the greatest good for one s friend and thus that he become a god But one cannot want this and I would say there are at least three reasons why One is that there is no longer any possibility of friendship with God by virtue of his distance or his separation Nzch 1159 a but also because of the absence of a common measure for propornonal equality between God and myself So one cannot want God for a friend The second reason is that friendship comrnands me to love the other as he is by desiring that he remain as he IS and do so according to his nature as man 1159 a Friend ship is again in its origin and its end in its rst sense and in its full realization what is proper to man So one cannot want to deify a friend 39 quot And yet the third and doubtless most radical reason the man of friendship as a manof virtue ought to resemble God Now God has no need of friends he thinks himself and not anything else The noesis noese s the thought of thought which characterizes the prime mover as well as in the same tradition absolute knowledge in Hegel s sense of the term has nothing to do with friendship because It has nothing to do with the other Perfect or true friendship that of the Just 352 Politics of Friendship and virtuous man who wants to resemble God thus tends towards this divine outarkeia which can easily do without the other and thus has no relationship to friendship any more than it does to the death of the other It is precisely in a passage devoted to this autarky that Aristotle emphasizes this sort of aporia Because God is such that he has no need of friends We conclude that it is the same for the man who re sembles God But then if one follows this reasoning we will also have to say that the valorous or virtuous spoudazos man does not even think for God s perfection does not reside in thought God is superior to any thought which would be a thought of something else unless he thinks himself The reason for this in our opinion is that thegood implies a relation to the other whereas God is for himself his own good aition d oli emm men to on katlfeteron ekeino de autos outou to en estin End VII 12 1245 b l4 l9 cited and translated in Aubenque I953 183 This passage clearly shows that true friendship can only be human but most of all and at the same time that for man there is no thought unless it is a thought of the other and a thought of the other as a thought of the mam within the same logic there is no thought there is no thinking being atleast if thought has to be thought of the other except in friendship Thought insofar as it has to be thought of the 0l h 1 aI1El tl3911S is what it must be for man does not happen without phzlzo Translated into the logic of a human and nite cogzto this results in the formula I think therefore I think the other I think therefore I need the other to think I think therefore the possibility of friendship lodges itself in the movement of my thought insofar as it requires calls desires the other the necessity of the other the Cause of the other at the heart of the cogito Translated into the logic of 3 dwlll 5083103 1 think therefore I think myself and I suffice for myself there is no need of the other etc But everythought is not necessarily translated into the logic of the cogito and we will be able later and along another route to rediscover this affinity of pliilein with thought and with mortality Jacques Derrida 363 By beginning in this way quoting the quotation of a quotation as I said earlier I have perhaps not assumed in my own name the responsibility for any utterance Perhaps I have not even yet addressed myself to you truly to you But are things that simple Am I completely irresponsible for what I have said when I am irresponsible for what I have said Am I irresponsible for the fact that I have said for the fact of having spoken when I do not hold myself responsible for what I have said for the content of what I have said and which I in fact have contented myself with reporting De ned by what are commonly called conventions a certain number of arti cial signs attest to the following even if I had not yet said anything determinate in my name when I uttered in order to without any further protocol O my friends there is no friend one has the right but what is this right to suppose that nonetheless I am speaking in my name It is also the question of the name that we bear nom port of the port or the support of the name and of the rapport to the name that I would like to approach here obliquely You hold me responsible personally responsible for the simple fact that I am speaking and for example for the fact of quoting Montaigne in order to begin in place of and before saying anything else And by holding me personally respotnsible you are in all rigor implying some knowledge of what person and responsible mean So what is happening at this very moment This could give rise to a description of a pragmatic type It would con rm that having been invited but how and by whom exactly in the end invited to speak to you when you are assembled to listen to me then to discuss with me in short to respond to me I have already responded to an invitation and consequently I am in the process of addressing myself to you who are beginning to respond to me You are doing so in a way which is still virtual with respect to the content of the response but you are already doing so actually with respect to that rst response constituted by the attention given or at least promised to a discourse With this distinction between potentiality and act we are already virtually installed in the dominant code in the very constitution of one of the great canonical philosophical dis 364 Politics of Friendship courses on friendship the very one which Montaigne was quoting Aristotle s The distinction between potentiality and act dynamis and energia is never far away in the Nichomachecm Ethics when it is a matter of distinguishing between the good men who are friends in the rigorous sense of the term and the others who are so only accidentally and by analogy with the rst VIII ch 4 or between on the one hand the prose philia of the Eudemitm Ethics or the teleia philia of the Nicho macbean Ethics and on the other hand the other friendships founded on utility or pleasure or again when after having de ned the three forms of government Aristotle declares that friendship appears there in the same proportion as justice or if man is a political being IX ch 10 political friendship is only a kind of friendship that he calls concord i homonoia All of these sequences should he meticulously re constituted You are thus already holding me responsible for what i say for the simple fact that I am speaking even if I am not yet assuming the responsibility for the sentences I am citing Let us suppose concesso non data that one can translate these Greek words philia and fzomonoia today by friendship Freundschaft amiti mand here everything will depend on thinking the possibility of this translation and on thinking thought as thought of the same or as thought of the other in terms of the possibility of this transfer or this train or this streetcar named philia F reundschaft amitie friendship This translation is already problematic in the Greek language itself as Aristotle knew better than anyone The Greek language had in fact to have recourse to the same word philia for meanings that were different and derived inadequate to phi lzla prote and teleicz philia Aristotle s whole discourse on philia is a discourse on language on the word philia its uses its contexts its regulated equivocality its legitimate and abusive translations Even supposing one could translate these words without any remainder I still do not know if there is philitz or homonoia between us nor how one should distinguish here 39 among us among each one of us who together would com pose this as yet quite indeterminate us But perhaps you will grant me the following something like the first result of a practical demonstration the one that Jacques Derrida 