In Exercises 2534, use the matrix capabilities of a graphing utility to find the inverse of the matrix (if it exists). 3212554122423511 1020
April 12, 2016 Indirect Rule: Colonialism and Postindependent Africa ● Sierra Leone and humanitarian crisis: ○ 1990s Revolutionary United Front used child soldiers to kill own parents ■ 1999 “Operation No Living Thing” in Freetown where people were killed and raped ○ Question, was this unique Has there been more humanitarian crisis in Africa ● Explaining the cause of Africa’s humanitarian crisis: ○ Robert D. Kaplan et a return to an older, primordial form of tribalism with modern weapons ○ NOT TRUE! tribals are organized, few tribal chiefs haveyrannize their fellowsrelatively egalitarian when compared to statelevel counterparts ● Another Explanation: ○ Colonialism and violence against indigenous populations ■ Leopold’s Belgian Congo ■ Coerced labor and economic extraction ■ Inhumane control or slaughter of local communities ○ Didn’t explain why African states are so weak ● Characters of brutal and weak stfailed states) ○ Failed to establish autholuntary compliance with the state’s wishes based on broad belief in government’s legitimacy ○ Used “despotic power” instead of “infrastructural power” to penetrate ● Fukuyama’s explanationindirect rule ○ Yes, colonialism has effect but more on indirect rule ○ Indirect rule: no direct presence of colonial government instead local ○ Term from Lord Frederick Lugards’ experience in Northern Nigeria and Hong Kong ■ Effort to expose European law and institutions oas rica w counterproductive instead better governed by local customs ■ Less European control, instead hierarchy with local chiefs ■ Had bureaucracy and centralized, not as hard due to long history of islam ○ Lugard’ use of customary laws in Northern Nigeria ○ Why “every African belonged to a tribe” didn’t work well in other parts ■ Tribal identities overlao single central chief ■ Multiple sources of identities ● Mahmood Mamdani’s critique of indirect rule: ○ Decentralized despotism ○ Tax collection by coercaise revenue and forced labor for European agriculture ○ Converting customary land tenure into modern property right ■ Create “big man” ■ Tribal chief = European feudal lord ● Modification of the effect of indirect rule: ○ The colonial authorities were able to impose their wishes in cehile age, w Africans resisted it ○ Compared to New World, Africa did not get as influenced by European institution ● Colonialism (French way) ○ Direct Rule ■ Belief in Roman law ● Direct rule didn’t make a difference because LIMITED RESOURCES and knowledge given ○ Local communities as agents of French states without traditions legitimacy ○ No direct path for Africans to be French citizen; failure in recruitment and development of good governance April 14, 2016 Tribe or Nation Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya and Tanzania ● It is easierbuild nationstate when you have a homogenous society ○ Ex: Japan ● Why ethnicity matters ○ Peruvian microcredgroups have higher loan default rates when members are from different cultural background ■ Microcredit loan for people in developing nations to help with building a business, no collateral ○ US municipalities wiigher levels of diversity raise less funding for public schools ○ Rural Kenyan communities witreater ethnolinguistic diversity have considerably less primary school funding, horse school facilities and maintenance of water wells ● Why ethnic diversity is bad for collective action ○ Taste expectations: ■ Individuals from different ethnic grefer distinct type of public goods and leads to less consensus on what to fund ■ Individualrefer to fund things that help own group ■ Fail to explain how to improve this ○ Social sanctions in sustaining collective action ■ If society has social sanctions to prevent the disorganization of funding ■ Social sanctionsublic policies that promote interaction, the sharing of information and coordinating across groups may decrease inefficiencies due to diversity a. Sharing information helps understand other groups ■ Powersharing across groups within government a. Some countries give veto to minorities or delegate number of seats in legislature b. This fails to solve crucial ethnic conflicmay collapse) ■ Within group policing or elite coordination ■ Doesn’t explain how coordination was created in first place ● Nation building and political socialization: ○ Through mass media and education system,olitical leadership can implant citizens with “desirable” politicalncluding a strong attachment to nation over ethnic or regional identities ○ Imagined communities:using things reate national identity ■ Mass media has huge influence ■ Urban USA survey vs rural USA survey shows that urban feel more “American” ○ Possible explanation for tastes ○ Investment in social capiow much you trust each other ● Kenya vs Tanzania: ○ They sharesimilar geography, history and ethnic diversity but have different nationbuilding policies ■ Provide a good natural experiment ■ Looked at Kenyan town of Busia and Tanzanian town of Meatu ○ Similar ethnic compositimajor ethnic (7580% of whole minority is about 25%) ■ Very common and dangerous population make up ○ Similainterethnic relations/conflict in precolonial times ○ Swahili not main language and none of dominant groups involved in national politics ■ Local groups don’t get political resource because not in national politics ○ Community members lead funding of public goods ■ Community have to do it, not government ○ Identical response in survey on political and citizenship issues ● Differences: ○ National Language policy: ■ Tanzania’s swahilization of governmeake universal use of Kiswahili ■ Kenya has english, Swahili and others ○ Public School Curriculum: ■ Tanzania: political education is key a. Starts early so covers most of the population ■ Kenya: official geography, history and civics not until after 5th grade a. Big percentage of the population has dropped out before learning this information ○ Local government institutions: ■ Tanzania: village/district council is key to local organizations ■ Kenya: colonial style, depend on tribe chiefs ○ Leadership: ■ Tanzania: Nyerere (first president) fgainst tribalism and building a national identity ■ Kenya: Kenyatta and Moi were both tribal leaders, contributed to ethnic militia ○ Regional distribution of central government resources: ■ Tanzania: equitable regional distribution of publicn education, health and infrastructure since 60s ■ Kenya: distribution HEAVILY favored Kikuyu ● Research design: ○ Compare and examine how ethnic diversity affects Busia’s and Meatu’s school funding, school infrastructure quality and well maintenance ■ Well maintance connected to school funding ○ Take into account control variasuch as income level and religion) ● Results: ○ Quantitative: ■ Busia ethnic diversity and local provision of public goods have NEGATIVE relation ■ Meatu ethnic diversity and local provision of public goods have NO SIGNIFICANT relation a. Actually have positive relation between desk per pupil and public fund ○ What does it tell us ■ Not ethnic that causes problems but government failure a. If they make effort to build national identity, ethnic division is NOT BAD ○ Qualitative: Interview ■ Busia ethnic rivalry over school ownership a key challenge of school fundraising a. No classroom built, classes took place under tree b. Sanctions not working welln ethnic diverse areas ■ Meatu ethnic divisions were MINIMAL in study district a. “This is Tanzania, we do not have that sort of problems” b. Ethnic “us vs them” is illegitimate ● Questions: ○ When is nation building a politically possible task When is it not ■ Leadership is very important, Kenya more affected by colonial system by Britain so chiefs are more important ■ Relations between politics, social elites and ethnic diversity ○ What’s the catch ■ Local culture and customs get wiped out, conflict can break out in result, brutal nationbuilding leads to conflict