Notes for Week of 3/3-3/9
Notes for Week of 3/3-3/9 10100-06
Popular in Introduction to Philosophy
Popular in PHIL-Philosophy
This 5 page Class Notes was uploaded by Zachary Kalik on Tuesday April 5, 2016. The Class Notes belongs to 10100-06 at Ithaca College taught by Dr. Theodore Korzukhin in Spring 2016. Since its upload, it has received 11 views. For similar materials see Introduction to Philosophy in PHIL-Philosophy at Ithaca College.
Reviews for Notes for Week of 3/3-3/9
Report this Material
What is Karma?
Karma is the currency of StudySoup.
Date Created: 04/05/16
Philosophy Notes for Week of 3/33/9 Topic: Knowledge (Side note: Brain in a vat refers to the idea in the Matrix, where people are in virtually created worlds that they perceive, and have perceived as the real world, but it actually is not. This concept is talked about alot by Calmers). Skeptics Argument (also what Moore (philosopher) would accept) 1. I don’t know x. 2. If I don’t know x, then I don’t know y. 3. I don’t know y. For Example: 1. I don’t know that I am not a BIV (Brain in a vat). 2. If I don’t know that I am not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands. 3. I don’t know that I have hands. In this argument, it is premise #2 which compresses the argument. In other words, premise #2 is what ties the argument together. Premise #2 can be contradicted when looking at concepts of Modus Ponens, and Modus Tollens. Modus Ponens 1. A 2. If A, then B 3. So B. For Example: 1. I have the key 2. If I have the key then I can unlock the door. 3. So, I can unlock the door. Then there’s the argument, which is essentially the inverse of Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens. Modus Tollens 1. Not A 2. If A then B 3. So, not B For Example 1. I cannot open the door 2. If I have the key then I can unlock the door. 3. So, I do not have the key. Both of these arguments are valid from a logical perspective. However, and argument being valid is not the same as an argument being sound. Validity when the conclusion consistently follows from the premises (it is impossible for it to be otherwise). Sound When an argument is valid AND all of its premises are true. Both are logically valid because being able to open the door or not directly correlates with whether you have the key or not, which makes sense. But Modus Tollens may not be sound because in Modus Tollens, it is directly stated that the reason one is not able to open the door is because they do not have the key, where there can be numerous reasons (barricade, someone’s holding the door closed, etc.) So in Modus Tolle’s, premise #3 isn’t necessarily true. In Modus Ponens, no such assumptions are made; so all the premises are true. Here is an example of how both of these concepts contradict premise #2 of the Skeptics argument. Example 1. I know I have hands (A) 2. If I don’t know that I don’t have hands, then I don’t know if I am in a BIV (if A then B, which when plugged into the skeptics argument of premise 2 would make this a triple negative, allowing the third premise to follow). 3. So I know I’m in a BIV Now I understand that the example I gave does seem to be similar to the Skeptics argument, but there is a key difference. This difference lies in the fact that in premise #2 of the skeptic’s argument, there is only a double negative, whereas in the above example, there is a triple negative. Because of these differences, if the example above stands as logically sound, then premise #2 of the skeptics argument would be false, and their argument would not be sound. The conclusion in #3 as a result would also be false. Whether either the skeptic’s argument, or the above example is logically sound is a matter of opinion. But assuming that the above example does apply, here’s what we know for right now about the skeptics argument: 1. I don’t know that I am not a BIV (Brain in a vat) 2. If I don’t know that I am not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands. (False) 3. I don’t know that I have hands (False). Dream Argument If one can know that dreams have occurred, then it stands to reason that one can tell the difference between what is real, and what is not real. However, Moore argues that people who believe that they can know when dreams have occurred are guilty of a logical inconsistency. Logical Inconsistency 1. He knows dreams have occurred 2. It follows that he does not know he is not dreaming. 3. So he does not know that dreams have occurred. Knowledge Transfer Argument 1. I know x 2. Y follows from x 3. I know (2). 4. Therefore I know y This argument is hard to debate, because its absurd to think that knowledge doesn’t transfer. Natick’s Argument Main Point: I know that p 1. P is true 2. I believe p 3. Were p false, I would not believe it. So consider this scenario: Main point: I am not a BIV (P) 1. P is true 2. I believe P 3. If I were a BIV, I would believe I am not a BIV. Because of condition 3, this would fail Nozicks previous conditions. In order to pass, one would have to not believe I am not a BIV Therefore, with these kinds of scenarios, when Nozicks argument fails, it proves that premise #1 of the skeptic’s argument is true. So by assuming this applies, here’s what we end up knowing about the skeptics argument: 1. I don’t know that I am not a BIV (Brain in a vat) (True) 2. If I don’t know that I am not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands. (False) 3. I don’t know that I have hands (False). Topic: Morality Divine Command Theory Action x is wrong if god commanded it. If this theory is true, then here is what follows: 2. X is right because god commanded it. This theory is not only controversial, but premise #1 and #2 of what follows are also conflicting claims (due to the placement of the word because).