365 has just taken place even before having taken responsibility in our name to each one of us for this or that af rmation we are already taken or caught up each and any one of us in a kind of asymmetrical and heteronomical curvature of the social space more precisely in the relation to the other prior to any organized socius to any determined govern ment to any law Prior to or before it in the sense of Kafllta s before the law 5 Please note prior to any deter mined law as either natural law or positive law but not prior to any law in general because this heteronomical and asym metrical curvature of a sort of originary sociality is a law perhaps the very essence of the law What is taking place at this moment the disquieting experience we are having is mrhaps just the silent unfolding of that strange violence which has for so long forever insinuated itself into the origin of the most innocent experiences of friendship or of justice We have begun to respond We are already caught we are already surprised in a certain responsibility and the most ineluctable of responsibilities as if it were possible to think of a responsibility without freedom Weare invested with an undeniable responsibility at the moment we begin to signify something But where does that begin Does it ever begin This responsibility assigns us our freedom without leaving it with us if one can put it that way and we see it coming from the other It is assigned to us by the other from the other even before any hope of reappropriation permits us to as sume this responsibility in the space of what could be called autonomy This experience is even the one in which the other appears as such that is appears without appearingf What comes before autonomy must then also exceed it that is to Say succeed it survive it and inde nitely overrun it in general when dealing with the law nomos one be lieves one can simply oppose autonomy and heteronomy Perhaps one would have to deform this oppositional logic and prepare from very far away its political translation To say it in a word and because it is good for reasons Of clarity during a lecture to anticipate in a number of ways and to announce a heading it is a question of a political translation whose risks and difficulties even aporias one Could hardly exaggerate After having foregrounded a scan 366 Politics of Friendship sion in a kind of history of friendship a scansion which would have introduced asymmetry separation and in nite distance into a Greek philia which did not tolerate them it would be a matter of suggesting that a democracy still to come one not yet given not yet thought even one still suppressed or repressed not only would not contradict this asymmetrical curvature and this in nite heterogeneity but in truth would be called for by them This asymmetry and in nite alterity would not only not bear any relationship to what Aristotle would have called inequality or superiority but they would even be incompatible with any sociopolitical hierarchy as such Later on it will appear that beyond a certain determination of right and calculation of measure of metry but not of right in general this democracy would free a certain inter pretation of equality from the phallogocentric schema of fro temity which I will attempt to show has been determining and dominant in our traditional concept of friendship in what sense could one still talk of equality even of symmetry within the asymmetry and measurelessness of in nite alterity What right would we have still to talk of politics of right and of democracy Must these words change their meanings entirely Allow themselvesto be translated And what then will be the rule governing this translation We spoke just now of an excessive assignation of re sponsibility What can it have to do with tuhotis called friendship I say advisedly what is called friendship and I underscore I this precaution It resembles once again a quotation as if I were forcing myself to remember unceasingly that before knowing what friendship is and what we mean here and now by this word we should first deal with a certain use of the word friendship We should mention these uses as well as i the interpretations and experiences for experiences are also 3 interpretations to which this friendship has given rise For i we should not forget that we are speaking first of all from t within the tradition of a certain concept of friendship within 39 a given culture let us say ours in any case the one on the basis of which a certain we here tries its luck Now this T tradition is not homogeneous nor is the determination of g friendship within it Our principal concern will be to rec l Jacques Derrida 367 ognize there the major marks of a tension perhaps ruptures and in any case scansions at the interior of this history of friendship of the canonical gure of friendship Let us listen once again to Montaigne listening to Di ogenes listening to Aristotle but let us translate and interpret him as well 0 my friends there is no friend The painful and plaintive irony of the address also states the certitude of a strange affirmation The phrase springs forth like a sort of apostrophe in fact someone is turning toward his friends O my friends but the apostrophe carries within it a pred icative proposition it envelops an indicative declaration Stat ing a fact it also utters a general truth there is no friend The general truth of the fact would seem to contradict in the act the very possibility of the apostrophe the possibility of its being serious there must indeed be friends in order for me to address myself to them in this way if only so as to say 39 to them there is no friend The performative contradiction would be as vivid and present as a simple logical absurdity in the best of cases the playful exercise of a paradox if the structures of the two utterances were symmetrical and if they belonged to a presently homogeneous set This is not necessarily the case The apos trophe whose form overruns and comprises in itself the al leged statement resembles at one and the same time an act of recalling and a call an appeal It resembles an appeal because it makes a sign toward the future be my friends for I love or will love you friendship as Aristotle also said con sists rather in loving than in being loved Nich VH1 9 1159 a 2530 a proposition on which we have not nished med itating listen to me be sensitive to my cry understand and be compassionate I am asking for sympathy and consensus become the friends to whom I aspire Accede to what is at the same time a desire a request and a promise one could also say a prayer And let us not forget what Aristotle said about prayer eukhe it is a discourse logos but it is a dis course that somewhat in the manner of a performative is neither true nor false all oute aleth s oute pe3ude53 There are no friends that we know but I beg you make it so that there Will be friends from now on What is more how could I be your friend and declare my friendship for you and the latter 368 Politics of Friendship consists more in loving than being loved if friendship did not remain something yet to come to be desired to be prom ised How could I give you my friendship where friendship would not be lacking if it were already there More precisely if the friend were not lacking If I give you friendship it is because if there is any perhaps it does not exist presently For the apostrophe does not say there is no friendship but rather there is no friend Perhaps this is because we have an idea of friendship and what it should be in the ideality of its essence or telos teleia philia and thus in the name of friendship we must conclude alas that if there is friendship there is no friend And this is just what Montaigne means in the context determined by the most thematic of his inten tions which dominates this passage up to a certain point it is while thinking about common friendships ordinary and customary ones that we are obliged to sigh with regret These common friendships are not the most perfect of their kind and that is why there is no friend But if there is no friend at present then precisely let us make it so that from now on there will be friendships the most perfect of their kind Here is what I am calling you to answer me it is our responsibility Friendship is never a given in the present it belongs to the experience of waiting of promise or of en gagement lts discourse is that of prayer and at stake there is what responsibility opens to the future Butthe apostrophe O my friends also turns toward the past It recalls it makes a sign toward what must be sup posed so as to be understood if only in the nonapophantic form of prayer you have already shown me this minimal friendship this preliminary consent without which you would not understand me would not listen to my call or be sensitive to what is hopeful in my plea Without this absolute past i could not for my part have addressed myself to you in this way We would not be together in a sort of minimal corn muni ty but one which is also incominensurable with any other speallting the same language or praying for translation within the horizon of the same language even were it so as to manifest a disagreement if a sort of friendship had not already been sealed prior to any other contract a friendship prior to friendships an ineffaceable fundamental and bot jacques Derrida 369 tornless friendship the one which draws its breath in the sharing of a language past or to come and in the being together which any allocution supposes including a decla ration of war Will one say in a rather Aristotelian gesture that this friendship has merely an accidental and analogical relation with friendship in the strict or proper sense Or with friend ship which is perfect of its kind Montaigne The question thus becomes What is friendship in the proper sense Is it ever present What is presence for this philia pro to or for this teleia philia whose aporia we have caught a glimpse of What is the essence of friendship If we are not close to answering this question it is not only because of the very large number of philosophical difficulties still before us which we are going to try to approach In a preliminary 39 principal way at once simple and abyssal it is because the question what is ti estin the question of essence or truth has already unfolded itself as the question of philosophy starting from a certain experience of philein and philia There is not enough space here to tie this question to the elaboration that Heidegger proposes of it notably in Was ist das die Philosophzie This elaboration concerns the moment in which the philein of Heraclitus philein to sophon after having been determined as originary accord sin ursprtinglicher Ein klang harmonia would have become an orientation toward research a jealous and tense inquisition or striving strebende Sachem determined by Eros 5051 It is only with this eroticization of the questioning about beings Was ist das Seiende insofern es ist that thought das Denken would have become philosophy Heraclitus and Parmenides were not yet philosophers 5 253 The step toward philosophy Would have been prepared by the Sophists and finally acllleyed by Socrates and Plato Guided by a vigilant reading Of this interpretation we might attempt to follow the very discreet thread of an incessant meditation on friendship in the path of Heidegger39s thought The meditation passes in particular by way of the unexpected and isolated allusion to the voice of the friend Safimme dos Fretmdes that every Dasein Carries within itself Safe and Zeit 34 163 The existential analytic of Dasein that carries traigt this voice in itself let j 39 3939r39393939 r 370 Politics of Friendship us not forget is neither an anthropology nor a sociology nor an analytic of the subject consciousness psyche or the 39 ego neither a morals nor a politics All these disdplines presuppose it This loads the allusion to the voice of the quotfriend and thus friendship itself with a very particular on tological signi cation in the chapter on Dasein und Rede Die Sprache l60 67 and not even in the analytic of Mitsein This strange voice at once both internal and from else where perhaps has some relation to the voice of conscience Getuissen of which Heidegger also proposes an existential analytic 57 The provenance of the call its Woher is an Unheimlichke t 58 The voice of the call is moreover ex perienced as an alien nomintimate voice anue rmut so etwas wie eine fremde Stimme by the everyday they 57 277 Since the sex of this friend is not determined 1 would also be tempted to graft onto this reading the questions I have elsewhere posed on the word Geschlecht and sexual difference in Heidegger Derrida 1987b and 1987c in any case the sophistic moment signi es a scission in the thought of harmony To heal this wound to calm this discord or this discordance in the harmony of the Einklang to reconstitute the originary and interrupted philein a trou bled and nostalgic philosophy asks what is and becomes with this what it is philosophy as if in the question what is ti estin philosophy implicitly asks itself what s happened What s taken place In other words what s happened to phil ein or to the originary Einklang Why has the harmony been interrupted Why the discord and the discordance These same questions should lead by way of the Gesprcick between the thinker and the poet the Gespr ich that always supposes some sort of friendship toward two types of texts on the one hand those addressed to Holderlin Wo aber sind die Freundeig in Andenkeng on the other those ad dressed to Trald to the gures of the friend who follows the stranger of the brother and sister precisely around this motif of the Geschlechtfm We should also reread from this perspective the 1943 44 course on Heraclitus l979a 127 ff on the interpretation of philia in the name philosophy philia tau sophou or of philein in the Heraclitean saying Der Spmch Hemklits phuszls km jacqnes Derrida T 371 tasthai pizilei Here Heidegger interprets plzilia as favor Guest a benevolent protection or happiness for Giinnen Gew ihren In der physis waltet die Gtms t 132 In physis benevolence reigns that which accords or is in agreement like the favorableness of a favor Or again lVi verstehen das philein als die Gumt und das Gt39inm2n 136 We understand philein as favor or solicitude Philia is here the essential and reciprocal or alternating wechselweise relationship between the raising opening or becomingopen Aufgehen and the decline Untergehen or selfdissimulation Sickaerbargen of physis Physis as philia is accord granted this solicitude for revelation and selfdissimulation this selfaccord of the Au geizezn and the Umtergehen It has a relationship to itself which is at once generous and jealous if one can say this which means that it loves to hide One of IIeideggefs concerns is T to avoid anachronism in this understanding of philia and philein This anachronistic deafness would above all consist of anthropologizing psychologizing subjectivizing pkileitn Heidegger appears to hold a modern or at any rate post Christian metaphysics of subjectivity responsible for this I nd it dif cult to follow him in this epochal scansion espe cially when he excludes Aristotle from this anthropologiza tion of philia or of philein it would be one thing to call the subjectobject point of view anachronistic another to say that the anthropological or even the psychological point of View was foreign to Aristotle It is true that for Heidegger what in modernity is called anthropology or psychology would be entirely dependent on a metaphysics of subjectivity on an Interpretation of man as subject It is this that allows him to Say in the same passage that Christianity constitutes the preparatory stage of an education in the passions and even Of a psychology For the Greeks there is no psychology Aristotle s treatise Peri Psykh s has nothing to do with psy chology ln the completion of metaphysics metaphysics be Comes psychology in other words psychology and anthro pology are the last words of metaphysics Psychology and technics go hand in hand Im Griechentum gibt es fzeine Psy cizologie Die Abhandlzmg des Aristoteles Peri Psylzh s hat mit Psy chologie nichzts zu turn In der Vollendtmg tier Memphysik wird die Memphysik zur Psyckologie dh die Psyckoloie und die Anthro I v 372 Politics of Friendship pelagic is 1615 letzte Wort tier Metaphysik Psychologie und Technik gehtiren zusammm wig rechts and links 130 Whatever one might say about this epochal distribution and the problems it poses one has to conclude at any rate that when Heidegger evokes the friend or friendship he does so in a space which is no longer or not yet that of the person the subject the anthropos of anthropology or the psyche of psychology When Heidegger in the rather late text on Was ist das die Philasophie 1956 attempts to return to an experience of speech or of language Spmche originary enough to pre cede in some way questioning itself alas Fmgen when he recalls that this questioning namely the very movement of research knowledge philosophy presupposes a certain ac quiescence an accord granted to Spmche and engaged in it he perhaps rediscovers this region of accord or of philein which has not yet become philosophia a questioning tension the eroticization of a Streben a jealous nostalgic mournful or curious contraction of Eros It is perhaps in this region that the voice of the friend resonates It is then perhaps a question of what I earlier called the minimal co1nmunity but one that is also incommen surable with any other speaking the same language or pray ing or crying for translation within the horizon of a single language even if only to demonstrate disagreement friend ship from before friendships And l will add from before enmity This promise from before friendships would be inti mately bound up with the yes yes this promise of memory which I have attempted to analyze elsewhere But the double affirmation which is and must remain essentially daring threatened open does not allow itself to be de ned or posited as a determinate position As such it withdraws itself from opposition it is thus not yet political at least in the strictly coded sense of the tradition that Schmitt claims to de ne To go no further than a very preliminary sketch we would situate Schmitfs Concept of the Political in the following way Without even mentioning the political affinities that this concept can have with a certain politics in a context dominated by na tionalsocialism in itself a very complex question which l Jacques Derrida 373 will leave aside for the moment one can at least attempt to recognize the differences of level 1 between Heidegger s discussion and that of Schmitt on the one hand and 2 between these two discussions and what I am trying to suggest here or elsewhere Schmitt appears to share with Heidegger the conviction that it is necessary to go back before the subjectal or anthro pological determination of the FreundFeind couple In the same way one would have to withdraw from it all of the dependent or corresponding determinations moral anthro pology aesthetics economics The specific political distinction to which political ac tions and motives can be reduced is the distinction Un terscheidung between friend and enemy The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation of an association or dissociation It can exist theoretically and practically without having simultaneously to draw upon all the moral aesthetic economic or other distinctions namely the distinctions mentioned earlier goodbad beautifulugly etc 1975 2627 The friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential sense Sims not as metaphors or symbols not mixed or weakened by ec onomic moral and other conceptions Vorstellungen least of all in a privateindividualistic sense Simz as a psychological expression of private emotions and ten dencies They are neither normative nor pure spiritual rein geistigen antitheses 1976 2728 War is still today the most extreme possibility One can say that the exceptional case has an especially de cisive meaning which exposes the core of the matter For only in real combat is revealed the most extreme consequence of the political grouping of friend and enemy From this most extreme possibility human life derives its speci cally political tension A world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated a completely paci ed globe would be a 39 SEL vj H 374 T Politics of Friendship world without the distinction between friend and en emy and hence a world without politics It is conceivable that such a world might contain many very interesting antitheses and contrasts competitions and intrigues of every kind but there would not be a meaningful an tithesis whereby men could be required to sacri ce life authorized to shed blood and kill other human beings For the de nition of the political it is here irrelevant whether such a world without politics is desirable as an ideal situation The phenomenon of the political can be understood only in the context of the everpresent possibility of the friend andenemy grouping regardless of the aspects which this possibility implies for morality aes thetics and economics War as the most extreme political means discloses the possibility which underlies every political idea namely the distinction between friend and enemy This makes sense only as long as this distinction in mankind is actually present or at least potentially possible On the other hand it would be senseless to wage warfor purely religious purely moral purely juristic or purely economic motives The friendandenemy grouping and therefore also war cannot be derived from these speci c anritheses of human endeavor A war need be neither something religious nor something morally good nor something lucrative 1976 3535 my emphasis Schmitt proposes in short a deduction of the political as such from a place where it did not yet exist For this it is necessary to think the enemy as such that is the possibility of a properly political war if there really are enemies in the existential sense as meant here then it is justified but only politically to repel and ght them physically For as long as a people exists in the political sphere this people must even if only in the most extreme case and whether this point has been reached has to be decided by it determine by itself the distinction between friend and enemy Therein resides the essence of its political ex Jacques Derrida 375 istence The justification of war does not reside in its being fought quotfor ideals or norms of justice but in its being fought against a real enemy All confusions of this category of friend and enemy can be explained as results of blendings of some sort of abstractions or norms 1976 4950 If Schmitt determines the political on the basis of the enemy rather than of the friend this is not simply an incon sistent asymmetry As we recalled earlier Schmitt is here relying on a necessity that he calls dialectical If one wanted to derive a politics from friendship rather than from war one would still have to agree upon what friend means Now the meaning of friend is only determined within the op positional distinction friend enemy And Schmitt indeed has recourse to this oppositional logic to the opposition friendfenemy to the possibility of war rather than to the asymmetrical fact of enmity in his deduction of the political The question toward which I am moving here would perhaps concern the possibility of an experience of friendship before or outside of this oppositional or polemological logic and thus also of the purity that this logic seems to demand One would doubtless look in vain for such at determining deduction of the political in Heidegger Is this a lack an endured or willed absence is it because in going back before this determination toward a more originary zone Heidegger no longer gave himself the means of a determining deriva tion Is it the modernity of such a determination thatis lacking But lacking where and for whom For Heidegger or for modernity itself And what if Heidegger in Schmitt s own logic had understood this properly modern depoliticization Of a world in which the concept of enemy loses its limits This stubbornness in restoring reconstituting saving or re ning Classical oppositional distinctions at a time when the atten tion drawn to a certain modernity that of war in particular Of guerilla war or of the cold war was prompting him to assert the disappearance of this fundamental distinction is not the least of the paradoxes nor the least interesting aspect of Schmitfs enterprise How can Schmitt be surprised or complain about the 376 Politics of Friendship difficulties encountered by a reflection whose object is the distinction between friend and enemy when he himself rec ognizes that our age at the same time produces machines of nuclear extermination and effaces the distinction between war and peace Does Schmitt not dream of improving the instrument of a classical theory which he claims moreover has never really served its purpose in order to adapt it to a modernity to a modern theory of the political and a modern poleniology which have nothing more to do with it He writes The era of systems is past The debut of the great epoch of European republicanisin Epoche des europ iischen Staatlichiieit three hundred years ago saw the birth of magni cent intellectual systems it is no longer possible in our time to build similar ones The only remaining possibility is an historical renospective gathering the image of this great epoch of jus piiblicum Europaeum with its concepts of the State of war and the just enemy into the consciousness of its systematisations 1 97217 He notes a little further on that the Cold War provokes the rupture of those axes of coupled concepts which have until now supported the traditional system of lim its and forms imposed on war The cold war knows nothing of the classical distinctions between war peace and neutrality between politics and economics soldiers quot and civilians combatants and noncombatants with the exception of the distinction between friend and enemy whose logic presides over its birth and determines its nature There is quotnothing astonishing in the fact that the 2 old English word f0e has awakened from its fourhun dred yearold archaistic lethargy and come back into j use over these last two decades alongside the word enemy How could we have since then in an age that at the same time produces machines of nuclear exter mination and effaces the distinction between war and Jacques Derrida 377 peace blocked the pursuit of a reflection whose object is the distinction between friend and enemy arfoe Shorter Oagford Dictionary 1 in early use an ad versary i deadll feud or mortal combat now on h hates and seeks to injure another Old Eiig1isli39 2e 311 belonging ii a hostilearmy or nation an enemy in battle or war Middle English 1972 13 The e 39 is D eT If1SS1l1l1ty ohf the question inthe form of what i1imp f E aquotiquotquotquot E f S P Pm 1 ii error a rmation 0 bein t the allocution Such an affirmation can no longgerog inte rated b bg a ove all it cannot be presented as a l lI1gpresen1 311 stance subject essence or existence within the space of an ontology precisely because it opens this space The I Who to which Nietsche s utterance in Human All Too Hu 7 1 773377 refers Riff 3071 der lebende Tor would not necessarily pre suppose beneath its grammatical appearance the presence of Sughhe 531Ib l fcii Of a beingpresent as subject erha s ii Oe logical game of contradiction or paradox ind lair me my f d5 hm 15 11 friend signi es first future ante1S390verli39mlIinmg of the present by the undeniable Off d nor w ic would be the very movement and time rien ship Undeniable future anterior the absolute of an ultlzpresenmble past as well as future which is to say of traces ll H 3 one can 0311 quot3V 1 deny by summoning them into the g t of phenomenal presence A temporal torsion thus knots lip the predicative proposition there is no friend within t 3 mtapiPhe ho my friends The torsion of this asym withlgl the OPE 13 6 theoretical statement orthe knowledge haust Thifjg ormativity of a prayer which it will never ex qzwstign of the TiSIlry leads us back to what I will call the How should the guesfo the 39 guestion of responsibilityZPlznirwhyTiiifilS irliiidIl1ipi fprtiire 1 d S ege site for this reflection A brief grammar of the re ponse or rather of responding will permit us 3 1elimi nary glimpse I sketch such a grammar on the basis of m language French but I do not believe that in this case th 378 Politics of Friendship concepts are thoroughly limited by language Not that they are valid in general beyond every language syntax and lex icon but that in this context they seem to be translatable within the set of European languages which authorize us here to interrogate something like our culture and our concept of responsibility Which is to say that this grammar however schematic will be a bit more than a grammar One says answer for r pondre de answer to r pondre ci answer before r pondre devant These three modalities are not juxtaposable they envelop and imply each other One cmswersfor for oneself or for something for someone for an action for a thought for a discourse before before an other a community of others an institution a tribunal a law And one always answers for or about oneself or one s in tention action discourse before by rst of all answering to This last modality thus appears more original more fun damental and hence unconditional 1 One answers for oneself for what one is says or does and this beyond the simple present The self or the me thus supposes the unity in other words the memory of the one who responds This is often called the unity of the subject but one can conceive such a synthesis of memory without necessarily having recourse to the concept of the sulgject or at least of the subject as beingpresent Since this unity is never secured in itself as an empirical synthesis the name is the instance to which the recognition of this identity is en trusted l am held responsible for myself which is to say for everything that can be imputed to that which bears my name imputability supposing freedom of course and a non present freedom but also that what bears my name remains the same not only from one moment to the next from one state to the other of what bears it but also beyond life or presence in general for example the presence to itself of what bears it The instance here of the proper name is not necessarily limited to the phenomenon of the legal name the patronymic or the social designation although this phenom enon is most frequently its determining manifestation This question of the proper name seems essential to the problem atic of friendship I nd at least one indication in Montaigne s re ection His friendship for Estienne de la Boetie preceded Jacques Derrida 379 he says their meeting More precisely this meeting or ac quaintance accointance took place long before I had seen him and gave me the rst knowledge of his name thus leading this friendship on its way There is beyond my whole discourse and what I can speci cally say about it some unlmown inexplicable and fatal force the gobetween of our union We sought each other before we had seen one another and through the reports we heard about each other which caused greater striving in our feelings than that occasioned by the sense of the reports I believe through some ordinance of heaven we embraced each other through our names Montaigne 1959 225 2 One responds rst to the other to the question the request the prayer the apostrophe the call the greeting or the sign the adieu of the other This dimension of responding as respondmgto IS more originary than the others as we have noted for two reasons On the one hand one does not answer for oneself and in one s own name one is not re sponsible except before the question request interpellation instance or insistence of the other On the other hand the proper name which structures the answeringfor one self 1S lI1 itself for the other whether because the other has phosen it for example the name I am given at birth which 1 never chose and which introduces me into the space of the til 0 Whether because 1nany case It implies the other in al 6 very act of naming its origin its aim its use Responding Ways supposes the other in relation to the self it preserves the sense of this asymmetrical anteriority even within the seemingly most inward and solitary autonomy of the as for me qutmt at soz39 of the inner heart for int riaur and of the Enoral CORSCIEITCC jealous of its independence another word 01 freedom This asymmetrical anterionty also marks tem poralization as a structure of responsibility alizeEIVV1r1ng beiorg this expression seems at rst to mod rst one amwpg 012 h ngl answers before the other because thing more thaisoo ti ot dfelar But this modalizanon 13 some decisive an is beige par dart a specigcauon by example A ts effgjts Idiom p eth ere an we shoulcl record all marks the 3 C3 Ya ff eifpression before generally passage to an institutional instance of alterity It 330 Politics of Friendship is no longer singular but rather universal in its principle One answers to the other who can always be singular and who must remain so in a certain way but 0116 3 5Wquot31395 551 3 39 t the law a tribunal a Jury an instance authorized to repr genl the other legitimately in the form of a moral legal or pf 103 community Here we have two forms or two d11II I1S1OI15 of the respect implied by any responsibility Let us note in passing that these two words respect and responszbilzty which fare 11111381 and constantly provoke each other appealr t I6 139d1R and rst case to distance to space 31191 to the T3337 in the second case to time to the V0103 and 10 113133111113 The co implication can be sensed at the heart of friltt1d5h1PCquott f1 of whose enigmas comes from this distance or 15 i 5PeTh1 separation which distinguishes It 33 fe lmlgi fI 01 1h 0 39 ti 3 coimplication calls fora rigorous rereadingf of deh 21 i I3 1 analysis of respect in friendship There IS no rien 5 ip out respect for the other but this respect although 193819 arable from a morally good will should not be simply con t ts fused with purely moral respect the respect owed only 0 E Cause the moral law of which the person is but an examp e The principal text that Kant devotes to friendslpphis r rnensely complex it makes up the Conc lusion o e ments of Ethics in the Doctrine of Virtue in The Metaphyszcs of Morals ltl6 439739 There Kant cites in a slightly different 2 ct St form Aristotle s words My dear friends there exi bl f1 iend5 111 its perfection that is to say as an unattaina e but practically necessary idea friendship suppo lels gt ones I both love and respect It must be equal and recipro 0 se it is a duty because although friendship does not produce happiness the two feelings that comprise it malltlt393 UH 3 1 worthiness of happiness But one of the dif culties within the very ldea of friendship comes from the contradictory character and hence the unstable equilibripm of these two q feelings which are opposed as the attraction that fuses 10 and the repulsion that holds at a distance 1quot3SPquot C2 Ugandf wU 8609 1991 261 A re ection on the Kantian et ics t politics of friendship should be organized around the concep H l k of the secret It seeiigisto me to dominate ltl7 anduglqgggggn in a problematic way the ideal of f1quot1 I1d5h1P 33 Q mgon would Mitteilung and egalitarian sharing Such a r6 6C Jacques Derrida 381 rst of all consider the de nition of the friend of man Every friend should first be the friend of man This is not only the philanthropist the friend of man presupposes equal ity among men the idea of being obligated by this very equale ity ls it just by chance if the familial schema imposes itself again here and in these terms fathersbrothers Here men are represented Kant in fact says as if all men were broth ers under one universal father who Wills the happiness of all 1978 8612 l3 1991 264 Of these two dimensions of the relation to the other only the one maintains the absolute singularity of the other and of iny relation to the other as of the relation of the other to the other which I myself am as his other for him But the relation to the other also passes by way of the universality of the law This discourse on universality which can nd its determination in the regions of morality law or politics always appeals to a third person beyond the facetoface of singularities The third is always witness for a law that comes to interrupt the vertigo of singularity Do we have here two models of friendship If by hypothesis we do one model would nd its motto in the Aristotelian de nition of the friend as another ourself 1166 a 32 or in Moiitaigne s response If one presses me to say why I loved him I feel that can only be expressed by responding because it was he because it was me The other model would rather be inspired by Zarathustra s sentences when it is a question of interrupting the jealous narcissism of the dual relation which always re mains enclosed between me and me I and me in order to prevent it from sinking into the abyss I and me are always in too jealous too zealous zu efr239g a dialogue how could one endure this situation if there were no friend f For the hermit the friend is always the third person the third person is the cork that prevents the dialogue of the two from sinking into the abyss 12 But is it a matter of alter natives Are there really two different even antagonistic or inconipatible relations Do not these two relations imply each other at the moment they seem to exclude each other Does not my relation to the singularity of the other as other pass hy way of the law Does not the law command me to recognize the transcendent alterity of the other who can only ever be 382 Politics of Friendship heterogenous and singular hence resistant to the very gen erality of the law But this codmplication far from dissolving the antagonism and breaking through the aporia aggravates them instead at the very heart of friendship Sharing singularityuniversality has always diyided the experience the concept and the interpretation of friendship It has determined other oppositions there secret private invisible unreadable apolitical at the limit without a concept vs manifest public exposed to witnesses political homog enous with the concept Between the two terms of the opposition there is the familial schema I am using the word schema in the Kantian sense between intuitive singularity and the generality of the concept On the one hand friendship seems to be essentially foreign or resistant to the res publica and thus Could 110 fmmd a politics But on the other hand as we know well from Plato to Montaigne from Aristotle to Kant from Cicero to Hegel the great philosophical and canonical discourses on friendship will have linked friendship explicitly to virtue and justice to moral reason and to political reason But the crucial questionthe one I can only situate in passing would bear precisely on the hegemony of the philosophical canon in this domain how has it imposed itself How has it excluded the feminine or heterosexuality Why can one not account fpr feminine or heterosexual experiences of friendship within it this heterogeneity of aims and of philia Why can such a history of the canon not be reduced to a history of concepts or of philosophical texts nor even to one of political structures Why is it a matter of a history of the world itself which would be neither a continuous evolution nor a simple succession of discontinuous gures From this point of view 1 question of friendship could at least be an example or a guiding them within the two principal kinds of deconstructive questions that of the history of concepts and of the hegemony trivially called textual that of history period and that of phallO39 gocentrisni These philosophical canons will have even set the moral and political conditions for an authentic fI 1 I1ClSl11p 3I1 l VlCC versa It goes without saying that these discourses differ among themselves and would call for long and prudent anal jacques Derrida 383 yses Such analyses should take care in particular not to stop too quickly in the name of the law at an identi cation of morality with politics it is sometimes in the name of morality that we have been able to withdraw friendship from the par titions and criteria of politics Aristotle appears to place friendship above law and pol itics when he says at the beginning of book VIII of the Ni cliomachean Ethics 1155 a 25 that when men are friends there is no longer any need for justice whereas if they content themselves with being just they also have need of friendship and the highest expression of justice is in the general opinion in the nature of friendship But if friendship is above jus tice political or moral it is thus also immediately the most justjnstice beyond justice In all of the forms of government or of constitution which it de nes monarchy aristocracy timocracy republic or politeiaand democracy as the least bad constitution for it is only a slight deviation from the republican form of government 1160 a b one can see a form of friendship appear which is coextensive with rela tionships of justice And if in tyranny friendship and justice play only a very minor role the opposite is true of democracy One would of course have to clarify these very dif cult points by a reading of the Politics which I cannot engage in here One would also have to specify that justice has two dimensions one not written and the other codi ed by law thus friendship founded on utility and this is the case for political friendshipcan likewise be moral or legal Nick H62 b 20 End 1242 b 30 These oppositions seem to dominate the interpretation and the experience of friendship in our culture A domi nation that is unstable and under internal stress but hence all the more imperious What relation does this domination maintain with the double exclusion that can be seen at work in all the great ethicopoliticalphilosophical discourses on friendship namely on the one hand the exclusion of friend Ship between women and on the other hand the exclusion Of friendship between a man and a woman This double exclusion of the feminine in the philosophical paradigm of friendship would thus confer on it the essential and essentially sublime gure of a virile homosexuality Within the familial 384 Politics of Friendship schema whose necessity I pointed out earlier this exclusion privileges the gure of the brother the name of the brother or the name of brother more than that of the father whence the necessity of connecting the political model especially that of democracy and of the Decalogue with the rereading of Freud s hypothesis about the alliance of brothers Again Montaigne on his friendship with La Bo tie In truth the name of brother is a beautiful and delectable one and for this reason we made it he and 1 our alliance These exclusions of the feminine would not be unrelated to the movement that has always politicized the model of friendship at the very moment one tries to withdraw this model from an integral politicization The tension here is within the political itself It would be necessary to analyze all discourses which reserve politics and public space for man domestic and private space for woman For Hegel this is also the opposition between day and night and hence a certain number of other oppositions as well What is Nietzsche s place in this history Does he profoundly corroborate an old tradition That is why woman is not yet capable of f riend ship she only knows love Deshalb ist das Wei noch nicht der Freundschaft fcihig es kennt nur die Liebe It is necessary to insist here on the not yet For it extends also to man Mann but first of all and once again to the brother of Zarathustra as the future of a question of an appeal or a promise of a plea or a prayer In the perforrnative mode of the apostrophe 39 There is not yet friendship wephave not yet begun to think I friendship But in a sort of mournful anticipation we can 5 already name the friendship that we still have not met We already think that we do not yet have access to it May we be able to do it that is the exclamation point the singular Z clamor of this wish Here is the O my friends there is no 39 friend of Zarathustra Woman is not yet capable of friend 3 ship But tell me you men who among you is capable of friendship There is cornradeship may there be friend ship Aber sagt mir iizr Manner war mm each ist demz fcihig Freundschaft Es gibt Kameradschaft mifge es Freundscimf quot39 gebenf 1980 473 1968 159 But as woman has not acceded to friendship because she p remains and this is love either slave or tyrant a friend quot Jacques Derrida 33 5 ship lo Come C mim1 5 750 signify for Zarathustra liberty equality fraternity The motto in short of a republic Or is he 158 to think 3 friendship which goes beyond this udeo Christian and philosophical history I teach on not th neighbor but the friend The friend should b to ou the festival of the earth and the anticipation of the Oveiman i teach you the friend and his overflowing heart 1s H ill 8139 931 Canonical meditations on friendship Cicero s D6 amlcifza MOI1ta1gne s De Z amiti Blanchot s L amit2I for eX3mPl belong to the experience of mourning to the mo ment of lossthat of the friend or of friendshipif through the irreplaceable element of the name they always advance into the testamentary shadow in order to entrust and refuse th d 6 Bath of the unique one to a universahzable discourse my friends there is no friend AristotleMontaigne But what has become of the friends Villon Wo aber sind die Freunde Holderlin if they thereby found and dgimbdize at the 531119 tim if because they menace them thpy restore a great number of oppositions singularunjver sa dpr1vatepublic familialfpolitical secretphenomenal etc 3 dpefhaps ail PPPOSIUOHS the relative invariance of this mo elifractures itself and opens itself onto its own abyss By Fet srning to all the motifs I have just sketched the morals an politics of friendship death the name fraternity etc by quot 3 1S1d I iI1s all the oppositions I would have liked 5 try to recognize two major ruptures in what one could as a giagtpg 1 golpvemence call the Izistmy of friendship but 3 Ce histo cit S lpk could make the most traditional concept of marked ga 39lt5 The GrecoRoman model appears to be ljst nitisy edvalule a reczproczty by hompiogical immanen reagdm hean tpo iticist concord Montaigne whom we are the magorit 61 h 9 eX3H1Pl 3 Ofa paradigm doubtless inherits there lnd gist t efe traits But he breaks with the reciprocity tmmcenden reet y Introduces it seems to me heterology by an insnitce disstlimmfuii and1li1i1my he surpassed me 110 wou 39 1 more P to an ess S is o S Courses which am1 lu1tY l135 l ft us on this S11b Ct seem to me to 39 be flat In comparison With my own feeling Shall We say that this fracture is judeoChristian Shall 385 Politics of Friendship we say that it depoliticizes the Greek model or that it displaces the nature of the political Can the same type of question be put regarding Nietzsche and Blanchotlother examples whet friendship should defy at once historicity and exemplarityl ln a different way to be sure boil 0311 the friend bl 3 name which is no longer that of the neighbor P 1 h3P3 1 10ng 3l that of a man Is it possible without making the IntIl1 lt315 0d an edifying and dogmatic humanism scream tod him at live the quiet rigor of friendship tile law Of le E E5 as the experience of a certain ahumanity beyond or 1 ore me dealings of gods and men and what politics cou onfe s found on this friendship Wl391ICll exceeds the measurelo Izgan without becoming a theologeme Will it still be a po itics So the who of friendship moves off into the distance beyond all these determinations In its infinite lII1H1lI1 I1C it exceeds even the interest in acquaintance kI10 l1ltquot3fdg Futh proximity up to life anclup to the memory o l e t is no yet an identi able l private or publ1C We must give up trying to know those to whom we aret linked by something essential by thls 1 man We 1 greet them in the relation with the unknown In W q they greet us as well in our distance Frien sh1pt ti 1 relation without dependence without episo e yet in 5 which all of the simplicity of life enters P35535 bl Wal of the recognition of the common strangeness that do not allow us to speak of our friends 1311 0111 to 5Pe to them not to make of them a topic of conversat10I1S I or articles but the movement of understanding in E I which speaking to us they reserve V 11f01 he 31 familiar terms an infinite distance the tin ainen separation on the basis of which what separates be 2 comes relation Here discretion is not in the simple t J refusal to put forward con dencesihowgvulgar the 1 would be even to think of it but it 15 the Interval the ure inteival that from me to this other who is a friend 9 measures all that is between us the interruption Of 39 l being that never authorizes me to use hunilor ktggm edge of him were it to praise him and w 1C 31 387 Jacques Derrida preventing all communication relates us to one another in the difference and sometimes the silence of speech At the death of the friend the intimeasure of the movement of dying the event of death reveals and effaces at the same time this truth of friendship not the deepening of the separation but its era sure not the widening of the caesura but its levelling and the dissipation of that void between us where for merly there developed the frankness of a relation with out history In such a way that at present what was close to us not only has ceased to approach but has lost even the truth of extreme distance We can in a word remember But thought knows that one does not remember without memory without thought it already struggles in the invisible where everything sinks back into indifference This is its profound grief It must accompany friendship into oblivion Blanchot 1971 326 30 The book bears as its epigraph these words from Georges Bataille friends even to that state of profound friendship where a man abandoned abandoned by all his friends meets up in life with the one who will accompany him beyond life himself without life capable of free friend ship detached from any ties 39 We should reread other writings by Blanchot for example the texts on communism or In communawf inavouable My hypothesis or my question would then to conclude provisionally for today take the following form is it possi ble whi1e assuming a certain faithful memory of democratic reason and of reason period I will even say of the Enlight enment of a certain Aufkliimng I leave open here the abyss which is still opening up today beneath these words not to found there where it is doubtless no longer a matter of founding but to open up to the future or rather to the Come of a certain democracy for democracy is to come 388 Politics of Friendship not only will it remain inde nitely perfectible hence always insuf cient and future but belonging to the time of the promise it will always remain in each of its future times to come even when there is democracy it never exists it is never present it remains an unpresentable concept to the come of a certain democracy that would no longer be an insult to the friendship we have tried to think beyond the homofraternal and phallogocentric schema When will we be ready for an experience of equality that would be a re spectful test of this friendship and that would at last he just just beyond justice as law that is measure tip to its immea sure 0 my democratic friends 24 rue des Bergeranettes 91 130 Rzls Orcmgis France References Aristotle I925 Nichomachean Ethics Trans by H Rackham Loeb Classical Editions Cambridge and London Harvard University Press and William Heineznann Aristotle 1952 Ezzdemian Ethics In I39reAtheniom Constitution Trans by H Rackharn 190481 Loeb Classical Editions Cambridge and London Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Aubenque Pierre 1963 Stul axniti chez Aristote In La prudence chez Aristore179 183 Paris Presses Universitaires de France Blanchot Maurice 1971 Ifamiti Paris Gallimard 1994 Friendship Trans by Elizabeth Rottenberg Stanford Stanford Uni versity Press forthcoming 1983 La communaut inaoouoble Paris Minuit 1988 The Uncwowczble Community Trans by Pierre oris Barrytown NY Station Hill Press Derrida Jacques 198721 Comment ne pas parler In Psyche Inventions do lirzutre 535595 Paris Galilee Budiclt and Wolfgang lser Trans by Ken Frieden 370 New York Columbia University Press 1985 Devant la loi In La fszcult dejuger Ed by jeanFrancois Lyotard et al 87139 Paris Minuit 1992 Before the Lawquot In Acts of literature Ed by Derek Attridge Trans by Avital Ronell and Christine Roulston 181200 New York Routledge 1987b Gerc2lecht difference sexuelle difference ontologiquequot Psyche In ventions do Fautre Paris Galilee 395414 415451 1983 Gescz ectt sexual difference ontological differencequot Trans by Reu ben Berezdivn Research in Pizenomenology 13 6583 1974 Glas Paris Galilee 1986 Glas Trans by john P Leavey r and Richard Rand Lincoln Uni versity of Nebraska Press 3989 How to Avoid Speakingquot In Languages ofrhe U nsayable Ed by Sanford Jacques Derrida 339 1987c La main d H d Paris Galilee 415451 61 egg Gmhmkt H P quot h 39 I quot 39 it awe 1937d GeschZeczt II Heidegger39s Hand quot In D Ed by John Saws l61196 Ch U I ecortsmtctwn and Phzlosophy i 368 gt3 13 hinges Paris oalilefago men Chicago Press 228 10 ence et metapbysiquequot L39 cn tm39e et la cifff rezzce Paris Seuil 117 1978 Violence and M ta h 39 39 J I W 39 39 Bass 791 3 Chicago IJ39IfiVCPI39SiiC ICf Clxllicagf Dyference Trans by Alan Dioggnes Lgerltiusr 1925 Aristotle Lives of the Eminent Philosophers Vol 1 of 2 d39f15iIarVa1d Loeb ClassicalEditions Cambridge and Lon ersrty Press and William IIememann Heidegger M3 5in 1931 1951 Vtndenken quot In Erlzfut pm H mngiglggth ii1l39OI1 79151 FrankfurtamMain Vingdifibgelgldgerdilgenrgm a ieFraewodiF d 39 Frcundschaf H wfmm Hjmfne e SIIdG1glsIi sS Vgese dgrvkunfngen Curd Ochwadt 166169 FrankfurtamMain Vittorio iii e an 32 Ed by 197921 Heraklit 1 Der Anfzmg dos b Lt3 I 3913971dz39 hgn Dmkgolzstgrn inp Lean vom Lagos Gesammusgabe Band 55 Ed 1 Manfred l 39 Heraklzrs am Ilg3 Vlfit o o Klostermann y mugs rankfun 9 39 1962 gdnglan ta B4 ltjit nMTubmgen Max Niemejfer Verla New York Harper and ow Y acquarne and Edward Robinson 1982b 1959 D39 quotS h 39 vv edition P mingen Gl ent ggq s r y Unterwegs zur 5397 aci2e Seventh 1971 Langua ein th P D Harm 157198 New e0derIrI1a1Prnn IeRV to Lil Euage Trans by Peter 1978 1951 flbe 39 d d yH edition Pf mngen GWnI1e1T 39es hg if lghyslk Vorzroge mid Au atze Fourth 1973 quotOvercomin M 3 h 3 I enss 3 so we we 39 39 39 3 50 yfWasiscdas diePhi1oso hi rm 1 39 b p e 1 mgual edition J T u mam v 0 N 0 0 3 Immanuel 1978 Die Metaphrsik der S tten Ed W39Ih 39 el W h 3ifg33i B7 l Cf8 taI zi391nltfurt mlziainz Suhrkamp Vierlagi em Edd Werkau I 26 M0 Egldg Egdversity I rgsS of on 39 Tmns by Mary Gr g quot Cambrldgei Cam 139chlquot39quot NieeBili IOct ql1i 1iia lZI afquot lamina Em B 1 Chquot 23 Pans Galhmard SC 6 39 ch mmwgabgl 15 B l9 p 1 ac zdZ Izrat zzitra Stojrzaitlltche Wzrrke Krzttsche tud B rl1iE91 5gV3r de Gruyten Y 810 0 land Mazzmo Montinan quotquot 39 us Spoke Zczmthustra In The Fort Erie 39 W3 2 Nzetzsche Ed and 1113 b fgg05E43EJNe3 pit vuung Press H5 Y 2 2 3quot ms Samliclze Werlze Kn39tzsche Stud 172153 3 zenausgabe 1986 Human All Too H T b h1riCiin1g2id1gelg quotersitY Press mm mm Y R L HOumgdale39 Cambndgei J 1 T C 39 Tee by George no on polttaque Trans by julien Freund Paris CalmannL vy
Are you sure you want to buy this material for
You're already Subscribed!
Looks like you've already subscribed to StudySoup, you won't need to purchase another subscription to get this material. To access this material simply click 'View Full Document'